The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these
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FINANCING INSURGENCY OR FINANCING TERRORISM? The FARC, their sources of revenue and the effects of these Image source: Christian Escobar Mora, 2010. Bachelor’s thesis Development Studies Theories on development, globalization and social change Candidate number: 303 Words: 10999 Date of submission: May 22, 2013 UTVB3300 (1) 2013-05 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 “If I don’t pay them, I have three alternatives: leave my village, leave my farm everything [..] If not, they kidnap me and I have to pay ten times more than they originally wanted. If they kidnap me and my family doesn’t pay them fast enough, they kill me. They are not going to win this revolution” - Araucan farmer [my translation] (Appendix A) 2 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 Abstract This thesis is the final product of my 3-year long bachelor’s degree in International Development at the University College of Oslo and Akershus. It explores the Colombian guerrilla organization of the FARC in relation to how they have accumulated revenue over their years of insurgency. It also discusses the relationship between the FARC and the Colombian government as I regard this as an important dimension to include when discussing the role of the FARC in Colombia. One of the objectives of this thesis is to investigate the effects of the FARC’s means of catching revenue, on themselves, on the Colombian society and on their relationship with the state. I discuss how the following theories apply to the dynamics of the internal conflict in Colombia in respect to the objective of this thesis: the theory of the “Shadow State”, theory on state power, theory of kleptocracy as well as theory on “financing terrorism” within the dynamics of the Colombian context. I demonstrate in this thesis why this specific research may be of importance as the Colombian government under President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC are currently in peace negotiations, why the death of Hugo Chávez may influence the FARC and speculate on what may be the future of the guerrilla organization in Colombia. 3 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 Acknowledgements First of all I would like to thank all of my Colombian friends and acquaintances who have inspired me to take a deep dive into the history of their country and into the reality many of them may face as citizens of a society so complex and filled with contrasts as the Colombian society certainly is. I have immense amounts of respect for you all. You are courageous, optimistic and I admire you for never giving up on the desire to make Colombia a peaceful and including country for all members of society. My companion, Camilo, has been of particularly good help in the development of this thesis, not only in finding suitable sources, but by introducing me to the beauty, injustice and campesino struggles of the Colombian department of Tolima. Thank for your unconditional love and support. Te amo mucho. My deepest gratitude goes to the informants whom I have interviewed for this thesis. Thank you for sharing your personal stories and opinions with me. I feel like it has added more depth and life to my thesis. I would like to express my gratitude to my parents for being the great support that they are and always have been. Thank you for encouraging me to always be curious of my surroundings, both in the backyard of my childhood home and in the selvas of Colombia. My classmates through these past three years: thank you for the insightful, challenging and liberating journey we have taken together! I would especially like to thank Johanne, Linh and Maja for being amazing friends and for sharing my passion for Latin America and my interest in grassroots rebellion. My final gratitude goes to Lars Leer. You are an inspirational person whom I have learned a lot from these past years. Thank you for all the support and knowledge you have given me. 4 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 Table of contents Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………….3 Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………………...4 Table of contents……………………………………………………………………………..5 List of abbreviations………………………………………………………………………….6 Map and basic statistics………………………………………………………………………7 1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………..8 2. Methodology and source criticism ……………………………………………………….9 3. Theoretic framework……………………………………………………………………..11 4. Background……………………………………………………………………………….16 5. The FARC: an organization of drug lords or organized resistance?.............................20 5.1 Drug activities…………………………………………………………………………….20 5.2. Financing by the people: extortion or real sympathy?.......................................................22 5.3. Hostages and ransom………………………………………………………………….....26 5.4. External sympathizers……………………………………….…………………………...27 6. The Future of the FARC in Colombia…………...…………………………….……….30 7. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………...33 8. List of references………………………………………………………………………….35 APPENDIX A………………………………………………………………………………..40 APPENDIX B………………………………………………………………………………..45 5 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 List of abbreviations AUC = Las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (the United Self-Defense Coalition) FARC = Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia ELN = El Ejército de la Liberación Nacional MBR-200 = Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario-200 OAS = Organization of American States 6 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 Map and basic statistics: Colombia Relevant locations in this thesis 1. Colombian capital: Bogotá 2. The birthplace of the FARC: Marquetalía, Tolima 3. Area controlled by the FARC: Tame, Arauca, Colombia 4. FARC-encampment: Elorza, Venezuela. 5. FARC-encampment: Apure, Venezuela 6. FARC-encampment: Achaguas, Venezuela 7. FARC-encampment: Sierra del Perija, Venezuela. 8. FARC-encampment: Zulia, Venezuela Size: 1,138,910 square km Population: 45,745,783 (July 2013 est.) Life expectancy: 75.02 years Government type: Republic Languages: Spanish (official) Religions: Roman Catholic 90%, other 10% GDP per capita: $10,700 (2012 est.) Unemployment rate: 10.3% (2012 est.) Human Development Index (HDI): 0.719 (2012 est.) Population below the poverty line: 34.1% (2011 est.) Literacy: 90.4% Source of statistics: CIA Factbook 2013 and UNDPR 2012, image source: designed by Camilo Alejandro Cuesta Ortíz, Bogotá 2013, locations of FARC-encampments: El Espectador, 2010. 7 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 1. Introduction 1.1 Approach After spending the fall semester of 2012 studying at the Universidad de los Andes in Bogotá, Colombia, my interest for Colombian domestic politics has grown significantly. My interest for the guerrilla – state relationship developed much due to the constant reminders of the conflict in Colombian everyday life and the conversations I had with young soldiers in the streets who willingly would tell me about how many guerrilleros they had killed. My travels to the departments of Tolima, Putumayo, Cauca and Nariño are also significant for the development of this thesis as I there witnessed a reality much influenced by their history of campesino resistance, socioeconomic repression and guerilla presence. As we in these days are facing new peace negotiations between the Colombian government under current President Juan Manuel Santos and the guerrilla organization FARC, I find it meaningful to study the FARC’s historical roots in Colombia. In particular I find it interesting to explore and discuss the different measures of financing they have utilized in order to form deep roots in the Colombian society and political sphere and what the effects of their financing methods have had on their political project. While writing this paper I was curious to find out whether or not their sources of revenue have had an influence on their ideological point of departure and how this has changed their position as an ideologically bound organization. I have chosen to focus on the FARC exclusively, and will not be discussing other guerrilla groups in Colombia such as the ELN – even though they fall under the same political and somewhat historical umbrella as the FARC. This decision is based on the limited time and amount of pages I have to my disposal in writing this thesis. Nevertheless, I will mention the ELN where I have viewed it as necessary to support my argument. My research question is the following: How have the FARC financed their activities and how has this influenced their political project? I will answer this question by investigating the following sources of revenue that the FARC have had during their time of insurgency: drug activities, contributions by civil society, 8 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 hostages and ransom and funding by external sympathizers. My findings and conclusions drawn from these are based on the information I have retrieved from my sources and these are for different reasons colored by the position of the specific source. I will elaborate on the limitations of my source selection in the following chapter. 1.2 Key terms In this thesis I will apply different terms without necessarily explaining them further. These are the definitions I have chosen to utilize as a premise for the understanding of the topics discussed in this paper. Campesino = a native of a Latin-American rural area; especially: a Latin-American indigenous farmer or farm laborer (Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary) Guerrillero = ”[..] a guerrillero or a guerrilla fighter is a disciplined member of an organized resistance movement opposing an established political or social system, government, authority , or occupying power and striving to overthrow them by use of violence or any other available means” (Kossoy 1976:28). Paramilitary = “activity akin to that of the military’s, but at the same time not performed by a military agency [..] Normally, paramilitary forces deal with challenges or threats to internal defense and public order, albeit this does not preclude an external defense role. A paramilitary force is usually desgined as a mobile, and in some respects self-contained, organization with a command structure not unlike that of the military’s” (McCulloch 2001:70). Pueblo = town, village (Spanish Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary) Revolutionary guerrilla warfare = “Revolutionary guerrilla warfare is the forcible attempt by a politically organized group to gain control or change the structure and/or policies of the government, using unconventional warfare integrated with political and social mobilization, resting on the premise that the people are both the targets and the actors” (Sarkesia 1975:7). 