sylvers2011

Clinical Psychology Review 31 (2011) 122–137
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Clinical Psychology Review
Differences between trait fear and trait anxiety: Implications for psychopathology
Patrick Sylvers ⁎, Scott O. Lilienfeld, Jamie L. LaPrairie
Emory University, United States
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Received 19 January 2010
Received in revised form 4 August 2010
Accepted 6 August 2010
Keywords:
Fear
Anxiety
Emotion
Phobia
Panic
a b s t r a c t
Fear and anxiety are poorly delineated in much of the clinical and research literatures. Although some
theorists and researchers have posited explanations for how trait fear and trait anxiety differ, many others
conceptualize the constructs as largely or entirely interchangeable. The primary goals of this review are to
examine clinical conceptualizations and neurobiological studies of fear and anxiety, examine the animal and
human literatures on the correlates of fear and anxiety, provide clearer definitions of these two constructs,
and discuss their implications for psychopathology. A secondary goal is to evaluate content of self-report
measures of trait fear and anxiety, and meta-analyze the relations between self-reported trait fear and
anxiety. We found that existing measures share significant content overlap across constructs. Despite this
overlap, our meta-analysis revealed only a moderate (r = 0.32) relationship between measures of trait fear
and anxiety, with an even lower relationship (r = 0.14) when we examined trait fear measures
operationalized in terms of harm avoidance. These findings suggest that fear and anxiety are largely
distinct emotions, and that psychological disorders of trait fear and trait anxiety warrant classification in
separate higher-order categories. Moreover, they suggest that future research should focus on deriving more
content valid measures of trait fear and trait anxiety from the neurobiological and diagnostic literatures.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Contents
1.
Fear and anxiety: Conceptual and definitional confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.
Conceptual distinctions between fear and anxiety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1.
Clinical conceptualizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2.
Neuroscientific conceptualizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.
Neuroscience research on fear and anxiety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1.
Animal studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1.1.
State fear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1.2.
State anxiety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1.3.
Trait fear and trait anxiety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1.4.
Implications of non-human animal neuroscience studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.
Human studies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.1.
State fear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.2.
State anxiety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.3.
Trait fear and trait anxiety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.4.
Implications of human neuroscience studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.
Operationalizations of fear and anxiety: Consensus and disagreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1.
Defining fear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2.
Defining anxiety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.
Diagnostic categories of pathological fear and anxiety: Descriptive psychopathology and behavior-genetic findings .
6.
Evaluation of the content of self-report fear and anxiety measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.1.
Self-report measures of trait fear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.1.1.
Phobic fear measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
123
124
124
125
125
125
125
126
126
127
127
127
127
128
128
128
128
128
129
129
129
129
⁎ Corresponding author. Emory University, Department of Psychology, 36 Eagle Row, Suite 280, Atlanta, GA 30322, United States. Tel.: + 1 404 727 0561; fax: + 1 404 727 0372.
E-mail address: psylver@emory.edu (P. Sylvers).
0272-7358/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2010.08.004
P. Sylvers et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 31 (2011) 122–137
6.1.2.
Harm avoidance measures. . . . . . . . . . . .
6.1.3.
Self-report measures of trait anxiety . . . . . . .
7.
Meta-analysis of self-report fear and anxiety measures . . . . . .
7.1.
Hypothesis 1: Primary meta-analysis . . . . . . . . . . .
7.2.
Hypothesis 2: Self-report measure as moderator . . . . .
7.3.
Exploratory analyses: Age, gender, and psychiatric status as
8.
Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.1.
Literature search and selection criteria . . . . . . . . . .
8.1.1.
Inclusion criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.1.2.
Search results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.2.
Data analytic strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.2.1.
Computing effect sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.2.2.
Effect-size aggregation . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.2.3.
Categorical moderator analyses . . . . . . . . .
9.
Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.1.
Hypothesis 1: Primary meta-analysis . . . . . . . . . . .
9.2.
Hypothesis 2: Self-report measure as a moderator. . . . .
9.2.1.
Fear measure as a moderator . . . . . . . . . .
9.2.2.
Anxiety measure as a moderator . . . . . . . . .
9.3.
Exploratory analyses: Age, gender, and psychiatric status as
9.3.1.
Age as a moderator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.3.2.
Gender as a moderator . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.3.3.
Psychiatric status as a moderator . . . . . . . .
9.4.
Summary of our meta-analytic findings . . . . . . . . . .
10.
Discussion and implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10.1. Implications for diagnostic classification systems . . . . .
10.2. Clinical implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10.3. Implications for neuroscience . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10.4. General summary and future directions . . . . . . . . . .
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
moderators
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
moderators
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
Fear and anxiety are primitive emotions that function to preserve
life. In healthy individuals, fear and anxiety can facilitate action in an
effort to maintain safety and well-being (Lang, Davis and Öhman,
2000). Nevertheless, when these often adaptive states become
characteristic of an individual, or trait-like, the resulting phenomena
can turn physically (e.g., cardiovascular disease) and psychologically
(e.g., agoraphobia) destructive. Currently, psychopathology marked
by high levels of trait-like fear and anxiety reside largely under the
umbrella category of anxiety disorders in the diagnostic nomenclature
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Kessler, Chiu, Demler, and
Walters (2005) found that the 12-month prevalence estimate for
these common disorders was 18.1%. Moreover, these disorders
account for approximately 32% of all mental health expenditures in
the United States (DuPont et al., 1996).
1. Fear and anxiety: Conceptual and definitional confusion
Despite the severity and pervasiveness of anxiety disorders, the
literature is only beginning to clarify the often poorly delineated
relationship between trait fear and anxiety. Moreover, the definitional
boundaries of trait fear and anxiety remain controversial. Although
some theorists and researchers (e.g., Barlow, 2002) have posited
explanations for how trait fear and anxiety differ, many others
conceptualize the constructs as largely or entirely interchangeable
(e.g., Beck & Emery, 2005). For example, Beck and Emery (2005, p. 9)
wrote that, “Fear involves the intellectual appraisal of a threatening
stimulus; anxiety involves the emotional response to that appraisal.”
Izard and Ackerman (2000, p. 260) wrote, “[Fear] is the key emotion in
the anxiety pattern.” Some prominent authors have even argued
explicitly that fear and anxiety are essentially isomorphic; for
example, Wolpe (1987) noted that he chose to use “‘fear’ and
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
123
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
130
130
130
130
130
130
131
131
132
132
132
132
132
132
132
132
132
132
133
133
133
133
133
133
133
134
134
134
134
134
134
‘anxiety’ synonymously in this paper because they are psychophysiologically indistinguishable” (p. 135).
Instead, and consistent with a growing body of research across
multiple domains, we contend that there is now persuasive evidence
that fear and anxiety are different emotions. We argue that their
conflation in the literature has led to ambiguous and at times
misleading findings. For example, there is a robust literature on the
underpinnings of pathological fear in children (e.g., Hayden et al.,
2007). Nevertheless, many of these studies used tasks designed to
measure worry, hypervigilance, and rejection sensitivity as proxy
measures of fear. As we will discuss later, these tasks appear primarily
to assess anxiety, not fear.
The confusion is most prominent when investigators use harm
avoidance (HA) measures, which can refer to either trait anxiety (e.g.,
Cloninger, Przybeck, & Svrakic, 1991) or trait fear (e.g., Tellegen,
1982). In research on psychopathy, a number of researchers have
attempted to test etiological models positing a lack of fear as the core
cause of this condition (e.g., Lykken, 1995) using either measures of
trait anxiety or measures that are highly contaminated with trait
anxiety. Consequently, some studies that appear to bear on the low
fear hypothesis of psychopathy may be largely or entirely irrelevant to
this hypothesis (Poythress et al., 2008).
Taken together, the conceptual confusion as to fear and anxiety
may negatively impact the implications of existing research. The
conflation of fear and anxiety, however, is not restricted to the clinical
literature. For example, Crestani et al. (1999), in a study investigating
the neural pathophysiology of anxiety in rodents, wrote that, “Anxiety
states in humans are characterized by harm avoidance behavior and a
bias for threat cues” (p. 833). As discussed later, the preponderance of
evidence suggests that avoidance behaviors (that is, fight, flight, or
freeze responses) are characteristic of fear, not anxiety. As another
124
P. Sylvers et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 31 (2011) 122–137
example, when describing fMRI studies, Davidson (2002) wrote that
“One common strategy for evoking anxiety among anxious patients in
the laboratory is to present them with specific types of stimuli that are
known to provoke their anxiety (e.g., pictures of spiders for spider
phobics)” (p. 69). Yet spider phobics are presumably pathologically
fearful of spiders and motivated to avoid them; therefore, pictures of
spiders may instead provoke flight or freeze responses characteristic of
fear, not anxiety. From these examples, it is evident that the relations
between trait fear and trait anxiety and their definitional boundaries
require clarification. Well-defined trait emotions, however, require
clear operationalizations at the state level. Although the phenomena of
state fear and anxiety ostensibly share many functional and structural
similarities, they may encompass distinct emotional states.
