bellin. contingent democrats

Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in Late-Developing Countries
Author(s): Eva Bellin
Source: World Politics, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Jan., 2000), pp. 175-205
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
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CONTINGENT
DEMOCRATS
Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization
in Late-Developing
Countries
ByEVABELLIN*
forces matter
social
cent
DO
literature
in democratic
on democratization
transition?
Most
of the re
argue to the contrary. A
on the role of elites and
leadership,
would
surge of new research has focused
of political
the importance
institutions,
strategic
trayed
in these
studies
path-dependent
outcome.
and the consequences
of
is variously
reform.1 Democracy
por
as the crafted
of
the
elites,
product
enlightened
for democratic
choice
yield of sticky institutions, or simply a conjunctural
Although
social
forces
are
occasionally
quiries into the strength of associational
this research has been
coalitions,3
that has dominated
centric work
decade.4
As
Remmer
points
out,
given
the nod by in
life2 or the role played by
overwhelmed
comparative
enthusiasm
state
by the flood of
for
the
past
politics
for bringing
the
state
*The author gratefully acknowledges
the assistance of Frank Schwartz, Atul Kohli, Khaled Helmy,
Tom Ertman, Dan Posner, and the
Singh, Deborah Yashar, Susan Pharr, Sam Huntington,
on
Politics at Harvard University
of the Sawyer Seminar/Research Workshop
Comparative
for their comments on this research. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the annual meet
November
of
East Studies Association
1997, and the annual meeting
Conference,
ing of the Middle
the American
1999.
Political Science Association,
Adanta,
September
1
O'Donnell
and Philippe
See, for example, Guillermo
Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian
Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press,
1986); Guiseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay onDemocratic Transitions
(Berkeley: Uni
Naunihal
members
and Richard G?nther, Elites and Democratic Consolida
versity of California Press, 1990); John Higley
tion in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992); Barbara
on the Leninist
MAComparative
Geddes,
Legacy in Eastern Europe," Comparative Politi
Perspective
inNew
cal Studies 28 (July 1995); Arend Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman,
eds., Institutional Design
Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America (Boulder, Colo.: Westview,
1996).
2
See Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1993); Au
Civil Society in theMiddle East (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995).
gustus Richard Norton,
3
in Costa Rica and Guatemala
See Deborah
Yashar, Demanding
Democracy: Reform and Reaction
Stanford University
Press, 1997); Gregory Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism or Social
(Stanford, Calif:
Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins ofRegimes in Interwar Europe (New York: Oxford Uni
Press, 1991).
versity
4
Recent exceptions
include Ruth Berins Collier, The Contradictory Alliance: State, Labor Relations
and
of
of California Research Series, no. 83 (Berkeley: University
Regime Change inMexico, University
Labor and Democratization;
California,
1992); Ruth Berins Collier and James Mahoney,
Comparing the
First and Third Waves inEurope and Latin America, Institute
no. 62
of California, May
1995).
(Berkeley: University
WorldPolitics 52 (January2000), 175-205
of Industrial Relations, Working
Paper
176
back
WORLD POLITICS
in has pushed
society
out,
largely
excluding
social
forces
from
comparative
analysis.5
in political
science put social
It was not always so. A long tradition
more
social
classes?center
forces?and
stage when
specifically
explain
outcomes.
in the tra
Both
liberals
and
Marxists
democratic
ing
writing
dition of political
capitalist
economy
industrialization
to the protagonists
long pointed
as the historical
agents
of
of democratization
(although there was disagreement over which protagonist played the
leading role). Focused primarily on the historical experience of the early
industrializing
schools.
countries
ofWestern
Europe,
these
scholars
fell into two
One
led by Moraze,
and Moore,
identified
the
school,
Hobsbawm,
as
the class agent of democracy.6 Moore
summarized
this
capitalist class
no
view in his inimitable
"no
Accord
bourgeoisie,
democracy."
phrase
was the consequence
to this school, West
of
ing
democracy
European
over
state
the absolutist
the traditional,
feudal
colliding with
capitalists
barriers
it posed
est, capitalists
parliamentary
to
inter
advance. Motivated
by this material
capitalist
to
create
economic
mobilized
their burgeoning
power
control over the
institutions
and impose parliamentary
state.7
A second school, led byMarshall, Thompson,
Bendix, Therborn,
and Stephens,
identified
and, most
recently, Rueschemeyer,
Stephens,
as
to this
the class agent of democracy.8
the working
class
According
achievements
of the capitalist
class fell far short of
school, the political
were
in estab
interested
they argued,
democracy.
primarily
Capitalists,
not
While
forms
of
rule,
democracy.
capitalists
lishing liberal
supported
the
the introduction
of representative
and
of
government
protection
civil liberties, they opposed the extension of political rights to the lower
classes?which
for these
scholars
is the mark
of true democracy.
In
5
The Resurgence
of Institu
Karen L. Remmer, "Theoretical Decay and Theoretical
Development:
tional Analysis," World Politics 50 (October 1997), 57. See also Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne
and Transformation
in the Third World (New York
Shue, eds., State Power and Social Forces: Domination
Press, 1994).
Cambridge
University
6
Charles Moraze,
The Triumph of theMiddle Classes (Garden City, N.Y: Anchor Books, 1968); Eric
Hobsbawm,
1969); and Barrington Moore,
Industry and Empire (Harmondsworth,
England: Penguin,
and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).
Social Orgins ofDictatorship
in David
and Political Change: A European
7James R. Kurth, "Industrial Change
Perspective,"
in Latin American
Press,
ed., The New Authoritarianism
(Princeton: Princeton University
Collier,
1979).
8T.H. Marshall,
Press, 1950); E. P.
Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge: Cambridge University
The Making
1963); Reinhard Bendix,
Thompson,
of the English Working Class (New York Pantheon,
Nation Building and Citizenship
"The Rule of Cap
Press, 1964); Goran Therborn,
(New York: Wiley
103 (1977); and Dietrich Rueschemeyer,
ital and the Rise of Democracy," New Left Review
Evelyne
and
and John D. Stephens, Capitalist
Huber Stephens,
(Chicago: University
Democracy
Development
of Chicago Press, 1992).
177
CONTINGENT DEMOCRATS
itwas
stead,
the working
class, organizationally
empowered
by capital
ist development andmaterially motivated by the desire to seek political
that fought
for universal
suf
for its economic
subordination,
was the true
class
of
As
democrati
the
such,
frage.
working
champion
inWestern
zation
Europe.9
on at least
both schools
their differences,
however,
Despite
agreed
is neither
three central verities of democratic
transition.
(1) Democracy
redress
an
evolutionary
nor
necessity
a
conjunctural
outcome;
rather
it is the
product of struggle inwhich social forces play a central role. (2) Interest\
not enlightenment, drives regime change. And (3) among the panoply
of interests
material
interests trump all
people politically,
are most
to cham
that
social
forces
suggests
likely
that animate
others. This
analysis
when
democracy
pion
the authoritarian
their
economic
interests
put
at odds with
them
state.
But if capital and labor played an important role in championing
countries
in the early industrializing
of Western
of political
(as the classic works
economy
argue),10 the ques
Europe
role
tion is whether
these social forces are likely to play a comparable
A brief survey of late-developing
in the context
of late development.
democratic
reform
countries
shows wide
variation
for the democratic
in the enthusiasm
project. Organized
in some
of democratization
champion
of capital and labor
an enthusiastic
labor has been
contexts
(Korea,
Chile,
Zam
bia) but amore diffident partisan elsewhere (Mexico, Tunisia, Egypt).
Private
sector
industrialists
have
championed
democratization
in some
9
Revisionist
that ascribes the rise ofWest
historians have taken issue with any simple mythology
or workers;
to the work of a single, self-conscious
social class, whether
capitalists
European democracy
Socialism 43
see Alex Callinicos,
International
and Historical Materialism,"
"Bourgeois Revolutions
(June 1989). Classes were internally divided, individual classes were often forced into coalitions with
also shaped regime
others to achieve political success, and other factors (institutional,
international)
of this process. In fact, a care
change. The best works of political economy recognize the complexity
and Stephens
ful reading of Rueschemeyer,
(fn. 8) reveals a nuanced argument along just
Stephens,
in Interwar Europe Revisited," World
these lines. See Thomas Ertman, "Democracy and Dictatorship
P?:j
50 (April 1998).
institutions
and the agency of elites does not
the importance of preexisting
But acknowledging
transition. Elites do not operate in a vacuum:
deny the central role played by social forces in democratic
their political choices are governed not only by ideals and interests but also by social realities (for ex
the
ample, the economic pressure posed by the threat of capital flight; the political pressure posed by
are themselves
a
and potentially
threat of organized
destabilizing
popular protest). And institutions
creation of the political process, subject to change in the face of political pressure and struggle. De
itself is an example of institutional
mocratization
transformation,
bought through the struggle of op
resources and agendas. The question
are
is not so much
equipped with different
posing interests that
as which social forces are likely
whether social forces play a key role in the struggle for democratization
to take up the cause.
10
this position. See Collier and Mahoney
Recent
studies have challenged
(fn. 4), who argue per
a much more negligible
transition than
role in the first wave of democratic
suasively that labor played
that proposed
by Therborn
and others.
178
WORLD
POLITICS
places (Korea by themid-1980s, Brazil by the late 1980s) but have dis
dained it in others (Indonesia, Singapore, Syria). Can this variation be
explained?
of economic
Level
alone
development
industrialists
among
cannot
account
for it. Enthu
not
directly
contra
in per
the
of old
capita GNP,
expectations
some cases
sector
and new versions
of modernization
In
theory.
private
have proven most enamored
industrialists
of democratic
transition pre
moments
in
of
economic
decline
in
others,
(Brazil);
great
cisely
they
siasm
for democracy
correlate with growth
and
labor does
even in a context of
of democratization
highly
suspicious
some
economic
(Indonesia, Malaysia).
spectacular
growth
Similarly,
at times
trade union movements
have campaigned
for democratization
a
of great growth
context
others
while
it
in
embraced
have
of
(Korea)
economic
(Zambia).
catastrophe
have
proven
Cultural
also proves
heritage
within
country
intertemporally
similar
cultural
endowments
asm of labor and
constant.
itages
Egypt
(both are majoritarian
drawn
Comparisons
as between
countries with
as well
variation
reveal dramatic
industrialists
and Tunisia,
less than decisive.
cases
even as culture remains
for democracy,
for example, possess
similar cultural her
un
Sunni Muslim
countries,
relatively
riven by ethnic cleavage, and saddled with
a long history ofWest
labor exhibits
colonialism),
yet organized
European
tudes toward democratization
in the two countries.
comparison
poral
increase
dramatic
within
the
in industrialists'
cases
of Brazil
enthusiasm
be hard pressed
past fifteen years. Yet one would
was
a revolution
in the core cultural
preceded
by
country.