2. Methodology and source criticism In this bachelor’s thesis I have applied an empirical, qualitative research method as most of my research is based on literature by professors and scholars with expertise in the matters I 9 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 have sought to investigate. I have also revised and incorporated official statements and texts by the FARC themselves as well as some statistics by the United Nations. In addition to research based on literature I have done interviews with people with either direct or indirect experience with the FARC. I do not wish to highlight one specific position in the Colombian guerrilla conflict, but rather to create a neutral analysis based on the thoughts and ideas a varied selection of sources. The literature and sources I have used in this thesis cannot merely be seen as completely reliable sources, as these have been influenced by their corresponding surroundings and the different subjects’ experiences. The academics I have included in this paper are from different geographical, socio-political and ideological positions. It is therefore necessary to not consider their ideas universal. Thus, I will attempt to not draw definite conclusions from the ideas presented in this thesis. The topic of this paper is also a very polarized one, where there are many different perspectives and layers to what different people may perceive as the truth. Some of the theories I have chosen for this thesis are also meant to explain a specific case from a different geographical area. Nevertheless, I have found them to be transferrable to the case of Colombia and the FARC. The different analytical points of departure among the sources used in this thesis are also evident in the linguistic typology they use when describing one or another side of the conflict. While some describe the FARC as a terrorist group others describe them as a Marxist organization. For instance, Associate Professor of Defense analysis, Michael Freeman, says in his book Financing Terrorism that “The FARC [..] is a Marxist group that has terrorized Colombia for decades” (2012:199), recognizing both of the popular conceptions of the FARC’s identity. Oliver Villar and Drew Cottle believe that “[..] the FARC deserves serious examination as a powerful political and military force in Colombia” and that they are “[..]the largest and longest-running insurgency since the Mexican revolution[..]” (Villar & Cottle 2011:93). This thesis also includes some thoughts retrieved from interviews with oral sources from different backgrounds. One of them is the thoughts and opinions of a 20-year old soldier from the Colombian National Army while the other one is those of a middle-aged farmer from the department of Arauca, an area where the FARC has manipulated the everyday life of the population for decades (see chapter 5. 2 in particular). Even though this selection of sources is 10 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 limited to only two persons, it may demonstrate how some Colombians personally perceive the conflict, how they are affected by the civil war in Colombia and their hopes for the future of their country. The discourse the different sources in this paper use thus demonstrates the specific ideological approach of the specific source. Once again, there are many strong feelings and opinions surrounding the research I will execute in this paper and that is an important issue that had to be taken into consideration while working on this thesis in order to end up with a product that is as neutral as possible. I will from now on (when using my own words) describe the FARC as a guerrilla organization, as I find this concept to be the most accurate and least problematic, although there are undoubtedly people who would contest this categorization as well. 3. Theoretic framework 3.1 The FARC and the “Shadow State” In this paper, I have found the “Shadow State”-model developed by William Reno applicable. Originally the model was based on his conception of the post-colonial African state as a shadow state where formal laws and procedures are overruled by a person or group who have taken on the role as rulers without being elected by the people they control. Another characteristic of the shadow state is that rulers disregard the formal government institutions by weakening bureaucratic structures and strengthening their positions in the markets and thus “enrich themselves and control others” (Funke & Solomon 2002:1). Reno writes that in states described as a “Shadow State”, attempts at democratization and peace brokering are often undermined, as external actors have given support to the “Shadow State rulers” which has helped maintain their position (Funke & Solomon 2002:2). In this thesis the theory of “Shadow State” will be applied in regards to the “revolutionary taxes” the FARC have imposed on civilians, exemplified by the department of Arauca (elaborated in chapter 5.2). It will also be connected to the external support from the Chávez administration which will demonstrate to have both complicated the diplomatic relationship between Colombia and Venezuela and helped maintain the position of the FARC through diplomatic and financial aid. 11 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 3.2 State power and its implications for the civil war It may also be fruitful to include some theory on state power and its implications for the civil war in Colombia. Alex McDougall from the University of Calgary has written an article where he has applied the theories of state power formulated by Michael Mann and Jeffrey Herbst. Mann described state power, or state autonomy, as “[..] the states unique ability to provide a territorially centralized form of organization” (Mann 1984:109). Herbst writes in his book State and Power in Africa that low population density makes it expensive for the state to control the population as “[..] distance from the capital increases relative to areas with higher population densities” and that the state may be ruling over outlying areas in a varied manner according to the possibility of developing infrastructure and thus the accessibility for armies and police forces to be deployed (Herbst 2000:251-252). Even though he bases these assumptions in an African context, they can be transferrable for a Colombian context as “[..] unlike any other Latin American country, Colombia’s principle cities – Bogotá,Medellín,Calí and Baranquilla – are separated from each other by vast expanses of towering mountain peaks and dense, lowland tropical jungles” (Leech 2011:4). McDougall writes that “[..] state weakness has provided armed groups with the political opportunity of rebellion” (McDougall 2009:322). His article argues that conflict is a direct consequence of a weak state because of two reasons in particular. The first one is that due to the specific state’s weakness (in this case Colombia’s) restive groups or other “threats to peace” are not restricted from organizing because they are able to rebel without being afraid of state repression. This again causes other groups to organize in self-defense because the first group has demonstrated that the state is unable to provide them protection. The second reason McDougall describes is the state’s inability to defeat the violence of the rebels. He claims that “even unpopular regimes can stamp out potentially violent opposition when they have enough resources to overwhelm the insurgents directly, arrest their leaders, or otherwise interfere with group organization before the violence becomes widespread. When the state weakens, however, insurgencies and terrorist organizations become more difficult to defeat” (Byman and Van Evera 1998 in McDougall 2008:323). In this thesis I will apply McDougall’s ideas in my discussion of how the FARC’s means of catching revenue have been able to flourish within the Colombian borders, in part due to the weakness of the Colombian state. 12 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 3.3 Colombia: a violent democracy? In order to understand how Colombia has a history affected by violent tendencies, it may be resourceful to include a study on violent democracy. “Democracy and violence appear to have come hand-in-hand from Independence Day to today” claims Associate Professor of Multicultural and Multilingual Education, Jorge P. Osterling (1989:46). He writes that almost all of the Presidents of Colombia have been democratically elected and finished their time in office over the last two centuries and that there have only been two coups d’etat and one successful revolution. In addition Osterling says that civil liberties have been honored by almost all administrations and that people have for the most part been allowed to assembly freely, have had right to trial and that the press has been free (Osterling 1989:158). Nevertheless, according to the Freedom House’s index on freedom of the press Colombia’s press status of 2013 is categorized as being only “partly free” with a score of 53 out of 100. In comparison, Norway scored 100 the same year and its press is categorized as “free” (Freedom House 2013a). In Freedom Press’ report of Colombia from 2012 they announce that several media reporters were harassed, threatened and even assassinated in 2011 after writing about sensitive information connected to paramilitary groups. Journalists were also harassed by political candidates in the regions were there was a high degree of armed conflict (Freedom House 2013b). Can a country be categorized as democratic without a satisfactory degree of freedom of the press? The violence that encounters some of those who question the status quo should also be questioned in the discussion of democratization in Colombia: “Violent pluralism describes the situation that ensues when demands for democratic, nonviolent alternatives to conflict resolution that can bring into dialogue multiple, divergent voices are met with resistance by the state, while the civilians who embrace a nonviolent approach are treated as potential enemies threatening the integrity of Colombian democracy” (Roldán in Arias & Goldstein 2010:64) Professor in Latin American History, Mary Roldán, says that Colombia may demonstrate the most extreme case of violent pluralism in Latin America. She bases this assumption on the fact that Colombia has one of the oldest and most stable two-party political systems in the Western Hemisphere and is simultaneously home of one of Latin America’s oldest and largest leftist guerrilla insurgency. Colombia also inhabits the post powerful paramilitary presence in Latin America and is the most extensive production of illicit drugs (Roldán in Arias & Goldstein 2010:63). It may not be so strange that Osterling and other scholars may categorize 13 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 Colombia as a democracy, but Colombia may also be described as a violent democracy. Roldán argues that the contemporary Colombian state has provoked a growing degree of violent pluralism in Colombia. She bases this argument on the increasing level of resorting to authoritarian and antidemocratic policies by the Colombian government as a response to the proliferation of violence. The increasing amount of grassroots demands for participation in the policies that are meant to confront the violence has also been met with antidemocratic practices, according to Roldán. She says that the grassroots have mobilized for more inclusive policies for peace building whereas what has happened in reality is an increase in use of arms in the areas which are highly affected by the violence. Colombia has also become an epicenter for the international drug trade, which has supplied criminal organizations, paramilitary groups and guerrilla organizations with the means to expand their influence and manipulate the politics within the country (Roldán in Arias & Goldstein 2010: 64). 