WALLERSTEIN CITIZENS 2002

Society for Comparative Studies in Society and History
Citizens All? Citizens Some! The Making of the Citizen
Author(s): Immanuel Wallerstein
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Oct., 2003), pp. 650-679
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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Citizens All? Citizens Some!
The Making of the Citizen*
IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN
Yale University
Inequalityis a fundamentalreality of the modem world-system as it has been
of every known historical system. What is different,what is particularto historical capitalism,is thatequality has been proclaimedas its objective, and indeed as its achievement-equality in the marketplace,equalitybefore the law,
the fundamentalsocial equality of all individualsendowed with equal rights.
The great political question of the modem world, the great culturalquestion,
has been how to reconcile the theoreticalembraceof equality with the continuing and increasinglyacute polarizationof real-life opportunitiesand satisfactions thathas been its outcome.
For a long time, for threecenturiesfrom the sixteenth to the eighteenth,this
questionwas scarcely mooted in the modem world-system.Inequalitywas still
considered natural,indeed ordainedby God. But once the revolutionaryupsurgeof the late eighteenthcenturytransformedthe languageof equalityinto a
culturalicon, once challenges to authorityeverywherebecame commonplace,
the disparityof theoryandpracticecould no longerbe ignored.The needto contain the implications of this culturalclaim, and therebyto tame the now "dangerous classes," became a priorityof those who held power. The construction
of the liberalstate was the principalframeworkthatwas built to limit the claim.
The elaborationof modem ideologies was in turnan essential mechanismin the
constructionof the liberalstate.
The great symbolic gestureof the FrenchRevolution was the insistencethat
titles no longer be used, not even thatof Monsieurand Madame.Everyonewas
to be called "Citoyen"(Citizen). This gesturewas intendedto demonstratethe
repudiationof traditionalhierarchies,the incrustationof social equalityin the
new society thatwas being constructed.The FrenchRevolutioncame to an end.
Titles were reinstituted.But the concept of "citizen"(if not its use as a title of
address) survived. It did more than survive-it thrived. It became adopted
*E. P.ThompsonMemorialLecture,Universityof Pittsburgh,18 April 2002. This articlewas written while I was at the NetherlandsInstituteof Advanced Study in the Humanitiesand the Social
Sciences (NIAS) at Wassenaaras Guest of the Rectorin 2002. I wish to recordmy gratitudeto the
Rector and staff of NIAS for the wonderful and productiveatmosphere,intellectual and social,
which they provide to make possible the work of the Fellows.
0010-4175/03/650-679 $9.50 ? 2003 Societyfor Comparative
Studyof SocietyandHistory
650
THE MAKING
OF THE CITIZEN
651
everywhere,to the point thatby 1918 the world found it necessaryto invent the
concept of "stateless"persons, to describe the relatively small portion of humanity who were unable to claim citizenship anywhere.
The concept of citizen was intendedto be inclusive-to insist that all persons in a state, and not just some persons (a monarch,aristocrats)had the right
to be includedin the process of collective decision-makingin the political arena and the right to receive the social benefits the state might distribute.Since
that time, the existence of rights that are guaranteedto citizens has comprised
the minimal definitionof what constitutesa modem "democratic"state, which
virtuallyevery state now claims to be.
But the other face of the inclusiveness of citizenship was exclusion. Those
who were not citizens of the state had become by definition aliens-citizens,
perhaps,of some otherstate,but not of this state. Still, for any given state,even
the exclusion of aliens withintheirboundariesdid not limit very much the number of persons theoreticallyincluded. In most cases, more than 90 percent of
the residentsof the countrywere citizens-legally citizens, that is, for citizenship had now become a matterof legal definition.
And this was precisely the problemfaced by the states afterthe FrenchRevolution. Too many persons were citizens. The results could be dangerous,indeed.' The story of the nineteenthcentury (and indeed of the twentieth) has
been that some (those with privilege and advantage)have been attemptingto
define citizenshipnarrowlyand thatall the othershave been seeking to validate
a broaderdefinition.It is aroundthis strugglethat the intellectualtheorizingof
the next 200 years centered.It was aroundthis struggle that the social movements were formed.
The way to define citizenship narrowlyin practice,while retainingthe principle in theory, is to create two categories of citizens. The effort startedwith
Abb6 Sidyes,just six days afterthe fall of the Bastille. In a reporthe readto the
Constitutional Committee of the National Assembly on 20-21 July 1789,
Si6yes proposeda distinctionbetween passive and active rights, between passive and active citizens. Naturaland civil rights, he said, are rights "forwhose
maintenance and development society is formed." These are passive rights.
There also exist political rights, "thoseby which society is formed."These are
active rights.And from this distinction,Si6ybs drew the following conclusion:
All inhabitants
of a countryshouldenjoyin it therightsof passivecitizens;all havethe
of theirliberty,etc. Butall do
rightto theprotectionof theirperson,of theirproperty,
nothavetherightto playanactiverolein theformationof publicauthorities;
all arenot
activecitizens.Women(atleastatthepresenttime),children,foreigners,andthoseoththepublicestablishment
erswhocontribute
shouldnotbe allowed
nothingto sustaining
1 "A
specter hauntedmost publicists at the beginning of the nineteenthcentury:that of social
dissolution. .... At the heartof these common preoccupationslay the wish to circumventthe model of popular sovereignty .... It was the numbersthat were frightening"(Rosanvallon 1985:75-
76).
652
IMMANUEL
WALLERSTEIN
of society,
to influencepubliclife actively.Everyoneis entitledto enjoytheadvantages
aretruestockholders
to thepublicestablishment
butonlythosewhocontribute
(actionnaires)of thegreatsocialenterprise.
Theyalonearetrulyactivecitizens,truemembers
of theassociation(Si6ybs1789:193-94).
On 29 October1789, the NationalAssembly translatedthis theoreticalconcept
into a legal decree thatdefined active citizens as those who paid a minimumof
three-dayswages in directtaxation.Propertybecame the prerequisiteof active
citizenship.As Rosanvallon(1985:95) points out, "If reason is sovereign,men
cannotinvent laws. They must discover them. ... The notion of capacityfinds
its logic in this framework."
The attemptto circumscribethe meaningof citizenshiptook manyforms,all
of them necessarily involving the creationof antinomiesthat could justify the
division into passive and active citizens. Binary distinctions(of rank,of class,
of gender, of race/ethnicity,of education) are ancient realities. What was different in the nineteenthcentury were the attemptsto erect a theoreticalscaffolding which could legitimatethe translationof such distinctionsintolegal categories that served to limit the degree to which the proclaimedequalityof all
citizens was in fact realized.
The reason is simple. When inequalitywas the norm, there was no need to
make any furtherdistinctionthan that between those of differentrank,generically between noble and commoner. But when equality became the official
norm,then it was suddenlycrucialto know who was in fact includedin the "all"
who have equal rights, that is, who are the "active"citizens. The more equality was proclaimedas a moral principle,the more obstacles-juridical, political, economic, andcultural-were institutedto preventits realization.The concept, citizen, forcedthe crystallizationandrigidification--both intellectualand
legal-of a long list of binarydistinctionswhich have formed the culturalunderpinningsof the capitalist world-economy in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries:bourgeois and proletarian,man and woman, adult and minor,breadwinner and housewife, majorityand minority,White and Black, Europeanand
non-European,educatedand ignorant,skilled andunskilled, specialistand amateur,scientist and layman,high cultureand low culture,heterosexualand homosexual, normaland abnormal,able-bodiedand disabled, and of course the
ur-categorywhich all of these others imply-civilized and barbarian.
To be sure, the concept of citizenship was meantto be liberating,and it did
indeed liberateus all from the dead weight of received hierarchiesclaimingdivine or naturalordination.But the liberationwas only a partialliberationfrom
the disabilities, and the new inclusions made sharperand more apparentthe
continuing(and new) exclusions. Universalrightsturnedout in actualpractice
to be somewhat of a linguistic mirage, an oxymoron.The republicof virtuous
equals turnedout to requirethe rejectionof the non-virtuous.
Liberalism, which would become the dominant ideology of the modern
world, preachedthat virtue could be taught, and it thereforeoffered the man-
THE MAKING
OF THE CITIZEN
653
aged progressionof rights, the managed promotionof passive citizens to the
statusof active citizens, a roadfor the transformationof barbariansinto the civilized. Since the process of legal promotionwas thought to be irreversible,it
had to be handled carefully,prudently,and above all gradually.On the other
hand, those social movements that were being createdto champion the interests of those whose rightswere not fully recognizedwere always debatingwhat
might be done to end this. There were those who insisted that the movements
should be antisystemic,that is, that they must seek to destroy the existing historical system which made possible the travestiesof equality.And there were
those who were essentially integrationist,that is, who believed that the role of
the movementswas to speed up the liberalprogramof managedacquisitionof
rights.
The story,as we have alreadyseen, began with the FrenchRevolution itself.
The NationalAssembly and then the Convention were faced with three concrete issues aboutcitizenship:women, Blacks, and workers.The recordof the
FrenchRevolutionwas mixed, but in each case, there were exclusions that left
bitterness.