This
article
tion
in class
ment.
Close
offers
support
in the enthusi
an alternative
atti
very different
intertem
Similarly,
and Korea
shows
a
over the
for democracy
to argue that this shift
endowments
of either
framework
for democratization
for explaining
the varia
in the context of late
develop
a few core cases,
to more
in addition
cursory
study of
examination
of several others, helps specify the conditions
under which
are more or less
to embrace democratization.
capital and labor
likely
to
the
article subscribes
the central verities
of the political
Although
economy
tradition,
often make
opment
mocratization
it argues
that the peculiar
of late devel
conditions
and labor much more ambivalent
about de
capital
than was
the case
for their
counterparts
among
early
industrializes. The theory will specify the conditions that give rise to
this diffidence but will also suggest (and empirically anchor) the way
these conditions
may
astic about democratic
to make both social forces more
enthusi
change
reform. The general
lesson of this examination
is
CONTINGENT DEMOCRATS
179
that capital and labor are
for the very reason that
contingent democrats11
are consistent
of
their
material
interests.
defenders
Like
their
they
countries will cham
predecessors,
capital and labor in late-developing
are
as
democratic
institutions
when
these
institutions
pion
perceived
advancing
mocratic
their material
interest
interests.
is contingent
that are not necessarily
Briefly put, capital and
But
the pairing of material
and de
historical
circumstances
specific
upon
in the context
replicated
of late
development.
turns
for democracy
largely
on two variables. For
two variables are state
the
and
capital,
dependence
are
state
and aristocratic
En
fear; for labor, they
dependence
position.
labor's enthusiasm
thusiasm
varies inversely with
for democracy
class score on these two
variables. Where
that score is split, class attitude
toward democratiza
come into
tion is indeterminate
and other variables
play.
a discussion
To support this argument,
the article begins with
of the
theoretical
the
It
logic underlying
contingency
hypothesis.
proceeds
of two core cases for capital (Indonesia
and
investigation
empirical
two
and
for labor (Mexico
and Korea)?cases
chosen for their
Korea)
on the
cases (Mexico
dramatic variation
variable.
Additional
dependent
with
and Saudi Arabia for capital; Egypt for labor) are added to correct for
that
collinearity
of other
number
eliminate
in the two
variables.
appears
independent
Finally,
cases (Tunisia, Brazil,
are
and Zambia)
presented
a
to
rival hypothesis.12
in the cases investigated
absolute parallelism
space prevents
for capital and labor; it also precludes
the experience
of cap
recounting
case
in all,
ital and labor for every country mentioned
studies
(sixteen
not
com
the
of
variation).
counting
Fortunately,
intertemporal
logic
not
the tale of
require exhaustive
parison does
parallelism.
Recounting
Limited
some omitted
dundant
cases
(for example,
(its experience
parallels
key variables) and would
11
Guillermo
see O'Donnell,
be largely re
capital) would
our
that of Indonesian
capital along
Tunisian
add little leverage to our hypothesis. Re
to
as
describes the private sectors commitment
democracy
"contingent";
in
"Substantive or Procedural Consensus? Notes on the Latin American
Bourgeoisie,"
in Latin
de Souza, and Akko A. Boron, eds., The Right and Democracy
Chalmers, Maria
Douglas
America (New York: Praeger, 1992).
12
that cultural heritage determines political disposition
To disprove the hypothesis
toward democ
and Brazil are added to the discussion
of labor and capital, respectively. Using Mill's
racy, Tunisia
of difference,
is drawn between cases showing overall similarity in cultural en
method
comparison
a crucial
dowment
for capital) but possessing
(Tunisia and Egypt for labor; Brazil pre- and post-1980s
in our independent
in outcome. To disprove the
difference
variables, resulting in a crucial difference
toward democracy,
that economic growth and prosperity determine political disposition
hypothesis
Zambia and Brazil are also added to the discussion of labor and capital. Using Mills method of agree
is drawn between cases showing overall difference
in level of economic growth and
ment, comparison
O'Donnell
(Zambia and Korea for labor; Brazil and Korea for capital) but sharing crucial similarity
prosperity
their values on our independent variables, resulting in a striking similarity in outcome.
in
180
WORLD
POLITICS
counting the tale of other omitted cases (for example, Saudi labor)
our discussion
with
conditions
(for ex
only confuse
exceptional
are
in Saudi Arabia
the fact that the vast majority
of workers
ample,
in
with
short-term
horizons
the
little
inter
and
nonnationals
kingdom
would
est in shaping Saudi political institutions).
case selection
Careful
cannot
eliminate
all the methodological
prob
lems involved in drawing scientific inference here. The investigation of
ten cases
not
does
independent
of indeterminacy
the problem
when
four
case selection on the
Furthermore,
proposed.
eliminate
are
variables
dependent variable introduces the possibility of biased results.As King,
only random
truly verify
theory.13 Nevertheless,
seems sufficient
to suggest the
plausibility,
ity, of the contingency
hypothesis.
Keohane,
cases can
and Verba
observe,
selection
of many
multiple
the evidence
presented
if not
the incontrovertibil
The Theory
State
fear, and aristocratic
toward democratization.
dependence,
labor's
disposition
elaboration.
merits
With
regard
to
position
Each
capital,
state
and
shape capital
of these variables
refers
dependence
to
the degree towhich private sector profitability is subject to the discre
tionary support of the state. Such support is typically delivered in the
form
of subsidized
tion
in the definition
inputs, protected
of economic
market
policy,
position,
and state
close
collabora
containment
of
labor and the capital poor. Two quite different state logics may fuel
such
support. Where
the
state
is developmental
(for example,
Japan
and Korea), it identifies national prosperity with that of the private sec
tor and explicitly sponsors the development of the latterwith the aim of
the state is pat
rapid economic
growth.14 By contrast, where
it
also
and
identifies pros
Indonesia
(for example,
Senegal),
that
the
of
but
here
the
state's
with
sector,
governing
perity
private
not the achievement
economic
for
the na
is
of
growth
rapid
objective
achieving
rimonial
tion as awhole
But whatever
private
ognize
sector
that
as
state elites.
personal gain for
the
the governing
of
state, sponsorship makes
logic
because
diffident
about democratization
capitalists
so much
their profitability
hinges
on
state discretion.
Therefore,
the
rec
in
13
Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in
and Sidney Verba, Designing
Gary King, Robert Keohane,
Press, 1994), 115-49.
Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University
14
The term "developmental
state" was coined by Chalmers Johnson, MITI and theJapanese Miracle
Press, 1982).
(Stanford, Calif: Stanford University
CONTINGENT DEMOCRATS
181
state
and patrimonial
with
cases, cozy collaboration
developmental
not
to
is
the
contestation
and
economic
elites,
key
public
opposition,
success. Where
re
to the
state elites are hostile
project of democratic
both
form (and few authoritarian rulers relish the thought of relinquishing
unaccountable
their distance
power), private
from it.
sector
entrepreneurs
sector
to be wary
capital is also likely
that do vary with
the character
of the
between
the
relations
private
logic rules,
Private
reasons
mental
are careful
of democratization
to
keep
for
state. Where
sector
develop
and the state are
antici
and collaborative.
So long as the state generally
typically positive
com
sector
not
the
interests
of
does
feel
pates
private
capital, capital
to create
to ensure
state
formal
institutions
democratic
pelled
accountability.
Where
patrimonial
logic
rules, however,
private
sector
profitability typically resides in shady relations with state elites. Under
one of the standard
of
conditions,
transparency,
selling points
to prove less attractive
to entrepreneurs.
is
In
this
way,
democracy,
likely
or devel
"collaborative
whether
governed
by patrimonial
profitability"
for democratization
enthusiasm
among pri
logic discourages
opmental
vate sector
capitalists.
the logic of collaborative
the second variable
Beyond
profitability,
these
sector
is fear. Private
for democracy
enthusiasm
is
first
and
concerned,
foremost, with protect
capital everywhere
and
the
of its in
ing property
securing
long-term
profitability
rights
vestments
is
the guarantee
of order.15 But where
poverty
through
that hinders
private
sector
widespread
communists
the mass
threatens
and the poor are potentially well mobilized
(whether by
in postwar Korea or by Islamists
in contemporary
Egypt),
inclusion
and empowerment
associated with democratization
to undermine
the basic interests of many
capitalists. At best,
such inclusion threatens to flood politics with "the logic of distribution"
rather
con
At worst,
it potentially
the "logic of accumulation."16
to overturn
the propertyless
the social order. Thus,
the means
a
sense of
is associated with
democratization
deep
capitalists,
than
fers upon
for many
and is regarded with distrust.
and fear prove to be more
should state dependence
Why
commitment
barriers to democratic
among
late-developing
than among their predecessors?
social
threat
significant
capitalists
15
See Leigh Payne, Brazilian Industrialists and Democratic Change (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni
versity Press, 1994).
16
inAfrica: A Dissenting
and Economic Change
See Thomas Callaghy, "Civil Society, Democracy
and Naomi Chazan, eds.,
in
Donald
about
Harbeson,
Rothchild,
Societies,"
John
Resurgent
Opinion
Civil Society and the State inAfrica (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 243.
182
WORLD
as Alexander
Gerschenkron
POLITICS
made
clear,17 late development
on
the state.
heightens
Embarking
com
the process
industrialized
j
already
means
sector
and highly
that private
mercially
integrated,
competitive
state
seek
(since the
capitalists
typically
help with capital accumulation
for
late
industrializers
often
exceeds
the
of
start-up capital
capabilities
First,
the dependence
of capitalists
in aworld
of industrialization
on
and with
trade protection
individual,
first-generation
entrepreneurs)
so
form
of
tariff
the
(in
barriers,
on). Such height
import quotas, and
sector
ened state dependence
makes
all the more
private
capitalists
state
of
with
elites. By
wary
embracing
political
projects
unpopular
econ
lower start-up costs and a less integrated
international
contrast,
success
the
of early industrializers
less contin
omy made
significantly
on state
with
much
gent
support, endowing
greater political
capitalists
latitude.
state
the developmental
mission
that guides
in
sponsorship
sector
countries
also
many
encourages
late-developing
private
capitalists
to cleave to the state and eschew
the cause of democracy. Where
the
can
state is
sector
to
it
expect
private
developmental,
capital
anticipate
contrasts
their interests to a
This
with
conditions
large degree.
sharply
Second,
to be hos
faced by early industrializers whose
feudal state was perceived
tile to capital. It was precisely
this hostility
that fueled
capital's democ
ratic conversion
in
the first transition.