3.4 Catching revenue I will illustrate how the FARC have increased their revenue by applying a theoretical framework on catching revenue developed by Michael Freeman. He claims that the FARC has gone through an ideological change after they began trafficking drugs and that economic interests have superseded ideological motivations (Freeman 2012:201). As Freeman is a professor in defense analysis and specializes in the different dynamics of terrorism, he is consequently referring to the FARC as terrorists in his works. For instance he writes that “[..] a terrorist group that wants a reliable revenue stream that is tied to the drug trade needs to be near the source of the drug (e.g., FARC and cocaine, Taliban and heroin) [..]” (Freeman 2011:464). By utilizing the term “terrorist group” he undermines the discussion surrounding the ideological motives that may or may not be behind their actions. Boaz Ganor from the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism says that “[a] correct and objective definition of terrorism can be based upon accepted international laws and principles regarding what behaviors are permitted in conventional wars between nations. This normative principle relating to a state of war between two countries can be extended without difficulty to a conflict between a nongovernmental organization and a state” She claims that the aims of guerrilla warfare and terrorism can be identical, but that they are differentiated by their targets. While the guerrilla warfare has military targets, the terrorist warfare has civilian ones (Ganor 2002:287). Although Freeman’s focus is how terrorist 14 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 groups are catching revenue, he does not use caution in his categorization of these terrorists. Nevertheless, as he has included the FARC in his analysis, I have found his theories and statistics useful in this thesis. Freeman does not only include the drug trafficking in his analysis of catching revenue, but also includes “[..] extortion or “revolutionary taxes,” kidnapping and ransom, theft, smuggling, petty crime, and pirating and counterfeiting goods” (Freeman 2011:466). He claims that illegal activities is a reliable source of gaining revenue because these actions are diverse and available at any given time and can take place anywhere. For instance can commercial activities be exploited and scarce resources can be smuggled, traded or stolen all over the world and according to Freeman are “[t]errorists of all kinds [taking] advantage of these opportunities to finance their organizations”. He claims that illegal activities are beneficial for the “terrorists” also because they can enhance the legitimacy of the group or undermine the legitimacy of the state. If the taxes the FARC impose on a population is not reported to the authorities, they achieve at least a passive support of the people they extort. Freeman says that the organization ideally would have liked to have strong, active support, but that the fact that they are able to engage in an extensive level of extortion indicates that the population lacks loyalty and confidence in the state to take control of their situation. Extortion by the FARC thus indicates to the state that the state is unable to control its own territory and that the FARC is the de facto authority in the areas where they are extorting the population for tax revenue (Freeman 2011:468). This analysis of the guerrilla-state dynamics in Colombia reflects back to the assumption of a state weakness explained in chapter 2.2, as the state is lacking the ability to provide the population of protection. 3.5 The FARC in the image of kleptocracy Another theory I find applicable to the Colombian context is the theory of kleptocracy. The theory was first introduced by US American economist and social scientist, Mancur Olson, who argued that the stability of a single kleptocrat, also called “stationary bandit”, is superior to its competitor, represented by a large number of autocrats or “roving bandits” (RoseAckerman 2003:163). It is originally a theory on how a state is formed from anarchy, but can be applied in order to understand how the state and the FARC have balanced the authoritarian power in between them within the Colombian borders. In this context the FARC can be perceived as the “roving bandit”, as they are undisciplined and has the incentive to steal while 15 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 the “stationary bandit” (in this case: the Colombian scenario) has the incentive to behave as the autocratic ruler as they gain the possibility to monopolize violence. The monopolization of violence is what constitutes a Weberian state, and thus the Colombian state can legally perform violent acts onto the “roving bandit” to limit their influence on behalf of their nation (Höijer 2004:27). The FARC says in their manifesto from 1964 that some of those that are against their struggle are the “merchants of violence” [my translation], those who have the legitimate right to use violence as a tool of oppression (Programa Agrario de los Guerrilleros de las FARC-EP 1964). Mancur Olson says on the topic of using violence as a political strategy that “[h]istorical outcomes surely depend not only on the incentives and self-interest of those with power but also on their morals and temperaments” (Olson 2000:3). Olson talks about the “monopolization of crime” exemplified by a group that takes control of a specific area. Not only would the group exploit the resources in the area or steal as much as it would like, but it would also keep others from entering and stealing in their territory (Olson 2000:5). This theory may be applicable to the FARC in the context of imposition of taxes on populations in rural areas of Colombia, which is elaborated in chapter 5.2. 4. Background: a history of violence and the premises for FARC’s insurgency The FARC was founded by the forty-eight survivors of a state-led military attack on the peasant community of Marquetalia in the Colombian state of Tolima on May 27, 1964. They formulated el Programa Agrario de los Guerrilleros de las FARC , the Agrarian Reform Program of the Guerrillas [my translation], the same year at the First Guerrilla Conference on July 20. The ELN was formed simultaneously as a guerrilla group by Cuban-influenced urban intellectuals in 1964, and they have both interacted with and intersected the FARC up until today. The FARC first called themselves “el Bloque Sur”, the Southern Block, but changed their named to FARC in 1966 during the Second Guerrilla Conference (Leech 2011:viii). The FARC themselves explained in their program from 1964 that: “[..] We have been victims of the fury of the landowners and the military because here, in this part of Colombia [southern Tolima, Huila and Cauca], the interests of the “big men of the earth” dominate the darkest chain reactions of the country. Because of this we have suffered both in flesh and in spirit, for the bestialities of a rotten regime that stems from the domination of the financial monopolies [which replaced] the imperialism” [my translation]. 16 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 This same document, what could be described as the FARC’s manifesto, describes how they perceive the Colombian government, with help from the United States, as a violent unit who seeks to “[..] corrupt minds, kill, persecute and incarcerate the Colombian people [..]” who counters the legitimization of these processes. The manifesto also describes how the FARC sees the situation in Colombia as a “cruel and inhumane war of extermination”. They describe themselves as armed revolutionaries who seek to acquire a position of power in Colombia and sets popular democracy, respect of the human rights and an economic development that benefits all the people of Colombia as their main political pillars (Programa Agrario de los Guerrilleros de las FARC-EP, 1964). Thus, according to the FARC themselves, their main objective is to create a humane society in Colombia. The image they painted of themselves is an image of romantic dimensions, of Marxist revolutionaries aiming towards a society built on equity and respect for the earth and its inhabitants. What reality has shown since their uprising in 1964 may tell a different story. An historic backdrop is essential in order to create a contextual image of the current relationship between the FARC and the Colombian institutional state. On April 9, 1948 Liberal Party dissident and charismatic mayor of Bogotá from 1936-1937, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, was assassinated. The assassination sparked what became known as La Violencia, “The Violence”, a period of civil war in Colombia which lasted from 1948 to approximately 1958. This period created severe polarizations between the left and right wing in the Colombian political landscape. The Liberal Party politician Eduardo Santos (and president of Colombia from 1938 to 1942) formulated a slogan which provided the left wing with motivation during La Violencia and in years after: “Public liberties and republican institutions. No more, no less. And to realize them only two things are indispensable: faith and dignity” [my translation] (Palacios 2003:219). During La Violencia more than 200,000 people from the left wing were killed. In 1950, the presidential elections were boycotted by the Liberal Party and Conservative representative Laureano Gómez won the seat as president. The Gómez administration was responsible for persecution and terrorizing of Liberal and communist insurgents and their sympathizers during his time in office (Leech 2011:vii). In 1953 General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla seized power after a military coup which later was described as one of the most celebrated changes in government in the history of Colombia. In 1954 the Constitutional National Assembly (ANAC) declared that Rojas could be re-elected “until the day where there will be a suitable 17 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 successor” [my translation] (Palacios 2003:210). Simultaneously armed peasant groups were organizing in Tolima under the direction of Colombian Communist Party member Manuel Maralanda. Rojas was overthrown in 1957 under another military coup by the Frente Nacional (National Front). In the years to come “La Violencia” became a common term in the Colombian everyday discourse when referring to the years between 1948 and 1958 (Palacios 2003:218). Professor of the Universidad de los Andes, Marco Polacios, writes in his book Entre la legitimidad y la violencia: Colombia 1875-1994 that La Violencia did not unify the supporters of the Liberal Party in the end, but rather fragmented them into the gaitanistas (supporters of the deceased Jorge Gaitán), the santistas (supporters of Eduardo Santos) and the lopistas (supporters of Alfonso López Pumarejo, president of Colombia for two periods: 1934 - 1938 and 1942 - 1945) (Palacios 2003:219). This fragmentation is reflected also in modern day politics in Colombia, as previous president Álvaro Uribe who descends from the Liberal Party won the presidential campaign as an independent due to his “get tough” platform in response to the unsuccessful peace negotiations with the FARC and other guerrilla movements of the years before him (Coppedge 2007:131). On February 24, 2008 (during Uribes presidential period) the streets of Bogotá were filled up by between 500,000 and 2 million people who protested against the FARC (Debate Periódico 2013). Even though Colombia had an intentional homicide rate of 70.2 per 100 000 in 2002 (making them the country in Latin America with the most homicides that year) (UNODC 2012), the country is still categorized as a democracy (though a debatable state of democracy as demonstrated in chapter 3.3). The same year one teacher or lecturer was murdered every single week in Colombia, in all 87 scholars were executed. Paramilitary groups were behind 95% of the murders (Dearden 2003). How can such a high degree of violence go hand in hand with democratic practice? According to the authors of the book Guns, Drugs & Development in Colombia, “Colombia is considered a deviant democracy, characterized by chronic insurgency and a seemingly stable political system” (Holmes, et al. 2008:3). McDougall writes that the evolution of violence and competition for power in Colombia is based on four aspects. The first one is the FARC and AUC’s origins as self-defense organizations. The second is the growth of violence as a response to the growing inequality and change in the political economy. The third is the military expansion aimed at securing 18 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 territory with access to important resources and the fourth is the competition over territory which leads to state-building. He says that the civil war has led to a “partial collapse of the state” and that violence has been “privatized” as a result of a single, effective authority. As a result, the FARC “colonized” areas of the country. These “colonies” will be elaborated in chapter 5.2 (McDougall 2009:335). The present-day FARC consists of an army of more than 20,000 guerrilleros, while the smaller and weaker ELN consists