In the case of women, the whole matterstartedout badly. The royal decree
summoningthe Estates-Generaledicted thatwomen who held seigniorialfiefs
had to choose male proxies to representthem in the ElectoralCollege-nobles
for lay women, clergy for nuns (Landes 1988:232, fn. 5). It is well known that
women played a major role in various popular demonstrationsduring the
FrenchRevolution,most cruciallyin the so-called Octoberdays in 1789, when
the Parisianmarketwomen (along with nationalguardsmen)marchedon Versailles and forced the royal couple to come to the capitalto reside. But a mere
two monthsafterthese riots, on 22 December 1789, the NationalAssembly formally excluded women from the right to vote.2 The Constitutionof 1791 renewed the exclusion, and this was reiteratedin a vote of the Conventionon 24
July 1793, specifying that women were excluded from all political rights.3
Some improvementsin women's rights were instituted,it is true. Marriage
and divorce became civil processes. Primogeniturewas abolished, and the
rights of illegitimate childrenand their mothersto financial supportcreated.A
law was passed permittingwomen to be witnesses in documentsrelatedto the
etat civil, althoughthis mattercontinuedto be controversial(Abray 1975:55).
And in the heated atmosphereof the Jacobinperiod,women began to organize.
They began to play a much largerrole in the popularsocieties. They stood out2 Condorcetdid write a famous pamphletin 1790
calling for women to have droit de cite, but
his voice was not heeded.
3 It shouldbe noted that this is a
regressionover the historic situationin France. "WhenPhilip
the Fair solemnly convened the first Estates-General... in 1302, he received an assembly chosen
by both men and women. For over five centuries,privileged women of all estates retainedthe vote,
both local and national.Then in the 1790s, the revolutionthat proclaimedthe rights of man abolished the political rights of women" (Hause with Kenney 1984:3).
654
IMMANUEL
WALLERSTEIN
side the doors of the Convention, trying to control who would enter. They
packed the galleries and shoutedtheir views (Landes 1988:139-40).
On 5 May 1793, the Society of Republican-RevolutionaryWomen was
formed. They pushed vigorously the demandsof women for bread.Their language had distinctly feminist overtones. They were allied to the enragds
(George 1976-1977:420), who were critical of the Jacobinsfrom the left. But
above all, they were women, organizedwomen, who insisted on being heard.
When women in one Paris section petitionedfor the right to bear arms,Fabre
d'Eglantine sputteredin the Convention:"After the bonnet rouge, which the
Republicaineswore duringtheir meetings, comes the gun belt, then the gun"
(Abray 1975:56). The Committee on Public Safety appointed a committee,
headed by Andr6Amar,to consider whetherwomen should exercise political
rights and whetherthey should be allowed to take partin political clubs. The
answerto both would be no. The committee deemed thatthey did not have the
"moraland physical qualities"to exercise political rights, and furthermore,it
was the aristocracywhich wanted women to have these rights "in orderto put
women at odds with men"(George 1976-1977:434).
As for participatingin political associations, Amar was quite explicit as to
why women should not be allowed to be members:
If we considerthatthepoliticaleducationof menis atits beginning,... thenhowmuch
morereasonableis it for women,whosemoraleducationis almostnil, to be less enTheirpresencein popularsocieties,therefore,would
lightenedconcerningprinciples?
to peoplemoreexposedto errorandseduction.Letus
giveanactiverolein government
addthatwomenaredisposedby theirorganization
whichwould
to an over-excitation
be deadlyin publicaffairsandthatinterestsof statewouldbe sacrificedto everything
whichardorin passionscangeneratein theway of erroranddisorder(citedin Landes
1988:144).
To be sure, the exclusion of women was often put forwardas a temporary
provision.An earlierreportby Lanjuinaisin April 1793 called for the exclusion
of women from politicalrights "forthe time thatit will take to remedythe vices
of women's education."As Cerati remarkedacerbically:"[These vices] must
have been terribly tenacious since it took a century and a half to overcome
them"(1966:170).4
The story of Blacks was not too different.There were of course few Blacks
in Franceproperat the time of the Revolution.But therewere the colonies, and
above all St.-Domingue,andthis was the subjectof a majordebatein Paris.St.4 Why it was the women's clubs that became the first victim of the Law of Suspects has been a
matter of considerable debate. Whatever the explanation, the situationdid not change after the
downfall of the Jacobins.In 1795, afterthejourndeof ler Prairial,the Conventionexcludedwomen
from the hall entirely,unless accompaniedby a man with a citizen's card(Abray 1975:58).And in
1804, the Napoleonic Code regressedover even the Ancien Regime. Previously,at least aristocratic women were allowed to handle propertyand legal matters.Now, in the more egalitarianmood
of the FrenchRevolution, all women were treatedequally, all having no rights whatsoever(Levy
et al. 1979:310).
THE MAKING
OF THE CITIZEN
655
Domingue had had a clear system of social stratificationbefore the Revolution.
There was a small White stratum,most of whom were planters.There was a
stratumof free mulattos.But the largestgroupwere the Blacks, and the Blacks
were almost all slaves. This was an ordinal social ranking.But none of these
groups had political rights. The FrenchRevolution was thus received enthusiastically by all threestrata,becausethey all hoped for political liberation.However, the Whites did not wish social equalityto be grantedto the free mulattos,
and neitherthe Whites nor the free mulattoswantedthe enfranchisementof the
slaves. Once again, the normof equalityraisedthe question of who is to be included.
The emancipationof the slaves in 1793 was not the fruit of the egalitarian
impulses of the Frenchrevolutionaries.It was imposed by the power of Toussaint L'Ouverture,leader of the slave rebellion in St.-Domingue, and merely
ratified by the Convention (Decree No. 2262 of 4 Feb. 1794), a decree that
would be revoked by Napoleon in 1802 after Toussainthad been imprisoned
(and not reenacteduntil 1848). What is more revealing, however, is the prior
debate on the rights to be accordedto free mulattos. Pushed by the Amis des
Noirs and opposed by the Club Massiac, which representedthe interestsof the
White planters,the Assembly decided "unanimously"on a curious compromise. After the adoptionof the decree grantingthe vote to free men of color,
Dupont de Nemours presenteda "declaration"of the Whites explaining their
assent on the groundsthatthe vote was only being given to "qualifiedmulattos
of free parents"and was not being accorded,could not be accorded,"to unfree
persons, or freedmen,since these were membersof a 'foreign nation'" (Blackburn 1988:187-88). The poor Whites on St.-Domingue opposed any property
qualification,since thatwould give the vote to some free mulattoswhile not to
them. They used the same argument,that the free mulattoswere "a species of
foreigner with no entitlementto political rights"(Blackburn1988:177). Thus
what was being arguedis that not only slaves but even the free mulattoswere
by definitionnot partof the "nation";they could not thereforebe citizens.
As for Frenchworkers,the concept of active citizenship,by creatinga property-based definition of political rights, resulted in excluding them, was intended to exclude them. In the heady revolutionary atmosphere, however,
workersbegan to seek improvementof their situationby organizing.The Assembly had abolished the guilds. The rapidrise of prices plus the collapse of
the paper money, the assignats, fueled worker effervescence, peaking in the
spring of 1791 just before the flight of the king and the enactmentof the Constitution.Strikes and disordersseemed beyond the control of the Paris municipality, and led to calls for action by the Assembly. While maintainingthe inegalitarianstandardsfor voting, the Assembly sought to use the ideology of
equality against the possibility of workers to organize by enacting an "anticabal"law.The notoriousLoi Le Chapelier,adoptedon 14 June 1791, outlawed
any workers'combination,and on 20 July this proscriptionwas extendedto the
656
IMMANUEL
WALLERSTEIN
compagnonnages,the mutualbenefit societies (Wallerstein1989:107, and fn.
248).
The FrenchRevolution appealedto nature,which was a universalphenomenon, belonging to everyone. But it also appealedto virtue, which was only a
potential(but not necessarilythe actual)characteristicof everyone. Fromthese
concepts, it derived the existence of humanrights. Since there could be multiple capacitiesand then for some multiple "natures,"the discoursehad an "ambivalent quality"(Landes 1988:123). Scott sums up "thepersistentquestionof
the relationshipof specific, markedgroups to the embodied universal"quite
well: "how could the rights of the poor, of mulattos,blacks, or women be figured as the rights of Man?The generalansweris: with difficulty"(1989:2).
The great socially unifying concept of the citizen thus led to the formalization of multiplecross-cuttingbinarycategoriesand to the binarytension of political life-the split between right and left, the Partyof Orderand the Partyof
Movement-a split thatcentristliberalismwould devote all its efforts to minimize. The resultwas an intense zigzagging of public life, energizedby thejuggernautof a belief in progress,and distortedby the continuousand increasing
social and economic polarizationof real life within the world-system.
In the nineteenth century, the so-called middle classes came to dominate
the Westernworld, and Europe came to dominate the world. When one has
achievedtop position, the problemis no longerhow to get therebut how to stay
there. The middle classes nationally, and the Europeans globally, sought to
maintaintheiradvantageby appropriatingthe mantleof natureandvirtuetojustify privilege. They called it civilization, and this concept was a key ingredient
of theireffort. In the Westernworld, it was translatedinto education,and educationbecame a way of controllingthe masses.5And on the global scene, starting with Napoleon (but adopted subsequentlyby all the other Europeanpowers), "theconceptof civilizationas an ideology ... becameunashamedlya form
of culturalimperialism"(Woolf 1989:119).