But
during
late-developing
state is often seen to be
where
the authoritarian
serving the
of private sector capital, why embrace
democracy?
one
wonder
be more
fearful of
Finally,
might
why
capital would
than
transition.
the
first
after
all was
democracy
today
during
Poverty
no less
or
in
than it
pervasive
eighteenthnineteenth-century
England
countries
interests
is today in many
and so the empowerment
countries,
late-developing
a
of the poor should have posed
threat to
interests
comparable
capital's
and made
of
The
difference,
early capitalists
equally leery
democracy.
in society across
lies not in the relative number of poor people
however,
time but rather in the degree of mass
empowerment
proposed
by the
in each era. During
the first transition
the hege
project
on
a
cast rather than
discourse
had
liberal
democracy
distinctly
one. Hence,
an
was under
inclusionary
capital's embrace of democracy
stood to be entirely consistent with
exclusion
of the propertyless.
Since
come
mass
to
has
stand
for
mak
then, however,
inclusion,
democracy
to
for contemporary
democratic
discourse
ing it difficult
justify exclu
or
sion based on property,
in ideas, then,
evolution
race,
gender. The
democratic
monic
17
Gerschenkron, Economie Backwardness inHistorical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).
CONTINGENT
goes far toward explaining
capitals
across time. With
democratization
many
capitalists
183
DEMOCRATS
divergent
spelling
countries
in late-developing
enthusiasm
for democracy
mass
empowerment
are more diffident
today,
about
embracing this political project.
enthusiasm
for democracy
labor? Labor's
organized
on two variables:
turns
state
and aristocratic
posi
largely
dependence
to which
tion. State dependence
refers to the degree
labor
organized
on state
for
its
and
support
vitality,
organizational
viability,
depends
What
about
its reliance on collective action to estab
with
everywhere,
lish influence,
is much more dependent
upon the state than is private
sector
labors re
this
run-of-the-mill
But
beyond
dependence,
capital.18
can
s
on
state
state
of a corpo
liance
the
be deepened
by the
adoption
clout. Labor
ratist
unions with financial
that provides
strategy
in
and
for
support
loyalty
exchange
political
labor
material
benefits
with
arrangement
provides
its true market
power
can deliver?but
and organizational
self-restraint.
This
far in excess
of what
at the
price of its autonomy.
rise to diffidence
about
upon the state gives
dependence
mocratization
for reasons
similar to those
Labors
capital.
comes
Labor
to fear
biting
de
in the case of
that operate
the hand that feeds it, that is, jeop
ardizing the flow of state benefits by embracing political projects that
are certain
to evoke
of state elites. To
the contrary, organized,
are
its interests
served by main
labor believes
better
state-dependent
not contestatory,
relations with
the state.
taining collaborative,
is
for democracy
The
labors enthusiasm
second variable modulating
to which
is economi
aristocratic
labor
degree
organized
position?the
labor
vis-?-vis
the
organized
cally privileged
general population. Where
enjoys
such
solidarity"
a
with
the wrath
stance,
privileged
the unorganized
it is likely to exhibit a degree of "dis
masses
sector and/or
in the informal
labors aristo
and especially where
such conditions,
agriculture. Under
intervention
cratic position
is a consequence
of political
rather than a
to be
its
interests
of true market
reflection
labor
will
power,
perceive
a cozy
the state (even if
with
served by maintaining
relationship
are authoritarian),
rather than by cham
the institutional
arrangements
to mass
state accountable
interests
institutions
that
make
the
pioning
better
is, democracy).
conditions
Again,
(that
that
the probability
of late development
heighten
and hence more diffi
and/or aristocratic
be state dependent
dent about the democratic
spells
typically
project. Late development
it is accompanied
structural weakness
for labor because
by industrial
labor will
18
"Two Logics
Claus Offe and Helmut Wiesenthal,
Social Theory (Greenwich, Conn.: JAIPress, 1980).
of Collective
Action,"
in Political
Power
and
WORLD
184
in a context
ization
izes the "reserve
of workers.
Late
POLITICS
of
situation universal
global capital mobility. This
of
labor
and
undermines
the
power
army"
bargaining
means
the importation
of industrial
tech
timing also
to be
capital intensive rather than labor intensive, and
of labor surplus and further weakens
the problem
labor's market
Such
weakness
labor to look to the
encourages
position.
state for
union dependence
and nurturing
remedies,
political
fostering
that tends
nology
this exacerbates
diffidence
of labor
who
about
surplus
are
organized
in the formal
an economic
vis the majority,
labor. The
result is that the
from
the same time, the problems
of workers
that the minority
are
to be
vis-?
likely
privileged
contestatory
politics. At
and mass poverty mean
sector
jealously guarded by organized
are
of the unions
quite distinct
and this discourages
the unions
privilege
interests
those
of the unorganized
poor,
to mass
from
for state accountability
fighting
preferences.
Of course none of this is cast in stone. Economic
growth may absorb
labor surplus and diminish
labor's structural weakness
and dependence
re
upon the state. Economic
public policy may
growth and/or welfarist
sense of social threat. Fiscal
duce mass poverty
and diminish
capital's
state may lead
crisis or political
internal to the authoritarian
exigencies
to
to
sector
it
reduce its sponsorship
of private
capital, leading capital
as
over formalized
reconsider
the advantage
of coziness
accountability
the surest route
may
to
such conditions
capital and labor
profitability. Under
offered by democratic
reform. For labor,
the advantages
such as freedom
of
holds out the promise
of civil liberties
reconsider
democracy
speech and association?the
For
power.
capital,
ized accountability
bedrock
holds
of collective
out
democracy
and transparency?the
action
and collective
the promise
of institutional
means
to more
predictable
influence over policy for the well organized and the well heeled. Thus,
be con
capital and labor may
re
is
their commitment
always
on the
fracted through
the prism of interest and can be predicted
only
that
and the variables
of this interest
basis of a clear understanding
it.
shape
after weighing
the costs
to
the democratic
verted
and benefits,
cause. But
to democ
to
power of our variables
explain class commitment
cases
core
two
in
in
each
for
will
be
racy
capital and
explored
depth
more
six
from
other
drawn
with
corroboration
labor,
country
cursory
The
on the state will be measured
in terms of
Capital's
dependence
re
on subsidized
and cronyistic
dependence
inputs, protected markets,
sense of fear or threat will be mea
state elites.
lations with
Capital's
the organizational
of poverty,
sured in terms of the pervasiveness
cases.
185
CONTINGENT DEMOCRATS
strength of the capital poor (for example, membership
Communist
Party), and past incidence
on the state will be measured
pendence
on state subsidies
fits
(for example,
of
credit
popular
in terms
access
and union members'
as well
and housing),
levels in the
violence.
Labors
de
of union dependence
to state-subsidized
bene
as the
politically
manipu
lated (inflated) setting of wage levels. Labors aristocratic position will
in terms
be measured
of differentials
between
found
the organized
and
so
employment,
as
such
mandated
nonwage
job
legally
a
are not exhaustive,
While
these
variables
security.
they anticipate
to
in class commitment
found
great deal of the variation
democracy,
cases across time.
both among cases and even more powerfully
within
A schematic
and positioning
of the cases is
summary of the argument
unorganized
cial security,
in matters
access
of wage
levels,
benefits
and other
to stable
presented in Figures 1 and 2.
State Dependence
Low
High
?
Leaning
Antidemocracy
Indonesia
Mexico
Ambivalent
Saudi Arabia
I
Democratic
(by the 1970s)
Prodemocracy
Korea (bymid-1980s)
Brazil (by the 1980s)
FIGURE 1
Private
Sector
Capital:
Champion
of Democracy?
State Dependence
Low
High
s ?
Leaning
Null
(CTM)
Democratic
Tunisia
V) O
3*
Antidemocracy
Mexico
Ambivalent
I
Egypt
Prodemocracy
Korea
Zambia
Organized
Labor:
Figure 2
Champion
of Democracy?
186
WORLD
and
Capital
Indonesia:
Patrimonial
Democratically
Indonesia
relatively
recently
of Southeast Asia's most
Asian
economic
Democratization
Fear,
Capitalism,
Diffident
Capitalists
Until
successful
POLITICS
was
and
19
for its success
celebrated
as one
"tigers." But like many other
rapidly growing
Indonesia
the
lie to any assumption
that
put
enthusiasm
for
among
necessarily
democracy
spells
countries,
growth
classes that are its primary beneficiaries.20
Specifically,
private
sector
to em
in
Indonesia
have
reluctant
capitalists
proved consistently
com
to democratize
brace projects
the country. To explain the business
the social
alliance
munity's
character
with
we must
state's relationship
with
the business
of social fear within
the historic
explore
sector
the private
and the
of the
prevalence
From
independence
the development
pioned
authoritarianism,
onward
community.
state
cham
consistently
the
devel
capital, especially
the Indonesian
sector
of private
(that is,Malay)
capitalist
of an
opment
indigenous
state gave
entrepreneurs
indigenous
ness benefits
such as government
class. To
access
this end, the
to essential busi
preferential
contracts,
licenses, bank credit, and
an
It put into effect
action
trade protection.
affirmative
"entrepreneurial
to boost
the
number
of
entrepreneurs
program"
designed
indigenous
(pribumi) by legislative fiat. And
cratic
capitalism,"
even while
neurs
which
permitted
in office.21
it embraced the practice of "bureau
public
officials
to become
entrepre
was
sector
in
of private
patrimonial
development
sponsorship
to
firms
Public officials distributed
government
support
private
a
an eye to
Officials
clientele.
and
securing personal profit
political
State
nature.
with
as
of li
used their control over the allocation
entrepreneurs
doubling
own
to
and
credit
their
censes, concessions,
promote
companies?blur
sectors. Nevertheless,
the
and
the
between
private
ring
boundary
public
over the first four
sector flourished
the private
and grew dramatically
decades
of Indonesian
independence.
19
in Suhartos Indonesia
This analysis draws extensively on Richard Robison, Power and Economy
et al., eds.,
Asia Publishers,
1990); Kevin Hewison
(Manilla, Philippines:
Journal of Contemporary
Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism,
Democracy, and Capitalism (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen
and Unwin,
1986);
1993); Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (Sydney: Allen and Unwin,
and Andrew Maclntyre,
Business and Politics in Indonesia (Sydney: Allen and Unwin,
1991).
20
in Southeast Asia," Comparative Politics 30 (April
See Jacques Bertrand, "Growth and Democracy
Class Culture in Pa
Civil Society, and Illiberal Middle
1998); David Martin Jones, "Democratization,
cific Asia," Comparative Politics 30 (January 1998).
21
et al. (fn. 19), 46.
Robison
167; Hewison
(fn. 19,1986),
CONTINGENT DEMOCRATS
187
of the private sec
The character of state sponsorship
explains much
tor's diffidence
The fact that licenses, contracts,
about democratization.
on a
access gov
and credit were distributed
basis, with
discretionary
erned by political logic (or official gain), rather than by publicly formu
were
that entrepreneurs
rational
lated, economically
criteria, meant
to nurture cozy relations with
state elites. The
wise
fact that much
of
state elites and
sector actors
the business
collaboration
between
private
was
not
in
if
nature,
corrupt, made
shady
quite
outrightly
political
less attractive. The
(a good associated with
transparency
democracy)
as
fact that many officials doubled
the business
reassured
entrepreneurs
sector interests
that state elites would
community
anticipate
private
more
need
when
for
the
formal
formulating
public policy, obviating
sector
of accountability.
