Seminario de Especialización en Derecho y Economía Segundo Semestre de 2013 Programa y Bibliografía Los mensajes deben ser cursados a Metodhodology@gruposyahoo.com.ar Bibliografía general Bour [1]: Enrique Bour, Derecho y Economía - Lecturas de Grandes Contribuciones, 2012. IMF [1]: International Monetary Fund, Public Private Partnerships, Approved by Teresa Ter-Minassian, March 12, 2004. Posner [1]: Richard A. Posner, 2011 (8th ed.), Economic Analysis of Law, Aspen Publishers. McQ-S [1]: Ronald W. McQuaid and Walter Scherrer, Public Private Partnership in the European Union: Experiences in the UK, Germany and Austria, Uprava, letnik VI, 2/2008. Enc LE [1]: Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, General Editors: Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest, Publishers Edward Elgar and the University of Ghent, Copyright 1996-2000 Bouckaert and De Gest. CooterUlen [1]: Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Introduction to Law and Economics, 3rd edition, 2000. 1. Orden espontáneo, Información y Conocimiento. Hayek y el problema del conocimiento. Gobernabilidad y modelos de organización flexible. Socialismo de mercado y dictadura. Bour [1], Cap. 14. Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: A new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy, Vol. 1 Rules and Order, 1973. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, The American Economic Review, XXXV, No. 4. pp. 519-30, September, 1945. Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption, Atlantic Monthly; May 1999 (traducción). Amy J. Cohen, Governance Legalism: Hayek and Sabel on Reason and Rules, Organization and Law, 2010. Bruce Caldwell, The Publication History of The Road to Serfdom, Introduction to The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Chicago, 2007. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Pretence of Knowledge, Lecture to the memory of Alfred Nobel, December 1974. Petter Boettke, Hayek, Arrow, and the Problems of Democratic Decision-Making, Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, Vol. XX, 2002. 2. Instituciones y Estado. Cooperación y Conflicto en la Economía. Análisis de Procesos de Asignación de Recursos. La Nueva Economía Institucional. La Corrupción Política. Bour [1], Cap. 11. Pranab Bardhan, Scarcity, Conflicts and Cooperation: Essays in Political and Institutional Economics of Development (MIT Press, 2004), Chapter 1 (traducción). Enrique Bour, Introducción a la Economía de las Instituciones. Enrique Bour, Apuntes sobre de Jasay, The State. Leonid Hurwicz, The design of mechanisms for resource allocation, The American Economic Review, Vol. 63, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the 85th Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1973). Daniel McFadden, The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacques Laffont, From the issue entitled "Special Issue - In Honor of Leonid Hurwicz: Part I", Review of Economic Design, Volume 13, Numbers 1-2, 77-100, 2009. Leonid Hurwicz, But Who Will Guard the Guardians? American Economic Review, June 1998, 98(3): 577–85. 3. Public Choice. Justicia, Derecho y teoría de los juegos. Teorema de Coase, su relevancia, Aspectos positivos y normativos de la Elección Pública. Teoría de la Justicia de Rawls. Bour [1], Cap. 18-19 y 9. Leonid Hurwicz, What is the Coase Theorem? Japan and the World Economy 7 (1995) 49-74. Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice: A Survey, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Jun., 1976), pp. 395-433. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1999, Oxford University Press. José Francisco Caballero, La Teoría de la Justicia de John Rawls, Iberoforum, Otoño, núm. II, año I, 2006. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy [1962] Foreword by Robert D. Tollison (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999). 4. Normas. Jon Elster, Social Norms and Economic Theory, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3 (4) (1989), traducción. Richard H. McAdams and Eric B. Rasmusen, Norms in Law and Economics, 2004. Remo F. Entelman, El Conflicto: Dilema para Abogados, Dic. 1 1997, Suplemento Resolución de Conflictos (R.C.) de La Ley. Ofer H. Azar, What Sustains Social Norms and How They Evolve? The Case of Tipping, SSRN, Working Paper, April 2003. Anastassios Karayiannis y Aristides N. Hatzis, Morality, Social Norms and Rule of Law as Transaction Cost-Saving Devices: The Case of Ancient Athens, SSRN, July 2007. Francesco Parisi and Georg Von Wangenheim, Legislation and Countervailing Effects from Social Norms, in The Evolution and Design of Institutions, C. Schubert and G. Von Wangenheim, eds., Routledge, 2006. 5. Mercados y Contratos. Axel Leijonhufvud, Capitalism and the Factory System, in Economic as a Process: Essays in the New Institutional Economics (Edited by R.N. Langlois), New York, 1986. Steven N. S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. XXVI (1), April 1983. Daniel L. Rubinstein y Robert Cooter, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and their Resolution, Journal of Economic Literature, Sept. 1989, pp. 1067-1097. Steven Shavell, On the Writing and the Interpretation of Contracts, The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 22, No. 2 (January 2006). Ian Ayres y Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L.J. 729 (1991-1992). Alfredo Garcia, James D. Reitzes, y Juan Benavides, Incentive Contracts for Infrastructure, Litigation and Weak Institutions, Journal of Regulatory Economics; 27:1 5–24, 2005. Steven N. S. Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Apr., 1970), pp. 49-70. David D. Friedman, An Economic Analysis of Alternative Damage Rules for Breach of Contract, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. XXXII, October 1989. Enrique Bour, Crisis Financieras y Enfoques Complejos, Mayo 2011. 6. Sistemas Capitalista y Socialista. ¿Hay alternativas? El sistema socialista centralizado. El sistema socialista descentralizado. El sistema capitalista. Distribución de los Riesgos Colectivos y Apertura a la Globalización: el Modelo Nórdico. Bour [1], Cap.6-7. John E. Roemer, Socialism, New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, January 5, 2005 (traducción) Hernando de Soto, The Mistery of Capital – Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere else, Black Swan edition, 2001. George Reisman, Capitalism, A Treatise on Economics, Jameson Books, Ottawa, Illinois, copyright 1998, 1996, 1990. Richard A. Epstein and M. Todd Henderson, Marking to Market: Can Accounting Rules Shake the Foundations of Capitalism, Law and Economics Working Papers, Chicago Law School, April 2009. János Kornai, What the Change from Socialism to Capitalism Does and Does not Mean, Journal of Economic Perspectives-Volume 14, Number I-Winter 2000 (traducción). Torben M. Andersen, Bengt Holmström, Seppo Honkapohja, Sixten Korkman, Hans Tson Söderström, and Juhana Vartiainen, The Nordic Model - Embracing globalization and sharing risks, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA), Helsinki, 2007. 7. Regulación: Funciones, Razones, Instituciones. Importancia de su Diseño. Anthony Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory: Oxford. Clarendon Press: The Clarendon Law Series. Pp. Xv, 355. 1994. FIEL, La Regulación de la competencia y de los servicios públicos - teoría y experiencia reciente, 1998: Cap. 1-2. IERAL, Las Regulaciones en Argentina, Trabajo presentado en la Reunión Anual de la Asociación de Bancos de Argentina, 1999. Asian Development Bank, Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Handbook, September 2008. 8. Asociaciones Público-Privadas. IMF [1]. McQ-S [1]. Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole, Public-Private Partnerships and Government Spending Limits, March 2008, International Journal of Industrial Organization. Antonio Estache and Tomás Serebrisky, Where Do We Stand on Transport Infrastructure Deregulation and Public-Private Partnership?, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3356, July 2004. Eduardo Engel, Ronald Fischer and Alexander Galetovic, The Basic Public Finance of Public-Private Partnerships, July 2007, Revised February 2008, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper. The World Bank Group, Public-Private Partnerships in Education, 2009. 2 9. Características Diferenciales entre Asociación Público-Privada, Concesión y Privatización como Instrumentos Regulatorios. IMF [1]. McQ-S [1]. J. Luis Guasch, Jean-Jacques Laffont and Stéphane Straub, Infrastructure concessions in Latin America: government-led renegotiations, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 2005. Klaus M. Schmidt, The political economy of mass privatization and the risk of expropriation, European Economic Review, Volume 44, Issue 2, February 2000, Pages 393-421. John Vickers and George Yarrow, Economic Perspectives on Privatization, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, Issue 2 (Spring, 1991), 111-132. Sunita Kikeri and John Nellis, An Assessment of Privatization, World Bank Res. Obs. (2004) 19 (1): 87-118. 10. La Asociación Público-Privada como Medio de Transferencia de Funciones del Sector Público al Sector Privado. IMF [1]. William L. Megginson and Jeffry M. Netter, From State To Market: A Survey Of Empirical Studies On Privatization, Journal of Economic Literature (June 2001). William J. Baumol, On the Perils of Privatization, Eastern Economic Journal, 19, 4, Fall 1993. 11. La Asociación Público-Privada Como Medio de Transferencia de los Riesgos Contractuales del Sector Público al Sector Privado. Richard A. Posner, El Análisis Económico del Derecho en el Common-Law, en el Sistema Romano-Germánico, y en las Naciones en Desarrollo, Revista de Economía y Derecho, 2, 7 (Invierno 2005). Posner [1]. George G. Triantis, Unforeseen Contingencies. Risk Allocation in Contracts, Enc LE [1]. CooterUlen [1], Chapter 6: An Economic Theory of Contract. International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Risks: Sources, Disclosure, and Management, Fiscal Affairs Department, 2008. José Antonio Trujillo del Valle, Financiación de infraestructuras. Los riesgos y su mitigación, Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, Enero de 2004. 12. Criterio de Asignación de los Riesgos Contractuales. Propuesta del Análisis Económico del Derecho. Posner [1]. Laure Athias, Political Accountability, Incentives, and Contractual Design of Public Private Partnerships: Demand Risk on Private Providers or Public Authorities?, International Society for New Institutional Economics, 2008. 13. Formas Jurídico-Administrativas de las PPP. Fortalezas y Debilidades. IMF [1]. McQ-S [1]. 3