This study contains the story of an encounter between the

This study containsthe story of an encounter between the International Labour Organization
(DID) and three Latin h e r i m countries. The question is addressed how the
has w e s e d
&the trade union situation in Chile, Colombia and Mexico.
Olle of the main assumptions is that relatiomhips between the state m d the labour moement in Latin American countries have been close. This situation has darnrnaged the free
functioning of labour .unions and has put labour rights in jeopardy.
The choice of the three countries has been made on the basis of certdn differences in,
govementalplcplicies towards the laborur movement. In literature on Iatin American labour
politics a distinction is aften made between repression and control. Repression ensues from
overt conflicts between the authorities and am autonomous and militant labour movement.
Grave violations of labour rights and other fundamental human rights are often embedded
in and even justified by the National Security-Doctrine.The labour pollicy of the Pinochetregme isr Chile provides a classic example. In the case of control, on the other hand, seemingly
harnaanious relations between labour and the authorities prevail. Close cooperation reflects
mutual interests "but at the same dime conceals the fact that the labour movement lacks independence and is a continuation of economic policy. Clrganiaagional linkages between one
or more labour confedemdons and the government party and huge social gaps between labour
leaders and the rank-and-file are typical of control patterns. In Latin America the labour
situation in Mexico best matches the above description. The situatian in Colombia presents
an interesting example-in-between:after havingacquiesced i nastate-imposed organizational
stmmre, the labour movement gradually radicalized and consequently faced irrcreairrg repression.
For the purpose of this study these sketchy typologies are taken as a frame of reference.
Wether these patterns of repression and control can be discerned in IUI-case law3 is the
pivotal question of my investigations. The core hypothesis underlying this research is that
it is likely tbat the ILO has no problems in detecting repression as a (grave) violation of tradeunion rights, whereas control measures could easily escape the attention of the IH-IO.
Chapter1 starts with a general introduction on the LO-standards and supervisory. naechmisms
in the field of trade union freedom. Next, the intricate question of universality of human
rights is extensively discussed. The main conclusion of this section is that, ]in the opinion of
union rights i n d d haw universal! didi'ly in that manner that n3Sp@ctfor
the Il.0,
trade union ripha should be jwdged in each coulntq dong the same yard-stick. This is a v e q
important starting-point for the rest of our shldy as it means that ueuses for infractions of
trade union rights on political loia socisrl/emnomic $rounds dl1 noit be accepted.
In order to get a clear picture of the general wessrnent by the Il.0 of repredon and control,
in the next sectiom tzlasle instmen%$are seleded which maybe cornidlered as more or less
emmplary.br reprmion ar contrd sit~at:i!oim.
From the d y r i s dW-erase law, it hkenbtively concluded that f a d control measures - such as obligatory arbitration p r w h r e s or Begsully
i o d stmdures - are mqdvocally qualified a infractions of IECT-standark
in the field of trde-union freedom.
ma question why b t i n h e d c a n labour unions have come to be involved in politics is the
subject ofCkq~ter2.Crucial to the undentmding of this phenomenon, atIleas%in the opinion
of the author, is the rise of natioml-ppulist governen& in the thirties, in reaction to internatianal clevelopments, i n search of political Begitimag these governments courted labour. On
the other hand, labour unions were in dire need of state protection, a%their bargaining psitian
vis a vis employers was generally weak in view of a tight labour market. Furthermore, there
w s a oertah logic in raising wages gradually: the "easy"phase of Impfl-Subtihtion-Industuializaaion required the broadening of the internal market.
fnmwistencies in the economic policies and new international developments after World
War lI - aspccidly the rise of Multi Wationd Corlparatim - caused the decline of the nationalpopulist governments. In the major industrial countries of Latin America the military took
power and paved the way for the so called Bureaumatic-Au&oritarian State. h h u r militancy
was totally incompatible with the new economic policy and the authoritarian regimes tried
to crush the social and political power of labour by repressive measures.
Mer the restoration of democrag in the eighties, labour's involvement in national politics
has; continued, as is shown by the Labour Pacts between the trade union movement and the
authonitie~.However, there are signs that the labour movement is gradually gaining more
independence,
C/#upter3deals with the 1LO-reactionon the labour politics ofthe Pinochet-regime in Chile
from 1973 until 19901. The initid harshness of lal>ourrepression is explained by the militant
and autonomous character which labour in Chile has developed overtime. This militancy
can be attributed to the primal .importanceof the mining sector within the Chilean economy.