In the animal literature, there is a rich discourse examining the
biological underpinnings of state fear and anxiety. This literature
is clinically relevant given that many of the same structures (e.g.,
amygdala) that mediate fear and anxiety in animals also mediate
these emotions in humans (Blair, 2003). Moreover, as methodologists and philosophers of science have long noted, conclusions are
strengthened to the extent to which they derive from maximally
diverse sources of information (Shadish, Cook & Campbell, 2001).
Several researchers have also recently examined the biological
substrates of state fear and anxiety in humans. The findings from
these literatures, to be discussed later, suggest that although there is
some overlap, there are sharp differences in the patterns of brain
activation. In healthy adults, complementary literatures have also
noted differential external correlates of self-reported fear versus
anxiety, such as pain perception (Rhudy & Meagher, 2000), whereby
self-reported fear is inversely and self-reported anxiety positively
related to pain perception. This finding is consistent with conceptualizations of fear as an emotion that motivates avoidance
behaviors, wherein the organism experiences less physical pain
during the fight, flight, or freeze response. This finding is also
consistent with the conceptualization of anxiety as an emotion that
motivates hypervigilance, wherein the organism exhibits heightened sensitivity to external stimuli during approach. Similarly,
several studies using cognitive laboratory tasks have found evidence
differentiating fear from anxiety (see Öhman, 2008 for a review).
Despite an abundance of biological and cognitive research
separating fear from anxiety, definitions of the subjective human
experiences of trait fear and anxiety remain contentious (Barlow,
2002). As Gray and McNaughton (2000) noted, however, the only
direct means of understanding and defining the subjective experience of fear or anxiety is by self-report. Although preliminary efforts
have been made to investigate the discriminant validity of selfreported trait fear and anxiety measures (e.g., Perkins, Kemp, & Corr,
2007), there are no comprehensive reviews of the relations between
self-report measures of fear and anxiety, as well as potential
moderators of this still murky relationship.
The primary goal of this article is to provide a broad overview of
research on the clinical and biological correlates of fear and anxiety
from both non-human animal and human literatures. In the case of
the latter, we examine research on both “normal-range” personality
and psychopathological disorders, especially anxiety disorders. We
also examine implications of differences between fear and anxiety
for the classification of psychopathological disorders and neuroscience research. A subsidiary goal of this paper is to evaluate the
content of self-report measures of trait fear and anxiety and metaanalyze their relationships. As discussed later, the meta-analysis is
not intended to provide a definitive evaluation of the relationship
between self-reported trait fear and anxiety, as we later contend
that many of the extant measures are fundamentally flawed.
However, we conducted the meta-analysis not only to investigate
the associations among these measures but to clarify potential
sources of ambiguity inherent in these measures. To set the stage for
our narrative review and meta-analysis, we first summarize the
theoretical and biological literatures on fear and anxiety, highlighting the most pertinent writings and studies.
2. Conceptual distinctions between fear and anxiety
State emotions refer to affective adaptations to specific situations,
whereas trait emotions refer to affective characteristics of a person
across time and situation (Morrissette, Tull, Gulliver, Kamholz, &
Zimering, 2007). Clinical conceptualizations of fear and anxiety are
concerned primarily with trait emotions, whereas neuroscientific
conceptualizations are concerned primarily with state. Although most
neuroscience studies focus on emotion states, their findings are
readily extrapolated to form trait operationalizations.
2.1. Clinical conceptualizations
In the clinical literature, there are several, in some instances
competing, conceptualizations of fear and anxiety. Beck and Emery
(2005), for example, posited that fear is a cognitive response to threat,
whereas anxiety is an emotional response to fear. In other words,
anxiety is the emotional byproduct of fearful cognitions. According to
Beck and Emery, trait fear results from pervasive and persistent
interpretations of stimuli as threatening. Trait anxiety, in contrast,
encompasses the emotional responses to pervasive fearful cognitions.
Accordingly, a trait fearful person would presumably be trait anxious.
Epstein (1972) suggested that fear is an emotional response that
results from the interpretation of specific environmental cues as
threatening and manifests itself in avoidance and escape behaviors.
He posited that anxiety, in contrast, is a product of one of three
different pathways. In the first, avoidance of a feared stimulus is
disrupted, a phenomenon termed unresolved fear. Several theorists
agree that the inability to avoid fearful stimuli leads to anxiety (e.g.,
Öhman, 2008). The second, according to Epstein, occurs when
individuals overestimate the potential for threat in ambiguous
situations. Because the threat is non-specific and future oriented,
there are no clear avoidance options, leading to apprehension and
indecision. Many contemporary clinical theorists (e.g., Barlow, 2002)
define anxiety similarly. Some learning theorists (Zinbarg & Mineka,
2007) support this pathway by suggesting that pathological anxiety
results from implicitly associating a benign feature of a dangerous
experience with the danger itself. The third type occurs when an
individual's environment and expectancies do not match. In terms of
behavior, Epstein proposed that anxiety elicits hypervigilance in the
face of uncertainty.
By Epstein's definitions, trait fear results from an individual being
hypersensitive to several distinct environmental threat cues and
avoiding situations involving those threats. Trait anxiety, in contrast,
results from an inability to avoid a prolonged feared situation,
overestimating the potential for threat across situations, or experiencing chronic mismatches between the environment and expectations. According to this model, trait fear and anxiety are largely
unrelated, as the specificity of perceived danger cues and their
proposed pathways differ.
In a review of the cognitive and psychophysiological literature on
fear and anxiety, Öhman (2008) posited that fear occurs when
individuals are actively coping with a perceived threat, whereas
anxiety results from a threatening situation without an effective
means of coping. Similar to Epstein's conceptualization of anxiety as
unresolved fear, Öhman suggested that fear and anxiety share similar
underlying processes and are differentiated based on perceived
avoidance options. He also implied that trait fearful individuals who
are concerned primarily with physical threat react more strongly than
healthy individuals to physically threatening stimuli. Nevertheless,
these individuals do not exhibit elevated trait anxiety as they actively
avoid perceived threats. Conversely, individuals whose trait fear is
concerned primarily with social threat also show elevated levels of
P. Sylvers et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 31 (2011) 122–137
trait anxiety. Therefore, the relationship between trait anxiety and
fear, according to Öhman's conceptualization, differs according to
whether the fear is primarily physical or social (see also Lykken,
Tellegen, & Katzenmeyer, 1973).
Tellegen (1982) conceptualized trait anxiety as aversive arousal in
uncertain situations where avoidance does not seem possible. In
contrast, he conceptualized trait fear as hypersensitivity to danger
cues leading to avoidance behavior. Using these definitions, Tellegen
found that trait fear (as assessed by a “Harm avoidance” scale) and
trait anxiety (as assessed by a “Stress Reaction” scale) are separable
and nearly orthogonal constructs in the development of the
Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ; Tellegen, 1982).
Tellegen (1985) also found that, when using these definitions, trait
fear loads on a higher-order Constraint factor, whereas trait anxiety
loads on a higher-order Negative Emotionality factor (see also
Watson, Clark, & Harkness, 1994). Individuals who score highly
on the Constraint factor “convey caution, planfulness, a tendency to
avoid danger, conventionality, and adherence to traditional values”
(Tellegen, 1982, p. 36). Individuals who scored high on the Negative
Emotionality factor, in contrast, “describe themselves as often
stressed and harassed, prone to respond with strong negative
emotions to everyday vicissitudes, and as enmeshed in adversarial
relationships” (Tellegen, 1982, p. 35). The finding that measures of
trait fear and anxiety load on two different higher-order factors of the
“Big Three” personality dimensions suggests that fear and anxiety
may relate to, and perhaps stem from, different etiological processes
(Tellegen & Waller, 2007).
2.2. Neuroscientific conceptualizations
Compared with the clinical literature, the constructs of fear and
anxiety are delineated more clearly in the neuroscience literature.
Fear is commonly defined as an aversive reaction elicited by the
perception of a specific threat stimulus, whether conditioned or not
(e.g., Cooper & Guynn, 2006). Mammals display three behavioral
responses to fear: fight, flight, and freezing in place (Gray &
McNaughton, 2000). In most studies of fear reactivity, the threat to
the animal or individual is physical (e.g., Berg & Davis, 1985).
However, White and Depue (1999) suggested that specificity and
degree of threat, not the type of threat, elicit fear. In other words,
social situations may also induce fear in humans, as social harm occurs
more often and can be equally as devastating as physical harm.
Moreover, as Öhman (1986) noted, social threat can quickly escalate
to physical harm.