of between 5,000 and 7,000 guerrilleros. Not only do the leftist guerrilla organizations mimic some of the basic functions of statehood in areas where the state has failed to manifest itself. The right-wing paramilitary umbrella organization of AUC is also present in certain areas of the country where they, along with the guerrilla organizations, levy taxes on the population as well as maintain a degree of public order in the areas they control. Over the last thirty years, the violence of the conflict has escalated dramatically which according to some economic conflict theorists is likely to be a result of the initiation of a drug trade based revenue (McDougall 2009:323). In 1960, four years before the FARC’s uprising, the government passed the Agrarian Social Reform Law (Law 135) which was supposed to help small-scale farmers obtain a legal right to their land. It was also intended as a legal framework for addressing the unequal distribution of land. In 1960, 1.7 per cent of farm owners owned 55 per cent of Colombia’s territory sustainable for agriculture, while 6.2 per cent of the farmers owned less than 1 per cent. Nevertheless, the latifundios, or large estates, owned by Colombia’s most powerful landowners did not have to make any changes nor limit their possibilities in accordance with the law. After some years of waiting for the state-initiated reform to help the farmers obtain their rights to land, many of the farmers grew tired of waiting for the change to come. Among these were the forty-eight survivors on the state-led attack on Marquetalia in 1964 who founded the FARC (Leech 2011:19-21). The FARC have over the years adopted several financing methods that may be regarded as harmful to the type of society they claim to be promoting. According to US professor and author of the book “Financing Terrorism”, Michael Freeman, the FARC depends on drug trade to finance their material needs. He writes that they have an annual income of somewhere between $100 million and $1 billion and that a large part of this revenue is earned from the drug industry. (Freeman 2011:462) 19 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 In addition to drug trade, the FARC have also been taking hostages which they release after receiving a satisfying amount of ransom. One of the most famous kidnappings done by the FARC is the kidnapping of presidential candidate at the time, Ingrid Betancourt, in 2002. Betancourt remained in captivity in the Colombian jungle for six years before she was rescued by the Colombian army (Brockes 2010). 5. The FARC: an organization of drug lords or organized resistance? As mentioned in the background chapter, FARC has an annual income of somewhere between $100 million and $1 billion (Freeman 2011:462). Where does all this revenue come from and at what cost? This chapter is narrowed down to the following four ways of catching revenue the FARC has been discovered to exploit: illicit drug activities, tax imposition on civilians in the areas they control, taking hostages and claiming ransom for them as well as financial (and political) support from external actors – here exemplified by the Hugo Chávez administration. 5.1. Drug activities In the years between 1978 and 1995 coca plantations became important resources to approximately one million farmers. As coca production is illegal in Colombia the production tend to take place in areas with little or no state presence, making the farmers an easy target for the FARC to control. In these areas, the FARC operates as a state would by exercising control and influence (McDougall 2009:336). During the 1980s and 1990s, the FARC’s military strength increased and their territorial control in rural areas expanded extensively. Some of the potential explanations to this expansion of the FARC are: the cocaine boom in the United States, displacement of the lower peasant class by the paramilitaries and the implementation of a neo-liberal, free-market based economic model which enhanced the difficulties the Colombian poor were already enduring. Garry Leech writes that “[w]hen cocaine production exploded during the 1980s, it impacted on virtually every sector of Colombian society. The FARC was no exception as its increasing involvement in the illicit drug trade posed distinct challenges to its ideological struggle [..]” (Leech 2011:56). During the explosion of drug production wealthy drug barons grew to power, like the infamous Pablo Escobar, who also invested a lot of their money in vast land areas. The FARC’s manifesto from 1964 says that they are countering latifundio, 20 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 “landlordism”, and thus the drug barons investing in these lands were converted into another natural enemy of the FARC (Leech 2011:57). According to Michael Freeman, The Colombian Ministry of Defense has made some estimates of the FARC’s revenues from “taxes” on the illegal drug trade, a so called gramaje (basis weight) which is aimed at the protection of drug producers and smugglers. A commander of La Fuerza de Tarea Volcano, a fraction of the Colombian army, affirms that the gramaje is imposed on the costumers of the drug trade (El Universal 2013). In 2009, the fees were as following (in USD): production of basic paste: $15.70/kilo, chlorhydrate of cocaine: $52.60/kilo, protection of laboratories: $5253 each, protection of coca fields: $52.60/hectare, protection of poppy fields: $4210/hectare, security of landing strips: $2631 each, cocaine shipments: $10.50/kilo, river transportation of precursor chemicals: 20 per cent of shipment value, international drug flights: $5263 each and domestic drug flights: $2631 each (Freeman 2012:204). Professors of Political Economy, Oliver Villar and Drew Cottle are authors of the book Cocaine, Death Squads and the War on Terror: US imperialism and class struggle in Colombia, claim that there is little evidence that FARC is even involved in the production and trafficking of cocaine, but that there has been solid evidence found of “extensive drug smuggling to the United States” and that the facilitators of this business are right-wing paramilitary groups in collaboration with “wealthy drug barons”, the Colombian army and different key figures from the Colombian government. One the other hand, they support the claim that the FARC are raising taxes for “local, drug-related activities.” They refer to Ricardo Vargas of the Transnational Institute (TNI), an independent research center that specializes in drug issues in Colombia, who claims that the FARC merely focuses on “the taxation of illicit crops” (Villar & Cottle 2011:93-94). In an article from the Journal of Drugs from 2005, the author María Clemencia Ramírez writes that the Colombian military has claimed that the FARC has replaced the drug cartels of Calí and Medellín and that the army has categorized the FARC as “narco-guerrilas” which she says means “guerrillas who have abandoned their revolutionary and political ideology and must be dealt with as drug dealing criminals” (2005:78). Consequently these different categorizations demonstrate the different approaches the different analysts use when talking about the FARC. It also demonstrates the contesting views on whether or not the FARC are in fact involved as much in the cocaine production and traffic as some claim. 21 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 According to a communiqué by the FARC from the 31 of March 2013, they claim they are still revolutionaries and that they are not drug traffickers. They say that they reject the Colombian officials’ accusations and claim it to be a strategy aimed at undermining the reputation of their revolutionary organization and erode their political character in front of an international community which closely observes their consolidation and growth. The FARC also says that the stigma of the “narco terrorism” was invented by those who oppose the democratic changes that are happening in Colombia (FARC-EP 2013). However, a citizen of Arauca claims to have witnessed their cocaine and marijuana production first hand when turning in his yearly taxes to the guerrilla organization (Appendix A).At the same time, María Clemencia Ramírez writes that “[c]ampesino coca growers are described as controlled and terrorized by the FARC, but at the same time willing to engage in the FARC’s terrorist activities and to join the Communist Party.” Ramírez says that the civilian participation in the FARC’s activities makes them legitimate targets of the drug war in Colombia and that the line between “fighting drug traffickers” and “fighting rebels” is blurred (Ramírez 2005:78-79). The civilian population thus plays both and active and a passive role in the war, in a way tools that are utilized by both parts of the conflict, as will be demonstrated by the use of civilian soldiers and forced taxation in the following chapter. 5.2. Financing by the people: extortion or real sympathy? The department of Arauca is a part of Colombia with a historically high concentration of guerilla presence. In Tame, a municipality of Arauca, the local civilians have experienced this first hand, as the FARC together with the ELN have imposed a so-called vacuna, or “vaccine “ on the people living there. This is a tax system that forces people to pay a certain amount of money once a year to the guerrilla, and a local farmer from Tame says that the amount of the vacuna is twenty times more than what he pays to the Colombian government yearly in taxes (Appendix A). Michael Freeman refers to this form of taxation as “revolutionary taxes” and supports the claim that the FARC is actively exploiting this form of providing funds for their organization (Freeman 2011:466). The farmer says that “[t]he FARC uses this money to buy weapons and food for their soldiers, the guerrilleros, because they are not given a salary” [my translation] (Appendix A). According to McDougall’s article, the FARC have constructed schools and hospitals (McDougall 2009:336), but whether or not there is any truth in this is debatable. According to the Tame farmer, elected mayors have frequently been indirectly 22 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 elected by the FARC. He says that they divide the municipality’s budget between the two and spend the money on whatever benefits them instead of building hospitals and schools (Appendix A). Hence, Arauca has been under FARC’s political control by influencing local elected officials to act according to their ideals. Arauca is an oil-rich department, and 9.5% of the oil income is controlled by the departmental government, which made the FARC’s control of the Araucan government very profitable for their organization (Fichtl 2003). In Arauca the FARC has “monopolized crime”, as described by Mancur Olson, by controlling the department’s natural resources, the revenues from them and influenced the local politics (Olson 2000:5). Nevertheless, in 2003 the situation started changing in municipality of Tame. The Uribe administration initiated a program aiming to weaken the FARC by engaging locals in a project called “Soldado de mi pueblo” or “Soldier from my town”. Local, young men were trained as soldiers of the Colombian military and by being born and raised in the very town that they work in, they provide the Colombian army with a certain intelligence that cannot be obtained by a person from the outside. One of the soldiers from the “Soldado de mi Pueblo”program says that: "We try to get our relatives and friends to bring us information about what the guerrillas are doing... Any remarks or gossip about a kidnapping or a theft or that the guerrillas are going to harass someone, we know in a moment. This is what we do: receive information and pass it to our commanders, so that we can take security measures and counteract what the guerrillas are planning." This soldier demonstrates how the former government under Uribe were successful in his attempt to turn the people’s backs on the guerrillas and turn them towards the politics of the