The eqeriences of nitrate and coppewnrkers have strengthened their class-caunsciousness,
have Ied to a preference for left-wing politicail parties and have made them insensitive to
co-opting attempts by corporatist and populist gavernnlents.
The Coimp of 11 september 1973 has induced the 1LiO to the establishment of a Fact
Rnding and Conciliadon Commission on the Trade Union situation in Chile*The Commission
has vehemently disapproved of repressive measures towards labour, such as dissollution of
trade unions, dismisd of trade union leaders, detention without trial, tomm, '~isappeahe17lces"
and aemdaas. After 19'76 repression slightly relaxed. However, restdctions of labom rights
were fonnajhedby the sa called Zabour Plm (1979) which was drafted by the nuthadties
in order Po f l E i ~ m i zthe interference of organized labout with the free hnctioning of the
market. The Committee on Freedom of Association has been critical on the b b o u t Plan
and its applicatbn. h particular 1%has criticized the severe restdctions ion the right to s&ike,
One remwkable feature of the ll0-case law in connection with Chile is the rejacdon of h e
goverments" contentian that repressive measures were justified as a reacdon to political
"tzesspasesdng" by the labour movement. The Committee exposed the trmvarant alibi by
emphasizing that politics, within certain limits, belong to the scope of t r d e union actividiles.
The appraisal by the TCO of the trade union situation in Galomlbja is examined in daoer
detail in chapter4. Whereas the face of the Chilean labour movement is determined in g e a t
deal by the experiences of nitrate- and coppeworkers, the origins of the labour movement
in Colombia a n be traced to the fate of workers in the coffee-zone. Small peasants became
mmive1y involved In the struggle for Ithe land and this fostered a specific attitude. Generally
kdividudistic and mmemtive-minded, the coffeeworkers were not susceptible to tbe appeals
of the political left and the labour movement who naturally advocated collective action. Trade
unions made some headway in foreign-owned export enclaves, but generally remained weak,
During the thirtjes the labour movement flourished under the slzelter of the Liberal Party
and cancentrated on "polliticd bargaining'"e. decline of the Liberal Party after World Was
;[lC left the l a h u r movement weak and divided. New labour legislation procured the atomisation
of the labour movement, as it prescribed that colllective bargaining could only be conducted
at the level of the enterprise. The ILO has criticized this legislation, as it takes the view that
it should be left to the paskies to decide at which level collective bargaining should take place.
Furthemore, the Il.0 has rejected legal provisions which allow (for) extensive state interEerenre in labour matters, such as mandatory arbitration in case of labour disputes.
llwing the seventies, in the face of economic recession, trade unions gradually radicalized
and started to join forces in order to confront bath employers and authorides. The government.
reacted with mcrderate repression, especially after the general strike of 1977, This repression
w the prelude to a general deterioration of the human rights situation and an erosion of
the d e of law. lncreminglyworkers and labour leaders were harassed by narcotic traffickers,
death squads md guerrilla's. The iwolwernent of the authorities in these human righb dolatiam
is a matter af controversy, Man-GovernmentaE-Organizarions in the fjeld of human rights
M well as the WN-Working Group on Disapperanccs have pointed to the close relations
between the death squads and the military or security police. The 1L.D on the other hand,
dthough admitting that isolated cases of offjcial involvement do exist, maintains that meither
the m y , nor the security police as such can be held responsibie for massive violations of
human rights.
The pattern of ~elatiansbetween labour and the state in Mexico - the subject of Chapter
5 -has been highly influenced by the Mexican Revolution ( 3 910-1917). From the start, labour
formedpart of aha reva8utiamry fadBy. The mrdM relations bemeen the Iabaus movement
a d the revelubioq g w e m e n t were a%cialJy mmobmkd by the o
ment of the lwglesr codedesaGon CTM and the govemenml party PRI in 1936.
Espeddly during the fifties and sixties, eanontic growth was prapelled by the effective
oontr01 orf the labour mlawement. Partly thki control was realized by a system d Conxciliadoa
a d kbitration (bards) whi~ehprovided for metimJa3us arrmgnernena rslF work disputes in
order $0avdd stdkes. But tha authorities also relied on indirect control: infsnmousi labux
ledem (the "charros'q were lavishly rewmded for r e e n g the wage ddm of the d - w d ale. E3rufig the ei@ties labour u&ons in the ~tpa@dc
s e d o slamded
~
xd wesesting themselves
from the tight pip of the government. However, lack of independence from the state remains
a remarkable feature of the Mexican labour movement.