The FrenchRevolutionwould come to a definitive political end andbecome
thereaftermerely a political symbol and a culturalmemory.It left however a
legacy to the whole world-system:Sovereigntynow belongedto the people, the
nation; and political debate and political change were their normal consequence. The privileged strataof the world-system had to come to terms with
this legacy, to try to incorporateit institutionallyin ways thatwould containits
potentialfor the radicaldislocation of existing hierarchies.
5 See
Thompson'ssummary(1997:23): "Attitudestowardssocial class, popularculture,andeducationbecame 'set' in the aftermathof the FrenchRevolution.For a centuryand more, most middle class educationalistscould not distinguishthe workof educationfromthatof social control:and
this entailedtoo often a repressionof or a denial of the validity of the life experienceof theirpupils
as expressed in uncouthdialect or in traditionalculturalforms. Hence educationand received experiencewere at odds with each other.And those workingmen who by theirown effortsbrokeinto
the educated culture found themselves at once in the same place of tension, in which education
broughtwith it the dangerof the rejection of their fellows and self-distrust.The tension of course
continues
still."
THE MAKING
OF THE CITIZEN
657
This process of containmenttook three forms. The first was the crystallization of what came to be called ideologies, which claimed to be philosophical
constructsbut were actually primarilypolitical strategies (Wallerstein1995).
The second was the elaborationof conceptual categories as a new discourse
with which to describe the world. This was initially and primarily,as we have
said, the work of the dominantstrata,who hoped thereby to frame the debate
and justify the limiting of citizenship. Eventually,this work of creative conceptualizationbecame transformedand institutionalizedin the structuresof
knowledge known as the social sciences (Wallersteinet al. 1996:ch. 1). And the
third was the establishmentof a network of social movements, initially primarilythe work of the dominatedstrata,which were to serve however not only
as agents of furtheringchange but also as mechanismsof limiting change.
From this time forward,those who were not considered active citizens demandedto become so. And they encounteredresistanceevery step of the way.
But it is also true that those who created the organizationswith which to demand this inclusion always themselves resisted the concepts of "citizens all."
They promotedthe rights of the particulargroup they representedand tended
to be silent about, often directly opposed to, the struggle of other excluded
groups, seeing them as rivals, at least as rivals in priority.They tendedto act as
thoughthey wished to secure a place on a lifeboat called citizenship,but feared
that addingothers afterthem would overload it. The nineteenthcenturywould
see this melodramaacted out in the principalliberal states of the world-system
by the three main groups that organized in this period-the workers, the
women, and the Blacks.
The conflicts of the social movements-not only with the powers thatbe but
also with each other-occurred within the context of the crystallizationof ideologies that occurredafter 1848. The period from 1815 to 1848 had been one
in which all and sundryseemed to be moving uncertainlyin this transformed
political terrain.The reactionariestried to turnthe clock back, to undo the culturalearthquakethatwas the FrenchRevolution.They discoveredthatthis was
not reallypossible. The dominated(andrepressed)strata,for theirpart,were in
searchof appropriateand effective modes of organizing.And the emergentliberal centerwas unsureof how it should, or could, constructthe appropriatepolitical base to get the turmoilundercontrol.They concentratedon constructing
liberal states, first of all, and most importantly,in the most powerful countries,
GreatBritainand France.
It would be the world revolution of 1848 and its immediate aftermaththat
would requireresolving these uncertainsearches and efforts, in order to stabilize the world-system and restore a certain degree of political equilibrium.
The movement for socialism6 would now separateitself clearly from centrist
liberalism (Lichtheim 1969:vii; Lehning 1970:171; Bruhat 1972:505; Kocka
6 In 1948,socialismwas still "abig headon a verysmallbody,a bodythatwas not evenautonomous.The tail, a lively tail, of the movement for bourgeoisdemocracy"(Willard1978:39).
658
IMMANUEL
WALLERSTEIN
1986:333). The revolutionsof 1848 constitutedthe first worldrevolutionof the
modernworld-system.It is not thatit occurredin all partsof the world-system,
since it did not. Nor is it thatthe revolutionariesachievedtheirobjectives, since
everywherethe revolutionswere defeatedpolitically.It is thatthe multiplerevolutions centeredaroundthe same issue, the issue of exclusion, exclusion from
the benefits of citizenship. It was in 1848 that we first see clearly that there
would be two kinds of antisystemicmovements, two separateways of dealing
with this exclusion in termsof immediateobjectives:morerightswithinthe nation (the social revolution);separatingone ethno-nationalgroup from another
dominant one (the national revolution). Whether overcoming the exclusions
was a sufficient objective or whetherthey should be truly against the (modern
world-) system as such would of course become a continuinginternaldebateof
these movements.
And it was in 1848 thatthe questionof long-termstrategyfirst became clearly posed. From 1815 to 1848, the ideological struggle had been consideredto
be one between liberalsandconservatives,between the heirs of the spirit(if not
of all the tactics) of the French Revolution and those who fervently sought to
restorethe orderderivedfrom an older way of viewing the world. In this struggle, "democrats"and "radicals"had little place.Anathemato the conservatives,
an embarrassmentto the liberals, they played a gadfly role, pressuringthe liberals to be more daring(without much success, be it noted). What the revolutions of 1848 did was to open up the possibility that these democrats/radicals
would do more thanbe a gadfly, thatthey would organizemass action separate
and distinct from the liberalcenter.
This was a terrifyingprospectnot merely to the conservativesbut to the liberal center.And both reactedaccordingly.Suppressionbecame the orderof the
day, not merely in the Russian and Austro-Hungarianempires, and among the
variousregimes in the Germaniesand Italies, but in the liberalstates of France
and England.The suppressionwould be effective, but not long-lasting,for all
these movementswould re-emergein a decadeor two, andin farstrongerforms.
What was lasting were the conclusions that the proponentsof the threeclassical ideologies of the nineteenthcentury--conservatism, liberalism,andsocialism-would draw as the lessons of 1848.
The liberals drew two lessons. One was thatthey were in many ways closer
to the conservativesthanthey had thought,and that alliances with radicalelements were often dangerousto their interests.But secondly, they determined
thatthey had to elaboratebettertheoreticaljustificationsof the distinctionsthat
they continued to wish to make among the citizenry, between the active and
passive citizens a la Sieyes, if they wished to sustain this distinction.
The conservativesdrew a differentlesson. The strategyof Metternich(really of de Maistre,Bonald,et al.) would not work.They were impressedthatonly
Great Britain did not have an uprising, even though it had been the country
where radicalforces hadbeen the strongest.They noticedthatGreatBritainhad
THE MAKING OF THE CITIZEN
659
been the only countrywhere conservativeshad followed a more centristpath,
readyto make some concessions, in orderto absorband co-opt at least middle
class forces into the arenaof political decision-making.And they noticed that
this policy had succeeded,by cutting"thevery groundfrom underdemocracy,"
as TheTimesput it.7The conservativeswould now be readyto go down the path
of pursuingsome version of centristliberalism, albeit a somewhat more conservative one, what historianshave come to call "enlightenedconservatism."
Socialists and nationalist-revolutionaries(erstwhiledemocratsand radicals)
drew a still differentconclusion. It was thatspontaneitywas not enough.8What
was needed was systematicand long-termorganization,in orderto be in a position to have a majorpolitical impact.This would lead the "movements"-an
ephemeralconcept-down the path of bureaucraticorganizations,with members and officers, with finance and newspapers,with programs,and eventually
with parliamentaryparticipation.What 1848 led the movementsto see was that
the "people"were unlikelyto do anythingthatmatteredto the statewithouttheir
priorunitingin organizationalform.This would inevitablymake them focus on
the state, the national political level. It would also eventually and inevitably
call into question the degree to which these movements continuedto be antisystemic and not simply a variantof centristliberalism,albeita somewhatmore
impatientone.
The story of the rest of the nineteenthcentury,and indeed of a good partof
the twentieth century,was that the centrist liberals would theorize, the antisystemic movements (both of the socialist and the national liberationvariety)
would organize, and the enlightened conservatives would enact the compro7 The leader in The Times,publishedon 26 February1848, is worth readingat length: "During
the remarkableperiod [since 1830] the Sovereigns and Governmentsof Englandhave been steadily improvingand popularisingall the institutionsof the country.They have immensely expanded
the basis of representation.They have evidently and deliberatelyincreasedthe power of the Commons. They have opened the municipalities.They have qualified and destroyedthe monopolies of
companies and of classes. They have liberatedmanufacturesand commerce. But why need we
linger on details? In a word, they have thrownthemselves into the arms of the people. They have
cut the verygroundfromunderdemocracyby satisfying,one by one all its just desires. Let any one,
who has not yet attainedto the midday of life, comparethe popularagitationsof the presentkind
and that precedingthe last Frenchrevolution.Englandwas then incessantly disturbedby clamour
for organicchange. The peerage,the church,the rightsof property,law, monarchy,and orderitself,
were to disappear.Markthe change which has come upon that turbulentscene. Popularagitation
is in these days of a purely rational,and, so to speak, legislative character.Thousandsand tens of
thousandsmeet to impressupon theirrepresentativestheiropinion-and generallytheirwise opinion-on a pending question, not concerningthe fundamentalsof society or the reconstructionof
the state, but some minor and debatablepoint. The discussion is lawful in its subject, and regular
in its tone" (cited in Saville 1990:229; italics added).