government. The paradox in this specific case is that left wing paramilitary groups are responsible for the majority of the murders in Tame and this is also acknowledged by Tame’s police commander (Fichtl 2003). Economist Herschel Grossman says that the kleptocratic state exists to optimize the welfare of the ruler. He uses an example where peasants allocate their time farming, serving as soldiers for the elite or rebellious activities. His example describes how the ruler taxes the farmers and hires soldiers at a wage level that is a decision variable. Hence, the ruler has to find equilibrium where the peasants are willing to be controlled into paying taxes or soldiering for the ruler (Charap & Harm 1999:3). In the case of 23 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 Tame, the young men may have joined the “Soldado de mi pueblo”-program for different reasons. “Tattan Ilich” says he comes from what he describes as “a humble campesino background” and that he joined the army because it is obligatory and that the military ID card is an advantage when applying for jobs (Appendix B). According to Grossman’s model, the functionality of the equilibrium he describes depends on whether or not the ruler’s defense through soldiering can compete with the technology of the rebel peasants’ technology. If the combat technology of the rebels is weak enough, the ruler may potentially lower the tax rate and mobilize a sufficient number of soldiers to eliminate the rebel activities (Charap & Ham 1999:6). This specific soldier’s willingness to join the military may not have had ideological purposes (as the military service is obligatory), but may have been an option for bettering the financial situation for himself and his family as he would be more attractive when applying for a job later on. The local farmer from Tame says that another incentive for the young men to join the program is that if the guerrilla is not assassinating soldiers of the Colombian army, they are assassinating local campesinos. He explains that many of those who had lost their children at the hands of the guerrilla joined the program because they had come to hate the guerrilla. The farmer says that there are a lot of poor people who one would think would agree with the guerrilla and the communism they claim to represent. They want free education, free health care, free housing, and so on. However, their reality shows them an image of the guerrilla as anything but what they claim to represent (Appendix A). Even though the FARC and ELN had imposed the vacuna on the local people of Tame and taken on the role as leaders of their community, they had in return improved some aspects of Tame’s infrastructure through building roads (Fichtl 2003). This is not sufficient to make amends with the damage they also have caused through dictating the people and frightening them into obedience, but it is also questionable whether the situation helped after the FARC were pushed out of Arauca. Mancur Olson says that with a true and continuing monopoly on crime in an area, those who inhabit this monopoly will not benefit from theft, but they will gain from promoting business profitability and a safe residential situation in the area (Olson 2000:5). The concept of “theft” or “protection” is debatable in the context of Tame, as a local farmer from the region says that he is left with few and unfavorable alternatives if he does not pay taxes to the FARC. One alternative is to leave his pueblo and his whole life there. Another is to be kidnapped by the FARC and be forced to pay ten times more than they 24 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 originally asked of him. If his family is unable to pay this amount of money, the FARC would kill him, he says (Appendix A). If these are the options for the people paying taxes to the FARC, it should undoubtedly be categorized as “theft” and not as “protection” if those the FARC are protecting them from are in fact the FARC themselves. The FARC and other Colombian guerrilla organizations have through different periods operated in different regions of the country as a form of “Shadow State”; an alternative to the formal government while they have “enrich[ed] themselves and control[led] others” (Funke & Solomon 2002:1). In regards to the example of Arauca, the FARC and ELN took control of the department’s oil resources and supplied their own organization with the revenue from it (Fichtl 2003). Nevertheless, this comes at a price, William Reno claims. If the people is deprived of social welfare in terms of goods and services as well as real representation, the rulers of the Shadow State may struggle to maintain their position in the long-run, as they are likely to be pushed out by more charismatic or powerful forces. This may be what happened with the FARC and the ELN when the Uribe administration and paramilitary groups entered Arauca. (Funke & Solomon 2002:2). After the Uribe administration took over the control of Arauca, they also took control of the Araucan oil revenue. The oil industry’s revenue’s shift from the hands of the local government to the hands of the Uribe administration caused welfare investments to be close to absent. When Colombian Journal journalist, Eric Fichtl, asked a local teenage boy in Tame whether or not the situation has changed after the guerrillas were dislodged from the town center he answered: “We don't talk about that because.." and continued to draw his fingers across his throat demonstrating that they would be killed for doing so (Fichtl 2003). The Araucan farmer says that his idea of the FARC has changed over the years. When he moved back to Tame after living abroad for several years, he was inspired by the idea of social democracy and thought that the guerrilla struggle was justified based on the social democratic conceptions of justice. What he discovered in Tame is that the “[..] their idea of justice is not to be imprisoned or otherwise, but to pay with one’s life. Their idea of justice is to kill defenseless people. They kill a poor person for stealing a cow, but they do not kill a corrupted politician who steals thousands of millions of pesos from the people” [my translation] (Appendix A). 25 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 As a result of the FARC’s undemocratic methods of controlling the people of Arauca in the pursuit of funding for their military operations, they effectively undermine their political identity as protectors of the small-scale farmers of Colombia. 5.3. Hostages and ransom Mauricio Rubio writes in his paper, Kidnappings and Armed Conflict in Colombia, that kidnapping has two distinctive roots in the Colombian history. One of them was practiced by bandoleros (outlaws) in the rural areas in the time of la Violencia in the 50s and that the other is the inner city kidnappings of foreign diplomats and CEOs. According to Rubio these two have now fused, causing Colombian armed organizations to hold bourgeois hostages in rural areas. He claims that the combination of a highly unequally distribution of wealth along with drug trafficking have facilitated this form of kidnapping (Rubio 2004). Professor of Political Science, Jon Elster, says that “[k]idnapping in Colombia has been routinized and almost trivialized to an extent that has no parallel elsewhere.” He writes in his article “Kidnappings in Civil Wars” that the kidnappings are losing their political agenda and that the focus has shifted to more gain-oriented kidnappings (2004:2-3). One of the most famous kidnappings in the history of the FARC is the kidnapping of FrenchColombian politician Ingrid Betancourt. Betancourt was a presidential candidate for the green party Óxigeno at the time and was campaigning around Colombia when she was kidnapped by the FARC in San Vicente de Caguán in 2002. San Vicente is widely known for being situated in an area controlled by the FARC. In an interview made by the Guardian, Betancourt described the FARC as “a military organization of drug lords”, despite their selfproclaimed identity as a Marxist organization (Brockes 2010). Another article by the Guardian says that Swiss Radio claims that a ransom of $20 million was paid to the FARC in order to have Betancourt released and that the whole rescue operation (for which the Colombian government and military received high amounts of praise) was staged (Siddique 2008). Betancourt was released six years after she was captured, in 2008 (Brockes 2010). Elster says that “[w]hen the victims of a kidnapping are detained for years, as they sometimes are, it is because of negotiating difficulties rather than because of their role as a pledge” (2004:3). This may apply to the case of Betancourt as the negotiation process during her kidnapping was long and without results. The purpose of the kidnapping remains uncertain. 26 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 After she was saved by the Colombian military, she filed for compensation to the Colombian state for the experiences she had been through. The Colombian press accused her of being “ungrateful” and she dropped the claim (Brockes 2010). Whether or not the FARC received what they hoped for by kidnapping Betancourt depends on the validity of the claims of Swiss Radio. If there is any truth in these allegations, neither the FARC nor the Colombian government would benefit from this information being exposed to the public. In other words, Betancourt’s role in the political or financial game between the FARC and the Colombian government is likely to remain of speculative character. As described by the local farmer from the department of Arauca, one does not have to be rich to be kidnapped. It can also be a response to refusal or incapacity to pay the taxes the FARC imposes on locals in different areas of Colombia and the measures of extortion are just as violent, if not more violent, than those that are applied on rich or more “strategic” hostages (Appendix A). For instance, if a poor “insignificant” farmer is killed by the FARC, this would not have the same repercussion in terms of an external response and it would not get the same national and international media attention as it would have if the FARC for instance assassinated Ingrid Betancourt while she was in their captivity. 5.4. External sympathizers With the passing of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and the current Colombian peace negotiations, the future of FARC may be at stake. In this chapter I will aim to explain why Chávez may have played an important role for the FARC’s ability to continue their mission during the years of his reign in Venezuela. In order to understand why Chávez may have sympathized with the Colombian guerrilla movement in particular, one may have to look at their common ideological roots. Bolivarianism constitutes a political ideology which is based on the ideas of Simón Bolívar, who liberated Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Panama from Spanish rule in the 17th century (Calderón 2007). According to the FARC’s own manifesto, their objective is to establish a Marxist-Leninist and Bolivarian state (Discovery en Español 2008). They launched their own political party in 2000 called el Movimiento Bolivariano para la Nueva Colombia, the Bolivarian Movement for the New Colombia. Jairo Martínez, a guerrillero from the FARC, said that the movement initiated as an alternative among the leftist political 27 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 parties in Colombia, but stressed that it is a clandestine party (El Tiempo 2000). In 1983, Hugo Chávez and three of his friends formed the MBR-200, a Bolivarian organization within the Venezuelan military. Chávez described the organization of this movement in Havana, 1993, by saying that: “We had the audacity to found a movement within the ranks of the Army of Venezuela. We were tired of the corruption, and we swore to dedicate our lives to the creation of a revolutionary movement and to the revolutionary struggle in Venezuela, straight away, within Latin America. We started doing this the year of the bicentenary of the birth of Bolívar” The MBR-200 would be the inspiration of the later Chavista movement, a movement based on Chávez’ politics in Venezuela (Schoen & Rowan 2009:31). As Bolivarianism has been the ideological inspiration of both the FARC and the politics of the Chávez administration, this gives a firm insight into why the two political fractions would choose to co-operate across the Colombian-Venezuelan borders. On January 11, 2008, Hugo Chávez said in a speech at the National Assembly that “[..] we should continue working on different levels with the Colombian government; we should continue working on different levels with the [FARC], with the [ELN]. No one will be bothered by this. It is essential to do it” [my translation] He continued by asking: “Who can imagine the possibility of reaching any peace agreement if there is no contact between the confronting parts? [..] I say it even though it might bother someone: the FARC and the ELN are not terrorist groups, they are armies. [..] [T]hey are real armies who occupy space in Colombia [..]