If we ~ s u m l that
e state control over labour siw'fias m infaaion af trade union liberty7
it is quita striking that these Mexican corurr~lpatterns have hardly surfwed in ILO-case law.
One obvious eqlamtion might be that workers who are, effeaively ~onbr0Pedlare reluctant
to submit manplaints to the ILQ, in fear af repriesion, Furthermore, to: a large extent Mexim
labour legislation as such is not in contravention of ILO-standardsin the field of trade union
freedom; it ody offers possibilities of Infringements. Although these explanations undoubtedly
have some validityBin the opinion of the author there is a third reaon. One quite effective
instrument of control is the clersed shop-provision: in order TOget a job, workers are required
to be a member of a particular union. Rebellion or the mere: threat of leaving the union in
order lojoin anotl~ermay occasion expulsion &om the union and (hence) dismissal. The ELOI,
however, does not consider such closed shop provisions a violation of the workerskight to
join orgganimtions of their own choosing, a right which is guaranteed in article 2 of [LO-Convention No. 8'7.
Finally, in Chapter 6 a more thematic approach is followed in analysing the results of the
investigations. It is submitted that the initial hypothesis, advanced in the introduction of this
study, is toa simpljstie and needs further qudification. Especially the findings in the Colombiacase give rise to ae%)"ust
our suppolsitions. On the lane hand, the ILO seems perfectly capable
of qualibing formal contralrneasures as a violation iof Labolarr rights. Oln the other hand the
1L.D is faced with serious difficulties in case of "informal'~tepressionwhere the involvement
of state-sponsored agencies is hard to assess.
In four separate sections reasons are advanced which might account for the IEOQ"predicamen%".The first concerns the ILO-view on political strikes. Investigations reveal that the
ILO employs different standards in different cases as to the admissibility of political strikes.
The daring suggestion.is made that the ILO tends to be mare lenient towards politicdl strikes
if they are aimed at a repressive government. This position however, would mean a radical
departure from the HLQ-view on universality and would shield states such as Mexico where
more covert forms d labour-domination Elre excerted, from criticism. On further conrsideratilan
this supposition seems unwarranted: overtime the ILO. hsls changed its view in that it has
extended the pûssiblirtpes of pllitid stnkes. There are nia indiadom that the i
U3&s&"u,ishm
betwrean states m the bais of dernomatic quality.
In the next section the question is addressed whether the supervlsory on;gm off the Pb.0
show reluctimce in Çnfficizlngjudicial decisionsi, n i e proposition stems from the fact ithet the
ILO attaches great value to judicial involvement in case of conflicts betweeni labour m d the
aiutholrities. However, judicial renwiew may be pointless if judges are bound ta apply national
law which is mot in confoumitywith international labour standards. The investigationsdo not
confirrn this f e u . The ElYOi systematically rrejects contentions by goverments especially the
MeAcan governent - that international orgainizatiens are not allowed ta cdticixe jjudiclal
de&hm. n i e superwisory organs have laken cognirmce of judicid decisioins and have P L d I y
made criticai remarks if the application of national law amouritedl to aviolation of1CO-standauds.
The fihiad section deais with the b u e off Inade union mon8sm versus trade nnloni pluralism.
The Mexico-case hm demonstrated that the government's indirect control over labour il;
effectively perpetuiated due to the fact that the 'bfficiai" labour movement enjoys a virtual
monapoly. This rnonopoly is not irnposed by law (with the exception of the public sector),
but is the result of widely pracftised union security clauses.
The Ilil)i-smdpoht on tmde union monism is amblvdent. Whereas trade union monoplies Znstihted or maintained by legislation are çonsidered ta be in conflict with trade union
freedom,faaual situationswhlch rnight be the reswlt of elosed shop-provisionsare condoned.
En this study the view is taken that this dogrnatic distinction may be untenable in view of
the fact that closed shop-provisions in practise impede the free choice olworkers to jain the
organizaitiaini of dheir own choasing.
