Asuntos de Gobernabilidad y Corrupcion en America Latina (incluyendo Chile) en un marco empirico comparativo Daniel Kaufmann, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) Presentacion en el Foro "Corrupción en Chile y America Latina los desafíos pendientes“ organizado por Espacio Publico y UAI, UAI Campus, Santiago, 6 de Octubre 1 Perspectiva sobre ‘escandalos’ • America Latina y Chile: Logros, no solo desafios… • Escandalos como estudios de caso de las distintas manifestaciones de corrupcion, y de como su sofisticacion ha cambiado • Antes: transaccion de coima tradicional entre 2 • Hoy en dia: Importancia de ‘Networks’ (Redes) de corrupcion, nacionales e internacionales, y de ‘Captura del Estado’… • Corrupcion como sintoma de debilidad institucional, necesidad de estudiar esquema amplio de gobernabilidad 2 La Red de Corrupcion en Peru durante el caso de Montesinos/Fujimori Judiciary Civil Society International Political Parties Legislative Branch Alberto Fujimori 1 State (Bureaucracy) Vladimiro Montesinos Media Private Sector Municipal Government Source: “Robust Web of Corruption: Peru’s Intelligence Chief Vladimiro Montesinos,” Kennedy School of Government Case Program, Case C14-04-1722.0, based on research by Professor Luis Moreno Ocampo; Peru: Resource Dependency Network, 2000 Military 3 Casos de Corrupción en America Latina (selectivos, recientes) • Caso FIFA – Basics: Chuck Blazer and other FIFA officials from CONCACAF and CONMEBOL received bribes and colluded with sports marketing executives – Corruption: Bribery of an unspecified amount in exchange for lucrative contracts and influencing votes – Consequences: U.S. has indicted 14 individuals, 13 of them arrested • Brazil: Caso Petrobras – Basics: Roberto Costa and other former Petrobras executives colluded with construction companies to inflate contracts signed with Petrobras – Corruption: Collusion network of money laundering and bribery of over $2 billion, illicit campaign financing – Consequences: Several executives and high ranking officials have been arrested or are under investigation, former President Lula also questioned • Brazil: Caso World Cup (“White Elephants”) Construction – Basics: Firms have inflated the costs of World Cup construction with many stadiums likely to go unused – Corruption: Procurement fraud and price gouging of unspecified amount 4 – Consequences: It could take years for official audits to be finalized and judged Source: AFP, http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/sports/06/02/15/look-key-players-fifa-scandal Brazil: Petrobras Source: Ministerio Publico Federal, http://pt.slideshare.net/arykara7002/fluxograma-do-dinheiro-da Casos de Corrupción en America Latina (selectivos, recientes) • Chile: Caso Caval – Basics: Sebastian Davalos used political connections for loan in 2015 to purchase real estate – Corruption: Influence peddling to receive $10m loan, made $5m profit – Consequences: Investigations have been hindered, with an extension being blocked by President’s allies. • Chile: Caso Pentagate – Basics: Tax official Ivan Alvarez gave fraudulent tax refunds; officials received political donations from Penta Group – Corruption: Collusion network of tax fraud, money laundering, and illicit campaign financing – Consequences: Arrests were made and an advisory council appointed, but reforms have made little progress • Colombia: Caso Fidupetrol – Basics: Judge Jorge Pretelt solicited bribe in 2015 to influence ruling in case involving Fidupetrol – Corruption: Bribery of $210,000 to influence ruling 7 – Consequences: Pretelt has stepped down as investigation continues Casos de Corrupción en America Latina (selectivos, recientes) • Mexico: Caso Casa La Palma – Basics: First Lady Angelica Rivera bought mansion in 2012 from construction company Grupo Higa, which allegedly got lucrative government contracts – Corruption: Bribery of unspecified amount in the awarding of public contracts – Consequences: The President and First Lady have been cleared of all charges • Mexico: Caso Iguala Mass Kidnapping – Basics: Iguala Mayor Velazquez and wife behind 2014 abduction and killing of 43 students who were handed over to local crime syndicate by corrupt police – Corruption: Collusion between government and police forces with organized crime networks – Consequences: Those involved were arrested and a new anti-crime plan was put in place following mass protests • Argentina: Caso Boudougate – Basics: Vice President Boudou saved printing company Ciccone Calcografica in 2010 and profited from the company’s government contracts – Corruption: Influence peddling and illicit public procurement worth $170 million 8 – Consequences: Investigation is still ongoing, but Boudou remains in office Casos de Corrupción en America Latina (selectivos, recientes) • Panama: Caso National Assistance Program – Basics: Officials in former President Ricardo Martinelli’s administration inflated contracts of Panama’s National Assistance Program from 2009-2014 – Corruption: Price gouging of procurement contracts in exchange for bribes – Consequences: Several officials have been arrested and Martinelli was stripped of his immunity, but is believed to be hiding abroad • Panama: Caso Martinelli Megaprojects – Basics: Former President Ricardo Martinelli received a cut from several of the “megaprojects” he pushed – Corruption: Bribery of an unspecified amount in public procurement contracts – Consequences: Several officials have been arrested and Martinelli was stripped of his immunity, but is believed to be hiding abroad • Guatemala: Caso La Linea – Basics: Juan Carlos Monzon, secretary of the Vice President headed a fraud network, undercharging import customs duties in exchange for kickbacks – Corruption: Collusion network to avoid tax payments of unspecified amount – Consequences: President Molinas has resigned and is on trial for his alleged 9 involvement Casos de Corrupción en America Latina (selectivos, recientes) • Peru: Caso Nadine Hereria – Basics: First Lady Nadine Hereria accused of money laundering funds from Venezuelan companies to finance her husband’s 2011 election campaign. – Corruption: Money laundering and illicit campaign financing of $250,000 – Consequences: Investigations are ongoing • Venezuela: Caso Ferrominera – Basics: State-owned Ferrominera sold ore to intermediaries below value in exchange for kickbacks – Corruption: Bribery resulting in $1.2 billion in ore sold at a fraction of real value – Consequences: Chairman of Ferrominera Radwan Sabbagh and businessman Yamal Mustafa have been arrested. 10 Bribery vs. State Capture, 2004 % Firms report ‘corruption’ % Firms report 'corruption' 100 Nordic Countries 80 G-7 60 East Asia 'Tigers' (NICs) Latin America 40 20 United States 0 Corporate Bribery Corporate "Legal Corruption" Source: Author’s calculations based on EOS 2004. Corrupción: enfoque alternativo • Corrupción como síntoma de un fracaso institucional • Definición tradicional de corrupción: abuso del poder publico para beneficio propio • Lo tradicional ignoraba corrupción política/alto nivel, el rol de las elites en el sector privado, y la ‘corrupción legal’ • Importancia de enfocarse en influencia indebida en las reglas del juego, leyes, regulaciones y políticas publicas, que conllevan a la “captura del estado” • ‘Otra’ definición: “privatización de la política pública” • Red de politicos, organizaciones, empresas y particulares que coluden para beneficiarse del acceso al poder, a los recursos publicos y formulacion de politicas, en detrimento del bien publico • Captura de los partidos políticos mediante el financiamiento de sus campañas • Necesidad de esquema amplio de gobernabilidad La Multi-Dimensionalidad de Gobernanza, y sus Indicadores Gobernanza: conjunto de tradiciones e instituciones a través de los cuales se ejercita la autoridad en un país -- específicamente: • El proceso por el cual aquellos en autoridad son seleccionados y remplazados – VOZ Y RENDICIÓN DE CUENTAS – ESTABILIDAD POLÍTICA & AUSENCIA DE VIOLENCIA/TERRORISMO • La capacidad del gobierno para formular e implementar políticas – EFECTIVIDAD DEL GOBIERNO – CALIDAD REGULATORIA • Respeto de ciudadanos y el estado a instituciones que gobiernan las interacciones entre ellos – ESTADO DE DERECHO – CONTROL DE LA CORRUPCIÓN 13 Datos de Gobernabilidad • Datos de gobernabilidad de 30 fuentes diferentes • Las fuentes de datos incluyen encuestas por países de empresas, agencias de clasificación del riesgo comerciales, think-tanks, agencias gubernamentales, agencias internacionales, etc.. • Cientos de variables e indicadores sobre gobernabilidad • Organizar estas medidas en los 6 componentes de gobernabilidad, desde 1996 hasta hoy • Metodo Estadistico avanzado de agregacion – U.C.M. 14 Fuentes de Datos de Gobernanza • Cross-Country Surveys of Firms: Global Competitiveness