. They should be recognized for being the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia and the Army of National Liberation of Colombia. They are insurgent forces who have political projects, who have Bolivarian projects, which are respected here, respected here. I ask of the governments of the continent that they retrieve the FARC and the ELN – those who have labeled them as guerrilla insurgencies – from the list of terrorist groups [..]. I ask of Europe that you retrieve the FARC and the ELN from the list of terrorist groups of the world, because this serves only one cause, the pressure of the United States. They have me on a terrorist list as well.” [my translation] 28 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 Chávez finished up talking about the Colombian guerrilla organizations by asking president at the time, Álvaro Uribe, to give the FARC and the ELN a status of belligerency, as Colombian insurgent forces and to remove them from their lists of terrorist groups (Scribd.com 2010). On March 1, 2008, the Colombian army launched a military attack on a FARC encampment in Ecuador. The FARC’s second in command, Raúl Reyes, was killed under the attack and his computer was seized. Colombian intelligence would later reveal that they found out Reyes’ co-ordinates by tracing a phone call between the guerrilla leader and Hugo Chávez. In Reyes’ computer they also found several documents that would reveal that the Chávez administration had supported the FARC with over $300 million since 1999 (Schoen & Rowan 2009:88). These revelations indicate that Chávez was giving as much money to the FARC as the United States was giving to the Colombian government to counter the trafficking of cocaine. In 1999, at the beginning of Chávez’ carrier, he proclaimed that he was “neutral” in the civil war in Colombia, and would later deny any co-operation with the FARC (Schoen & Rowan 2009: 93). Nevertheless, the files from Raúl Reyes’ laptop would prove that he might not have been as neutral as he claimed to be. While Chávez was in jail in 1992, the FARC gave him $150,000 earmarked seed funding for the political movement that would bring him to become President of Venezuela. Chávez would return the favor by giving the FARC $250 million to purchase weapons (Shoen & Rowan 2009: 94). The Chávez administration also organized “safe havens” for the FARC, areas on the Venezuelan side of the border where injured and fatigued FARC-soldiers would come to recuperate from battle. Rockets traced back to the Venezuelan army under Chávez have also been confiscated during raids on the FARC, although Chávez denied all these allegations (Revista Semana 2008b). In 2008 Colombian Ambassador of the OAS, Luís Alfonso Hoyos, proclaimed that there were over 75 FARC encampments in Venezuela which he claimed harbored some 1,500 guerrilleros (Washington Post 2010). General Hugo Carvajál, the Chief of Military Intelligence General Directorate of the Chávez government, says that he has had meetings with Grannobles, the FARC’s commander of the 45th Front in a ranch in the Venezuelan state of Barinas. Carvajál claims to have provided Grannobles with Venezuelan identification papers, protection and food supplies for FARC guerrilleros in refuge in Venezuela (Revista Semana 2008a), thus confirming the allegations of the establishments of FARC camps on Venezuelan soil if what Carvajál claims is true. 29 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 By supporting the FARC in the civil conflict in Colombia, Hugo Chávez may arguably have weakened the possibilities at democratization and peace brokering and alimented the FARC with a stronger purpose. By doing this, he has helped maintain the position of the FARC’s “Shadow State” and demonstrated that he has been partial in the conflict. This could in turn have complicated the diplomatic relationship between Colombia and Venezuela as Chávez in 2008 asked the Uribe administration to acknowledge the FARC and the ELN as “insurgent forces” (Scribd.com 2010). However, this assumption may not necessarily be of a correct character. According to Colombian journalist Constanza Vieira, Hugo Chávez, played a key role during the still ongoing peace negotiations between the FARC and the Colombian government. She refers to Colombian political scientist Ronal Rodrigúez who is confident that Chávez’ successor will follow the same path as the late President Chávez. Rodríguez says that “Venezuela has already played the most important role it could play with respect to peace in Colombia, by getting the FARC to have the confidence and trust to sit down at the table for peace talks.” Simultaneously, former Colombian minister Camilo Gonzáles argues that “Venezuela in the post-Chávez era will continue collaborating with the peace process in Colombia,” because ending the armed conflict “is in the interests of all sectors of society in Venezuela” (Vieira 2013). 6. The future of the FARC in Colombia According to Colombian political refugee in Norway, Diego Fernando Marin, the conflict in Colombia needs to be divided into four parts: the political, the economic, the social and the military. He says that the war has been an excuse for the elite to use violence to prevent social and political reforms. “Because of this, the process of establishing peace is not about reestablishing the country in one day, but to focus on solving the military part of the conflict, which is more manageable” [my translation] (Marin 2012:25). Since 2000, the number of FARC deserters has decreased dramatically. In addition, the United States has supplied the Colombian military with technical and signal intelligence in their support of the Colombian government in the war against the guerrillas. FARC deserters have also supplied the Colombian military with inside information making it easier for the military to attack the FARC where they are the most vulnerable. The military’s knowledge of the FARC’s whereabouts have also hindered the FARC from being able to communicate and 30 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 redistribute sources among the various frentes throughout the vast territory in which they operate (Felbab-Brown 2009:11). The soldier “Tattan Ilich” says his main task as a soldier is to “[..] observe and preserve the order in the transit route between San Vicente del Caguan [where Betancourt was kidnapped] and Florencia, Caqueta” and that during his fifteen months of doing military service he has yet to have any encounters with the FARC, even though he works in an area where the Frente 15, Frente 14, Frente 3 and the mobile column “Teófilo Forero Castro” are operating (Appendix B). Expert on international and internal conflicts from the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings, Vanda Felbab-Brown, claims that the number of active FARC combatants has been reduced to approximately 9000. She also claims that security has improved in Colombia since the “substantial weakening of the leftist guerrilla [..]” According to her article, the number of homicides in Colombia has decreased by 40% between 2002 and 2006 and that kidnapping has declined by 80% in the same period (2009:11). The dispute over land distribution continues in present day Colombia. In the 1990s the Colombian government converted six conflict-prone areas into reserves for small-scale farmers, where they would not be victims of land grabs and they were encouraged not to support the FARC. What happened after was that due to the lack of government control of the area, the FARC and other armed groups started controlling the farmers, making these reserves a factor in the conflict between the government and the guerrillas. In March 2013 the FARC proposed to add another 54 reserves for the small-scale farmers, covering 9.5 hectares, 11 times the present day size of the areas in total (The Economist 2013). The farmer from Tame, Arauca, says that the FARC wants these areas to be autonomous and adds that he believes the FARC are the ones who will be controlling these areas as well, just as they are controlling present day Arauca. He says that the area he lives in is a campesino area and that he and the other campesinos do as the FARC tells them to do, because if they do not obey they become military targets. “We cannot be against them, because that would make us the enemy” [my translation], he adds (Appendix A). There have been several attempts by the Colombian government to negotiate with the FARC. During the peace negotiations in Havana in March this year, former Vice President, Humberto de la Calle, said that the government will not be taking any land from private land owners, but that “[..] it is clear that there will be no peace without addressing the problems of Colombia’s 31 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 rural poor, including their lack of land for farming” (Franks 2013). How the Colombian government is imagining this to be done remains unclear, at least until we see the results of the peace negotiations. De la Calle also said on May 3 this year that in the opinion of the government “[..] the pace of the talks has been insufficient and inconsistent. We believe that it is important to speed them up and that it is possible to speed them up” (Aljazeera 2013). The FARC’s lead negotiator, Iván Marquéz, has responded to the governments wishes to speed up the negotiations by saying that they need more time, as this is a half a century long internal conflict in Colombia (BBC News 2013) President Santos has set the deadline for the negotiations to November 2013 (BBC News 2012). This may be a convenient moment for his administration to succeed in disarming the FARC as his time in office expires in May the following year. In accordance with the FARC’s original idealism, it may be a paradox that the FARC claim to be fighting for an agrarian reform in light of their original manifesto and that their enemies are the large land owners who have occupied the land of the small scale farmer. In an interview with Aljazeera, FARC commander Ruben Zamora says that “[t]he government does not want to touch large land owners and we say that that is one of the roots that has started this conflict. There is inequality among those who own the lands. Three quarters of the country is owned by the elites [..] We believe that it is important to recover lands, so that those who live in poverty in rural areas can get something in exchange “ (Aljazeera 2013). A farmer from the department of Arauca says that the FARC and the ELN have stolen and occupied several farms in Arauca, including the farm of his father. The guerrilleros ate all the crops of the farmers, and the interviewed farmer’s father had to buy back his farm from them by giving them a certain number of three-year-old heifers. Afterwards they had a meeting where the guerrilleros said that they only occupied them because of “orders from the guerrilla” (Appendix A). The future of the FARC in Colombia is still uncertain, but the Araucan farmer says that the FARC should follow the example of the Colombian former guerrilla movement M19 who laid down their weapons and joined the political arena to become mayors of towns and governors of departments. He says that one cannot simply remove a guerrillero from its life as a guerrillero nor a professional soldier from his life as a professional soldier. They are likely to be converted into delinquents who will take advantage of their abilities to kill to earn a living, 32 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 because they do not know how to do anything else. The farmer says that when some prior paramilitary soldiers turned in their weapons, they formed armed gangs, and the violence kept spreading only dressed as something else (Appendix A). Even if the peace negotiations succeed in accordance with the government’s aspiration to dismantle the FARC, this may generate new challenges for the Colombian society. 