Private
had reason
mechanisms
thus
capitalists
to be diffident
democratization.
So long as the state
about championing
sector
prosperity,
private
capital had lit
for
reform.
push
political
on state
But if dependence
support fostered private sector diffidence
so
com
about democratization,
did fear, which
for the business
then
was
in
had
three
there
Indonesia
First,
munity
components.
underlying
mass
the
of widespread
the problem
and
fact
that
empower
poverty
ment
had historically
been associated with
threats to the social order.
continued
to deliver
tle incentive
economic
to
During the late 1950s and early 1960s more than 60 percent of In
donesians lived below the poverty line.22Pervasive poverty helped fuel
the popularity
of a strong Communist
Party, with
proaching three million by the mid-1960s;23
a
membership
ap
by 1965 the party had
sense of revolution
in a
coup. The
implicated
regime-threatening
at
that
Indonesia
the
time
turned
the propertied
ary danger
pervaded
and pushed
them into the arms
classes against democratic
experiments
was a historic
of authoritarian
legacy that lingered.
stability. This
But even after the Communist
had
been
decimated
Party
by the mil
been
itary in 1965 and rapid economic growth had reduced mass poverty in
the 1970s and 1980s, the business community still had reason to fear
mass
From
empowerment.
turned
on
strategy
opment
containment
which
required
the early 1980s
the exploitation
of the masses,
onward
the regime's devel
labor force?
of a docile
not
their
empowerment.
22
of Hawaii Press, 1994), 57;World
Hal Hill, ed., Indonesias New Order (Honolulu: University
Press, 1990), 41-43.
Bank, World Bank Development Report (New York: Oxford University
23
The party also organized upwards of sixteen million citizens in its mass organizations
of peasants,
and youth, and in the 1955 national elections itwon 16.4 percent of the pop
trade unionists, women,
Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy
it one of the big four parties in Indonesia.
ular vote, making
(Boston: Roudedge,
1978),
113.
188
WORLD POLITICS
The growing labor unrest of the 1980s and 1990s only reinforced cap
ital s belief
that a repressive
state
apparatus
was
to economic
essential
success.24
the business
fear of mass empowerment
had a
Finally,
community's
third component,
ethnic
conflict
and
the
for
class
namely,
tendency
to take on ethnic coloration
warfare
in Indonesia.
Because
the vast ma
jority of domestic capitalists hail from the Chinese minority
most
are Muslim
Indonesians
class
Malay),
discontent
over
(while
inequity
and exploitation is frequently channeled along ethnic/religious lines,
with protest expressed in the language of Islamic populism and riots
as awhole.25 Violence
against the Chinese
community
against
a recurrent
the Chinese
has
been
in
community
problem,
growing
directed
intensity since the 1950s and culminating most recently in theMay
1998 "orgy of looting, plundering, and fire-raising" aimed at Chinese
businesses.26
As
a result,
the Chinese
suffer from
a sense of social vul
nerability that has long ledmany Chinese capitalists to prize stability
over
and a strong
freedom
authoritarian
state over
empower
popular
ment.
For
these
ically proven
reasons
has histor
then, private sector capital in Indonesia
unenthusiastic
about democratization.
The private sector's
dependence upon the state for its profitability, aswell as its fear of mass
have
empowerment
have recent events
prodded
economic
tor.
Catastrophic
Indonesia
and
long
a tentative
allied
it with
the authoritarian
order.27 Nor
conversion
the political
of the private sec
crisis in 1997-98
fueled regime change
in
transition
toward democracy.
it also
But
quadrupled mass poverty (eighty million now live below the poverty
line) and sparked violent interthnic strife.28Both have fanned the busi
ness
traditional
fears about mass empowerment
community's
concerns
with
about
the new regime's
together
(IMF-supported)
on business-state
have
left
business
leaders
cronyism,
skeptical
not
actually
hostile
to, Indonesia's
fragile
new
and this,
attacks
about,
if
regime.29
24
R. William
Liddle and Rizal Mallarageng,
"Indonesia in 1996," Asian Survey 37 (February 1997).
25
et al. (fn. 19), 58-60; Robison
Hewison
(fn. 19,1986),
274-76,315-20;
(fn. 19), 3.
Maclntyre
26
Country Report, Indonesia, Economist Intelligence Unit (2d quarter, 1998), 19. For accounts of ear
see "Anti-Chinese
lier anti-Chinese
in Indonesia, 1959-68,"
in J. A. C. Mackie,
Outbreaks
violence,
The Chinese in Indonesia (Sydney: Australia
Institute of International Affairs, 1976).
27
Robison
in Suharto's Indonesia,"
"Business as Usual
(fn. 9,1986),
150-52; Jacques Bertrand,
Asian Survey 37 (May 1997), 443.
28
Adam Schwartz and Jonathan Paris, eds., The Politics ofPost-Suharto Indonesia (New York Coun
cil on Foreign Relations,
1999), 2-9.
29
Country Report, Indonesia, Economist Intelligence Unit (3d quarter, 1998), 13.
contingent
South Korea: Variation
democrats
189
Proves the Rule30
confirms
South Korean
case, like that of Indonesia,
tance of state
the
and
fear
for
shaping
political
dependence
sector
in the context
of late
of private
capital
development.
more
case
the Korean
evidence
mately,
compelling
provides
The
the
impor
disposition
But ulti
of this re
lationship thanks to its internal variation. During the first few decades
of the postwar era, the high level of state dependence and the preva
lence of fear within
tor diffidence
political
arenas
the Korean
toward
and economic
business
community
spelled
From the mid-1980s,
democratization.
in the international
developments
sec
private
however,
and domestic
of state sponsorship,
signaled
important
changes
and the prevalence
of social fear in the
the extent of state dependence,
sector
with
these
business
Coincident
community.
changes,
private
to exhibit
enthusiasm
reform
for
political
began
significant
capitalists
over time
variation
and democratization.
This
compelling
provides
in shaping the po
confirmation
of the role played by our two variables
litical
sically
in the character
inclinations
contingent
capital.
For the
of private sector
capital.
nature of the
political
sake of conciseness
leanings
to the intrin
of private
sector
the logic of this period
the
case,
analysis of South Ko
in brief. At this time
is given
and because
largely replicates
rean
capital's first
that of the Indonesian
sector diffidence
about democratization.
four postwar
It also testifies
decades
the character of state sponsorship played a key role in fostering private
the patrimonial
rule of
of private sector firms
to the state's
discretionary
During
and the success
Rhee both the genesis
Syngman
mediation
and access
turned on political
sector firms.31 And
start of many
the
favor. Cronyism
governed
private
resources
tax
access to
(including
government-controlled
preferential
and low-interest
trade monopolies,
disbursement,
breaks,
foreign-aid
a culture of
sector
Neither
nurtured
loans) governed
private
growth.32
or kindled
a desire
contestation
for transparency
among
political
30
This analysis draws extensively on Carter Eckert, "The South Korean Bourgeoisie: A Class in
Search of Hegemony," Journal ofKorean Studies 7 (Fall 1990); idem, Korea Old and New
(Cambridge:
Ilchokak, Korea Institute, Harvard University,
1990); Hagen Koo, State and Society in Contemporary
Korea (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1993); Karl Fields, Enterprise and the State inKorea and
and Eun Mee Kim, "Economic
Taiwan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1995); Nora Hamilton
in South Korea and Mexico,"
Third World Quarterly
and Political Liberalisation
14, no. 1 (1993);
(London: Zed Press, 1990).
Ogle, South Korea: Dissent within the Economic Miracle
George
31
Eckert (fn. 30,1990),
40; Ogle (fn. 30), 42.
32
of Chaebol," Asian
Role in the Making
Fields (fn. 30), 31-40; Minho
Kuk, "The Governmental
Perspective
12, no. 1 (1988),
110-17.
190
WORLD
POLITICS
Park Chung Hee
the state adopted
a more
ethos, but this did not reduce the private sector's
developmental
state retained
The
control over the distribu
dependence.
discretionary
tion of resources,
such as credit and foreign currency, that were critical
to the
to nurture a culture of
and this continued
compli
private sector,
ance within
as well as a lack of interest in
the business
po
community,
Korea's
business
elites. Later,
under
litical campaigns that might jeopardize the flow of state benefits.33
The
to a
ethos fostered private sec
developmental
in a second way as well.
democratization
By prior
state's conversion
tor diffidence
about
itizing economic development
private
interests.
sector
and identifying public welfare with
the state
growth,
leaders
Business
to
attentive
capital's
proved extremely
thus felt little need to push for more formal
mechanisms
of accountability.
the private sector's lack of interest
But
at this time was
in democracy
also fueled by fear, specifically fear of the revolutionary potential of
mass
an
Korea emerged
from the Korean War
empowerment.
impover
were
ten
ished country
estimated
million
without
(an
homes,
adequate
found revolution
food, or medical
care),34 and its poor had historically
ary inspiration
(and organizational
tivist Communist
wherewithal)
Party. Although
in a
popular
actual membership
and ac
in the Korean
Communist
small (at between
forty and sixty thousand
Party remained
to
the party's extraordinary
citizens
in a
members),
capacity
organize
mo
meant
network
of youth,
and
it
could
labor,
peasant organizations
if not millions,
bilize hundreds
of thousands,
for communist
purposes.35
to threaten the
the
thus
had
the
poor
potential
Enfranchising
capitalist
social
order. The
victory
of communism
tinuing state of war between North
sense
of danger
also disinclined
in North
Korea
and
the con
and South only heightened
sector
the
were
felt by capital interests. Private
capitalists
to embrace mass empowerment
because of its potential
to undermine
in the 1980s
Koreas development
strategy. Like Indonesia
a
and 1990s, Korea
in the 1950s and 1960s embraced
strategy of export
success
on
the repression
oriented
industrialization
whose
turned
and
exclusion
of labor. Democratization,
which
empower
potentially
might
as an unwelcome
for Korean
prospect
capitalists.
labor, loomed
33
and state supervision of access to foreign loans
State monopoly
of the banking system (1961-80)
and grants endowed itwith substantial financial power; Fields (fn. 30), 95-96,121.
34
Parvez Hasan, Korea (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1976), 26. In 1953 Korea was
one of the poorest countries in the world with a GNP per
capita of $67 (in 1996 dollars); Byong-Nak
Song, The Rise of theKorean Economy
35
Robert Scalapino and Chong-sik
fornia Press, 1972), 268.