Anxiety, in contrast, is commonly defined in the neuroscience
literature as prolonged hypervigilance in anticipation of, or response
to, a diffuse threat where danger is not clearly imminent (e.g.,
Macleod & Rutherford, 1992). As Blanchard and Blanchard (1990)
noted, however, the perceived imminence of danger in both fear and
anxiety is in part a cognitive construction. Therefore, individuals'
perception of the specificity and imminence of danger may shape
their emotional experience. In other words, perception of danger is
subjective and can be influenced substantially by individual differences in personality.
Another theoretical distinction is the duration of arousal, whereby
the fear response tends to be short lived and the anxiety response
long-lived (e.g., Davis, 1998). Trait fear, by these definitions, results
from an organism chronically engaging in fight, flight, or freezing
behaviors due to perceiving specific environmental cues as threatening. Trait anxiety, in contrast, results from an organism being in a
chronic state of hypervigilance due to the anticipation of a generalized
threat. By these definitions, trait fear and anxiety are not necessarily
related (see also Barlow, 2002).
Additionally, McNaughton and Corr (2004), based largely on the
works of Jeffrey Gray (1982) and Blanchard and Blanchard (1990),
posited a two-dimensional behavioral defense system, whereby fear
125
and anxiety are distinct defensive responses. McNaughton and Corr
posited that the certainty of threat is necessary but not sufficient for
differentiating fear from anxiety. To McNaughton and Corr, the
primary difference between fear and anxiety lies in the directional
motivation of the behavior. They described fear as a defensive reaction
during which fight/flight/freeze responses facilitate escape from
threat. In contrast, they described anxiety as hypervigilance while
approaching a potential threat, in the form of physical danger, failure,
or loss of reward. Their theory holds that the anxiety system
continually compares the current environment with goals and
expectations. When conflicts arise between them (approach/approach, approach/avoidance, or avoidance/avoidance), the anxiety
system interrupts behavior and places the individual in a heightened
state of hypervigilance. In contrast with other neuroscientific
conceptualizations, their operationalization of anxiety necessitates
conflict arising from competition among available goals.
Taken together, the clinical and neuroscience literatures suggest
several experiential characteristics of fear and anxiety (see Table 1).
Although fear and anxiety appear to share some defining characteristics (e.g., negative valence), they also exhibit several discriminating
characteristics (e.g., defensive direction).
3. Neuroscience research on fear and anxiety
Despite the relative consistency of neuroscientific conceptualizations, the substrates of fear and anxiety remain the subject of many
research endeavors. Fear and anxiety are primitive states, which
provide adaptive survival responses to threat (Porges, 1995). The
brain structures implicated in fear and anxiety are similar across
species, which allows investigators to extrapolate provisionally
biological findings from non-human mammals to humans. Although
there are species-specific fearful and anxious behaviors, translational
research is consistently supported by complementary human studies.
The majority of animal research in this area has been conducted using
rodents (e.g., Nader & LeDoux, 1999), although some studies used
non-human primates (e.g., Winslow, Noble, & Davis, 2007).
3.1. Animal studies
3.1.1. State fear
As Gray and McNaughton (2000) pointed out, the only feasible
way to infer causal pathways in the neural circuitry related to fear and
anxiety is through non-human animal experimentation. The human
brain displays comparable connectivity to other mammals with
analogous functioning in many areas implicated in fear and anxiety
(Aggleton, 1992). Over several decades, neuroscientists have methodically pinpointed the structural and functional substrates necessary to induce fear- and anxiety-associated behaviors in animals,
primarily through brain stimulation, lesion, and pharmacological
blockade studies in rats.
Within these studies, the two most widely investigated behavioral
responses include the freezing response and fear-potentiated startle
reflex (Brown, Kalish, & Farber, 1951) acquired through classical
(Pavlovian) conditioning (Fendt & Fanselow, 1999). A limitation of
the freezing response is that it is limited by a zero baseline (Lang et al.,
2000), meaning that it only occurs during a fear state. Therefore, it is
unclear in pharmacological and lesion studies whether the effect of a
treatment is due to blocking fear or blocking the animal's physical
ability to freeze. A challenge of conditioning studies more broadly is
clarifying whether the effects of interventions are due to fear,
memory, or both (Walker & Davis, 1997). In other words, it is often
unclear whether attenuated startle or freezing responses result from
reduced fear per se or impaired memory of the fear-provoking
stimulus resulting from the treatment.
126
P. Sylvers et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 31 (2011) 122–137
Table 1
Experiential characteristics of fear and anxiety.
Dimension
Fear
Anxiety
References
Emotional
valence
Temporal
focus
Duration of
arousal
Defensive
direction
Negative
Negative
For example, Epstein (1972)
Presentfocused
Phasic
(brief)
Avoidance
(escape)
FutureFor example, Tellegen (1982)
focused
Tonic
For example, Davis (1998)
(sustained)
Approach
For example, Epstein (1972); Gray and
McNaughton (2000); McNaughton
and Corr (2004);
Mineka (1979); and Öhman (1993)
Diffuse
For example, Davis (1998); Lang,
Davis, and Öhman (2000); and
Macleod and Rutherford (1992)
Enhanced
For example, Rhudy and Meagher
(2000); and Tang and Gibson (2005)
Specificity
of threat
Specific
Pain perception Blunted
3.1.1.1. Neurobiology. Despite these limitations, researchers have
continued to isolate specific brain areas involved in fear conditioning.
Blanchard and Blanchard (1972) implicated the amygdala in fearful
responding by observing the failure of rats with amygdalar lesions to
freeze when presented with a shock-associated CS. Later studies
implicated the lateral nucleus (LA; e.g., LeDoux, Cicchetti, Xagoraris, &
Romanski, 1990) and central nucleus (CeA; e.g., LeDoux, Iwata,
Cicchetti, & Reis, 1988) of the amygdala. Whereas the LA is implicated
only in the acquisition of fear, the CeA is implicated in the acquisition
and expression of fear conditioned responses (Wilensky, Schafe,
Kristensen, & LeDoux, 2006). In a review of the fear-potentiated
startle reflex literature, Davis (2006) highlighted several studies
implicating the CeA as the primary circuitry in the acquisition and
expression of fear-potentiated startle in rats. Studies have also
implicated the CeA in non-human primates (e.g., Kalin, Shelton, &
Davidson, 2004). Overall, Davis (2006) concluded that the conditioned fear-potentiated startle reflex has a very short latency, is
consistent, and deteriorates rapidly after the removal of the feared
stimulus.
Fear-conditioning research also implicates prefrontal regions in
the extinction of fear. Morgan, Romanski, and LeDoux (1993)
demonstrated that lesions to the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC)
exerted no effect on fear conditioning but impaired extinction training
in a freezing paradigm. Conversely, Gewirtz, Falls and Davis (1997)
found that lesions to the mPFC had no effect on fear conditioning or
extinction in a startle paradigm. Although these findings suggest that
prefrontal circuits might have a differential involvement in freezing
versus startle, Quirk, Russo, Barron, and LeBron (2000) found that
ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) lesions exclusively impaired
extinction recall. That is, vmPFC lesions did not affect initial extinction
learning, but resulted in diminished recall of extinction on subsequent
days. In a later study, Sierra-Mercado, Corcoran, Lebrón-Milad, and
Quirk (2006) temporarily inactivated the vmPFC by infusing tetrodotoxin (a potent neurotoxin) prior to fear acquisition and prior to
extinction. They found that inactivation prior to extinction led to
diminished recall of extinction the following day, whereas inactivation prior to fear acquisition had no effect on recall. These findings
suggest that the vmPFC may play a role in the maintenance of trait fear
by impairing extinction memory for feared stimuli.
3.1.2. State anxiety
In the animal literature, state anxiety is often studied in rats using
the open field test and the light/dark box. These tasks take advantage
of rats' preference for enclosed, familiar spaces and dark environments. When given a choice between a darkened area and a brightly
lit area, rodents will consistently choose the dark area (Crawley,
1981). However, anxiolytics reduce the preference for darkness
(Onaivi & Martin, 1989). In one study investigating the startle
response in a well-lit environment, rodents displayed increased
startle responses (Walker & Davis, 1997). Consistent with several
theories of anxiety, the light ostensibly represents a diffuse threat and
uncertain environment characteristic of anxiety-inducing situations.
A benefit of this paradigm over the fear-potentiated startle is that it
does not rely on conditioning (Walker & Davis, 1997). Contrary to the
extinction displayed in fear-potentiated startle paradigms, repeated
exposure to the light without a US does not extinguish elevated
responding. Moreover, the rapid dissolution characteristic of the fearpotentiated startle response is not observed in light-enhanced startle.
3.1.2.1. Neurobiology. Although lesions to the CeA diminished startle
responses in fear-conditioning paradigms, they did not change the
startle response in the light-enhanced paradigm (Walker & Davis,
1997). Conversely, lesions to the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis
(BNST) fail to diminish startle responses in fear-conditioning
paradigms (Hitchcock & Davis, 1991), but diminish startle in the
light-enhanced paradigm (Walker & Davis, 1997). These findings
suggest two separable pathways mediating the startle response in fear
versus anxiety. However, the CeA and BNST share similar downstream
connections (Davis, 2006).