-
Whereats the previolis sections have searched for possible explanations for the diflriculties
whieh the IL0 faces as regards the assessment of unoffifficial control, in the last section the
emphasis shifts ta unofficial repression. Alluding to the Colombia-case,the discussion starts
from the premiise that large discrepancies in the imarion of aparticwlnr trade union situation
are unidesirable inview of the c o m o n effort to irnprove the situation of human rights. The
disparate opinions of the I L 0 and some NOCI%s regards the situation in Calornbia are
attributed to differences in characteu and aims which are reflected in Cliffercint methods of
fact-finding. The question is raised whether the ILO-assessrnent of the traie'le union situation
in Chlombia is mot overcautious in relying tao much on govermental information. Hesitaliom
are expressed about the suitability of informal "Direct Contacts"-procedures to shed a light
on çomplex and obscure tuade union sibations, swch as that iar Colombia. The pracedure
of the Fact Finding and Conciliatio~nCommission on Freedom of Associadon provides for
quite thorou& hvestigations and 'buthe spot" vîsirs. As this procedure offers extensive pussibilitiles to gatheu information from NGO-sources anid hence rnlght contribute ln obtaining a
more balanced Yiew, a more frequenit use of the Fact Finding and Conciliation Gommissioin
Is recommended.
En el piresenite mtudlto se narra la historia de un enwentro entre Irl Oqaaizacidn Entesniaciad
del Trabajo (OU]y tses paises btinoamericanos. la cuestibn central es la açritud de la
OIT ante Ia situacidn de los sindicatos en Chile, Co~lombiay México.
Una de las tesis principales que aquf se reçogen es que en h é r i c a h t i n a el Estado
ha mantenido una estrecha relaci6n con el movimiento laboral, lo que ha perjudicado el
iibre fnincionamiento de los slndicatos y ha arneruazado el ejercicio de los derechos de los
uabajadrsres.
elecddn de las palses mencionados se basa en determinadas dlferençiasen la respectiva
polltica pbemamental en rellacibn con el movimiento obrero. Los escritores que tratan Na
polltica labord en AmtLniiço.Latina suelen distinguir encre los canceptoç de represidn y mntrol.
La represidn es consemencia de confiidos mdfiestos entre las autoridades y los rnovimientoç
sindiades independientes y militantes. Bajo la doctrina de la "seguridadnacionai" con fremencia se mbren, e lnclwso se justificaq graves violaciones de los deaechos labordes y otms derechos
humanos. El régimen de Pinochet en Chile es un ejemplo clasico. En la sltuacibn de controll,
sin embargo, impera wna aparente relaci6n de armania entre trabajadores y autoridades.
La estrechaco3aboracibn existente es reflejo de los mutuos intereses, pero encubre a1 mismo
ciempo la falta de independencia del niovinaienta sindical y sui condicidn de prolongacidn
de lagoEith e m n 6 ~ c gubemamental.
a
A p n a s manjfestaçBçrnescarackrfstiw de la sikuaci6n
de mntrol son los Yrfnculos organinativos entre un%o rnh cconfederaçianes Iaborales y el
gabierno y 'lasenormes diferenciaias sociales entre Bos Ildenes sindicales y los miembros de
base, Clara ejemplo de esta situacibn es el cas0 de México. C!olombia, por su parte, presenta
ma interesante copntuza intemedia. Tras haber axreptado una esbruçlura.irnpuedzl por el
Estdo, el rnowniento siridid se ha ido radiulhndo palilatinamante para awbar acerchdose
a una situaci611de represibn.
A los efectos del presente estudio se ha tomado cesrno marco de referencia Ya tipologla
que brevemente se acaba de expaner. El tema. central de mi investigaciijn consiste en ver
hasta cpé punto estas manifestaciones de represibn y contra1 se aeflejan en la jurisprudencia
de ]la OFli: El estudio parte de la hipdtesis de que para la OIT no es diffcil constatar situadones
de represibn,colnsidergnddascomo (graves)violaciones de los derechos sindicales,al tiempo
las medidas de control poddan escapar f6dilmente a la atencidn de la OIT.
1"1 e ~ l & I o1 wdena;a icon una h t m d u d b n general en la que se t m m los c-smdm& y
de rxlntrol de la O R en materia de WMad siridid. A eonhua"nhnise discute
& m e n & el prablem de la u n i v e d m de los dermhm b m o s . hprin.cippal mnclm1si6n
ss que, a juicio de !an OIT, los dereçhoç sindides poseen cîert;unente validez universal, en
el sentldo de que el raspeto de dichos derechos deberfa ser jusg-ido en todos los p&s de
m e r d o con lafi misrna8 par!t;$rnetros.Es bste hm punto de partidai Importante para el resta
del estudio, puiesto que habran de considersrseinacjepbbles l a e x w presentda contra!