(Hong Kong and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 60.
inKorea, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University
of Cali
Lee, Communisn
For
191
democrats
contingent
closed
era, then, Korean
part of the postwar
capitalists
state.
the
mid
the
the authoritarian
1980s,
however,
By
a
of
from
culture
attitudes of capital had shifted, moving
away
contesta
consent
of
frank
embrace
and
and toward
political
the better
ranks behind
political
passivity
tion and democratization. The first glimmers of this shift came in
business
the leading
when
1986-87,
(the Federation
confederation
of
Korean Industries) advanced a new political agenda, boldly independ
ent of the
ruling
party.36 More
dramatic
evidence
came
in 1991, when
one of
Chung JuYung, the founder and chair of the Hyundai group,
to
a new
established
party designed
political
largest chaebol,
to
the
win
17
of
the ruling DJP. The party managed
percent
challenge
vote in the
and later that year Chung
of
elections
1992,
general
popular
an im
a bid for the
even made
marked
Such assertiveness
presidency.37
for
portant departure
capital.
in au
orientation
of this new political
Much
away from complicity
and
contestation
of democratic
rule and toward embrace
thoritarian
Korea's
pluralism
ence upon,
is
in the private
by the reduction
explained
state
in addition
and receipt of,
support,
cline in social fear.During
rean
state
to a
depend
de
general
the 1980s and 1990s two factors led the Ko
to reduce
its sponsorship
recession
engendered
the worldwide
sector's
sector
of private
industry. First,
crisis of 1979 created
the
oil
by
econ
indebted,
trade-dependent
highly
a
was forced to
program
omy. The Chun
wide-ranging
adopt
regime
sector.
state support for the private
reform that decreased
of structural
serious
difficulties
for Korea's
loans were eliminated,
reduced, policy
protection
and a new trade law ended the
market was decreased,
in the
chaebol
by many
enjoyed
positions
long-standing
monopoly
to
economic
reform
commitment
The
market.38
domestic
regime's
Credit
supplies
of the domestic
eliminated
in Korea
were
many of the rents
a novel
and marked
that had
disjuncture
long
sustained
in the
domestic
interests
capital
of state and
capital.
in 1987
electoral politics
shift to competitive
the country's
Second,
to woo
for
the
created a new political
sup
regime
popular
imperative
to
and social reform.39 As part of its campaign
port through political
36
Eckert (fn. 30,1990).
37
Koo (fn. 30), 47; Fields (fn. 30), 60.
38
in
and Economic
"The State, Politics,
and Chung-in Moon,
Development
Stephan Haggard
Postwar South Korea," in Koo (fn. 30).
39
elections came in
377-79. The regime's decision to introduce competitive
Eckert (fn. 30,1990),
summer
in 1986-87. The pending
for democracy
response to widespread
popular demonstrations
to greater interna
games, scheduled to be held in Korea in 1988, also subjected the regime
Olympic
the effectiveness
of popular protest. The business community was not
tional scrutiny and heightened
and Kim (fn. 30), 119-20.
See Hamilton
at the vanguard of this popular movement.
192
WORLD
POLITICS
build a popular base, the regime sought to distance itself from big busi
ness by attacking the chaebol for corruption and reining inmany of
on
stricter controls
imposed
that infuriated
the
taxes, policies
In short, structural adjustment
business
and political
open
commuity.40
no
so
meant
state
that the
would
solicitous
of
ing
reflexively
longer be
on busi
interests. To the contrary, the state directly
business
trampled
their
bank
long-standing
credits and
The
privileges.
raised inheritance
state
ness
to view
it with
domestic
interests,
leading many
capitalists
This
business
like
distrust.
leaders
encouraged
Chung
creasing
state more
to look for new ways
to make
the
Hyundai
responsive
their interests.
Alongside
in
of
to
state
the private
sector's
the reality of declining
support,
more
to
it
need {or that support also made
democra
receptive
declining
tization. During
the first postwar decades Korea's late industrialization
sector
had spelled private
upon the state for capital accu
dependence
of the local market.
and
direction,
mulation,
entrepreneurial
protection
for private sector depend
But by the mid-1980s
many of the grounds
was
so
ence had been eliminated.
Korean
industry
competitive
enough
from foreign rivals was no longer essential. Korean
that state protection
a
had developed
state direction
capital
dering
chaebol were
sufficiently
store of
entrepreneurial
deep
experience,
And many
of
increasingly
superfluous.41
on an in-house
to
large
provide
ren
the
basis many
of
the financial services that the state had previousl supplied.42This, to
gether with the liberalization of the banking sector in 1980, the cre
ation
of nonstate
financial
markets,
sources
financial
meant
and the internationalization
institutions,
that the business
had access
community
of
to in
the states's control.43
of corporate financing
beyond
the private sector had overcome many of the depend
encies associated with
latecomer
status, and this decreased
dependency
new
to break ranks with
the regime
for
created
capital
opportunities
dependent
By the late 1980s
and embrace
Finally,
ness more
a
political
general
sympathetic
reform.
decline
in fear of mass
to democratization.
made busi
empowerment
the
late
1980s
By
expanding
prosperity had decreased the sense that capital and laborwere locked in
a zero-sum
conflict.44
Although
income
inequality
remained
signifi
40
Koo (fii. 30), 48.
41
See Hamilton
and Kim (fn. 30), 116; Koo (fn. 30), 47.
42
and Kim (fn. 30), 118.
Ham?ton
43
Koo (fn. 30), 88.
44
in South Korea," in
and Democratization
Liberalization
Tat Yan Kong, "Origins of Economic
Gerd Nonneman,
1996),
(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,
ed., Political and Economic Liberalization
241.
CONTINGENT DEMOCRATS
193
cant,45 absolute poverty had largely been eliminated, with less than 10
percent of the population living below the poverty line.46Demands for
no
improvement
longer
the global decline
of communism
tions of
empowerment,
popular
material
with
social welfare
agendas
of an international
that
persuaded
social order.
mass
were
fears of upheaval.
In addition,
the revolutionary
implica
mass movements
that domestic
aroused
reduced
such
no
longer perceived
revolutionary
project. Consequendy,
exclusion was no longer essential
as the foot
soldiers
could be
capital
to
preserving
the
one should not
the extent of capital's con
Nevertheless,
exaggerate
on democ
to
remains
version
commitment
Its
contingent
democracy.
some of these
interests.
with
its
economic
And
racy's consistency
interests (for example, fear of higher wages and lowered profitability of
exports) still incline capital toward political repression, especially the
containment
thus far, at least, an overall calculation
to abandon
support for democracy.
capital
of labor. But
terest has not
induced
of in
FROMBRAZIL,MEXICO, AND SAUDIARABIA
CORROBORATION
cases for the
and Indonesian
by the Korean
are cor
to
commitment
democracy
capital's contingent
logic governing
cases. The Brazilian
roborated
case, for example,
by other
replicates
as its etiol
as well
in Korea,
variation
found
both the intertemporal
em
sector was
with
the country's
closely allied
ogy.47 Brazil's private
The
conclusions
suggested
brace of authoritarianism in 1964, but by the late 1980s much of the
sector had come to endorse democratization.
The reasoning be
private
case.
of
the
of
that
Korean
this
heart
echoes
hind
change
sector was
the 1960s the private
by fear of revolu
gripped
During
a radical left eager to mobilize
poverty,
tionary insurgence. Widespread
and a cold war context gave substance
the economically
disadvantaged,
to the threat
In addition,
the private
of insurgence.
sector, highly de
state for subsidies,
and technology,
contracts,
credit,
pendent
a state that would
to its interests and
to empower
be
responsive
sought
to support an
to its
committed
capital
growth. Both factors motivated
on
the
45
in South Korea," World Develop
of Income Distribution
Hagen Koo, "The Political Economy
12, no. 10 (1984), 1030-31. Already by 1978 absolute poverty had declined to 12 percent, down
from 41 percent in 1965.
46
D.C.: Li
Andrea
Savada andWilliam
Shaw, eds., South Korea: A Country Study (Washington,
of Congress,
1992), 177.
brary
47
on
and the
This analysis draws extensively
"Entrepreneurs
Payne (fn. 15); Fernando Cardoso,
et al., Transitions
Process: The Brazilian Case," in Guillermo
O'Donnell
Transition
from Authoritari
anism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1986); Leigh Payne and Ernest Bartell, eds., Busi
ness and
of Pittsburgh
Pa.: University
in Latin America
Press, 1995); and
(Pittsburgh,
Democracy
ment
O'Donnell
(fn. 11).
194
WORLD
POLITICS
containment
of the left and spon
regime that promised
of
sector.48
the
the
late
1980s, however,
sorship
private
By
changing
sector to reevaluate
had led the private
its support for au
conditions
thoritarianism.
Fear of revolutionary
in light
had dissipated
insurgence
authoritarian
of the change in international conditions (the demise of the Soviet
Union, the end of the coldwar) and the deradicalization of the left after
two decades
of repression.
In addition,
the authoritarian
regime
had
proven less than fully responsive to capital's interests, privileging public
enterprises
economy
ing fear
abandon
over
and expanding
the state's regulation
of the
private
at the expense of
sector interests.49 Thus,
both declin
private
state support
sector to
and declining
the
private
persuaded
the authoritarian
In this way
Brazil's
democrats.
contingent
ward an embrace
their material
Note
private
Like
of democracy
interests.50
that the Brazilian
our
core
enthusiasm
cultural
cannot
account
and
case also
helps
As
contingency.
theory of democratic
the Brazilian
parison within
sector
transition.
support democratic
an
case of
constitutes
archetypical
to
their Korean
counterparts,
they shifted
on the basis of a "utilitarian
calculus" of
regime
sector
case
eliminate
rival hypotheses
to
com
intertemporal
variation
in private
significant
in the country's
constancy
despite
in Korea,
shows
for democracy,
This
that cultural heritage
alone
suggests
in class enthusiasm
for variation
for democracy.
Fur
case reveals
case with
the Korean
of the Brazilian
sig
endowment.
ther, comparison
sector enthusiasm
in private
for democracy,
nificant
similarity
despite
context.
in economic
economic
crisis at the mo
variation
faced
(Brazil
sector enthusiasm
ment
for democracy,
whereas
Korea was
of private
that level of eco
suggests
experiencing
rapid economic
growth.) This
in class enthusiasm
variation
nomic prosperity
alone cannot anticipate
for democracy.
a
be
the cases presented
thus far manifest
degree of collinearity
to find
tween our two
It is possible,
variables.
however,
independent
cases where
this is true,
the two variables do not covary. Where
prelim
All
inary
more
evidence
suggests
inhibitor
state
that, for capital,
may be a
dependence
cases of
for democracy.
The
of enthusiasm
support this impression.
powerful
and Saudi Arabia
a case of
state
but
Mexico
dependence
provides
declining
persistently
sector
these conditions
social fear for capital. Under
private
capital
high
Mexico
48
to the 1964 coup was perceived
The Goulart
regime that existed prior
and inattentive to private sector interests. See Payne (fn. 15), 13
competent,
49
Cardoso
(fn. 47), 143.