Survey, World Competitiveness Yearbook, BEEPS • Cross-Country Surveys of Individuals: Gallup World Poll, Global Corruption Barometer, Latinobarometro, Afrobarometer • Expert Assessments from Commercial Risk Rating Agencies: Global Insight, Political Risk Services, BERI, Economist Intelligence Unit, Merchant International Group, IJET Travel Consultancy, Asia Risk Consultancy • Expert Assessments from NGOs, Think Tanks: Reporters Without Borders, Heritage Foundation, Freedom House, Bertelsmann Foundation, Amnesty International, IREX, Global Integrity, Binghamton University, International Budget Project • Expert Assessments from Governments, Multilaterals: World Bank CPIA, EBRD, AFDB, ADB, State Department, OECD, IFAD 15 Indicadores Mundiales de Gobernabilidad (WGI): Comparacion de America Latina con otras Regiones (2014) Worldwide Governance Indicator Score Good 2.25 1.75 1.25 0.75 0.25 -0.25 -0.75 -1.25 -1.75 Poor OECD High Income - excl. HI CEE Emerging East Asia Central/Eastern Europe Latin America Voice and Accountability Government Effectiveness Rule of Law Control of Corruption Source: Kaufmann, D., A. Krray and M. Mastruzzi “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues”, data at http://www.govindicators.org, author’s calculations. Theoretical range of indicators is from -2.5 to +2.5 (standard deviation units). 16 WGI Control de la Corrupcion: 2002-2014 Worldwide Governance Indicator Score 2.50 2002 2014 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 -0.50 -1.00 -1.50 High Income OECD All Emerging Countries Emerging East Asia Central/Eastern Europe Latin America Note: From the WGI set of countries, ‘Emerging’ consists of 183 countries that are not high income developed OECD (but includes a few high income emerging economies in East Asia and Central/Eastern European). ‘High Income OECD countries’ includes 24 countries, ‘Emerging East Asia’ countries includes 10 countries, ‘Central/Eastern Europe’ includes 18 countries, and ‘Latin America’ includes 21 countries. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (http://www.govindicators.org). Author’s calculations. Control de corrupción en países de América Latina (WGI) Good 2000 Control of Corruption Score, WGI 2.50 2014 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 -0.50 -1.00 -1.50 -2.00 Poor Chile Uruguay Costa Rica Brazil Colombia Peru Argentina Mexico Paraguay Venezuela 18 Selected countries shown. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, www.govindicators.org . Author’s calculations Worldwide Governance Indicator Z-Score Control de la corrupción 2002 & 2014: Ricos en RRNN vs No ricos en RRNN 1.25 0.75 0.25 -0.25 -0.75 -1.25 Non-Resource Rich avg 2002 Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, www.govindicators.org Resource Rich avg 2014 19 índice de presupuesto abierto: Algunos Países 100 Open Budget Index Score 2010 2012 2015 75 50 25 Ecuador El Salvador Costa Rica Chile Argentina Mexico Peru Brazil 20 Note: Chile’s rank in 2010 is 8 out of 94 and in 2015 is 27 out of 102. Source: International Budget Partnership, 2015 Open Budget Index, http://internationalbudget.org/opening-budgets/open-budget-initiative/open-budget-survey/ El impacto de Gobernabilidad y Control de la Corrupcion 22 El Dividendo de desarrollo de mejoras en gobernabilidad y control de la corrupcion 45,000 Resource-Rich Countries Non Resource Rich GDP per capita (PPP) 30,820 12,712 10,272 6,851 10,000 3,941 5,000 0 Poor Corruption Control Average Corruption Control Good Corruption Control Sources: GDP per capita (atop each column) from World Bank World Development Indicators, 2012. Corruption Control data from Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI, 2012) Countries grouped into terciles based on WGI 23 Control of Corruption scores. Resource Rich country classification according to IMF (2010). Inequidad en América Latina (data GINI más reciente) 60 GINI Coefficient 55 50 45 40 35 Source: World Bank World Development Indicators LatAm Non-RR LatAm RR LatAm Emerging Non-RR Emerging RR Emerging World 30 Calificaciones promedio en matemáticas en 2012 Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) 700 650 PISA Score 600 550 500 450 400 Source: 2012 OECD PISA http://www.oecd.org/pisa/ PISA is the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment. The latest in 2012 covered students from 65 countries and economies. Peru Indonesia Colombia Argentina Brazil Latin America