Isis violacionles de Bos darechos sindieales y que se basen en argumentos sstlciaeclrnbdms.
Para dquidr .lahagen fiel de la valoracibn genead de la OIT respcto de las situaciones
de represibn y control, se selemionan aquelllos instrumentos que, en mayar O menor grado,
pueden considerar~erepresentativos de dichas;situaciones. El mJialisis de la jurispmdencia
de lai OIT fionduce a u m primera conclucli6rn provisional, segm la mal 1% asedidas foraales
de control - tales mrno la! prescdpcibn de promdimientos de arbitraje a la Pmposicihn legal
de estructuras orgaf3ijaatîvrrs - deben ser caliEimd~15sin ningih g6nero de daidas oomo yiolaciones de los estaradards de la OIT en rnaterîa de libestad sindical.
En el c q M o 2 se andiza el proceso que ha conducido a la inrervenicibn adva del mowimienti
sindical latinomericaino en la poliitica El autor estima que Pa chva: de dicho proceso se
encuentra en el surgimientoen los &os rreinta de goblernos nadonal-popukta, como reamibn
a determinados acontecimientas internacionales. Estos gobiernos procuraron aproximarse
d movinniento sindiai en busça de legitimaicibn politica. Por su parte, dach su posicidn negociadorai generalmante débil respecta de la patronal a causai del restringido mercado de trabaijo,
Um sindiatos pneçisaban del apqo estatd- rridemh, el paulatino inicremento salarialno mecfa
de sentédo: la 'Isencilla"fase de impxrrtacidn-sustiUcibn-indu~a1izacinrequetla el emnche
del meamdo interior.
El declive de 1% gabiernos nacional-ppuljstas se produjo corno conseouenda de diversas
incongrueincias en, las pollticas econ6micas asi corno de cierdos desarrollos internacionales
en açpecid el surimienta de lm complrnfas mmr~lliniaciondes- tras la Segunda Guenra Mundial.
En los palsies altamente indl~strializahde h k r i c a Latina los militares se hiciaxon con el
padar, prepamdo el carnino parsi lo que habrka de llagar a çer el Ilmado Estado burocrfiticoautaritario. La rnilitmcia sindical era completamente incompatible con la nueva politica
econ6mica, par Io que los reglmenes autoritarios tratarcsni de reprimlr el poder p~lîticoy
social de los sindicaros.
La restavracibn deinocxfitica de los ochenta no ha puesto fin a Ba intewenabn polltica
de las sirrdimtos, ral y corno demuestran los convenios laborailes celebrados entre sindicatos
y ek poder polltico. No obstante, se pereiben alg~inosindicios de cambio hacia imna mayor
independencia sindical.
-
El cr;ipIfdo3 maliza la reaccibn de la OIT frente a la polrticalsiboral del dgimen del general
Finachet entre 1973 y 19910. Za durem de la represibn!sindical en los comienzos del ritEgimen
se exprlim par el carficrier militante e iindependiante Iradiciciand del movimiento sindical dileno.
principal de esta rnilitr$rmdadelx
en Ia h p r E a n ~ capital
a
del sitoictar minera
para la c a n a d a chigena. Las egedaacias sufrida~par los mberm del dtrtatlo y del cabre
hakrtdeddo su mnaeslrviade clase3favaseciendolasprefetenclas pior partidos izquierdism
e tnsemibil&do1es mite los intentos de capataci6n de gobiernos de cotte oorpora~dsta
y poprilista,
El golpe de estado que hivo lugar el 11 de septiernbre de 1973 movi6 ia la OIT 8 Ia
comtltu@ibnde una Comisibn de Investigaciidny Concillacidnipara la Libertacl de Asociacitln
Sindical que habrlai de estudiais la dtuaci6n sindicd chilena Esta CarnisiilSn ha: reiterado su
enkrgica ccondena de las mniedas tendentes a la repisesibn del mofimlelito sindical, corno
disoJuila6n de shdicatm, despido de ifderes sin&des, Cletenciones sin prxrwia prmeso, tomru$
"desaparicianes'" ejecudones. A pairtir de 1976 lai represibn fue Hnitighurdosa. Sin ereaibagoi,
el Ilmado Han Labord de 1979, disefiado por las autoridades con el fin de mijnimalizar
la interferencia del trabajo sindicado en el fvncionamiento de un mescaido libre, content
tdavlla dertas zestnccioms de las derechos labordes. El Cornite por Y
a Zibertad de Asacirrcidai
Sindial se ha manifestado en contra del Plan Laboral y de su âplicacion, en espeçial por
la que se refieae a 1% restricciones al derecho de fraielga.