In addition to the amygdala, Gray (1982) and Gray and
McNaughton (2000) posited that the septum and the hippocampus
are central to anxiety. Through several anxiolytic and lesion studies
(see Gray, 1976), he demonstrated that anxiolytics and hippocampal
lesions produce similar behavioral effects. Moreover, he found that
among classical anxiolytics, the common electrophysiological “signature” involved the hippocampal theta rhythm. This rhythm refers to
patterns of neuronal firing that produce a slow wave of approximately
5–10 Hz (McNaughton & Gray, 2000). In a review, McNaughton,
Kocsis and Hajos (2007) found that manipulation of the theta rhythm
is characteristic of all clinically effective anxiolytic agents. They also
found that the same was not true for some other drug classes, such as
antipsychotics. In support of this finding, studies have found that
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) injections into the
hippocampus reduce anxious behaviors in rats (Degroot & Nomikos,
2005). Since Gray and McNaughton (2000)'s work, several studies
have supported the role of the hippocampus in anxiety (e.g., Edinger &
Frye, 2006).
3.1.3. Trait fear and trait anxiety
In addition to the voluminous literature investigating state fear
and anxiety in non-human animals, there is a large literature
investigating trait anxiety. Conversely, there is little evidence for
trait fear (Miller, Garner, & Mench, 2006). However, Aguilar et al.
(2003) found trait anxiety (measured using exploration tasks) and
fear (measured using avoidance tasks) factors independent of a
conditioned fear factor using several behavioral tasks in rats.
Trait anxiety in mice and rats is typically studied using animals
bred for either high or low levels of anxious behaviors. In non-human
primates, these animals are usually selected based on their performance on unconditioned tests. In addition to different levels of trait
anxiety, studies have found that different strains of rats and mice
are differentially affected by anxiolytic drugs (e.g., Vendruscolo,
Takahashi, Brüske, & Ramos, 2003). One limitation to this literature is
that the behaviors associated with these tests are often referred to as
“anxious/fearful,” reflecting a failure to distinguish these two
constructs (e.g., Williamson et al., 2003). With that caveat in mind,
Kalisch et al. (2004) found that selectively bred trait anxious rats
displayed reduced dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) oxygenation compared with nonanxious rats. De Wit, Yutaka, Balleine, and
Dickinson's (2006) findings also support the role of the dmPFC in trait
anxiety. They found that rats with intact dmPFC were able to come to
a resolution in a goal-conflict paradigm, whereas rats with chemically
inactivated dmPFC were not.
P. Sylvers et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 31 (2011) 122–137
In one study not using selectively bred rats, Blundell and Adamec
(2007) observed trait anxiety-like behaviors following the unprotected exposure of a rat to a cat for 5 min. In this paradigm, the rat is
stalked and attacked (bitten and clawed). Following this encounter,
rats display enhanced startle (Blundell, Adamec, & Burton, 2005) and
anxious behaviors (Cohen et al., 2004) for several weeks, even in the
absence of apparent danger cues. Blundell and Adamec (2007) found
that the behavioral changes result from changes to NMDA receptors in
several amygdala nuclei, the BNST, and the periaqueductal gray.
3.1.4. Implications of non-human animal neuroscience studies
Studies investigating the biological substrates of fear and anxiety
in non-human animals provide several important implications for our
understanding of the trait and state emotions:
(1) Autonomic arousal occurs during fear and anxiety states.
(2) Two distinct neural pathways appear to mediate fearful and
anxious responding: The CeA is the primary circuitry in the
expression of fear, whereas the BNST is the primary circuitry in
the expression of anxiety.
(3) Conditioned fear responses extinguish in the absence of CS/US
pairings, whereas unconditioned anxiety responses may not.
(4) The fearful response dissipates quickly, whereas anxiety
promotes a sustained response.
(5) Fear occurs in situations of certain threat, whereas anxiety
occurs in response to uncertain situations.
(6) Preliminary evidence suggests that the vmPFC is involved in
the maintenance of trait fear, whereas the dmPFC is involved in
the maintenance of trait anxiety.
(7) Overall, these findings support the biological differentiation of
fear from anxiety in non-human animals.
3.2. Human studies
Although there are several advantages to studying the biological
correlates of fear and anxiety in animals, human research also holds
several advantages, including the ability to measure subjective levels
of fear and anxiety, the ability to manipulate experimental paradigms
with verbal instructions, and the ability to measure the effects of
implicit as well as explicit stimuli. However, one disadvantage is that
humans readily habituate to experimental threat cues (Klorman,
1974). Moreover, it is ethically impermissible to induce state fear
comparable to that presumably induced in non-human animal
studies.
3.2.1. State fear
Fear studies in humans typically involve fear-conditioning paradigms consistent with those in the animal literature (e.g., shocks or air
blasts). Additionally, fearful responding is measured following
presentation of unconditioned fear-inducing stimuli (such as fearful
faces). A variety of techniques is used in these paradigms, including
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), positron emission
tomography (PET), fear-potentiated startle, and skin conductance
responding (SCR).
Fear conditioning in humans consistently increases SCR (e.g., Grillon
& Ameli, 2001) and fear-potentiated startle (e.g., Hamm & Vaitl, 1996).
Moreover, research demonstrates that, unlike SCR, fear-potentiated
startle response is an indicator of arousal and valence, specifically
negative valence (Ruiz-Padial & Vila, 2007). Ruiz-Padial and Vila (2007)
further found that increased fear-potentiated startle does not require
the subjects' awareness of unconditioned fearful stimuli, suggesting
that the acquisition of fear may occur as part of implicit (unconscious)
processing. Jovanovic et al. (2006) elaborated on this point by finding
that startle responses increased to a CS whether or not subjects were
aware of it. However, the inhibition of the startle response in the
presence of safety cues occurred only in the aware group. In addition to
127
external cues, the human fear-potentiated startle increases when
visualizing fearful stimuli (Vrana & Lang, 1990). Although these
findings indicate similarities in human and animal fear conditioning,
they suggest two implications for the human experience of fear that
differ from those found in the animal literature. First, humans are
capable of processing environmental fear cues outside of their
awareness. Second, internal fear cues can generate human fear
reactions.
Studies investigating central nervous system responding to fearconditioning paradigms parallel the animal literature. Several studies
have found increased blood flow in the amygdala using PET during
the acquisition of fear conditioning (e.g., Furmark, Fischer, Wik,
Larsson, & Fredrikson, 1997) and increased amygdalar activity using
fMRI (e.g., Pine et al., 2001). Supporting Ruiz-Padial and Vila's (2007)
findings, studies have found increased amygdalar activity in response
to unconditioned fearful stimuli, whether or not the subject was
aware of the stimuli (e.g., Whalen et al., 1998).
Consistent with the animal literature, several studies have implicated the vmPFC in the recall of fear extinction (see Sotres-Bayon, Cain, &
LeDoux, 2006, for a review), whereby activation in the vmPFC is
associated positively with extinction recall. Milad, Quinn, Pitman, and
Orr (2005) also found that vmPFC thickness, most notably the medial
orbitofrontal cortex, was positively associated with extinction recall. In a
more recent study, Milad et al. (2007) found that both hippocampal and
vmPFC activation were positively associated with extinction learning.
3.2.2. State anxiety
Like the state fear literature, the animal literature on state anxiety
is broadly corroborated by human studies. In contrast to nocturnal
animals, humans experience increased anxiety in response to
darkness. In light of this fact, Grillon, Pellowski, Merikangas, and
Davis (1997) found preliminary evidence that darkness enhanced the
human startle reflex. Nevertheless, they also found that self-reported
state anxiety did not correlate with the magnitude of this reflex.
Moreover, subjects reported the dark and light conditions as equally
unpleasant. One limitation to this study is that participants were
presumably healthy undergraduates who volunteered to participate.
Therefore, negative findings concerning self-reported anxiety may be
due to a restricted range at the lower bounds of trait anxiety, although
the authors did not report descriptive statistics for self-reported
anxiety. A second limitation is that subjects displayed habituation to
both light and dark blocks after the first trial. Despite their limitations,
these findings suggest that dark spaces may potentiate human startle.
In contrast to fear studies, many studies investigating the neural
bases of human state anxiety are equivocal. One primary limitation to
these studies is that many use fear-related stimuli, such as fearful
faces (e.g., Bishop, Duncan, Brett, & Lawrence, 2004) to elicit anxiety.
A secondary limitation is the seemingly conflated interpretation of the
data. For example, Straub, Schmidt, Weiss, Mentzel and Miltner
(2009) monitored 16 healthy female participants using fMRI while
the participants anticipated 4 levels (mild to strong) of electric foot
shock. Following the paradigm, participants rated the level of anxiety
they experienced on a 9-point Likert-type scale. They found that
activation in the pregenual anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was
positive during moderate threat and negative during strong threat.