7. Conclusion In the background chapter of this thesis we observed the premises for the insurgency of the FARC in Colombia. The FARC’s motivation to rebel against the powerful landowners and what they perceived as an unjust government was based on the unequal distribution of land and the suffering small-scale farmers endured from lacking land to work on. However, the empirical evidence of this thesis proves that they may not always be as true to their ideological point of departure as they still claim to be. The question that remains is: how have the FARC’s sources of revenue influenced their political project? Chapter 5 exhibits how small-scale coca growers are co-opted and controlled, mayors are manipulated into corruption and civilians are extorted for taxes and ransom. If the FARC’s Marxist ideology had not suffered from their need to feed, house and arm their guerrilleros, they would probably not have been scaring and manipulating the lower peasant class into obedience. They claim to represent the “victims of the fury of the landowners and the military”, democracy and human rights, but are in reality creating more victims, depriving them of democratic local elections and basic human rights. Through kidnapping and extortion, not only of famous politicians and diplomats, but of local, modest farmers they fail to maintain the image they created of themselves in their manifesto from 1966. As the peace negotiations may have improved the diplomatic relationship between Venezuela and Colombia it is debatable whether or not Chávez successor, Nicolás Maduro, will continue building on the relationship between the Venezuelan government and the FARC. Since the FARC also have moved into Venezuelan territory, they are undeniably affecting the different local societies in the areas surrounding their camps there as well. Neither the Colombian state nor the FARC have clean sleeves. Even if the peace negotiations were to be successful, the civil war has left ugly scars in many different Colombian communities. Thus, Colombia would not only be left with thousands of ex-guerrilleros and 33 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 ex-soldiers who are likely to develop posttraumatic stress disorder, but also thousands of civilians whose life have been tainted by active or passive partaking in the internal conflict. Whether or not FARC could have financed their insurgency in any other way is a complex debate. Nevertheless, their methods of catching revenue have indeed left an imprint on their political project. Not only have they manipulated and scared potential supporters away from them, but they have also colored the perception the international community has of them as revolutionary, justice-oriented freedom fighters through their engagement in the illicit drug industry and violations of human rights. 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Peasant farmers and the peace talks” 04.06.13 http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21575801-peasant-farmers-and-peace-talksreserved-whom?zid=305&ah=417bd5664dc76da5d98af4f7a640fd8a Accessed: 05.19.13 United Nations Development Programme (2012) Colombia Country Profile: Human Development Indicators, http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/COL.html Accessed: 05.21.13 Vieira, Constanza (2013) “Colombia’s Peace Process Sans Chávez”, Inter Press Service News Agency, 15.03.13 http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/03/colombias-peace-process-sanschavez/ Accessed: 05.20.13 Villar, Oliver & Drew Cottle (2011) Cocaine, Death Squads and the War on Terror: US imperialism and class struggle in Colombia, Monthly Review Press, New York. Washington Post (2010) “Colombia proves again that Venezuela is harboring FARC terrorists”, 07.30.10 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/07/29/AR2010072905211.html 07.30.10 Accessed: 05.16.13 39 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 APPENDIX A Interview 1: civilian farmer of Tame - ¿Me podría contar un poco de sus experiencias con las FARC? Les tengo que pagar lo que en Colombia se llama “vacuna”, una cantidad de dinero, una vez al año. Y los pago 20 veces más de lo que pago al gobierno colombiano de impuestos. El gobierno utiliza el impuesto que yo le pago para obras, carreteras. Ahora están construyendo 100 mil casas para dar a los pobres. Las FARC utiliza este dinero para comprar armas y darle de comer a su tropa, sus soldados, guerrilleros. Porque no les pagan sueldo. Los soldados ya se han aburrido. Si yo no pago, tengo tres alternativas. Irme del pueblo, dejar mi finca, todo. La ocuparían otras personas hasta que los echan también. O si no, me secuestran y entonces tengo que pagar 10 veces de lo que nos querían. Si me secuestran, y si mi familia no les da dinero pronto, me matan. Esta revolución no vayan a ganar, ellos nunca van a vencer al ejército colombiano. Y ellos tampoco van a vencer a la guerrilla, sino que es una lucha de crimen, es estúpida, absurda porque muchos guerrilleros no saben lo que es el guerrillismo. He visto que reclutan niños, que utilizan niños, como un empleado de nosotros, el hijo tendrá 10 años, anda en una moto, avisándoles si es del ejército o si no es del ejército. El ejército lo para y no pueden hacer nada porque es de menor de edad y en seguida interfieren con los derechos humanos. Los he visto con indios, indígenas, menor de edad también. Pero para ellos no hay ley ni hay derechos humanos. Gente pobre, gente humilde que ha perdido sus piernas, sus brazos, la vida, por las minas quiebra patas. Niños que salen a jugar, corren a coger un granado en la finca de sus padres que son pobres y pierdan la vida o las piernas o los brazos con las minas quiebra pata que son prohibidos por las Naciones Unidas. Pero para ellos no hay ley. Los políticos explotan el presupuesto de los municipios y de la nación, ellos no les hace nada, pero el granadero y la gente que vive en el campo somos las víctimas porque ellos tienen las armas directo a nosotros. Nos pueden secuestrar, nos pueden matar mientras que los políticos viven en la ciudad y allá no está la guerrilla. Muchas veces se ponen de acuerdo con los alcaldes para repartirse el presupuesto de los municipios. El alcalde puede robar con tal de que la idea de ellos es parte del presupuesto. Dinero que se podría utilizar para escuelas, carreteras, hospitales, etc. A veces se vuelve un mal necesario para nosotros los granaderos, los que tienen finca en la zona donde manda la guerrilla. Por ejemplo, si un pobre le roba una vaca, lo matan. De los ricos, como un político, o un ingeniero corrupto que se roba miles de millones de pesos, no les hacen nada. A ellos no les secuestran ni nada porque a ellos les da miedo llegar a la ciudad y que los castigan. La gente que trabaja con ellos no sabe ni quiere trabajar. El día que se firme la paz en Colombia que este país es en realidad lo que necesita no va a ser un problema. Estoy de acuerdo con que se firme la paz, pero también tengo temor porque los que vivimos en el campo vamos a ser víctimas de los guerrilleros que quedan sin jefe, sin control, sin ley. Porque no saben hacer nada, no saben hacer otra cosa, que ganas de la vida con un arma en la mano y ellos van a quedar secuestrando, robando, matando gente, etc., así como quieren. Los antiguos paramilitares cuando entregaron las armas, formaron las famosas BACRIM en Colombia, son bandas criminales que secuestran, roban, asesinan, etc. Eso va a pasar con los guerrilleros que quedan. Yo en mi caso, no le daría trabajo a un guerrillero porque el día que él no haga un 40 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 trabajo bien hecho, o no lo haga, y yo le haga. No le cuesta nada matarme. Porque esa gente solo sabe matar, eso es lo que aprendieron y han aprendido con la guerrilla. Los del ELN nos invadieron una finca. Se comieron todo el ganado. Y se quedaron allá. Después para intentar de recuperarla, hablamos con las FARC y subimos olvidados qué dable las escrituras que dijeron que habían vendido la finca a ellos. La tienen sin producir, abandonada. No deja ninguna persona entrarla, porque es de ellos. Casi al mismo tiempo nos invadieron otra finca. Mi padre tuvo que comprarla. Le exigieron que él tuviera que quedar una cantidad de novillas de tres años y escogida que estuvieron prendadas. Estaba en la finca cuando ellos llegaron por las novillas. O sea que casi que tuvimos que comprar la otra finca que nos ocupó las FARC. Que nos invadió. Nos encontramos después con gente invasora, con personas que nos invadieron y nos dijeron, nos pidieron disculpas, que ellos no tenían la culpa. Que habían invado las fincas de nosotros por orden de la guerilla. No creo que esa gente vaya a arreglar el país. De ninguna manera. Esa forma no es. El comunismo no cabe en Colombia. Vemos un ejemplo en Venezuela. Hay más corrupción que en Colombia. Más inseguridad en las calles de Venezuela. Y aquí llegan personas de Venezuela cuando allá no hay comida. Los supermercados que están en Arauca están llenos de comida venezolana; arroz, azúcar, etc. ¿Quiénes venden esa comida a los supermercados colombianos? Los Chavistas de Venezuela que son los únicos que pueden estar a cargo de los grandes depósitos de comida del gobierno venezolano. Un venezolano que no sea Chavista no puede ocupar un cargo de manejar ese grande depósito de comida. O sea que, son ellos mismos los que están vendiendo, traicionando la famosa autonomía de Chávez. Eso pasará en Colombia porque aquí hay mucha corrupción. El día que haya la paz, la guerrilla, o sea, va a ver más corrupción. Porque adentro de la cultura hay cosas buenas y cosas malas. Hay muchos rateros que tiene de robar por medio de que matan la guerrilla. Para mí, me conviene que la guerrilla, más bien a los que vienen a robarme del ganado, pero yo soy confidente de que muchas veces los que roban son gente pobre. Mientras que un político u otras personas que tienen dinero roban muchísimo más y no logran hacer nada. Es un delito peor. Porque a mí me roban una vaca, pues no es mucho delito que si están robando el presupuesto de la nación, el presupuesto del municipio, de los pueblos. Porque este dinero es el dinero del pueblo. Si un político o un alcalde se roban la plata del pueblo, se está robando del municipio, se está robando la plata del pueblo. Eso debería ser más castigado que si se roba una vaca. Pero sin embargo, se lo roban y no les pasa nada. Si un político quiere ganar alcaldía en algún pueblo se tiene que quedar en las montañas, y luego encontrarse con la guerrilla. Ellos les prometen los votos del monte, los de la gente, los campesinos. He visto aquí muchas veces que la mayoría de los alcaldes que han ganado las elecciones porque han tenido los votos del pueblo del campo, de afuera de la ciudad. Los que no quieren negociar con la guerrilla, pierden. El que quiere ganar tiene que pagar. Y él no va a dar de su bolsillo, lo que da es del presupuesto del municipio, presupuesto que se debería utilizar para obra social. No me parece justo que