Una aùacterfstica signeficativa de la jurispmdencia de la OIT en relacibn con el casa
çhileno es el rechazo de lia arpmenitacibn @bernamentail en el sentido de que 1% medidas
represkaisvedan,justificadas corno reaccibn a los "excesos"pofi'ticos del movim9ento abcers.
El Comité desestimd esta evidente coarrada sefialando que la cuesti6n politic-, dentro de
ciertos 1
pertenece al grnbito de la actividad sindical.
El capituto 4 andiza con mayor detalle el tratamiento de la situacion sindical en Colombiâ
por la O K Mientras que el movimiento chileno esth determinade en buena parte por las
experiiencias de los mineras del nitrato y del cobre, los orlgenes del movimienro sindical
colombiano hay que ~ L I S C ~ P Ien
O Slas circunstancias de Iostrabaijadoresde las zonas cafeteras.
Los pequeiios campesinos se vieron envueltos en la lucha por la tieara, lo que fornent6 un&
peeuliar ardtud. Los tirabajadores del caf6, par la general dl: carActer individuallçta y cornuservdor, no se vefan especialmente atraldos par pasliciarues izquierdistao;ni por un movimienta
sinckiçd de suyo propenss a la accldn colectiva. Pese a una cierta pentetracidni lein empresas
de: lrxpartacidn extranjera, la preslencia sinidical permaweci6 generalmenae dbbil.
Durmurte las afios dteinta el molvirniento nbrero conocib un perlodo de pujarna bajo In
p l r a b d a del Pastido fiberal, oanentr6.ndoçesu acicibzr en el plano de "potidcd bargaiining".
Fixmlimda la Segunda Guerra Mundid, la @aidadel Partido Liberai dej6 al rnoaPidento ahrem
debilitado y diidido. La nueva legislacibn labral provocd la atamizad6n de dicha mowimiente
al prescribiir coma tini-i. forma de negociacidn colectiva la negociacibn a nivel de empresa.
La OIT ha cslticado esta legislacibn par estirnar que deben ser los propios agentes sociales
los que decidan el nive1 al que debe llevarse a cabo la negociaci6n coPechiva. AdlemAs, lei
OIT ha rcrchaz-ado prrivisilanes legales que permiten una interferencia intençivzl del Bkadirr
en materla Iabarailes, como plueden ser lai canciliaci6n obligatoriai en casa de Iitigia.
En
trBflaarrJO [Q$
Elenta 1%recesibn e@anblmicaprovo& Uns p r o ~ e g i ~
r da d i de ]asindiaforj;,que uirtrefon sue h e m par&isina acCi6~icorniin ker.ktea 10%pari.on~~
y el pporier polj2Bm. h aewcidn de9 gohiesno h e una moderacla represibn, esp&dmente:
después de la h u e l e pleneral de 1977, Esta represibn puede coinsiderarse como el pirdudio
de un detedorai general del. respeto de los derechos h m n o s y de la erosion pdncipio de
legdidd. "Frabdadoreay lfdeses sindicalesheronvlctima con medente frecuenda de nascotraficmtes, esaadrcunes de la m e r t e y perrillas. Una m~estidnclmntnovertida es el grado
de iateweneih de llw autoridadee en est% dicslacionies de 10s derechos humanos. Tanto
orgenizaciones na pbernamentales activas en el canpo de los derechos haimanos coma el
Gmpo de Trabaja de lm Nadones Unidas solitrre Desapariciones Fomdas o Invaluntarias
se han heçho eeo de 1% eestrecltas relaciones existentes entre los esmaduones de ka muerte
y al ejhrcito y Ias fuerm de sepgridad. Pas su paste, la OIT, si bien ha admitides en aligunoa
casos dsladcus la intervenci6n oficàal, estima que ni el ejército ni l
a Euerzas de seguridad
pueden ser compr;ideradasresponsables de las violadanes masivas de 10s dereohos humno&.