They also found that self-reported anxiety was positively related to
dorsal ACC activation during the anticipation of strong threat. The
authors interpreted this finding as suggesting that activation of ACC
areas is dependent on the level of anxiety and severity of threat,
whereby moderate threat is associated with increased attentional
avoidance and strong threat with hypervigilance. However, it is
unclear whether the authors were measuring self-reported anxiety or
self-reported fear, as participants were probably rating their subjective experience of aversive arousal. Moreover, the authors labeled
brain activation during a fear-conditioning paradigm as “anxiety.”
128
P. Sylvers et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 31 (2011) 122–137
3.2.3. Trait fear and trait anxiety
Some studies have explicitly investigated the physiological and
neurobiological substrates of trait fear and anxiety in humans. White
and Depue (1999) found that self-reported trait fear was inversely
related to pupil dilation in response to the introduction of a
norepinephrine (which facilitates global alarm functions) agonist,
whereas trait anxiety was unrelated to pupil dilation. Additionally,
they found that pupil dilation in response to darkness (an evolutionary threat, as noted earlier) was positively related to trait anxiety but
unrelated to trait fear. They interpreted these findings as implying
that trait fear and trait anxiety are different emotional dispositions.
In terms of central nervous system functioning, several early studies
(e.g., Gur et al., 1988; Martinot et al., 1990) found mixed results as to
lateralization of fear versus anxiety. Some authors have found that
anxiety is right-lateralized (e.g., Gur et al., 1988), whereas others have
found that anxiety is bilateral (e.g., Reiman et al., 1989). However,
Heller, Nitschke, Etienne, and Miller (1997) suggest that these findings
are equivocal because studies often recruited participants from anxiety
disordered populations and failed to differentiate whether fear (e.g.,
specific phobia) or anxiety (e.g., generalized anxiety disorder) was the
primary emotion underpinning the anxiety disorder of interest. To
address ambiguity regarding the lateralization of trait anxiety, Heller
and colleagues administered the trait scale of the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) to
an initial pool of 2203 participants. From this pool, they selected 20
highly anxious and 20 comparison participants. The experimental task
consisted of measuring EEG while participants listened to 30-second,
emotionally aversive narratives. The authors found that greater
hemispheric asymmetry, specifically more left hemispheric activity,
differentiated anxious from comparison participants.
Dien (1999) found that self-reported trait fear correlated with
increased right-lateral blood flow in the frontal lobe during an objectspatial recognition task, whereas trait anxiety correlated with increased
left-lateral blood flow in the frontal lobes. Funayama, Grillon, Davis, and
Phelps (2001) found some support for Dien's findings with a double
dissociation of the startle reflex in patients with right or left temporal
lobe damage. Patients with right temporal lobe damage reacted
appropriately to a task involving uncertainty of threat (i.e. state
anxiety), but displayed impaired reaction to visual presentation of
threatening stimuli (i.e. state fear). Patients with left temporal lobe
damage, in contrast, reacted appropriately to the visual presentation of
threatening stimuli (i.e., state fear), but displayed impaired reaction to
the uncertainty task (i.e., state anxiety). Moreover, Morinaga et al.
(2007) found that right prefrontal brain activity was associated with
self-reported fear, but not anxiety, during a fear induction paradigm.
Engels et al. (2007) sought to differentiate neural activity
associated with high trait fear (which they referred to as “anxious
arousal”) versus high trait anxiety (which they referred to as “anxious
apprehension”) during an emotional Stroop task. They prescreened a
group of 1099 participants and selected 11 scoring low on trait fear
but high on trait anxiety, 13 scoring high on trait fear but low on trait
anxiety, and 18 scoring low on both trait fear and trait anxiety. Their
results indicated that the trait fearful group exhibited more activity in
the right inferior temporal gyrus for negative than neutral words,
whereas the trait anxious group exhibited more activity in the left
inferior frontal gyrus for negative than neutral words. Consistent with
Dien (1999), their findings suggest that trait fear is characterized by
increased right-lateral blood flow, whereas trait anxiety is characterized by increased left-lateral blood flow.
3.2.4. Implications of human neuroscience studies
In summary, human neuroscience studies permit several conclusions:
(1) Autonomic arousal occurs during both fear and anxiety states.
(2) Preliminary evidence for the lateralization of trait fear and anxiety,
whereby fear is right-lateralized and anxiety left-lateralized.
(3) Impaired extinction but not acquisition of fear characterizes
trait fear, supporting the conceptualization of trait fear as
persistent harm avoidance behavior even when it is irrational.
(4) Enhanced arousal during the acquisition phase of fearconditioning paradigms characterizes trait anxiety, supporting
the conceptualization of trait anxiety as hypervigilance.
(5) Evidence suggests that fear and anxious responding can occur
inside or outside of awareness, challenging the conceptualization of fear or anxiety as purely cognitively mediated.
4. Operationalizations of fear and anxiety: Consensus
and disagreement
Clinical and neuroscientific theorists have offered many conceptualizations of fear and anxiety that converge on some points and
diverge on others. Although biological similarities and differences do
not necessarily imply experiential differences, the findings from this
literature suggest subjective differences in the certainty of threat,
direction of defensive response, and duration of experience. In
defining fear and anxiety, it becomes necessary to focus on trait
emotions rather than clinical disorders or syndromes.
4.1. Defining fear
By informing theoretical conceptualizations with biological findings, we can discern that state fear has several characteristics (see
Table 1). Trait fear appears to result, in part, from an underactive
extinction circuit. Therefore, avoidance responses persist even with
evidence demonstrating the removal of the objective danger.
Although extinction of irrational fears remains possible, the learning
curve associated with extinction appears to be higher in trait fearful
than in other individuals. In terms of awareness, repeated avoidance
reactions to fearful stimuli presumably become automatic over time.
Therefore, the trait fearful individual can ostensibly avoid specific
threat stimuli outside of awareness and in some cases without
recalling the associated danger.
In assessing self-reported trait fear, questions addressing avoidant
behaviors (that is, the fight, flight, and freeze response) across
situations are appropriate. It is not sufficient to ask whether an
individual is fearful of specific stimuli without assessing avoidance
behaviors. It is likely that individuals cannot discriminate anxiety
from fear without appropriate instruction. In other words, individuals
may endorse being fearful of aversive stimuli about which they are
hypervigilant but do not necessarily avoid. For example, individuals
may endorse a fear of flying. However, they may elaborate by stating
that they are concerned that something bad will happen when they fly
and consequently experience a prolonged state of aversive arousal. In
this scenario, individuals are endorsing anxiety surrounding flying
(manifested as hypervigilance and hyperarousal during flight), but
not fear (avoidance) of flying. Therefore, “How likely are you to avoid
flying on an airplane because of fear?” is probably a more valid trait
fear item than “How much do you fear flying on airplanes?”
4.2. Defining anxiety
Theoretical and biological findings also point to several characteristics of state anxiety (see Table 1).Trait anxiety appears to result
largely from a hypersensitive appraisal circuit. Therefore, persistent
hypervigilance and prolonged hyperarousal seem to result from
overestimating the potential for threat in ambiguous situations. In
humans, this sustained state of hyperarousal manifests itself as
apprehension, hypervigilance, and rumination.
In assessing self-reported trait anxiety, generalized questions
addressing apprehension and hypervigilance across situations are
probably most valid. Similar to fear questionnaires, it may not be
sufficient to ask whether an individual experiences anxiety
P. Sylvers et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 31 (2011) 122–137
regarding a specific stimulus or situation. An individual may ascribe
anxiety to the aversive arousal experienced before avoiding a
specific stimulus (i.e., fear). Therefore, items that assess stimulus
non-specific and chronic arousal, such as “I am often worried that
something bad will happen,” should be most valid for trait anxiety
questions.
5. Diagnostic categories of pathological fear and anxiety: Descriptive
psychopathology and behavior-genetic findings
The current diagnostic system, the DSM-IV, combines disorders of
fear and anxiety under the umbrella category of anxiety disorders.
However, several clinical researchers have recently questioned the
validity of this DSM-IV classification and proposed alternative models
that are aligned more closely with research evidence (e.g., Krueger,
1999; Watson, 2005).
Krueger (1999) factor analyzed data from 8098 non-institutionalized participants ranging in age from 15 to 54. To investigate
common “comorbidities” (covariations) among mental disorders,
Krueger included generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), panic disorder
(PD), major depressive disorder (MDD), alcohol dependency, substance dependency, social phobia (SoP), simple phobia (SiP; known as
“specific phobia” in DSM-IV), agoraphobia (AG), antisocial personality
disorder, and dysthymic disorder (DD) in his analyses. The best fitting
model consisted of two correlated lower-order factors, AnxiousMisery (MDD, GAD, and DD) and Fear (SoP, SiP, AG, and PD), that
loaded on a higher-order Internalizing Disorders factor. These
findings suggest that the DSM-IV category of anxiety disorders is a
heterogeneous mix of conditions, some marked primarily by anxiety
and others marked primarily by fear. These findings also suggest that
at least some mood disorders may primarily be disorders of anxiety or
negative emotionality more broadly, not fear.