8 They alreadyknew that conspiracywould not work. The utterfailure of Blanqui's uprisingin
1839 was telling. In 1846, Karl Schopper,on behalf of the London CommunistCorrespondence
Committeewrote in a letter:"[A] conspiracyhas never been of benefit to anyone except our enemies.... We are certainlyconvinced that one cannot avoid a grandrevolution,but to bring about
such a revolution through conspiracies and silly proclamations... is ridiculous" (cited in Ellis
1974:42). But now the conclusion went beyond doubtingthe value of conspiraciesto doubtingthe
sufficiency of spontaneousrebellion.
660
IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN
mises.9And in the process, they seemed to compromisethe antisystemicmovements. It was, however, the theorizing of the liberals about citizenship that
would make this scenariopossible. It is this story we shall now tell.
In the liberal states, the strongestdemandfor inclusion in citizenshipcame
from the urbanworking classes. Neither bourgeoisienor proletariatareeternal
essences. They were social creations,reflecting to be sure a certainsocial reality, but reified.And as with all such concepts, it was the dominantnot the dominated stratumthatbegan the process of reification,contraryto subsequentbeliefs. Even before the July monarchy,Guizot elaboratedthe concept of class, a
concept he had taken from Saint-Simon.He did this, of course, in orderto justify the political role of the bourgeoisie as opposed to the aristocracy.But he
did this as well, in orderto situatethe bourgeoisie (which he felt would in time
assimilate the aristocracy)vis-a'-visthe proletariat,and to distinguishbetween
the two (Botrel and LeBouil 1973:143). If he was seeking droit de cite for the
bourgeoisie, and ultimatelytotal political control, he was specifically opposed
to the inclusion of the proletariat.The droit de cite was to be reservedto active,
that is, propertied,citizens.'0
As the bourgeoisie slowly became that much vaguer and more inclusive category of the "middleclass" or "classes,"so eventually the proletariatevolved
into that vaguer and more inclusive category of the "workingclass" or "classes." There was a great deal of resistance to explicit class language by many
politicians and social scientists, because the use of such language came to be
identified with a particularpolitical position, that of Marxism, and using it
thereforecame to signify for many people acceptingMarxistanalysisandpolitics." But the retreatto vaguerlanguagedid not eliminatethe antinomy.If any9 A good example would be what happenedin Germany.In the period between 1848 and 1870,
the Liberalsachieved substantialpolitical power in the City Councils of the largerurbanareas.In
the Kaiserreichafter 1871, controlledessentially by conservatives,universalmale suffragewas institutedfor Reichstag elections, one of the majorexpressions of "enlightenedconservatism."The
Liberalmunicipalitiesresistedcopying this idea, maintainingwhat in Prussiawas called the ThreeClass system, and for good reason.Universal suffrage was a threatto control of the City Councils
by the Liberals.Sheehannotes:"Longafter[theLiberals]hadbeen seriouslyweakened[inthe Reichstag and most state parliaments]they remaineda formidable if often beleagueredforce in local
institutions.The most importantreason for this was the restrictedsuffrage for local elections....
For those who saw the cities as the last refuge of liberalismit became crucially importantto protect urbaninstitutionsfrom the ravageseffected on the nationalscene by the democratizationof political life" (1971:131, 134).
1o And when, lateron, workershad achieved droit de cite, as in the Kaiserreich,theoristsof enlightened conservatismdid not lose sight of class as a basic componentof political life. Steinmetz
(1993, ch. 5) describesthe rise of whathe calls the "Bismarckianparadigm,"the basisof Germany's
"workerpolicy," which stemmed, he says, primarily"fromthe specific fear of the organizedsocialist movement"(p. 144).
"
England has always been a notableexception to this queasiness aboutclass language.Jones
(1983:2) notes the unusual "pervasiveness... of class vocabulary"in England,and offers the following explanation:"Unlike Germany,languages of class in England never faced serious rivalry
from a pre-existinglanguageof estates;unlike FranceandAmerica,republicanvocabularyandnotions of citizenship never became more thana minor current... ; unlike the countriesof southern
THE MAKING
OF THE CITIZEN
661
thing, it strengthenedit, by makingit easier for individualsto pass quietly over
the line, while at the same time maintainingthe line firmly. For those who
passed, the importantthing was thattherebe a line, one that might keep others
from passing as well and therebyunderminingthe newly-acquiredprivileged
position of full citizenship of those who managedto pass.
During all this time, as indeed throughoutthe nineteenthand twentiethcenturies,"fearof the masses, the concernwith order,was the motif . .. always underlying the actions of the ruling class" (Moorhouse 1973:346). The question
always remainedfor the dominantstrataas for the working classes: which tactics were optimal? From the point of view of the dominantstrata,repression
had its merits,but it also stokedthe fire thatwas brewing,andeventuallywould
breed revolt. So, in the late 1860s, both Napoleon III and the British Conservative Partyfelt the need to loosen the constraints,to make it more possible for
thereto be workers'organizationsand perhapsto expanda bit the de facto definition of citizenship.
The situationwould evolve in the last thirdof the nineteenthcentury.There
seems to have been a considerable"radicalization"of class conflict, starting
with the ParisCommune,andfollowed by the rise of socialist partiesandtradeunions, at least in all the more industrialized,wealthier zones of the worldsystem. "In 1880 [socialist parties]barely existed.... By 1906 they were...
taken for granted"(Hobsbawm 1987:116-17). But is now also a truism that,
after 1890, there was a general deradicalizationof these movements (Geary
1981:109), culminatingin 1914 with the war votes of all the socialist parties
(with the notable exception of the Bolsheviks).12
The picturethatis offeredus by most historicalwriting on the subjectis one
of a curve of militancy that went upward via popular mobilization and then
downwardvia reformistsagacity (or betrayal,if one prefersthatrhetoric).This
is undoubtedlytrue in its crudeoutlines, althoughthe upwardpartof the curve
may never have been as great as some believe.13The question is where lie the
roots of this so-called radicalpolitical upsurge that, in the end (by 1914), no
longer seemed to threatenany of the encrustedsocial structuresof the modern
world-system.It seems reasonableto interpretthis as a clash aboutcitizenship,
thatis, aboutwho is to be includedin the privileges and derivedbenefits of being designatedthe kind of citizen (active) who had these rights. It was a material issue, to be sure, but it was also a question of identity and identification.
The narrownessof the prevailing definitions of real citizenship in the period
Europe,vocabulariesof class did not accompany,but long preceded,the arrivalof social democratic partiesand were never exclusively associated with them."
12 The ambiguousdebatesin the periodimmediatelyprecedingthe declarationsof war are to be
found in Haupt (1965). The essential point is that virtually all the partiespromised to refuse participationin the war but, when war actuallybroke out, virtuallyeveryone voted the war credits.
13 As Michble Perrotsays of so-called revisionism among the socialists of late nineteenth-centuryFrance,"Inorderthattherebe a 'revision,'therefirsthas to be somethingto revise"(1967:702).
662
IMMANUEL
WALLERSTEIN
1815-1848 (justified by the premise that the workers were uneducatedand
propertyless,and thereforecould have no reasonto maintainsocial order)provoked a "worldrevolution,"which appalledthe middle strata(since it threatened to go too far), and led to repression.When the pluses of repressionwere
exhausted in twenty years, there came to be more political space for popular
maneuver.On the one hand, the liberal center urged the "education"of the
working classes. And on the other hand, the working classes pushed for their
own "education."
This is turnled to the creationof seriousorganizationswhich soughtto force
the pace of inclusion of at least the male, urbanworkingclasses. These organizations had to make their demandssomewhatloudly in orderto be takenseriously, both by the dominantclasses and by those they were hoping to mobilize
politically.Thus we hearda "radical"rhetoric.This rhetoricwas effective, and
the dominantstratareactedby variouskinds of concessions-extension of the
suffrage, the expansion of economic benefits (including the nascent welfare
state), and inclusion in the "nation"via the exclusions resulting from racism
and imperialism.Of course, this gave the resultsintended-the maintenanceof
the system in its majoroutlines, and the "moderation"of the workers'rhetoric.