&bn
h relaeiones entra el movirniento obrero y el! Estaido en MÇxico - el tema del c a i p i ~ b5 han sida elarameatc: Influidas por la revolucihn (1910-1917)).El movirniento obrero farrn6
pwte de la familia tevlc~lucionariadesde el primer momento. Las cordiales telaciones entre
dichol movhiento y el gobiemo rewlwcionarioberon ratificadas aficitalmente en 1936mediante la Mrnculaçidn organizaitiva entre la rnayor confederacibn sindical, la ICTM, y el pmtido
gubernamental PRI.
El creclmiento econbrnico fue propiciado especialmente durante los afios cincuenta y
sesenta gradas al control efectivo del mavimienito obrero. Este control fue posible, en buena
medida, par la implantaci6n de un sistema de Conciliacion y kbitraje que contenia unai
reguilad6n metinilosa de los cainflictçsslaborales tendente a evitar Ias huelgas. No olbstanre,
las autoridades también hicieron uso de medios de control indirects, por ejempllo el saborno
de las Ilmados 'kharaos'" infames lideres sindiales, para mderar las reivhdicaciones salariales de lm bwes. EFIEE euwo de los ailas r~hentaeli rnov1natenro sindiad logrd esatpar ai Mrreo
ic~nlrolestalal en diversios seclores el;tratBgPcos, aiunque la Edta de indepeindencia respecta
del plrder pdfdco gigue siendo un raîlgo canstitutivo del movimienzo abrero mexicano.
Si se parte de la hase que el contrai astatan del movimienao obrero constituye unavialacihai
de 1â liberrad sindical, llamapoderosamenfe la atencibn el hecho de que en lajurispmdencia
de la 01T ;aiPenasse perciban los sintomas del eontsol mexiçano que acabo de iexpionea. Una
posible explicacibn de este fendmeno podrla ser el aernor a las represalias da los trabajadores
efeetivmente conlsolados si presenrssen sus quejas ante el cttado orgarnisrno. Adembs, la
Iegislacidn labaral mexicsna, en buenn. parte, na es en sf misrna contraria a los estadards
de la OFlf, aunque ofrezca posbbilidades de conrravencibn. El autor estimai, sin embargo,
que aunque estas razones no cararecen de validez, hay un tercer motiva rn& poderoso, h
afjliaci6n obligatoria en forme de clausulas de exclusihn es, en efeda, un sistema da cointrol
efeclivo. b s trabajadores que deseen obtener un empleo deben pertenenecer a un sindiçato
d e t e ~ m i n dh
~i. ~~xurreecldn
o la mera amenaza de abandonar el sindicat~para &lliarse
a otra puede mdlevar la expulsion del mÜma y. en conseniencia, la pCrdida del empleo.
Sin embmgo, la OIT no c0inzÜdera la apliaciSia de dausutas de @xclwi6nuna vialacibn del
derecho de los trabajaidaires ai d l l i m a las orgdmiaicioaes que ellos dijan, myo derecho
garantha d azulmio 2 de la Goavencisin na 87 de la OIT.
Par 6IItimq en el c q d d o 6 tiene un m&cter
temdtifxu, con el fin de arraha Im res3t-adas
de las inv~Bgacionieçiprevias. la hi@tesis anrllmtada en la iniC'rBducd6nse demuestnt mesivamente simpliJ'tzr y pitecisa, p h ello, ser m h d a En especia2 los resultados del m o colombiano justrfican esta rnathcibn. De una parte, la OIT parece estar pesfe;ctamente capacitada
para califlm 1% medidas brmales de c ~ n t r acarno
l
iuna violacihm de les deaechos labarales.
De otna, 1sQ m s e we confrontada con serias difialtades en los casos de represisn '5n£uissmJU",
en los que es déflcél de amtatar la irrterwencibn de dementas apoyados par el Estado.
En cuatro suhpbnilos se exponen las rmries que podrfan avülaz la opinibn de Ia O R respecto del tema que nos ocupa.