Watson (2005) reviewed the factor-analytic literature on structural models of DSM-IV diagnoses and proposed a revised structural
model consisting of three factors. The Emotional Disorders factor
comprised Bipolar Disorders, Distress Disorders, and Fear Disorders
sub-factors; the Distress Disorders sub-factor comprised of MDD, DD,
GAD, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder; and the Fear Disorders subfactor comprised PD, AG, SoP, and SiP. Consistent with Krueger
(1999), Watson proposed separate factors for primarily fear-based
versus anxiety-based disorders.
Behavioral-genetic studies have similarly pointed to alternative
classification models consistent with a distinction between fear- and
anxiety-based disorders. Kendler, Prescott, Myers, and Neale (2003)
acquired twin diagnostic interview data from more than 5600
individuals in the Virginia Twin Registry using raters blind to cotwin diagnostic status. To increase the number of individuals meeting
criteria for PD and GAD, Kendler and colleagues reduced the minimum
duration of GAD symptoms from 6 months to 1 month and the
minimum number of PD criteria for panic attacks to 2 within 30 min.
Their results indicated that MDD and GAD loaded strongly onto an
Anxious-Misery sub-factor, whereas animal phobias and situational
phobias (e.g., fears of closed spaces, fears of elevators) loaded strongly
onto a Fear sub-factor, similar to Watson's (2005) and Krueger's
(1999) conceptualizations. Moreover, the two sub-factors again
loaded on a higher-order Internalizing Disorders factor. Nevertheless,
they found that PD loaded weakly on both the Anxious-Misery and
Fear sub-factors, in contrast to Watson (2005) and Krueger (1999).
That ambiguity aside, the collective findings point to different genetic
underpinnings for primarily anxiety-based and primarily fear-based
clinical conditions.
6. Evaluation of the content of self-report fear and anxiety measures
Self-report measures are the primary tools for assessing fear and
anxiety in studies of anxiety disorders. There are several hundred self-
129
report measures of fear or anxiety in the literature (see Antony,
Orsillo, & Roemer, 2001). Many of these measures assess specific
components of fear or anxiety (e.g., dental fear), some assess relevant
clinical syndromes (e.g., agoraphobia), and others assess related
phenomena (e.g., anxiety sensitivity, namely the fear of anxiety).
Nevertheless, few measures assess trait fear or anxiety more broadly.
Of the trait measures, the most commonly used fear measures are the
Fear Questionnaire (FQ; Marks & Matthews, 1979) and the Fear
Survey Schedule (FSS; Wolpe & Lang, 1964), and the most commonly
used anxiety measures are the Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS; Taylor,
1953) and the STAI — Trait Scale. One or more of these measures were
used in 84% of the studies in the meta-analysis to be reported later.
6.1. Self-report measures of trait fear
6.1.1. Phobic fear measures
6.1.1.1. FQ. The FQ is a 24-item self-report measure designed to
assess phobic fears. The first 17 questions assess the specific fears on
a 9-point Likert-type scale, with values ranging from 0 (would not
avoid it) to 8 (always avoid it). Item content ranges from fears of
public transportation to the sight of blood. The last 6 questions are
related to anxiety and distress on a 9-point Likert-type scale, with
values ranging from 0 (hardly at all) to 8 (very severely troublesome).
Their item content ranges from depression to dissociation.
The FQ has demonstrated adequate internal consistency, with a range
of 0.71 to 0.83 across studies (Oei, Moylan, & Evans, 1991). It also
demonstrated a 1-week test–retest reliability of 0.82 (Marks & Matthews,
1979); however, the elapsed time between tests was brief so subjects may
have recalled their initial responses. Factor analytic studies of the fear
items on the FQ typically find a three factor solution (physical, social, and
agoraphobia; Oei et al., 1991), although a few authors have not confirmed
this structure (Trull & Hillerbrand, 1990). Moreover, these studies do not
support a unitary fear factor. Studies have also demonstrated that the FQ
is sensitive to changes in fear following treatment (e.g., Marks &
Matthews, 1979). Within the present meta-analysis, all studies limited
their analyses to the 17 avoidance items.
By the definition of trait fear derived earlier, the first 17 items of
the FQ are appropriate for assessing fear across a variety of situations.
However, at least some of the FQ content may be outdated or
culturally specific. For example, item 5 is “Traveling along by bus or
coach.” Although many fears appear to be timeless (e.g., sight of
blood), the content of the FQ has remained the same for nearly
30 years and may not accurately reflect common phobic fears in
today's society (e.g., radiation, computers, driving on freeways).
6.1.1.2. FSS. There are several versions of the FSS; the most popular are
the FSS-II (Geer, 1965) and the FSS-III (Wolpe & Lang, 1964). The FSSII is a 51-item scale developed for research, whereas the FSS-III is a 72item scale developed for clinical settings (Antony et al., 2001).
Questions on the FSS-II and FSS-III assess fears on a 7-point Likerttype scale from 0 (None) to 6 (Terror). In contrast to the FQ, the FSS
requires subjects to rate the degree of fear they feel towards a broad
range of potentially threatening stimuli.
The FSS-II and III have demonstrated adequate internal consistency (α N 0.90; Arrindell, 1980). In terms of construct validity, studies
have demonstrated a positive relationship between scores on the FSSIII and the magnitude of fear-potentiated startle to fearful stimuli
(Cook, Davis, Hawk, Spence, & Gautier, 1992). Factor analytic studies
of the FSS-III have yielded mixed results (e.g., Arrindell, 1980; Bates,
1971). However, two factors, blood/physical injury and social, are
consistently found across studies. Similar to the FQ, these studies do
not support a unitary fear factor.
Unlike the FQ, the FSS may not assess fears with adequate validity for
two reasons. First, the Likert-type scale does not assess avoidance;
second, some of the items (e.g., life after death and God) assess abstract,
130
P. Sylvers et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 31 (2011) 122–137
diffuse, and unavoidable threats akin to anxiety-provoking stimuli.
Among the items, 43/51 (84%) assess potentially fear-inducing (rather
than strictly anxiety-inducing) stimuli. Using the FQ and FSS-III,
Stravynski, Basoglu, Marks, Sengun, and Marks (1995) found evidence
for the relative independence for the diagnoses of social, agoraphobic,
and specific phobias using the FQ and FSS-III. There are no published
studies suggesting that a unitary fear factor provides the best fit to selfreported fear measures. There are also no published studies of the
correlations among FQ and FSS-III total and factor scores.
6.1.2. Harm avoidance measures
6.1.2.1. Activity Preference Questionnaire (APQ; Lykken et al., 1973). The
APQ is a 74-item forced-choice measure designed to assess fear. Each
item consists of two choices, one of which is unpleasant primarily
because it is frightening or embarrassing (e.g., “Sleeping out on a
camping trip in an area where rattlesnakes have been reported,” “Having
to blow your nose while in a group of strangers”) and the other of which
is unpleasant primarily because it is burdensome or onerous (e.g., “Sitting
through a two-hour concert of bad music,” “Having a gabby old woman
sit down next to you on the bus”). Respondents are asked which of the
two activities within each pair they would prefer. Within each item, the
two choices were matched for social desirability by a panel of judges
using a modified Thurstone scaling procedure. The internal consistency
of the APQ ranges from 0.82 to 0.86 (Lykken et al., 1973).
6.1.2.2. MPQ — Harm avoidance Scale (HA). The MPQ-HA scale, which
was modeled largely after the APQ (Lykken et al., 1973), has been used
in a number of studies as a measure of fearfulness. This scale consists of
28 items; many of the items are in forced-choice format and juxtapose a
potentially fear-inducing activity (e.g., “Being chosen as the ‘target’ for a
knife-throwing act”) with another that is less so (e.g., “Being sick to
one's stomach for 24 hours”). Other items ask people how likely they
would be to fear or avoid a potentially scary stimulus. A high score on HA
indicates a preference for avoiding potentially hazardous situations. Like
its “parent” measure, the APQ, the HA scale has adequate internal
consistency; for example, across four samples (some including college
students, others members of the community), Tellegen and Waller
(2007) reported Cronbach's alphas ranging from 0.82 to 0.84.