One does not need to intrudeconcepts of errorsof judgment(false consciousness), self-interestof a leading, bureaucraticstratum(betrayal,the iron law of
oligarchy), or the special interestof the better-paidworkers(aristocracyof labor) to accountfor a process which seems more or less pandemic,more or less
inevitable in retrospect,and which occurredin quite similar form throughout
the world (the moreindustrialized,richerpartsof the world)in the period18701914, despite all the nationalvariationsin the details, variationsthatprovedultimately to be of minor importance.14
The period runningfrom the 1870s to the FirstWorldWarsaw the first substantialorganizationof the workingclasses into political movements(primarily socialist and anarchist)and into trade-unions.It thereforebecame the period
of a majordebate about strategy.The question that preoccupiedall those who
organizedwas how the working classes might achieve their goals, and in particularhow they should relate to the existing states and parliaments.This was
the debate between Marxistsand anarchists.The heartof it was that the anar14 Thereis a sense in which the "radicalism"of the
post-1870 periodwas actually a lot less radical in spiritthanthe "radicalism"of the pre-1848period.As Jones (1983:237-38) putsit: "Oneof
the most strikingfeaturesof the social movementsbetween 1790 and 1850 had been the clarityand
concretenessof their conception of the state... . It had been seen as a flesh and blood machineof
coercion, exploitationand corruption.... The triumphof the people would replace it by a popular
democracyof a Leveller or Jacobinsort .. ." The concreteprogramhowever was "republicanism,
secularism, popular self-education, co-operation, land reform, internationalism,"and all these
themes had by now become partof the litany of the liberal center, at least of its more progressive
flank.The late nineteenth-centurymovementswould shift theiremphasis"frompower to welfare,"
and with that,they were encasedin a "defensiveculture."In a sense, howeverradicalthe post-1870
movements,they were less angrythan the pre-1848 movements. The lure of the rewardof citizenship was becoming too strong.
THE MAKING OF THE CITIZEN
663
chists regardedthe state as an implacable enemy, with which there could be
compromise,whereasthe Marxistsessentially had a two-stage theory of social
transformation:obtain somehow state power, and then transformthe world.
There was the cross-cuttingdebate between so-called revolutionariesand socalled reformists,which came to divide the Marxistcamp severely.These were
real debates,and absorbeda good deal of organizationalenergy andtime. What
is striking,when one reviews the debatesin the variouscountries,is how amazingly similarthey were, despite all the importantand oft-notedhistoricalspecificities of each national situation,and despite the differences in rhetoricallabels which areusuallyused to describethem. In the end, however,these debates
turnedout often to be less consequentialdebates than people at the time and
even since have usually assumed.
in the world social/labor movement would now be, up
The "modelparty"'"15
to the FirstWorldWar,the GermanSocial-DemocraticParty(SPD). It was the
most powerful party in the Second International.It was the only party with a
true mass base. It was the partyof the most intense theoreticaldebates.When
in 1877, the SPD was able to get sixteen deputieselected to the GermanReichstag, this resulted in increasedrepression(the anti-socialistlaws of 1878) but
at the sametime in the deflationof the anarchistcase (Ragionieri1961:57-62),
and in the acceptanceat the ErfurtCongressin 1891 of Marxismas the official
doctrineof the SPD.16
From this point forward,the SPD became the locus of the granddebate between Bernsteinand Kautsky.How importantwas this theoreticaldebate?The
resultof the debatein the end was "radicaltheoryandmoderatepractice"(Roth
1963:163).And the basis of it was "deterministicMarxism,"in its two variants
(Bernsteinand Kautsky).17The key shift was not in the terminology,but in the
fact that,from the 1870s on, the socialists began to demandprotectivelegisla15 The phrase"modelparty"is the title of chapter3 of Haupt(1986), in which he discusses the
influenceof the SPD on the variouspartiesof southeasternEurope.VictorFay says that"thedream"
of all the Russian socialists, including even the Bolsheviks, was "to transposeonto Russia soil the
Germanmodel, both in terms of organizationand in terms of the relations of tradeunions to the
party"(1981:187).
16 Schorske (1955:3) says that the German movement turned to Marxism in reaction to the
"fury"that Bismarckhad unleashed against them. "Marxism"as a doctrine was a productof the
1890s, "atthe very moment when its exact naturebegan to be debatedamong the various tendencies and schools of Marxism"(Hobsbawm, 1974:242).
17 See Bebel at Erfurt(cited in Mathias 1971, I: 178): "Thebourgeois society is striving vigorously towardits own destruction;we need only wait for the momentto seize power as it slips from
their hands!"Marxism, as Hobsbawmreminds us, was not necessarily equatedwith "revolutionary"doctrine:"Between 1905 and 1914 the typical revolutionaryin the west was likely to be some
kind of revolutionarysyndicalist who, paradoxically,rejectedmarxism as the ideology of parties
which used it as an excuse for not trying to make revolution.This was a little unfairto the shades
of Marx, for the strikingthing aboutthe western mass proletarianpartieswhich ran up his banner
on theirflagpoles was how modest the role of Marx actuallywas in them. The basic beliefs of their
leadersandmilitantswere often indistinguishablefromthose of the non-Marxistworking-classradical orjacobin left" (1987:134).
664
IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN
tion. After 1871, the workingclasses "enteredinto a close relationshipwith the
nation-states"(van der Linden 1988:333). Nolan calls this a shift from "politics to social policy" (1986:386). In Germany,they were responding to "an
agenda that Bismarckhad set." This had to lead over time to "a general integrationof the working-classinto the state"(Mathias 1971, I:181).18
What was crucial to all the social/labor movements in the end was their
driveto participatein the nation.The workersregardedthemselves as the working classes. The upperstratatended to think of them as the dangerousclasses.
A large partof the tactical struggle on the partof the workersrevolved around
how they could lose the label of "dangerous"and acquirethat of citizens. In
Germany,after 1871, the Social-Democratshad been accused on being "enemies of the nation"and "Vaterlandlose"(withouta fatherland)(Groh 1966:17).
They needed to overcome this label. One key, widely used mechanismwas to
distinguish between workers by the categories of ethnicity or of nationality.
Racism internallyand imperialism/colonialismexternallyserved the function
of displacingthe label of dangerousto a subcategoryof workers.To the extent
thatthis was persuasive,some workerscould become active citizens whilst oth18 Roth (1963:8, 315) calls this "negativeintegration,"which he defines as allowing "a hostile
mass movement to exist legally, but prevent[ing]it from gaining access to the centers of power."
KaiserWilhelm I repealedthe antisocialistlegislation in 1890 and called for an internationalconference to promote internationallabor legislation (Ragionieri 1961:159). He gained the sobriquet
of Arbeiterkaiser,by makingvarious small "reformistconcessions," althoughhe continuedto vacillate by occasional "recourseto furtherrepressivelegislation"(Hall 1974:365).Roth wantsto see
this as quite differentfrom what happenedin GreatBritainand the United States. I agree that the
rhetoric was more strident in Germany, but were the ultimate results so different? Heywood
(1990:ch. 1) calls the Spanishsocialists "decaffeinatedMarxists."The Dutchpartyandtrade-unions
"were clearly moving in a reformistdirection"(Hansen 1977:199). The Italian partypursuedan
"edulcoratedversion"of the programof the GermanSPD (Andreucci 1982:221), and its greatexpansion in 1901-1902 occurred"underthe aegis of reformism"(Procacci 1972:163).
Everywherethe patternis one of organizing with some difficulties in the light of state repression, rhetoricthatis often radicalcombined with practicethat is on the whole moderate,and a sort
of "negativeintegration"into the nationalcommunities. In France,the heavy repressionafter the
Communeeased up after 1875, the governmentrecognizingthe wisdom of a "social policy directed at the workingclass" (Sch6ttler 1985:58). In any case, all the partiesseemed to follow the path
of de facto reformism,that is, integration(even if negative) into the political structuresof theirrespective countries.
As for the United States (and Canada),which Lipset (1983:14) insists are differentbecause the
absence of a feudal past "servedto reduce the salience of class-conscious politics and proposals,"
one merely needs to change a bit of the rhetoricto see the similarities.Herberg(cited in Dubofsky
1974:275) showed the degree to which the relationshipof the IWW ("withits stress on proletarian
direct action")to the craft unionismof the AFL was parallelto the relationshipof Bernstein's"reformism"to Kautsky's"orthodoxMarxism."Laslett (1974:115-16) makes the same pointessentially aboutthe American Socialist Party.Foner (1984:74), respondingto the literatureon "why is
there no socialism in the U.S.?," says that the question should really be posed as "why has there
been no socialist transformationin any advancedcapitalistsociety?"The most strikingdifference
in the United States (and Canada)from the west Europeanstates was the ability of the Democratic Partyin the United States (andthe LiberalPartyin Canada)to remainthe primevehicle of working-class politics (Shefter 1986:270;Kealey 1980:273), somethingwhich might be explainedmore
by the role of the city machinesin incorporatingimmigrantworkersthanby anythingelse.
THE MAKING OF THE CITIZEN
665
ers remainedpassive citizens or even non-citizens. Once again, inclusion was
being achieved by exclusion.
The story of the feminist/women's movement in the nineteenthcentury is
similar in very many ways to the story of the social/labor movement. There
were of course a few voices who saw the two strugglesas not merely compatible but intertwined.FloraTristanin the pre-1848 period spent her life preaching this. She was, it mustbe said, a voice in the wilderness.19The problem,from
the point of view of the male workerin urbanwage-work, was quite straightforward. Women were paid less, before 1914 "considerably"less (Guilbert
1966:21), and this posed a threatto the level of wages in general.The issue was
raisedin meeting aftermeeting (Guilbert1966:188). The FirstInternationalwas
divided on the question.At the first congress in Geneva in 1866, the final resolution compromisedby saying that women's work was to be regardedpositively, but criticizing its conditions undercapitalistproduction(Frei 1987:39).
The workers'organizationswould now push on threefronts:equalityof wages,
the family wage, and dangerousworkplaceconditions.