El primer subpltulo trata la postura de la OIT ante las huelgas politicas. las inves~gaeirr
nes indican que este oganismo ernplea diferentas estandards se&n sea el casa. Se ha dicho,
no sin cierta audacia, que la OIT tiende a set nias condescendilente con las huelgas polfticas
si &tas van dirigidas contra un rrSgiwen autoritaria. Sin embargo, esta opinidiin significarla
d abandono de la opciibn de la OlT'por ]launiversalidad de 10s derechols laborales y absolveth
a estados como M ~ G O
en,las que se dan formas e n d i e r r a s de dorninacibn laborali. Si se
mzrnaliza can detalle, esta tesis se dernuesrra insostenaible. La OIT ha modificado su postura,
inc2inhdose pauilatinamente por una mayor aceptacibn de la huelga poililtica. No existen
indiclos que apunten a un trato desigual de los estados, segUn su mayor O menor inspiracibn
democr&tic%por parte de la 017'.
En el slguiente subcapfitulo se estudia la pasibile retlcencla de los brganos de control
de la OIT por 10 que respecta a la crltica de las decisionesjvdiciales nacionales. Esta suposici611 se basa en el hecho de que la OIT valarai en gran medida la intemencldo judicial en
los conRicrtos entre el mavimientto obrero y las autoridades. Debe admitirse, sin embargo,
que esta htemenc56n caaece de senrida mando las autoridades jiwdiciales estuviesen obligadasi
a aplicar m a legislacibn que no se aciectiir a 10%estandards Interruaciondes. Nuestras investigaciones NO confirman este ternos. La OIT ha rechwddo sistemAtic.amentelas quejas de los
lestdm - en espcilail del Estado rneuciao - que estiman que las organizaciones internaciorraies
wem de autoljdd para criticar la decisiones judiciales, Sus Grgrnos de central han tomildo
conocimiento de las decisionesjudiciales y han çnticado honestarnenite aquellas apliçaciones
de la ley nacional que consideraban en desacuerdo çan los estandards de la C
E
lr
La dispntiva: rnonisrno O pluralisme sindical, se estudia en el tercer swbcapftulo. El casa
meximne demestra que el control directo de los trabajadores por parte del @bierna se
p q e t f i a efectivarnenteen vittud del monopolio fActico de que d i s h t a el blndicaro "oficial".
Dicho monopolio, aungue no est6 irnpuesto legalmente (salvo en el casa del sectoa pliblico),
es el resulrado de una extendida praclica da clAusulas de exclusidai.
La OTT manriene una prrsmra mbigua anee la 6nrestid.n del molnisrna sindical,
Meirtr;us que h hlniplmab~no el m & d ~ e n t legal
o dei monopaEos s u d t - 8e a i d e r a
~anainicPl&bade la libertaci sindical, se d d t m simaciones de rnonopolno fddm m m mmemencia de las dispsicione~en maeria de &liaciE-jn obligatoria. El ppresente estudso estima
que esta dkdnd6n d o p A ~ m
na d o m suficientementeel hecho da que la aElia&6noibligatona puiede vulnerar en L pr8rXic.a la Iibeirtad de eliemibn s i ~ & ddie 10s tr&&id~re~.
Si en el! &ubeap%alo
precedente traraban de explicarse las dificultades de h OIT en 10
que e rs&re a la oansbwll.in de contra1 ofiiiloso, el iiltho submpftuim maka lm smpcstos
de reprsseâibn olficiosa El ,
I
wlombian~~
se estudia partiendo del fnechlo que rua es awnuej&le
mireaer grandes dgerenda de aprt-éacibaé en b que se refiere a wia d e k m a situaban
sindical mando es manifiesta el desea de mejorar la sltuacidn de los desechos h u m o s . Ha
diveraidaid de opinilanes de la OIT y de Orgadzagiones No Cubernamentaieles (ONO) por
la que se refiere a la mestibn calorruhiana se derivan de los distintos caracteres y fines, y
se?madifiestan eni los diversoos miéitodlos de malimr los hechas. Cabe pregurrtarse si la açtitud
de la OIT rra es demasiado cautelosa al baarse excesivamente en idorrnaci6n de origen
pbesnrtmental. El presenta estudio duda de la efiçacia de lois procedimienlos informâles
da 'Cmtacicitos Directos" para esclarieeer intirincacias y osaras situaicionas sindicales como
la colombim&Las acmtulacioiresde la Cornisiciin de Investigacidn y iCanciliaci6n para Ba Cib-ntad
de Asociacibn Sindical ofiecen lnvestigacionas la suficientemente completas y visitas Ilocailles.
Vistw laposlbllidades de esta Cornisiibn para recabar idormaci6n de las ONG, Io que pueda
facilitar una vlisidn ni& ecwanirne, se propimgna und rnayor intenrenci6n de la mencionada
Comlsibn.