avg Mexico Malaysia Chile Vietnam East Asia avg Japan Macao Sar Korea, Rep. Taiwan Hong Kong Sar Singapore 300 Shanghai, China 350 Indicador de Innovacion: # de aplicaciones para patentes 800,000 Total Patent Applications 500,000 400,000 300,000 200,000 15,000 10,000 Source: World Intellectual Property Organization, total by applicant’s country of origin Chile Argentina Mexico Brazil Israel Korea, Rep. Japan China 0 United States 5,000 Budgetary Balance, 2006-2009 Are Budgetary Deficits in Industrialized Countries Associated with Corruption? Surplus 6 r = .6 CHL 4 HKG 2 KOR 0 -2 0.0 0.5 TUR HRV ITA ESP EST 1.0 1.5 ISR SVN POL BEL CZESVK JPN -4 PRT HUN -6 FRA USA DEu 2.0 AUT FIN DNK SWE NZL CHE SGP LUX AUS CAN NLD Good Control of 2.5Corruption IRL GBR GRC -8 Budget Deficit Control of Corruption, 2008 Graph from: D. Kaufmann, ‘Corruption and Budget Deficits in Industrialized Countries:’, Sources of Data for this graph: Control of Corruption, 2008 from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI): Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters VIII” (2009). Higher value means better Corruption Control. Budget Balance: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), average for budget balance for 2006-2009. A positive (negative) value for budget balance depicts a budgetary surplus (deficit). Chart shows sample of 35 countries of the OECD and other high income economies, except for oil-rich and small islands. Sovereign Bond % Yield vs Worldwide Governance Indicator Composite: The ‘1,000 basis points dividend of good governance’…? 16 Egypt, Arab Rep. r = -0.776 Uganda 14 2014 Sovereign Bond % Yield Pakistan Brazil 12 Kenya 10 Turkey Russian Federation India Vietnam Indonesia 8 South Africa Colombia Mexico 6 Romania China 4 Philippines Thailand Chile Croatia New Zealand Poland Portugal Slovenia Korea, Rep. Israel Lithuania Italy LatviaSpain Malaysia Bulgaria Australia IrelandKingdom Norway United States United Singapore Canada China Hong Sweden France BelgiumKong SAR, Czech Republic Finland AustriaNetherlands Denmark Taiwan, China Germany Switzerland Japan 2 0 -1.50 Iceland Botswana Hungary Greece -1.00 -0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2013 Worldwide Governance Indicator Score Sovereign Bond % Yield is obtained from countries’ 10-year bonds as of April 21, 2014. 28 Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, available at: www.govindicators.org and 10-Year Government Bond Spreads, available at: www.investing.com/ratesbonds/government-bond-spreads. Índice Global de Competitividad: Algunos Países 2007-2015 2007 2015 6 5 4 Note: Chile’s rank in 2007 is 26 out of 131 and in 2015 is 35 out of 140. Source: World Economic Forum, 2015-2016 Global Competitiveness Report, http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/ 29 Switzerland Singapore United States Germany Netherlands Japan Hong Kong Finland Taiwan Malaysia Korea, Rep. Israel China Estonia Czech Republic Thailand Spain Chile Indonesia Azerbaijan Russia Philippines Panama Costa Rica Mexico Colombia Peru Brazil 2 Argentina 3 Venezuela Global Competitiveness Index 7 Índice Global de Competitividad: Chile 2007, 2015 2007 6 2015 5.5 5 4.5 4 3.5 3 Note: Chile’s rank in 2007 is 26 out of 131 and in 2015 is 35 out of 140. Source: World Economic Forum, 2015-2016 Global Competitiveness Report, http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/ Innovation Business sophistication Market size Technological readiness Financial market development Labor market efficiency Goods market efficiency Higher education and training Health and primary education Macroeconomic environment Infrastructure 2 Institutions 2.5 GCI Composite Global Competitiveness Index Score 6.5 30 Reflecciones para debate 1. Fortaleza de gobernabilidad de un pais: No es la ausencia de corrupcion o escandalos, si no la capacidad de reaccionar y reformarse cuando crisis 2. Reformas politicas son fundamentals (incentivos 3. Reformas y rol del Estado de Derecho es critica 4. Transparencia y Rendicion de Cuentas – involucracion y presion ciudadana 5. Rol del sector privado: pendiente 6. Reformas anti-corrupcion al nivel municipal 7. Incentivos: importancia de integrar costos/beneficios 8. Interaccion entre los pilares claves de plan reforma 9. El entorno internacional: los mercados, OCDE, las multinacionales, iniciativas como OGP (IGA), EITI 10. De la crisis a la Oportunidad: “El Momento es Hoy”...