le matan a una persona pobre que se roba una vaca, pero no le matan a un político que se roba miles de millones. - ¿Cómo funciona ese proceso de pagar la “vacuna” a las FARC? Para pagar la vacuna, el impuesto que tengo que pagar cada año, no solamente yo sino todos los que tengan algo de dinero, tiene uno que ir a los campamentos de ellos en la selva. Si uno se encuentre con la policía o con 41 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 el ejército, uno tiene que explicarles que uno hace con toda esa cantidad de dinero. Millones de pesos, en la selva. Y que va a hacer uno por allá. Que en Colombia es prohibido, es un delito, pagarle dinero a la guerrilla. A ellos les importa un carajo que el gobierno, que el ejército, que la policía, me coja a mí, y me pegan una multa y luego a la cárcel. A ellos lo que les interese es que yo llegue al sitio donde me ponen la cita y que les entregue el dinero. Las FARC quieren que el gobierno colombiano destine diez millones de hectáreas para repartirlas a los campesinos. Y que las zonas campesinadas de Colombia fueran autónomas. Es como tener una república independiente del país. Y ellos son los que van a mandar, así como mandan actualmente aquí en el departamento de Arauca. Hay una zona es campesina por la gente, incluyendo a mí, hacemos lo que ellos dicen, porque si no somos lo que ellos llaman objetivo militar. Uno no puede estar en desacuerdo con ellos. En contra de ellos. Porque seriamos el enemigo. Tenemos un trabajador en la finca, lo pusieron ellos, no hace nada solo robarse el sueldo. No hace nada y no lo podemos cambiar porque ellos lo pusieron allí. Nos han dicho los vecinos que él, de acuerdo con ciertos guerrilleros, se está robando el ganado. Pero no podemos decir nada porque nos matan. A ese señor no lo podemos sacar, no lo podemos echar o cambiarlo. Nos toca ir y saber hablar con él porque si no, nos puede matar la guerrilla. Con eso, lo que quieren hacer ellos, lo que pasa es que el gobierno, la gente de la capital, no sabe lo que sucede exactamente acá en el campo, en este departamento. Que si ellos piden autonomía, que el campo tiene su propia economía, y sus propias leyes, es mandar a ellos exactamente así como están mandando. - ¿En su opinión, cómo ha afectado el proyecto que inició la administración de Uribe “Soldado de mi Pueblo” la vida cotidiana en Tame? El ejército colombiano tomó la decisión de dejar los mismos soldados en su pueblo, su región. Primero porque ellos ya conocían la región. Segundo porque eran hijos de campesinos y si la guerrilla no estaba matando a soldados estaba matando a campesinos. Los mismos hijos de los campesinos del pueblo. Y eso llegó a que muchas personas, los cuales perdieron sus hijos a la mano de la guerrilla, estaban todos prestando el servicio militar. Pues odian la guerrilla y no los quieren a pesar de que son pobres. Hay mucha gente pobre que se supone que el pobre es él que más debería estar de acuerdo con la guerrilla y con el comunismo. Quieren una educación gratis, salud gratis, medicinas gratis, vivienda gratis, etc. Pues eso es lo que la guerrilla dice que los va a dar. Más sin embargo a mucha gente pobre que no es de acuerdo con la guerrilla. - ¿Siempre han sido presente en su vida o ha cambiado su situación en relación con ellos durante los años? Durante los años ha cambiado mi posición en respeto a ellos. Cuando yo regresé a Colombia después de vivir varios años en Suecia y simpatizaba con el partido social democrático sueco, cuando estaban en el gobierno de Olof Palme. Llegué a Colombia y me parecía que la lucha de la guerrilla era justa, que era para arreglar el país, pero cada vez que pasa el tiempo me doy cuenta que no. Me tomo más distancia, me alejo más de ellos, me decepciono más de ellos. Por mis experiencias personales, por lo que he visto, no tanto por lo que leo, pues en parte si por lo que leo en la prensa también. Pero es que muchas de las cosas que yo sé, las he visto, las he 42 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 experimentado personalmente. Injusticias, cosas absurdas, prepotencia, maltrato a la gente a veces, que porque tienen un mando y tienen las armas y si alguien del pueblo es armado tiene que enviarles la arma y aceptar lo que le digan. Todo el mundo tiene que pagarles, él que tenga algo de dinero tiene que pagarles de acuerdo con lo que tiene una “vacuna”, una cantidad de dinero anual. También se habla mucho, y he visto cuando estaba yo en la zona de ellos cuando iba a entregar el dinero, he visto plantaciones de cocaína y de marihuana. Es un negocio. Está prohibido fumar marihuana o consumir cocaína, pero si la venden. Una persona que sea drogadicta la matan. La matan en seguida por nada. O por cosas muy pequeñas que en salida ante de la justicia ordinaria en Colombia tendría dos meses en la cárcel y nada más. Aquí ellos, la justicia de ellos no es cárcel ni nada sino como pagan con la vida. La justicia de ellos es matar a la persona indefensa. Matan a un pobre porque se roba una vaca, pero no matan a un político corrupto que se roba miles de millones de la plata del pueblo. Yo con los años que vivía en Suecia, me considero más socialista que los guerrilleros que están aquí en las montañas de Tame. - ¿Qué piensa Usted sobre las conversaciones de paz entre el gobierno y las FARC que están pasando en estos días? ¿Cree que va a cambiar algo o que las FARC/el sistema político colombiano ya están bastante firmes en la sociedad en Colombia? ¿Cree Usted que el proceso sería diferente con otro gobierno en reino? El proceso de paz le conviene a Colombia porque es una guerra absurda que si seguimos así, nunca va a tener fin. Y la guerrilla se va tomar el poder porque nunca la va a vencer el ejército colombiano, porque a pesar que los han dado golpes fuertes [el ejército a la guerrilla], pero para poner una bomba, bombear un puente, bombear un edificio o una casa, no se necesita diez-veinte guerrilleros, con uno es suficiente. Entonces si ellos son pocos, no importa. Hacen lo que hacen muchos porque unas pocas personas son suficientes para poner una bomba. Sabotear las torres de energía eléctrica por ejemplo, quedan los pueblos sin luz por varios días. Y hay gente pobre que la necesita. Y a ellos no les importa. El rico se compra un motor o una planta eléctrica, y funciona la luz en su casa, su nevera, el aire acondicionado, etc. Pero el pobre que no tiene para comprarse un motor, una fuente de energía, pues tiene que vivir sin electricidad durante varios días. Pero ellos no piensan en eso. Ellos podrían cambiar, si, un poco. Pero es difícil porque tienen la posición pero la corrupción es más fuerte. Hacen crítica en el periódico, pero nada. No creo que un país de estos, como con un gobierno de el de Venezuela vaya a surgir. La mentalidad, la cultura del pueblo colombiano no se aguanta que los prohíban una cantidad de cuestiones como en Cuba, como la gente no puede tener celulares. En pleno siglo veintiuno, un pueblo sin celulares, ¿por qué? Si el sistema es bueno, si es lo mejor que hay, ¿por qué se reprime al pueblo? ¿Por qué no pueden tener libertad de expresión? No pueden salir y entrar libremente. ¿Por qué prohíben tantas cosas al pueblo? El gobierno colombiano no se aguantaría, el pueblo colombiano no se aguantaría eso. Y aquí vendría una guerra como va a suceder en Venezuela. En Venezuela, para poder quitarse del gobierno que tienen actualmente, tiene que haber una guerra civil. Siendo uno de los países más ricos del mundo es inexplicable que tengan una economía tan mala. Tan pésima y cada día es peor. 43 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 La guerrilla debería aprovechar estas conversaciones de paz en Cuba con el gobierno colombiano. Para seguir el ejemplo del M19 que se dieron cuenta que esa guerra de ellos no iba a llegar a ninguna parte, que al contrario estaban destruyendo el país. Deberían entregar las armas y por la vía del dialogo, por la vía del voto llegar al poder. Tenemos comandantes del M19 que son senadores, que han sido gobernadores del departamento, alcaldes. Actualmente el alcalde de Bogotá, que es el segundo puesto más importante del país después de la presidencia, él tiene un excomandante de la M19. Deberían seguir el ejemplo de ellos. Y no matar soldados, hijos de campesinos. Porque el soldado que está prestando su servicio militar por obligación es presa fácil por la guerrilla porque es un muchacho joven. Y el soldado profesional, que tiene un entrenamiento especial, él no es presa fácil para la guerrilla. Pero el día de mañana va a ser un psicópata que cuando retorna a la vida civil se va a convertir en un delincuente que aprovecha su entrenamiento para matar, etc. Para ganarse la visa de esa forma sin trabajar. Lo mismo pasa con los guerrilleros que ellos entrenan. Así como pasó con los soldados de los paramilitares. Cuando los paramilitares entregaron las armas los soldados que quedaron formaron bandas criminales y están matraqueando, matando, robando, secuestrando. Porque no quieren trabajar y no saben hacer otra cosa. Para ellos es más fácil ganarse el dinero con un arma en la mano que ponerse a trabajar y ganar un sueldo. 44 The FARC, their sources of revenue and effects of these Candidate number: 303 APPENDIX B Interview 2: soldier of the Colombian Army - ¿Me podría contar un poco de su historia? ¿Cuántos años tiene Usted y de dónde es? ¿Por qué decidió Usted unirse al ejército colombiano? Soy un joven estudiante, de familia humilde campesina. Tengo 20 años y soy de Bogotá, Colombia. Hago parte de la filas del Ejército colombiano hace 15 meses como soldado regular. Pues debido a que en Colombia el servicio militar es un deber constitucional obligatorio, opté por esta opción para obtener mi libreta militar de 1era clase, ya que es un documento primordial a la hora de obtener un contrato laboral entre otros. - ¿Me podría describir su trabajo como soldado del ejército colombiano? ¿Cuáles son sus labores? Me desempeño como soldado regular. Mis labores son preservar el orden público, velar por los derechos humanos. Militarmente mis labores son dependiendo el área donde me encuentre, en este momento estoy en un biter (batallón de instrucción y reentrenamiento). 20 días antes de salir al área de desarrollo de operaciones militares a cuidar y preservar el orden en la vía de transito particular y petrolero de San Vicente del Caguan a Florencia, Caqueta, Aparte de esto, me toca patrullar el área para conservar el orden y la tranquilidad de los habitantes de la región y demás personal civil y militar que esté en el sector. ¿En su opinión, cómo ve el ejército colombiano en general a las FARC? ¿Qué tipo de conocimiento de las FARC enseña el ejército en general? En opinión el Ejército colombiano está haciendo mucha inclusión en ataques hacia las FARC, dando resultados militares, pero también se presentan los casos donde las FARC ataca a la tropa y generan más resultado a favor de ellos que los que el ejército encuentra. Es una guerra continua "es de parte y parte" mientras el ejército ataca las FARC lo hacen igualmente. - ¿Usted tiene alguna experiencia con las FARC? ¿Me podría contar algo de lo que enseñan el ejército a los soldados sobre las guerrillas colombianas? Hasta el momento no he tenido ningún tipo de experiencia desfavorable con las FARC a pesar de que en el área donde estoy opera el frente 15, frente 14, frente 3 y la columna móvil "Teófilo forero castro". Y pues espero que en mi tiempo restante de servicio no pase algún tipo de inconveniente. - ¿Qué piensa Usted de las negociaciones de paz entre el gobierno de Santos y las FARC? Cree Usted que habrá una solución? Explícame porque no o porque si, por favor. Pues esas negociaciones son algo difíciles, porque las FARC tiene el comité que está negociando, pero mientras eso pasa ellos siguen con los ataques a al ejército y viceversa. La parte militar de las FARC siguen en el combate con las tropas del ejército. Creo que será una idea muy lejana, es conflicto armado en Colombia. La guerra irregular está muy latente en este país. 45