50O'Donnell(fn.ll).
to be unpredictable,
in
CONTINGENT
has been
persuaded
to embrace
195
DEMOCRATS
democratization.51
was long the dependent
stepchild of theMexican
The
private
sector
revolution. Excluded
from
but generously
nurtured
any public role in politics
by the state's
"alliance for profits," the private sector long
in the regime's
acquiesced
on state
authoritarianism.
support, the private sec
Beyond
dependence
was
tor's alliance with authoritarianism
further fueled by fear. Although
the threat of a radical
revo
out
largely been shut
by the ruling
and
income
in
Mex
found
poverty
lutionary party,
inequality
ican society were grounds
for concern among the propertied
classes and
reason to
an
even
state
support
apparatus.
exclusionary,
repressive,
the rationale for capital's
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, however,
to unravel. Not
alliance with
the authoritarian
that the
regime began
sources of
or income
sector fear?massive
poverty
private
inequality?
as currency
had decreased.
If anything
these scourges worsened
prob
into severe economic
lems and fiscal deficits
crisis
plunged Mexico
left had
the mass
itwas the private
during the 1980s.52 Rather,
ence on the state (and its confidence
in state
decline.
At
this time
were
there
emerged
export oriented
a new
sector's
economic
depend
that began to
sponsorship)
sector en
group of private
on state sup
and less dependent
trepreneurs
markets
for their prosperity.
resented
the
port and protected
They
in the economy
state's corrupt intervention
and were vexed by many of
its policy decisions,
the nationalization
of banks during the cur
notably
who
sector entrepreneurs
to
rency crisis of 1982. As private
began
question
the state's "alliance for profits," an important
segment of them also "dis
to
covered democracy."53 They
of
began
push for the democratization
Mexico's
political system and spearheaded political pluralization by
case decreased
state
the political party PAN. In the Mexican
sector support
but
invariable
social
threat
dependence
spelled private
for democratization.
bankrolling
state
In Saudi Arabia,
has remained persist
by contrast,
dependence
but social threat has declined. In this context
the private sec
ently high
tor has remained
ambivalent
about
democratization.
The
largely
sector on the Saudi state is
the
of
Indus
private
dependence
legendary.
51
This
on Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Business-Government
in
Relations
analysis draws extensively
The Case of the Sugar Industry," Comparative Politics 13 (January 1981); Roderic Camp, En
Mexico
Press, 1989); Sylvia
(Oxford: Oxford University
trepreneurs and Politics in Twentieth-Century
and Private Sector in
and Ricard Anzaldua,
Mexico
Maxfield
eds., Government
(San
Contemporary
at San Diego,
of California
Center for U.S.-Mexican
Studies, University
1987).
Diego:
52
See Sebastian Edwards, Crisis and Reform in Latin America: From Despair toHope (New York: Ox
ford University
Press, 1995); Kevin Middlebrook,
ed., Union, Workers, and the State inMexico
(San
at San Diego Press, 1991).
of California
Diego: University
53
The phrase is borrowed from Cardoso
(fn. 47).
Mexico:
196
WORLD
are
trial ventures
POLITICS
and subsidized
by the government.
protected
firms
value
added but survive
Many
register negative
manufacturing
nonetheless
thanks to state guarantees
of preset
for pri
profit margins
vate sector ventures.54 The
state's "allocative
logic"55 sustains these firms
as it has eliminated
a
source of social fear in the Saudi
just
major
king
dom. Since the mid-1970s
the state has funded massive
social welfare
highly
in the country,
investing billions of dollars in health, education,
nets to eliminate
and social
the problem
of mass
housing,
safety
sector
this
social
the
threat, however,
poverty. Despite
declining
private
to
has not judged
it advantageous
democratization.56
Al
champion
an
interest in
have expressed
though leaders of the business
community
projects
strengthening the rule of law in the kingdom, their political ambitions
have
have
fallen
far short
circulated
of democratization.
petitions
calling
even
Thus,
for due process
as businessmen
and a strengthened
ju
dicial system, they have continued to declare their fidelity to the Saudi
as well
as to the monarchical
of government.
system
family,
access to state
not wish
to
business
their
elites
do
Clearly,
jeopardize
royal
largesse, and this has muted
cratic reform.57
As
the cases
presented
variation
has shown wide
and within
ence
and
and
social
cases
across
any
impulse
to
push
for extensive
demo
sector
thus far demonstrate,
private
capital
in its support for democracy,
both across cases
time. Two variables?degree
of state depend
a
fear?explain
good deal of this variation.
an inverse
the
be
evidence
Overall,
suggests
empirical
relationship
tween variables
and outcome. That
is, as the levels of state dependence
brace
level
of social
the likelihood
fear decline,
that the private
score on these
increases.
Where
the
democracy
sector will
two variables
em
is
54
See Hazem
Beblawi and Giacomo
Luciani, The Rentier State (New York: Croom Helm,
1987).
ventures (e.g., commerce, real estate,
of private sector entrepreneurs
in nonindustrial
dependence
is even more legendary. For a colorful account, seeMichael
construction)
Field, The Merchants: The Big
Business Families of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States (New York: Overlook
Press, 1984).
55
in Luciani, ed.,
Giacomo
States: A Theoretical
Luciani, "Allocation vs. Production
Framework,"
The
The Arab State (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1991).
56
See Helen Chap?n Metz,
ed., Saudi Arabia: A Country Study (Washington D.C.: U.S. Depart
ment of State, 1993). Of course, the elimination
of mass poverty has not eliminated all sources of so
cial threat in Saudi Arabia. Expatriate
workers
from the state's social welfare
(largely excluded
and Islamist activists all consti
benefits), the Shiite minority
(which suffers second-class
citizenship),
a
tute
sources of insurrection. Neither
of the latter two groups, however, constitutes
potential
popular
use mass empowerment
are not cit
to overturn the status quo.
majority who might
Expatriate workers
izens and so would not be empowered by democratization.
See R. Hrair Dekmejian,
"The Rise of Po
in Saudi Arabia," Middle East Journal 48 (Autumn
litical Islamism
1994); Mahdawi
al-Rasheed,
"Saudi Arabia's Islamic Opposition,"
Current History
95 (January 1996), 16-22; Peter Wilson
and
Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994).
Douglas Graham,
57
On Saudi elites' limited demands for political reform, see F. Greg Gause III, Oil Monarchies: Do
on
mestic and Security Challenges in theArab Gulf States (New York: Council
1994).
Foreign Relations,
CONTINGENT DEMOCRATS
the more
state
proves
split,
dependence
enthusiasm
for democracy.
197
inhibitor
powerful
of capital's
Labor and Democratization
Organized
If the preceding
makes
investigation
empirical
nature of
instrumental
capital's commitment
clear the contingent
and
to democratization,
fur
and
instrumental
contingency
a similar
ther empirical
study confirms
on the
two variables
of
labor.
The
labor's
part
ity
organized
governing
are
state
and aristocratic
support for democracy
contingent
dependence
suggests an inverse
for democracy.
the evidence
position. Again,
these variables
and enthusiasm
Mexico:
State Dependence,
Aristocratic
Democratically
Diffident
Labor58
The Mexican
of
ponent
the Mexican
repression
tested to
in
sisted
itself
Privilege,
between
and
case provides compelling evidence of the
diffident attitude
com
leading
allied with
labor, the CTM, remained
steadfastly
organized
even as that
on civil liberties,
restrictions
regime
regime's
at
of the opposition,
and repeated noncompetitive
elections
its authoritarian
the CTM per
character. More
surprisingly,
even after the
to authoritarianism
its commitment
regime
labor may
organized
relationship
to move
began
exhibit
toward
in a more
democratization.
democratic
The
direction.59
The
CTM de
nounced the regime's legalization of leftist parties in 1977, called for
the expulsion
of Cardenas
reformist movement
from the ruling party
successes
in 1988,
in
the
elections
held
opposition
protested
general
to
and
refused
in
the
that year,
1990s. Ponte
support
opposition
parties
was
that democratization
labor's
observes
greatest fear.60 The
organized
question
Both
is, why?
state
dependence
in explaining
and aristocracy
prove decisive
to
CTM.
state
of the
the political
First, with
regard
disposition
depend
the Mexican
ence, the CTM long enjoyed an authoritarian
bargain with
state. In
for the CTM's delivery
of reliable political
support
exchange
and
industrial
peace,
the regime
provided
labor with
a host
of organi
58
This
on Middlebrook
(fn. 52); idem, The Paradox of the Revolution:
analysis draws extensively
inMexico
State, and Authoritarianism
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1995);
University
inMexico
1995); Collier
(fn.
(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,
Stephen E. Morris, Political Reformism
4); and Rueschemeyer,
(fn. 8).
Stephens, and Stephens
59
For explanations of the regime's decision to embrace democratic
reform, seeMorris
(fn. 58), 7-31.
60
of Mexican Workers,
the Labor Congress,
Victor Manuel
Durand Ponte, "The Confederation
Labor,
and the Crisis
ofMexico's
52), 15; Rueschemeyer,
See also Middlebrook
Social Pact," inMiddlebrook
(fn.
(fn. 52), 94,101-2.
and Stephens
and Middlebrook
(fn. 8), 217-19;
(fn. 58), 292, 311.
Stephens,
198
WORLD POLITICS
zational and material benefits. These
included financial subsidies and
as
exclusive
domain
and closed
(for example,
legal
shop),
access
to
well as profit-sharing
social-welfare
schemes,
pro
privileged
subsidized
urban housing
and credit, expanded
social security,
grams,
concessions
and a nationally defined minimum wage.61 Although
the bargain with
labor was
coercive
ministrative,
(the state's superior
lopsided
it to set the terms
enabled
both
power,
of the alliance
with
and ad
labor
in a
the organizational
and material
benefits
deliv
fashion),62
self-serving
on its own.
exceeded what labor could have
ered by the state
procured
far
in
The
of
labor
the
Mexican
weak
structurally
position
organized
economy
tainment
state essential for labor's at
political
sponsorship
by the
of basic material
and social rights.63 Many
factors (for exam
made
ple, high rates of unemployment,
geographic dispersal of the labor
per firm, low overall levels of union
undercut
the structural position
of organ
state
economy.64
by the
Sponsorship
some of this weakness.
state sponsor
But
for
the
of
compensated
logic
on the
inMexico
of an authoritarian
bargain
ship hinged
persistence
a
more
on
as
the leverage that labor enjoyed
and,
key guar
specifically,
antor of
for
democratization
the
Because
pre
support
regime.
popular
force,
concentration
small worker
ization, and global pressures)
in the Mexican
ized labor
sented the regime with new ways to forge political legitimacy and build
popular
support,
it threatened
to rob the labor confederation
of its key
political trump (and its certainty of political sponsorship). As such, it
less than attractive.
proved
on state
to labor's
In addition
(and the link
dependence
sponsorship
an
to
authoritarian
age of state sponsorship
system of rule), labor's dif
was also a function
of its "aristocratic''
fidence
about democratization
position
minded
in the Mexican
governments,
of development
decades
economy. Despite
and
poverty remained
rampant,65 unemployment
61
Collier
"Mexicos Economie
(fn. 4), 59,83; Ponte (fn. 60), 100; Lawrence Whitehead,
Prospects:
inMiddlebrook
for State Labor Relations,"
(fn. 52), 73.