Equalityof wages (for equal work)is a standardandobvious demandof trade
unions. But it was frequentlythe secret hope that, if wages were made equal
(for women, for minoritiesand immigrants,for workersin othercountries),the
hierarchicallydominantworker(the male citizen workerof the rankingethnic
group)would thenbe employedin preference,if only for cultural-historicalreasons.20 The "family wage" became a centraldemandof the trade-unionstructures. The family wage was a simple idea. The minimumwage an adult male
should receive for his waged work should be a sum sufficient to sustain him,
his wife, and his non-adult children. This concept had wide appeal. It was
strongly endorsed by the labor movement (Lewis 1984:49). It appealed to
many employers, since it seemed to promise stability of the work force (May
1982:418). It fit in with the nineteenth-centuryvalue of the "responsibility"of
men to care for their family (Evans 1983:281). It appealedthereforenot only
to the labor movements but to centristpoliticians of all stripes. Only feminists
objected to the concept (Offen 1957:183).21
19 As was Aline Vallette,
disciple of Guesde, who wrote in L'Harmoniesociale on 15 March
1892 that "torenovatesociety, it is necessarythatthe two oppressedgroupsof society, women and
proletarians,unite" (cited in Zylberberg-Hocquard1978:89).
20 Notice, for example,the languageof the resolutionin the Ninth Congressof the FrenchC.G.T.
in Rennes in 1898: "Thatin all areasof life we seek to propagatethe idea that the man must nourish the woman; that for the woman, widow or young girl, necessarily obliged to provide for herself, it shall be understoodthat the formula,for equal work equal pay, shall be appliedto her....
Keep men from takingjobs and work that belong to women, and reciprocally,keep women from
taking work away from men that are theirnaturalprovince (cited in Guilbert1966:173).
21 The same was more or less true about the concept of special "protective"legislation for
women workers.Rowbotham(1977:114) says it was always a "thornyissue." It seemed a virtuous
idea, and it was long a preoccupationof the socialist movement (Guilbert 1966:413). Anarchists
did not like it, because it involved governmentintervention.Middle-class feminists opposed it in
the name of equality.The women workersthemselves often feared that it would result in reduced
666
IMMANUEL
WALLERSTEIN
From 1890-1920, feminists and socialists remained"at arm's length,"and
indeed "becamebitter enemies" (Kennedy and Tilly 1985:36). For workingclass women the basic choice seemed always to be: "Sistersor citizens?"(Sowerwine 1982:1).And in the end, working-classwomen who were politicallyactive were not allowed to refuse the choice.
The women's/feminist movement must not however be seen primarily
throughthe prism of the social/labormovement.It had its own dynamic,albeit
one that was parallelin many ways. Still, the story didn't really startwith the
women, but with the men.As O'Neill says of Victorianmen (butwas moregenerally truethroughoutthe nineteenth-centuryEuropeanworld), the men "taught
women to think of themselves as a special class.... [They] created The
Woman,where before there had only been women" (1971:6).
In 1848, feminism reasserteditself as partof the social revolutionin France
and elsewhere. But with the exception of a few tiny Communistgroups,these
demandswere met by a "wave of puritanism"(Devance 1976:92). In the United States, the only expression of the world revolution was the Seneca Falls
Convention,generallyregardedas the founding moment of U.S. feminism.Its
famous Declarationof Sentimentsof 19-20 July 1848, echoing the Declaration of Independence,begins: "Wehold these truthsto be self-evident:that all
men and women are createdequal."Among the grievanceslisted on 18 August
were that women were deprivedof "the first right of a citizen, elective franchise," a franchise that was given (this complaint foreshadowingfutureconflicts) to "ignorantand degradedmen-both natives and foreigners"(Rossi
1973:416).
In Europe,after the June Days in France,repressionwas severe, not merely
of the socialists but of the feminists as well. This did not however drawthe two
"pariah"groups together.Rather,they would now go, for the most part,their
separateorganizationalways. The housewife had now become the dominant
culturalimage of the role the womanwas supposedto play in the modemworld.
In the nineteenthcentury,the distinctionbetween public and privatespheresof
life became centralto the geoculture.It was being hailed as one of the greatadvances of modernity,and was the logical consequenceof the demandfor rationality,in which "good social organization"seemed to require"a stricterdefinition of spaces, roles and tasks" (Perrot 1986:35), which in turn "servedas a
justification for the assignmentof personal characteristicsand social roles to
males and females"(Allen 1991:29).This has been called the "genderingof the
public sphere"(Landes 1988:2).22
wages. And, in fact, the socialist movementwas somewhatdivided. The CatholicZentrumin Germany endorsed it as part of their search for a more social capitalism. For most male workers,it
served as an alibi for theirunwillingnessto see an equal role for women in the workplace,andhence
in political society.
22 Nye (1993:47) asserts that this gendering of the public and private spheres became legally
sanctionedin the period 1789-1815, and connects this with scientific theorizing:[A] biomedical
THE MAKING OF THE CITIZEN
667
Feminist movements were from the beginning caught in the conceptual
dilemma that had been createdfor them. On the one hand, they were heirs to
the universalist,andindividualist,traditionenshrinedin the FrenchRevolution.
But when they asked for their full rights as active citizens, they found these refused on groundsof theirdifferencefrom men in some importantways. On the
other hand, when they decided alternativelyto seek "equalityin difference,"
they were fittingin with the "newscientific representationof the body"thatsaw
male and female bodies "as a series of binaryoppositions"which were incommensurable(Poovey 1988:6). In doing this, they were in effect acceding to their
role as passive citizens, acceptingif you will the role men had assigned themselves of "benevolentpatriarchs"(Offen 1983:257).
Navigating the channel between Scylla and Charybdiswas not, is not ever,
easy, andit is rarelydone successfully.Feminismhadto makeits way in a world
in which sexism was not merely legitimatebut openly and aggressively argued,
and thereforehad an impacton any and all potentialallies.23Neitherthe scholars24nor the publicistsnor the political leaderswere of much help. The search
for political integrationinto the states became virtuallythe only political issue
of a movementthathad an "overwhelminglymiddle-classcomposition"(Evans
1977:34). How does one demandto be an active citizen? The answer seemed
simple enough: organize, ask that laws be changed, lobby for these changes.
And that is what feminists did. And if one asked why was it importantto become a citizen? The answerwould be parallelto the two-stage theory of Marxism: first the vote, then everythingelse.25
model of male andfemale was constructedby medical scientistsin this erathatmade the sexes 'naturally'suited for theirrespective social and familial roles. The sexed bodies thatemergedfrom this
process were so constitutedas to be both 'opposite' and 'complementary.'Because the public and
private spheres of the bourgeois cosmos were delineated so sharply from one another,only two
wholly differentbeings could occupy them."
23 Reb6riouxspeaks of "theforce of 'cultural'antifeminismcommon to all Europeansocieties
in the nineteenthcenturyand sharedas well by the socialists: the [socialist] partiescould function
as the anti-State,but not as the anti-Society"(1978:154).
24 In England, HerbertSpencer's early supportfor feminism (derived from his individualist
ideas) was transformedinto anti-feminismby his discovery of the principleof Darwinianselection
(Paxton 1991). Michelet's La Femme (1981[18591: 49) includes an incredibly sexist dialogue of
two men aboutthe limitationsof women, who are "broughtup to hate and disdainwhat all Frenchmen love and in which they believe"-that is, secularvalues, science, the Revolution of 1789.
25 "Classicalfeminism ... finally came to focus on the vote as the capstone of emancipationin
the West.This does not mean thatthe vote was seen as the end of feminist aspirations.The evidence
is clear enough that most feminists envisioned political equality as a means, a continuanceof the
emancipationprocess at a higherlevel: female voters would elect women; women would effect the
desired reforms not only for their own sex (law, divorce, education, and the rest) but also (via an
argumentfor female sensitivity that sometimes contradictedmainstreamfeminist rhetoric) contributeto nationalregeneration,and ensure the abolition of such evils as alcoholism, prostitution,
and war" (Stites 1978:xviii). Bidelman sums up the viewpoint of Frenchfeminists thus: "without
a permanentliberal answer to the 'first stage' political question, there could be no answer to the
'second stage' woman question"(1982:190). See the defense by Dubois of this strategy:"[I]t is a
mistake to conclude that the women's suffrage movement was a useless distractionin women's
668
IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN
The questionwas how to get the vote. It requiredorganization,organization
as women. The Frenchfeminists called the two possible alternativetactics the
"politicsof the breach"and the "politicsof the assault."The issue was whether
to give priorityto civil emancipationor to political emancipation(Bidelman
1982:chs. 3, 4). As a debateabouttactics, this was not too differentfromthe reformist-revolutionarydebate among the Germansocial-democrats.In general,
the politics of the breachwas dominant.26
The usual explanationof the moderationof feminist movements is thatthey
were dominatedby middle-class women with bourgeois values (Hause with
Kenney 1981:783; Rover 1967:61; Evans 1976:272). But some feminists did
move on to more radical tactics. The aggressive tactics took hold particularly
in GreatBritainand the United States.27The feminists who led the strugglefor
suffragewere faced with groups of organizedwomen who placed otherobjectives aheadof suffrage,eitheras a goal or as a priority.The suffragistssaw these
othermovementsas essentially less militant,more socially conservative.28The
social feminists were in fact as concernedwith politicalquestions(thatis, questions of the law), as were the political feminists who concentratedon suffrage.