6.1.2.3. Psychopathic Personality Inventory — Fearlessness Scale (PPI-F;
Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996). The PPI-F scale was designed to assess
fearlessness or (reversed HA), considered by many to be a core
attribute of psychopathy (Lykken, 1995). This scale consists of 19
items in a 1–4 Likert-type format and, like other PPI scales, was
constructed using an iterative approach in which the results of
successive exploratory factor analyses informed construct reformulation and item revision (Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996). Each item
assesses the relative absence of fear, typically in one or more specific
situations or settings (e.g., “I would find the job of movie stunt person
exciting”). Across two undergraduate samples, Lilienfeld and Andrews
(1996) reported internal consistencies (Cronbach's alphas) of 0.86
and 0.88 for the PPI-F scale. Correlations between this scale and trait
anxiety measures were reflected in direction in the analyses reported
here given that this scale assesses reversed fear/HA.
Among the items on the MAS, 4/50 (8%) are explicit fear items
(e.g., “I do not have as many fears as my friends”) and 5/50 (10%) are
related ambiguously to anxiety (e.g., “I cry easily”). Therefore, 41/50
(82%) appear to be explicit anxiety questions.
6.1.3.2. STAI-T. The STAI-T is a 20-item scale designed to assess
pervasive feelings of anxiety. Items are rated by respondents on a
4-point Likert-type scale. The STAI-T has demonstrated acceptable
internal consistency (α N 0.85) and 1-month test/retest reliability
(r N 0.70) in adolescent, healthy adults, and military samples
(Spielberger et al., 1983). Factor analytic studies (e.g., Bieling,
Antony, & Swinson, 1998) suggest that a two-factor model,
consisting of depression and anxiety, best fits the data. Bieling and
colleagues found that the depression factor correlated more strongly
with measures of depression than anxiety, whereas the anxiety
factor correlated more strongly with measures of anxiety than
depression. This finding and others suggest that the STAI-T is
heterogeneous in content and indexes construct-irrelevant variance
(Messick, 1995) stemming from mood disturbance.
Among the items on the STAI-T, 5/20 (25%) are explicit depression
items (e.g., “I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be”) and 1/20
(5%) are ambiguously related to anxiety (e.g., “I have disturbing
thoughts”). Therefore, 14/20 (70%) are explicit anxiety questions.
Despite the differences in format and item content, correlations
between the STAI-T and MAS are high, ranging from 0.72 to 0.92 (e.g.,
Watson & Clark, 1984).
7. Meta-analysis of self-report fear and anxiety measures
Our meta-analysis sought to evaluate the relationship between
scores on frequently used measures of self-reported trait fear and trait
anxiety. Based on the clinical and neurobiological literatures, we
generated the following hypotheses.
7.1. Hypothesis 1: Primary meta-analysis
As the preponderance of evidence from these literatures suggests
that trait fear and trait anxiety are separable phenomena, we
hypothesize that the relationship between self-reported trait fear
and trait anxiety will be low or at best moderate. Although three
author teams who conducted narrative reviews (Perkins et al., 2007;
Watson & Clark, 1984; White & Depue, 1999) have reported that the
correlations between trait fear and trait anxiety appear to be low,
none has examined this association meta-analytically.
7.2. Hypothesis 2: Self-report measure as moderator
We also investigate the moderating effect of self-report measure.
From our evaluation of the content of commonly used trait fear and
anxiety measures, we found that some measures contain less
unrelated or overlapping items than other measures. Therefore, we
hypothesize that the relationship between fear and anxiety will be
significantly weaker in the FQ versus the FSS as well as the MAS versus
the STAI-T. Moreover, we hypothesize that the relations between trait
anxiety and trait fear assessed using HA measures (e.g., MPQ-HA) will
be significantly weaker than with trait fear assessed using specific fear
measures (e.g., FQ).
6.1.3. Self-report measures of trait anxiety
6.1.3.1. MAS. The MAS is a 50-item true/false scale of trait anxiety
derived from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI).
The internal consistency of the MAS is typically high (α N 0.9; King &
Campbell, 1986). Using MAS data, Buss (1962) found two primary
anxiety factors, physiological hyperreactivity and subjective feelings of
apprehension. Fenz and Epstein (1965), however, found that a unitary
anxiety factor accounted for nearly 75% of the variance in the scale.
7.3. Exploratory analyses: Age, gender, and psychiatric status as
moderators
In addition to testing these two hypotheses, we conduct
exploratory analyses investigating whether age, gender, and psychiatric population moderate the relation between trait fear and trait
anxiety. Because we do not have access to the ages of participants in
the studies, we investigate age as a categorical moderator with child
P. Sylvers et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 31 (2011) 122–137
Table 2
Phobic fear and anxiety scale correlations in child samples.
131
Table 4
Harm avoidance and anxiety scale correlations in adult samples.
Study
Measures
N
r
ESzr
Study
Byrne (2000)
King, Gullone, and Ollendick (1992)
Muris et al. (2003) Sample 1
Muris et al. (2003) Sample 2
Muris et al. (1998)
Ollendick (1983) Sample 1
Ollendick (1983) Sample 2
Peleg-Popko and Dar (2001)
Scherer and Nakamura (1968)
Schmidt and Mallott (2005)
Shore and Rapport (1998)
Silverman, Fliesig, Rabian, and
Peterson (1991)
Walters (2001)
Wilson and Hayward (2006)
FSS-C; STAI-C
FSS-C-R; RCMAS
KFS; STAI-T
KFS; STAI-T
FSS-C; SCRAD
FSS-C; STAI-C
FSS-C; STAI-C
CFI; CSAI
FSS-II; MAS-C
FNES; STAI-T
FSS-R; MAS-C
FSS-C; STAI-T
300
1524
189
163
120
99
118
108
99
405
385
81
0.50⁎
0.53⁎
0.29⁎
0.59⁎
0.44⁎
0.51⁎
0.46⁎
0.54⁎
0.49⁎
0.33⁎
0.31⁎
0.57⁎
0.55
0.59
0.30
0.68
0.47
0.56
0.50
0.60
0.54
0.34
0.32
0.65
Blankstein (1976)
Church (1994)
Helfritz and Stanford (2006)
Hodges and Felling (1970)
Lilienfeld and Andrews (1996)
Lykken et al. (1973)
Newman and Schmidt (1998)
Poythress et al. (n.d.)
Schmidt and Newman (1999)
Sellbom and Ben-Porath (2005)
FQ-C; STAI-C
FQ; STAI-T
149
2246
0.50⁎
0.31⁎
0.55
0.32
Note. ESzr = Fisher's Zr-transform; FNES = Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale. FQ = Fear
Questionnaire. FSS = Fear Survey Schedule. FSS-C = Fear Survey Scale — Child Version.
MAS-C = Manifest Anxiety Scale — Child Version. RCMAS = Revised Child Manifest
Anxiety Scale. STAI-C = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory — Child Scale. STAI-T = StateTrait Anxiety Inventory — Trait Scale.
⁎ p b 0.05.
and adult categories. As the anxiety disorders of PD (e.g., Oei, Evans, &
Crook, 1990) and GAD (e.g., Oei et al., 1991) are not necessarily
associated with trait anxiety and trait fear, respectively, we conduct
exploratory analyses to investigate whether the relationship is
weaker in clinical than non-clinical samples. As we do not have
specific diagnostic information for most participants, we investigate
psychiatric versus community samples as a categorical moderator.
Table 3
Phobic fear and anxiety scale correlations in adult samples.
Study
Measures
N
Bates (1971)
Carleton, Collimore, and Asmundson
(2007)
Carsrud and Carsrud (1979)
Dien (1999)
Geer (1965)
Grossberg and Wilson (1965)
Hagopian and Ollendick (1996)
Hersen (1971)
Kent and Keohane (2001)
Kilpatrick and McLeod (1973)
Kilpatrick, Sutker, Roitzsch, and
Mason (1975)
Kocovski and Endler (2000)
Kogan and Edelstein (2004)
Lang and Lazovik (1963)
Lerner and Keltner (2001) Study 1
⁎Lerner and Keltner (2001) Study 2
⁎Manosevitz and Lanyon (1965)
⁎Mattick and Clarke (1998)
Mellon (2000)
Perkins et al. (2007) Sample 1
Perkins et al. (2007) Sample 2
Schroeder and Craine (1971)
Stanley, Beck, and Zebb (1996) Sample 1
Stanley et al. (1996) Sample 2
Weeks et al. (2005)
FSS-III; MMPI-A
BFNE; SIAS
41
322
r
ESzr
FSS; MAAC
FSS; STAI-T
FSS-II; MAS
FSS-III; MAS
FQ; STAI-T
FSS-III; MAS
FNES; HADS-A
FSS-III-M; STAI-T
FSS-III-F; STAI-T
99 − 0.07 − 0.07
63
0.40⁎
0.42
205
0.42⁎
0.45
505
0.46⁎
0.50
61
0.38⁎
0.40
351
0.46⁎
0.50
141
0.48⁎
0.52
36
0.52⁎
0.58
211
0.39⁎
0.41
FNES; EMAS-S
FSS-II; BAI
FSS; MAS
FSS-II; STAI-T
FSS-II; STAI-T
FSS-III; MAS
FQ-SP; STAI-T
FSS-GV; MMPI-A
FSS-III; STAI-T
FSS-III; STAI-T
FSS-III; MAS
FQ; STAI-T
FQ; STAI-T
BFNE; SIAS
174
114
13
75
601
46
42
696
141
101
107
50
94
148
0.57⁎
0.64⁎
0.41⁎
0.40⁎
0.81⁎
0.54⁎
0.57⁎
0.27
0.51⁎
0.49⁎
0.21
0.34⁎
0.56⁎
0.34⁎
0.43⁎
0.38⁎
0.65
0.76
0.44
0.42
1.13
0.60
0.65
0.28
0.56
0.54
0.21
0.35
0.63
0.35
0.46
0.40
Note. ESzr = Fisher's Zr-transform; BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory. BFNE = Brief Fear of
Negative Evaluation Scale. EMAS = Endler Multidimensional Anxiety Scale. FNES =
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale. FQ = Fear Questionnaire. FSS = Fear Survey
Schedule. FSS-GV = Fear Survey Schedule — Greek Version. HADS-A = Hospital
Anxiety and Depression Scale — Anxiety. MAAC = Multiple Affective Adjective Scale.