Implications
62
75.
Middlebrook
(fn. 61),
(fn. 52), 9;Whitehead
63
inM?xico," David Rockefeller
"A Strained Alliance: Continuity
Victoria Murillo,
and Change
no. 96-3
Center for Latin American
Studies Working
1996);
(Cambridge: Harvard University,
Paper
Middlebrook
(fn. 58), 288.
64
of this structural weakness was a consequence
of (or at least reinforced by) the late timing
Much
industrialization.
Late timing resulted in an immature industrial sector, still overwhelm
of Mexican
dispersed firms. It led to the importation of turnkey projects
ingly composed of small, geographically
countries whose capital intensity did little to absorb labor surplus. It meant indus
from industrialized
see
trialization in the context of global capital mobility,
reducing the leverage of local labor. For more,
Middlebrook
(fn. 58).
65
In 1989, 23 percent
treme poverty." Sebastian
York: Oxford
University
of Mexicans
still lived below
Edwards, Crisis and Reform
Press, 1995).
the poverty line and 7.3 percent lived in "ex
to
in Latin America: From Despair
Hope (New
CONTINGENT DEMOCRATS
remained
underemployment
ued to account
high,66
and the informal
199
contin
economy
economic
activ
of the
for a large proportion
country's
context
In
inMexico's
this
unionized
workers
formal economy
ity.67
a
access to stable em
economic
occupied
position,
privileged
enjoying
as well as nonwage
that far exceeded
benefits
those enjoyed
ployment,
by the vast majority of their compatriots. These benefits included priv
access
ileged
to state-subsidized
health
housing,
care, financial
credit,
and retirement funds.68This privilege disjoined labor's interests from
those
of most
centive
to
countable
other
and gave organized
labor little in
poor Mexicans
strata to make
forces
with
other
subordinate
the state ac
join
to mass
interests. To the contrary,
labor
had an
organized
interest
in preserving
its special relationship
with
the state,
an authoritarian
meant
the CTM
Thus,
bolstering
regime.
in their
and
other
Cardenas
candidates
support
left-leaning
to support the PRI in
of the 1970s and 1980s and continued
even
if that
refused
to
campaigns
an effort to
the status quo.69
In short, diffidence
about democracy
has been the mark of lead
CTM. State
in
unions
trade
Mexico
like
the
and aristo
ing
dependence
to
cratic status go far toward
their reluctance
break with
explaining
sustain
authoritarianism.70
Korea:
State Persecution,
Democratically
In contrast
casions
Committed
Exclusion,
and
Labor71
to the Mexican
at the forefront
in Korea was
Economic
labor in Korea has long been
case, organized
of the struggle for democratization.
rule
Authoritarian
on
twice during the postwar era, and
both oc
interrupted
organized
labor played
an active
role in the popular
movements
66
In 1995 urban underemployment
reached 25.9 percent and official unemployment
figures for
48.
urban areas clocked in at 6 percent. See The Economist: Country Profile, Mexico
(1996-97),
67
In 1996 the informal sector was the source of jobs for between 20 and 30 percent of theMexican
labor force. The Economist: Country Profile, Mexico
10; Country Report, Mexico, Economist
(1996-97),
Intelligence Unit (1st quarter, 1997), 21.
68
concessions won by the CTM generally translated into higher
Middlebrook
(fn. 58), 221. Wage
van Ginneken,
minimum wages that benefited all workers, not just union members.
See alsoWounter
Socio-Economie Groups and Income Distribution
inMexico
1980), 68-69.
(London: Croom Helm,
69
Ponte (fn. 60), 102.
70
an anonymous
A counterhypothesis
reader argues that internal trade union democ
suggested by
or aristocratic
racy, more than state dependence
position, might be the better predictor of organized
labor's support for democracy. But the fact that democratically
inclined trade unions have made pacts
me
with authoritarianism
when handicapped
by structural weakness makes
skeptical; Ponte (fn. 60),
inMexico,"
inMiddlebrook
87,100; and Enrique de laGarza Toledo,
"Independent Trade Unionism
research is necessary to test this counterhypothesis.
(fh. 52), 159,174. Additional
71
on Eckert
This analysis draws extensively
(fh. 30); Koo (fn. 45); Frederic
(fn. 30, 1990); Ogle
Deyo, Beneath theMiracle:
California Press, 1989).
Labor Subordination
in theNew Asian
Industrialism
(Berkeley: University
of
200
WORLD
for
agitating
protest,
an end
In 1960 workers
reform.72
organizing
to corrupt
forces with
joined
sure the
POLITICS
scores
of strikes
followed
student-initiated
and demonstrations
government.73
Similarly,
during
and church
students,
intellectuals,
to reform.74 In contrast
to Mexico's
regime
labor staunchly
allied
itself with
that called
for
the 1980s workers
activists
to pres
CTM, organized
the cause of democratization
in Korea.
explains this divergence in labor's behavior?
What
The
of
labor's
state
and aristocratic
dependence
privilege
a
not
labor did
prove important. Overall,
enjoy
dependent
relationship
was a conse
with
the state in Korea. Labor's
relative
independence
re
quence of both state policy and labor's own market
position. With
to the state's posture
contrast
toward
in
Korea
stands
stark
labor,
gard
to Mexico.
In Mexico
the regime's "revolutionary"
it
inclined
origins
degree
toward
alliance
the working
with
class,
and
an
strategy of industrialization (that persisted well
vided
it with
economic
sufficient
space
import-substituting
into the 1970s) pro
to accommodate
labor's
de
In Korea,
in a cold war
the regime's
emergence
by contrast,
war with
context and its
of
civil
the
it
North
made
experience
extremely
to the threat of communist
sensitive
overthrow. This
spelled hostility
as a
toward organized
vehicle
for
labor, which was perceived
potential
In addition,
communist
infiltration.
the regime's
embrace
of
early
a
on
industrialization
low-cost,
put
export-oriented
premium
quiescent
labor.
labor, setting the regime at odds with organized
mands.
Given
ratist
goon
these
ruthless repression of labor (not cozy corpo
as
the defining mark of the regime. From the
alliance)
emerged
to
labor activists during the U.S. occupation
squads who hounded
conditions,
the legal emptying of the labor movement
to the mass
reign
the espousal
Hwan,
of
arrests
Lack
militants
under
and
every postwar
Labor
therefore had little
tally.75
reason
to
for reform
every
push
to mass
interest.
sponsive
interest
during Syngman Rhee's
to
Park Chung Hee
under
Chun
Doo
"purification
camps"
in
Korea
labor, often bru
government
repressed
torture
of union
incentive
that would
to side with
make
the
the regime
state more
and
re
of state support thus gave labor both the independence
and the
to embrace
the cause of democratization.
But labor's inde
72
see Eckert
For historical
and Hamilton
and Kim (fn. 30),
details,
(fn. 30, 1990), 352-56;
118-21.
73
(fn. 30), 13-16.
74Ogle
Eckert (fn. 30,1990),
and Labor Protest in
380; Jeonge Taik Lee, "Dynamics of Labor Control
the Process of EOI in South Korea," Asian Perspective 12 (Spring 1988), 149; Koo (fn. 30), 39; Ogle
(fn. 30), 116.
75
For details of this repression, see Ogle (fn. 30); Koo (fn. 30); Lee (fn. 74); and Deyo
(fn. 71).
CONTINGENT
201
to the
In contrast
its market
position.
by
low levels of indus
case, where high levels of unemployment,
a
and
skill
levels
low
for
trialization,
spelled
structurally weak position
on state
en
labor (and hence dependence
in Korea
labor
propping),
a
rate
structural
Korea's
strong
joyed
relatively
position.
rapid growth
to an
and the dramatic
of
led
expansion
tight
industry
increasingly
labor market
that strengthened
labor's negotiating
muscle.76
In addi
pendence
Mexican
was
DEMOCRATS
also fostered
the regime's shift into heavy industry reinforced
labor's position
by
enormous
and facil
industrial
sites
that
concentrated
workers
creating
on industries
itated trade-union
Furthermore,
organizing.
by focusing
tion,
that relied on skilled labor, this shift in strategy insulated labor from
In
with
the poorest of the poor in the global proletariat.77
competition
struc
Korea's
favored
labor
with
short,
development
path
independent
tural power,
and this meant
labor could look to itself rather than to
state
propping
political
to advance
campaigns
Korean
its interests. This
labor to embrace
also freed
not favored
state elites.
by
scored low in terms
of aristocracy. For all
a
eco
its growing
structural
labor hardly enjoyed
strength,
privileged
in Korean
nomic position
remained deplorably
low, lag
society. Wages
Finally,
labor also
ging far behind productivity gains and substantially trailing wages
many
service
sectors.78 Working
hours were
interminable.80
conditions
working
cult for workers,
the material
given
sectors in
Workers
"came
society.81
victims of economic
development,"82
This
cratic privilege. Worse
intent of the
liberate
still, the harsh
regime, which
were
hardship
progress made
appalling.79
was
by
to see themselves
not
especially
so many
in
And
diffi
other
as the
principal
of aristo
as the beneficiaries
treatment
of workers
was
the de
saw the extreme
of
exploitation
contrast
to
In
its
the
of
strategy.
development
in
labor
Korea
had no special, politically
organized
labor as the cornerstone
situation
inMexico,
76
Koo (fn. 45), 1030; Deyo
(fn. 71), 24.
77
was made with workers
in Europe and the U.S., not Bangladesh.
comparison
Wage
78
the 1970s only 10 percent of workers
in manufacturing
and mining
earned incomes
Throughout
even half of that
to the minimum
set by the government.
living standard
Only 50 percent made
equal
standard. Ogle (fn. 30), 76. See also Kong (fn. 44), 240. For figures on the failure of wages to keep pace
see
and
in South Korea (Lon
with gains in productivity,
Sohn, Authoritarianism
Hak-Kyu
Opposition
in
don: Routledge,
between
industrial workers and workers
1989), 234, n. 81. For wage differentials
inKorea (Seoul:
the service sector and agriculture, see Young-Ki
Park, Labor and Industrial Relations
Press, 1979), 102; and Young-Bum
Park, Labor inKorea (Seoul: Korea Labor Insti
Sogang University
tute, 1993), 59.
79
even the most basic health and
Manufacturers
routinely ignored
safety regulations; Ogle (fn. 30), 77.