For the law impingedon women's rights and possibilities in countless ways.29
We have seen that the social/labor movements had great difficulty in accepting the legitimacy of the women's/feminist movements in their demands
struggle for liberationbecause the vote did not solve the problemof women's oppression.... It
was the first independentmovementof women for their own liberation"(1978:17-18).
26 "Almosteverywhere,the radicals(i.e. above all those who demandedfeminine suffrage)were
a minority,often stronglyopposed by the 'moderate'majorityof feminists"(Evans 1977:37).
27 "The [British]suffragettessmashedthe image of woman as a passive, dependentcreatureas
effectively as they smashed the plate-glass windows of Regent Street"(Rover 1967:20).Chafetz
and Dworkin argue that it was precisely this militancy and "narrowingthe issue to suffrage"that
enabledthe U.S. [andBritish]movementsto achieve a "massfollowing" (1986:112). If this did not
happen in France, Moses says, it was not because the French movement "burneditself out" but
ratherbecause "repressivegovernmentsrepeatedlyburnedfeminism"(1984:230).
28 The question is what is "conservative."McLaren(1978b: 107) argues the ambiguitiesof the
discussion on birth control: "The early birth control ideology was a curious amalgam.Its 'progressive' dimensions were exemplified by its interestin women's rights and medical self-help;its
conservatism,by its adherenceto neo-Malthusianeconomics."And then the eugenicistsenteredthe
debate,and this "shiftedattentionfrom the rightsof the motherto those of the state;fromthe quantity of the work force to its quality"(p. 154).
29 The illegalization(as opposed to the social disapproval)of abortionwas an earlynineteenthcentury action (Rendall 1985:226). And its legalization has been a women's issue ever since
(McLaren 1978a; Evans 1977:108). So has been birth control. So was, especially in the United
States, the issue of temperance,in which movement many suffragistsparticipated."Participation
in the [Women'sTemperance]Crusadeby ... suffragistswas possible because an areaof agreement existed between the two movements.Not only were both movementsby and for women, but
both also assertedwomen's right to be active in the public sphere"(Blocker 1985:471).And when
Germanfeminists arguedfor kindergarteneducation, it was in pursuitof their model of a liberal
state, based on Rechtsstaat,"which requiredan active role for governmentnot just in protecting
individual freedoms but in positively encouraging a sense of community."Kindergartenswere
thought to promote this goal "by stimulatingthe child's early instinct for self-activity" (Allen
1991:65).
THE MAKING
OF THE CITIZEN
669
for the rights of active citizenship. In a similar manner,the women's/feminist
movementshad greatdifficultiesin acceptingthe legitimacy of the ethnic/racial
movementsin the latters'demandsfor the rights of active citizenship.It was as
thoughtherewere not enough room on the ship to accommodateevery one. Or
perhapsthe better metaphoris the unwillingness to accept the idea of a oneclass ship-citizens all, citizens equal. In the nineteenthcentury,this second
organizationalconflict was to be found primarilyin the United States, where
the oppressionof the Blacks played such a centralrole in political tensions and
thereforegave rise to Black social movements.30
The firstformal exclusion of women from the vote was in the Reform Bill
of 1832, which was intendedto enfranchisesome who did not have the franchise before. But in doing this, the bill specified "malepersons,"a phrasethat
had never before been found in English legislation. This phrase"provideda focus of attackand a source of resentment,"(Rover 1967:3) out of which British
feminism would grow. This was the kernel of the debate over the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth,and FifteenthAmendmentsto the U.S. Constitutionfollowing the
end of the Civil War.PresidentLincoln had emancipatedthe slaves on 1 January 1863 (actually not quite all the slaves, but most of them). The Fourteenth
Amendment,passed in 1868, said that if the right to vote were denied in any
statesto citizens over twenty-onewho were "maleinhabitants"of thatstate,the
basis of representationof that state would be reduced in Congress. The feminists saw the FourteenthAmendmentas a "political setback"because, for the
first time the word "male"was included, parallel to what had happenedwith
the ReformAct of 1832. The women of course arguedthat extending the suffrage should be done for all that were excluded. But Wendell Phillips, one of
the leaders of the U.S. abolitionist movement said in May 1865 that the demands of women's suffrage should not be pressed at the moment, for "this is
the Negro's Hour."The women suffragists did not stand by mute. Elizabeth
Stanton and Susan B. Anthony supportedthe campaign of George Francis
Train, a known racist, who however advocated women's suffrage.31Not all
women leaders took the Stanton-Anthonyposition.32The outcome was a pro30 The struggle for Irish rights in GreatBritain
posed a parallel issue, except that it included a
demand for political separationwhich was largely absent in the case of the Blacks in the United
States.
31 FrederickDouglass, the Black leader,denouncedthe associationof StantonandAnthonywith
Train (Dubois 1998:187). Hersh (1978:70) says it was only a "brief association." But Dubois
tothecharges
(1998:95-96)arguesthat"byturningtoTrain[AnthonyandStanton]gavesubstance
of anti-feministRepublicansthat the women's suffragemovement was a tool that the Democratic
of women'ssuffrage.He atpartyusedagainstthefreedmen."
Douglasshadlongbeena supporter
tended the Seneca Falls meeting in 1848 and he renewed his supportin the 1870s. "But in the vital years of 1866-9 he withheld his support,"believing that addingwomen's suffrageto the package would endanger obtaining the vote for the freedmen, and that the latter was more vital and
urgent(Evans1977:48).
32 Lucy Stone arguedthat "if the women could not win theirpolitical freedom, it was well that
the Negro men could win theirs"(Kraditor1965:3).
670
IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN
found split in the feminist movement.As the women's movementbecamemore
conservativeon all social/laborissues in the second half of the nineteenthcentury, so did it on all ethnic/racial issues within countries (as in the United
States)33or colonial issues (as in GreatBritain).34In the course of this conservative shift, many feminists abandonedthe naturalrightsargument.In the United States, they began to argue that women be given the vote "to balance the
impact of the foreign born" (Berg 1978:269). When the National American
WomanSuffrageAssociation (NAWSA) in 1903 came out for an "educational
requirement"for the vote (to the notablebut lonely dissent of CharlottePerkins
Gilman), they had shifted from campaigningto extend the franchiseto a proposal "to take the vote away from some Americans--Negroes in the Southand
naturalizedcitizens in the North"(Kraditor1965:137;see Flexner 1975:316).35
At the height of this tension, some suffragistsresortedto cruderacism.For example, they issued a poster of a "brutish-lookingNegro portersittingnext to a
refined-lookingWhite lady" with a caption that read "He can vote; why can't
I?" (Kraditor1965:31).
If citizenship-that is, active citizenship-was difficultto achieve for workers and women, it was even more difficult for personsof color (or othergroups
defined by some status-groupcharacteristicand treatedas somehow inferior).
The intellectualjustification for this had been building up since the beginning
of the capitalist world-economy (Poliakov et al. 1976:52). But it was only in
the nineteenthcenturythatthe theme of superiorand inferior"races"was constantlyelaboratedand consideredby Whites to be virtuallyself-evident.36
The racial divide was made almost inevitable from the beginning by the
forms in which class ideology evolved (Balibar in Balibar and Wallerstein
1988:chs. 12, 13). When commonersassertedtheirrightsto citizenshipboth in
Englandand in France,one of the argumentsthey sometimes used was thatthe
aristocratswere "strangers"and not of native origin. This was the theory of
the NormanYoke, put forwardin Englandsince the seventeenthcentury37and
33 In the United States, "by the closing years of the century it was commonplacein the South
for racist argumentsto be used in supportof women's suffrage"(Banks 1981:141).
34 "[F]eministargument,no less than imperialistapologia, was preoccupied with race preservation, racial purity,and racialmotherhood.This was in partbecause it had to be. One of the most
damaging attacks made against the case for female emancipationwas that it would enervatethe
race"(Burton 1990:299).
35 In a parallel way, the British feminist movement was divided on the issue of propertyqualifications for the vote (Banks 1981:133-34).
36 "Beginningin the nineteenth
implicitly or explicitly, there was a rupturein huhave a mobile status"(Guillaumin 1972:25).
manity;groups 'are' and no longer century,....
37 The theoryof the NormanYoke is thatthe Normanconquestof 1066 deprivedtheAnglo-Saxon inhabitantsof their heritageas "free and equal citizens" and thatthe struggle of the people was
to reconquerancient rights. On the Great Seal of the Commonwealth,created in 1651, was the
inscriptionthat freedom was "by God's will restored."As Hill notes, this theory "also stirredfar
profounderfeelings of English patriotism and English Protestantism.Herein lay its strength"
(1958:67).
THE MAKING
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671
the theoryof the distinctionbetweenthe "racegauloise" andthe "racefranque"
in France,which had been bruitedfor some time but became prominentduring
the French Revolution.38A parallel argumentemerged in Italy with Etruscomania (Poliakov 1974:65-66). But if the aristocratswere to be excluded from
active citizenship on the grounds of their foreign origins, how much more
obviously would persons of color be so excluded?Jus sanguinis as opposed to
jus soli is by definition exclusionaryand inevitablyracist.39
If race became a theorizedconcept in the nineteenthcentury,and racism an
institutionalizedpractice,it was the resultprimarilyof the centralityof the concept of citizenship.For citizenshipas a concept had two logical consequences.