80
in the world, officially clocking in at fifty
workers averaged the longest workweek
Manufacturing
four hours per week (though some argue that sixty hours per week was amore common average). Ogle
(fn. 71), 98.
(fn. 30); Deyo
81
(fn. 44), 226-37.
Kong
82
Lee (fn. 74), 144.
202
WORLD
POLITICS
to conserve
and therefore
every reason to support
privilege
democratization
of the political
system.
case low scores on state
In the Korean
and aristocratic
dependence
em
in
interest
labor's
and
position
capacity for
help explain organized
mediated
bracing
democratization.
FROMZAMBIA,EGYPT,ANDTUNISIA
CORROBORATION
of state dependence
for shap
and aristocratic
position
importance
to
is further corroborated
by evi
ing labor's commitment
democracy
case confirms
dence from Zambia,
and
Tunisia.
The
Zambian
Egypt,
that low scores on both these variables
incline labor toward champi
trade union movement
The Zambian
(ZCTU),
oning democratization.83
one of the strongest
was based
in
in
sub-Saharan
Africa,
long
primarily
sector
This
the
lion's
share
of
the
copper mining.
country's
provided
The
revenues.
and government
the 1980s, how
foreign
exchange
During
a
in international
the country
ever,
copper prices plunged
steep decline
a
into economic
erosion
in wages,
crisis. Workers
huge
experienced
of
aristocratic
The
state, moreover,
any vestige
eliminating
privilege.84
on an
to insulate labor from the crisis but rather embarked
did nothing
In this context of low aristoc
of labor repression.85
energetic
campaign
state
labor movement
and
Zambia's
racy
negative
emerged
sponsorship,
as one of the most
for
democratization.
The
enthusiastic
campaigners
ZCTU threw its support behind theMovement
forMulti-Party Democ
an extensive
network of trade-union
strikes, mobilizing
racy, organizing
and
for
the
cause.86 Like Korea,
committees,
providing
key leadership
a
an
movement
Zambia
that once cut
trade-union
provides
example of
to harsh eco
loose from the moorings
of state support
and exposed
as
a
nomic conditions
of
democratic
reform.
emerges
major
champion
case
is
it
The Zambian
also useful because
the rival hy
helps eliminate
that
pothesis
and prosperity.
came
links
enthusiasm
In Zambia
for democracy
with
labor's activism on behalf
economic
growth
of democratization
at a time of great economic
crisis. Compare
precisely
Korean
labor's agitation
for democratization
case, where
a context of economic
prosperity.
this with
the
developed
in
83
Odds: The Zambian
This analysis draws extensively on Paschal Mihyo,
"Against Overwhelming
inHenk Thomas,
and Third World Trade Unions (London:
Trade Union Movment,"
ed., Globalization
Zed Books, 1995), 201-14.
84
Low- and middle-income
workers saw their wages decline by an average of 55 percent during the
1980s. See Mihyo
(fn. 83), 203.
85
Ibid., 208.
86
A Study of Party
Ibid., 201. For more, see L. Rakner, Trade Unions in Processes ofDemocratization:
in Zambia (Bergen: Michelsen
Labour Relations
Institute, 1992).
CONTINGENT DEMOCRATS
In contrast
to the Zambian
case,
the experience
203
of organized
inTunisia replicates the pattern of the CTM inMexico
high
scores on state
dependence
and aristocratic
position
labor
and shows that
can
spell labor
diffidence about democratization.87 Organized labor (the UGTT) in
Tunisia long enjoyed a collaborative, if troubled, relationship with the
state. The
a
state favored
the trade-union
movement
with
sub
and non
financial
and a host
of wage
for labor's
generous
legal context,
in exchange
for its members,
political
benefits privileged
vis-?-vis workers
organized workers
in the country's massive
and unorganized
informal
sector, and they far
exceeded what
labor would
have commanded
unassisted.
But though
state
no
the
favored organized
labor in this way, it brooked
hint of po
sidies,
relatively
benefits
wage
alliance.88 These
on the
even the
part of the UGTT and answered
independence
to state
minor
with
and
brutal
challenge
hegemony
unrelenting
a result, the trade-union
movement
As
has
distanced
itself
repression.
movements
from the country's
for
them
fledgling
democracy,
denying
litical
most
both
financial
sistently
thrown
and symbolic
its support
support.89
to President
In addition,
Ben Ali,
and authoritarianism.
the UGTT has
con
his
despite
regime's
Labor's
desire not to
increasing
repressiveness
and privilege
has prevented
it
upset the apple cart of state patronage
from embracing
the campaign
for democratization.
cases cited above have shown a fair
The
be
degree of collinearity
tween state
In
aristocratic
and
however,
position.
Egypt,
dependence
remains
the state dependence
of the labor movement
but its aris
high
was
tocrat
to a
is
The
labor movement
privilege
long party
declining.90
re
the Egyptian
worker
regime, exchanging
corporatist
bargain with
straint for essential
material
and organizational
benefits
from the
87
This
section draws extensively on Eva Bellin, "Stalled Democracy:
Industrialization
Capitalist
and the Paradox of State Sponsorship
inTunisia,
the Middle
East, and Beyond" (Book manuscript),
4,5.
chaps.
88
to bolster
For example, throughout
the 1990s the regime intervened in national wage negotiations
the position of labor and guarantee wage gains that, while not dramatic, far exceeded what labor could
command on its own. For more, see Bellin (fn. 87); and Christopher Alexander,
"State, Labor, and the
in Tunisia,"
New Global Economy
and Reform in a
in Dirk Vandewalle, North Africa: Development
Global Economy (New York: St. Martins
Press, 1996).
Changing
89
of Tunisia s
For example,
the UGTT has refused to publish any of the reports or declarations
Human Rights League
(the crusading force for civil liberties in the country) in the trade union news
paper; nor has it ever publicly endorsed the league's work.
90
This analysis draws extensively on Marsha Pripstein Posusney, Labor and the State inEgypt (New
York: Columbia
and Zachary Lockman,
Workers on theNile
Press, 1997); Joel Beinin
University
of the Egyptian
(Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1987); Robert Bianchi, "The Corporatization
Middle East Journal40
Labor Movement,"
(Summer 1986); idem, Unruly Corporatism: Associational
"The
Press, 1989); Ellis Goldberg,
Egypt (New York: Oxford University
Life in Twentieth-Century
in Contemporary
Foundations
of State-Labor
Relations
Egypt," Comparative Politics 24 (January
1992).
204
POLITICS
WORLD
state.91 Both
sorts of benefits
spelled
aristocracy
and dependence
for or
ganized labor, and this politically mediated privilege wedded the trade
union movement
multiparty
condemned
to the authoritarian
status quo,
it unreceptive
making
toward
Sadat began to move Egypt
reform. Thus, when
in
leaders
the
trade-union
system
vigorously
early 1970s,
to reduce the influence
it threatened
the plan because
they
had
under
to democratic
a
the country's
system.92
single-party
to shift its stance on
labor has begun
however,
Recently,
organized
to undertake
In the last decade
democratization.
international
pressure
structural adjustment
has forced the regime to retreat from its historic
enjoyed
to reform the
the regime has begun
labor. Specifically,
bargain with
labor code in ways
that will ax organized
treasured advan
labor smost
schemes
that will
and it has endorsed
tage (job security),
privatization
the essence of
the sphere of labor's political protection.93 With
now under attack, trade-union
leaders have
labor's aristocratic
privilege
to express support for democratization.94
Persistent
dependence
begun
makes
the labor movement
hesitant
about dramatically
po
endorsing
contract
litical
reform
it has not
(for example,
formed
an
independent
labor
party to contest the ruling party), but declining aristocracy (and hence
labor receptive
the declining
value of the authoritarian
bargain) makes
as it comes at someone
to reform, so
initiative. All told, or
else's
long
to an ambivalent
at
labor has shifted from candid negativism
ganized
a
score on aristocratic
titude toward democratization,
with
declining
for
this
the
best
change of heart.
privilege
explanation
Conclusion
case
The
labor
are
in this article
studies
presented
not
contingent,
not
is
random.
consistent,
that capital
demonstrate
democrats.
and
This
contingency,
turns on
for democratization
Support
see their economic
interests served by the au
capital and labor
state. This,
in turn, is shaped by two key factors for each so
thoritarian
on its level of state
enthusiasm
cial force. For capital, democratic
hinges
enthusiasm
and fear of social unrest. For labor, democratic
dependence
on its level of state
in soci
aristocratic
and
position
dependence
hinges
moreover,
whether
91
for union leaders,
included financial subsidies to the union, prestigious political positions
These
and nonwage benefits for workers such as job security, social security benefits, and generous leave pol
icy (maternity).
92
138.
See Bianchi
438; and idem (fn. 90,1989),
(fn. 90,1986)
93
See Marsha
Provisions," Middle East Re
Pripstein,
"Egypt's New Labor Law Removes Worker
port
1995), 52-53.
94(May-August
this development
Bianchi anticipated
as
early
as the mid-1980s.
See Bianchi
(fn. 90,1986),
443.
CONTINGENT
DEMOCRATS
205
is an inverse one, with
relationship
higher values of depend
and
into
reduced enthusiasm
for de
ency, fear,
aristocracy
translating
a number
mocratic
reform.
In many
countries
of
late-developing
state
extensive
the
structural
weakness
factors?including
sponsorship,
ety. The
of democratic
of social forces, pervasive
dis
poverty, and the evolution
states
led capital
course?have
and labor to ally with
authoritarian
This
rather than championing
democratization.
diverges
experience
at least from the historical
from that of the earlier industrializers?or
of the early industrializers?and
the expectations
of classic
challenge
myth
has political
consequences
and Marxist
analysts.
that
liberal
the same time,
is
capital and labor's alliance with authoritarianism
in stone. The
is
of
and
labor
gov
capital
political disposition
inter
erned by interest. As political
and economic
conditions
change,
At
not carved
ests may
suggest
logic of international
duce
may
its sponsorship
eliminate mass
class
propertied
may
The
Our case studies
may be recalculated.
that may prompt
such realignment.
The
re
state
to
economic
may force the
integration
and alliances
change
some of the conditions
perceive
of social
forces (Korea, Egypt). Or robust growth
sense of fear within
and
the pervasive
the
poverty
conditions
Under
these
and/or
labor
(Korea).
capital
democratization
intertemporal
variation
in a new
found within
to embrace
it.
light and choose
cases like Korea, Brazil, and
Egypt makes this possibility clear.
societal pressure for democratization,
then, turns on the
Predicting
and labor may well be champions
of
analysis of these variables. Capital
reasons and not
universal
dictum.
The
but
for
by
democracy,
contingent
of late
social forces' en
conditions
may
dampen
development
particular
thusiasm
for democratization.
ity of democratic
change.
enthusiasm
also spells the possibil
But contingency
as conditions
in late-developing
countries