It led statesto emphasizeandto predicateandinsist on homogeneityas the only
soundbasis on which to justify the theoreticalequalityof all citizens. And it led
states to justify their political dominationof other states on the grounds that
theirparticularhomogeneous qualityincarnateda higherdegree of civilization
than that of the dominatedstate, equally homogeneous but inferior.
The organicqualityof the nationis inherentin what we have come to call Jacobinism, the key concept of which is that there should exist no intermediary
bodies between the state and the individual.All individualsbeing equal, they
have no public (or state-relevant)qualities other than that of being a citizen.
Groups,however formed,no matterwhat theirbasis, do not have legal or moral
standingas such. It would not be difficult or even illogical to transformthe concept of organicqualities into differentones for each nation, and more generally, for the civilized (European)nationstakentogetherversus all the others.The
slide from a created homogeneity to a culturo-geneticorganic reality, which
could not be easily changed,was not difficult either.40Thus did we go from an
organic whole that legitimatedthe equality of all citizens to an organic reality
thatjustified a hierarchyamong these citizens. Once again, from citizens all to
an active/passive distinction.At which point, those excluded had the choice of
insisting on inclusion or embracingthe negatives-as angryriposte,rhetorical
ploy, or organizerof identification.
38 During the French
Revolution, the "race gauloise" became identified with the bourgeoisie
(and hence with the "people") and the "race franque" with the "aristocracy"(Poliakov et al.
1976:69). They cite the earlierargumentsof Boulainvilliers,Montesquieu,andthe Comte de Montlosier.And Guizotlaterexplicitly used this distinctionas partof his effortto justify the FrenchRevolution for the cause of his version of liberalismand the bourgeoisie (Poliakov 1974:32).
39 Still, if thereexisted the theme of the racial superiorityof commoners,there was of course an
even strongerone of aristocratic"blueblood"and its naturalrights. "Thedreamsof racism actually have theirorigin in the ideology of class, ratherthanin those of nation:above all in claims to divinity among rulers and to 'blue' or 'white' blood and 'breeding'among aristocrats.No surprise
then thatthe putativesire of modem racismshould not be some petty-bourgeoisbut JosephArthur,
comte de Gobineau"(Anderson 1991:149).
40 A
good example is that of Gustave Le Bon who, in his 1886 work on race psychology, defined the greatestdangerto the organicnation as that of assimilation-of criminals,of women, of
ethnic groups, of colonials (Nye 1975:49-50).
672
IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN
The nineteenthcenturywas the apogee of Europein the world. "[N]everdid
white men of European descent dominate [the world] with less challenge"
(Hobsbawm 1975:135).4~This was based on their military power, no doubt,
but it was secured by their ideological constructs. "Europehad been 'Europeanized' by the constructionof a unifying grid of civilization, againstwhich
all other cultures could be measuredand classified" (Woolf 1992:89). As the
states sought to create homogeneous nations of citizens, they simultaneously
sought to createa White (European)race, in the "crusadeagainstthe backward
areas of the world"that had alreadybeen advocatedby Saint-Simon(Manuel
1956:195). The concept of a racial hierarchyreceived the legitimationof science, itself the greatculturalicon of the nineteenthcentury.Science did this by
the "confusion of sociological reality and biological reality," (Guillaumin
1972:24),42egregious for avowed racists like Gobineaubut equally evident, if
in milder form, among centristliberals.43As the Europeanpowers moved into
41 Hobsbawmspecifies the moment as the third
quarterof the nineteenthcentury.This view of
an apogee was sharedby one of the majorracistbooks of the twentiethcentury,TheRising Tideof
Color against WhiteWorld-Supremacy,
by LothropStoddard,who said: "1900... was the highwater markof the white tide which had been flooding for four hundredyears. At thatmomentthe
white man stood on the pinnacle of his prestige and power. Pass four shortyears, andthe flash of
Japaneseguns across the murkywatersof PortArthurrevealed to a startledworld the beginningof
the ebb" (1920:153).
42 She notes how this confusion was a new phenomenonof the nineteenthand twentiethcenturies.In the eighteenthcentury,"evolution[was] a phenomenoninternalto the social mechanism"
and the origin of differenceswas "eithergeographical,or psychological,or puresocial mechanism,
but in all cases foreign to biology" (pp. 24-25). Similarly, Lewis argues:"Whenall of its limitations have been noted it remainstrue the [the] reputation[of the eighteenthcentury]as the 'age of
reason' was not an empty one. It was ready and eager to look at non-Europeanpeoples in a spirit
of genuine curiosity.It no doubt tended to romanticizethese peoples. . . . But it was willing to listen to black and brownvoices, and to recognize that there were culturaland spiritualvalues in the
non-Europeancivilizations absent in Europe"(1978:74-75). What intervenedwas the universalism of the FrenchRevolutionand the dilemmasof citizenship.
Poliakov et al. (1976:67) also date the momentof shift of emphasis as that of the FrenchRevolution. The reverse side of the principles of liberty,equality,and fraternity,scarcely noticedat the
time they say, was "thenew scientific mentality[which] tendedto emphasizethe determiningcharacterof biological elements.It substitutedfor ancientreligious andculturalclassificationsnew ones
derived from observing physical characteristics(skin color, etc.). The latterwere consideredto be
unchangeable,and affected,it was thought,the behaviorof the individualsin question."To be sure,
Poliakov also says thatracism"in its modernform, as a value-judgmentbailed out by science, goes
back to the eighteenthcentury"(1978:74-75).
Jordannotes the same shift in the United States:"Whatseems particularlyto make the debateon
the Negro's naturedifferentafter the Revolution than before was the rapid growth in Europeand
America after 1775 of interestin anatomicalinvestigation of humandifferences"and "the widespreadinterestin elucidatingthese differences with scalpels and calipers"(1968:xiii).
43 "Thetrueextent of scientific racismcan best be graspedthroughits appealto whatis not normally seen as its constituency,namely to the liberalsamong the scientists"(Barkan 1992:177).He
cites specifically JulianHuxley and HerbertSpencer.Poliakov (1982:55-56) speaks of the role of
Voltaire,Kant, and Buffon in laying the groundworkfor such ideas. Voltaire,the great symbol of
civil liberties in the nineteenthand twentiethcenturies,was explicitly anti-Blackand anti-Jewish.
THE MAKING
OF THE CITIZEN
673
a more active imperialexpansionin the late nineteenthcentury,the racistideas
that had previously supportedslavery were "dressedup in a new pseudo-scientific garband given a popularmass appeal"(Davis 1993:73). The concept of
the Aryannow became thejustificationof Europeandominationof the non-European world. The concept of the Aryan then met up with the concept of the
Oriental.
Racist theorizing bred anti-racistmovements. But it must be admittedthat
such movementswere in fact quiteweak in the nineteenthcentury,much weaker than the social/labor movements and the women's/feminist movements.
And, in the end, they got even less supportfrom the liberal center than did the
otherkinds of movements. In part,this may reflect the even greaterstrengthof
racist ideology than of ideologies of bourgeois or male dominance.In part, it
reflected the numericalweakness of those at the bottom of the racialhierarchy
in Westerncountries.The only countryof which this was not truewas the United States, precisely where racist ideology was most deeply rooted, because it
was the countryfirst of slavery and later of Jim Crow.
The difficulty of the centristliberals in confrontingracism was their acceptance, fundamentally,of the active/passive distinction, which they framed as
the difference between the inherent potential of all humans to be civilized
(hence active citizens) and the currentlevel of those who had not yet achieved
theirpotential(hence passive citizens). They assumedthatthose with potential
would take "generations-even centuries-to catch up, even given the most
careful, paternalistic attention from benevolent Anglo-Saxons" (Bederman
1995:123).44
Difference and inequalities of persons of different social origins-orders
(Estates), class, gender, race, and education-were not invented in the nineteenth century. They had long existed and had been considered natural,inevitable, andindeed desirable.Whatwas new in the nineteenthcenturywas the
rhetoricallegitimacy of equality and the concept of citizenship as the basis of
collective governance.This led as we have seen to the theorizingof the binary
distinctions, the attemptto freeze them logically, to make de facto transiting
across the boundariesnot merely against the rules of society but against the
rules of science. What was new as well was the social movements createdby
all those excluded by these binary reifications in orderto secure their liberation, or at least a partialliberation,from the legal constraints.Each success of
a particulargroupseemed to makeeasierby example andmore difficultin prac-
44 Lasch points out that, in the debate about the acquisition of the Philippines by the United
States, the differencebetween the imperialistand anti-imperialistcamp did not revolve arounddifferent views on equality,but merely thatthe anti-imperialists"refusedto believe that [Anglo-Saxon] destiny requiredsuch strenuousexertionsof the Americanpeople, particularlywhen they saw
in these exertions the menace of militarismand tyranny"(1958:321).
674
IMMANUEL
WALLERSTEIN
tice the attempts of the next claimants of liberation. Citizenship always excluded as much as it included.
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