MAS = Manifest Anxiety Scale. MMPI = Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory.
SIAS = Social Interaction Anxiety Scale. STAI-T = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory — Trait
Scale.
⁎ p b 0.05.
Measures
APQ; STAI-T
MPQ-HA; NEO-A
PPI-F; PAI-A
SSQ-P; STAI-T
PPI-F; MPQ-SR
APQ; STAI-T
MPQ-HA; WAS
MPQ-HA; STAI-T
MPQ-HA; WAS
MPQ-HA; MMPI-2
RCP
Uzieblo, Verscuerea, and Crombez PPI-F; STAI-T
(2007)
Waller, Lilienfeld, Tellegen, and
MPQ-HA; TPQ
Lykken (1991)
N
r
101
674
39
228
110
25
207
1473
217
985
0.05
0.05
0.20⁎
0.20
0.23
0.23
0.02
0.02
0.06
0.06
− 0.01 − 0.01
− 0.22⁎ − 0.22
− 0.05 − 0.05
− 0.15 − 0.15
0.04
0.04
ESzr
120
0.14
0.14
1236
0.22⁎
0.22
Note. ESzr = Fisher's Zr-transform; APQ = Activities Preference Questionnaire. MMPI-2
RCP = Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory — Restructured Clinical Scale
Psychasthenia. MPQ-HA = Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire — Harm
avoidance Scale. MPQ-SR = Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire — Stress
Reaction Scale. PAI-A = Personality Assessment Inventory — Anxiety Scale. PPI-F =
Psychopathic Personality Inventory, Fearlessness Scale, reverse scored. SSQ-P =
Stressful Situations Questionnaire — Physical Danger Scale. STAI-T = State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory — Trait Scale.
⁎ p b 0.05.
8. Method
8.1. Literature search and selection criteria
We identified relevant studies primarily through a computerized
database search of journal articles using Psycinfo and Medline with
the constraints of human studies, peer-reviewed journals, written in
the English language using the key words anxiety, anxious, fear, harm
avoidance, neurotic, panic, phobia, phobic, and self-report. If the title of a
paper included the search terms fear and anxiety, the entry was
automatically included in an initial pool of potential studies. In
secondary searches, we used the names of commonly used self-report
measures of fear and anxiety as key words, including Fear Questionnaire, Fear Survey Schedule, Manifest Anxiety Scale, Multidimensional
Personality Questionnaire, Psychopathic Personality Inventory, and
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. In addition to using databases, we
inspected reference lists from retrieved articles and books to generate
potential studies. Finally, as the relationships of interest were often
buried within studies, we perused issues of a specialized anxiety
journal, the Journal of Anxiety Disorders, from the publication dates
1987 (the first year of publication) through 2009.
Studies reporting within-measure correlations among subscales
(e.g., MPQ-Stress Reaction and MPQ-Harm Avoidance, PPI-Stress
Immunity and PPI-Fearlessness) were excluded from the meta-
Table 5
Gender and correlations between phobic fear and anxiety scales.
Study
Byrne (2000)
Geer (1965)
Grossberg and Wilson (1965)
Gullone and King (1992)
Hersen (1971)
Ollendick (1983) 1*
Ollendick (1983) 2*
Scherer and Nakamura (1968)
Measures
FSS-C; STAI-C
FSS; MAS
FSS; MAS
FSS-C; STAI-C
FSS-III; MAS
FSS-C; STAI-C
FSS-C; STAI-C
FSS-II; MAS-C
Male
Female
N
r
ESzr
N
r
ESzr
150
150
203
207
160
57
51
59
0.49
0.39
0.42
0.38
0.42
0.44
0.32
0.41
0.54
0.41
0.45
0.40
0.45
0.47
0.33
0.44
150
55
302
225
191
42
67
40
0.50
0.55
0.45
0.31
0.52
0.56
0.50
0.52
0.55
0.62
0.48
0.32
0.58
0.63
0.55
0.58
Note. ESzr = Fisher's Zr-transform; FSS = Fear Survey Schedule. FSS-C = Fear Survey
Scale — Child Version. MAS = Manifest Anxiety Scale. MAS-C = Manifest Anxiety
Scale — Child Version. STAI-C = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory — Child Version. All
correlations reached significance at p b 0.05.
132
P. Sylvers et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 31 (2011) 122–137
analysis. Because these subscales were derived from factor-analytically developed measures that were intended to yield largely
independent dimensions, the inclusion of these studies could
artificially weaken the relationship between trait fear and trait
anxiety (cf., White & Depue, 1999, who included these correlations
in their narrative review). In the case of the MPQ, its 11 lower-order
scales were designed to be largely independent (Tellegen & Waller,
2007). In the case of the PPI, items that loaded highly on more than
one lower-order factor were discarded in the process of subscale
development (Lilienfeld, 1990). Hence, our analyses focused exclusively on correlations between fear and anxiety subscales derived
from different omnibus measures of personality or psychopathology.
These analyses represent a “stringent” test of our central hypotheses,
as they exclude numerous studies in which trait fear and trait anxiety
correlations are likely to be spuriously low.
8.1.1. Inclusion criteria
The following criteria were used to select studies for inclusion in
the meta-analysis:
1. The study was based on data published in a peer-reviewed, English
journal through December 2009.
2. The study included self-report measures of trait fear and trait
anxiety (i.e., studies using measures of a specific fear or anxiety
were excluded).
3. The study reported data that allowed the computation of an effect
size of the relation between the measures. In several cases where
these data were not reported, we contacted authors for their raw
data.
4. The study was based on correlations between trait fear and trait
anxiety measures derived from different broadband measures.
8.1.2. Search results
These search strategies generated a list of approximately 800
articles. These articles were retrieved and examined for inclusion
criteria. Only 55 of the 800 articles reported association between selfreported fear and anxiety. Of the 55 articles, we excluded 9 from the
meta-analysis for using measures tailored towards specific, rather
than trait, fear or anxiety. An additional dataset containing the
variables of interest (which have formed the basis for several
publications, but in which the intercorrelations between trait fear
and trait anxiety were not reported) was identified by correspondence with the authors (Poythress et. al, unpublished).
fear measures: FQ (5 studies, n = 2493), FSS (24 studies, n = 4607),
and BFNE (5 studies, n = 1190). Second, we compared the phobic fear
(FQ, FSS, BFNE; 34 studies, n = 8290) measures' relations with anxiety
measures, on the one hand, with those of the HA (PPI-F, MPQ-HA,
APQ; 13 studies, n = 6765) measures, on the other. To account for the
possible effect of anxiety measure, we conducted a secondary analysis
investigating relations between the FQ (4 studies, n = 2451) and FSS
(12 studies, n = 2037) with the STAI-T. In the second analysis, we
compared two anxiety measures: STAI-T (11 studies, n = 1829) and
MAS (7 studies, n = 1305). The FSS was the only fear measure used in
the MAS studies, so we only used the 11 studies correlating the STAI
with the FSS for the analysis to minimize systematic error.
8.2.1. Computing effect sizes
In the current meta-analysis, effect sizes index the relationship
between self-report scores on measures of anxiety with those of selfreport measures of fear. Within studies, the effect sizes were reported
as Pearson correlations. Effect sizes for individual studies were
estimated using the unbiased estimator Fisher's Zr-transform (Hedges
& Olkin, 1985), defined as ESzr = 0.5 loge [1 + r/1 − r]. We used
Microsoft Excel 2003 to compute all effect-size estimates.
8.2.2. Effect-size aggregation
The grand mean, as well as means for each level of a given
categorical moderator, was computed by using an estimate of the
inverse of each estimates sampling variance (Hedges & Olkin, 1985).
This weighting scheme accords greater weight to more precise effectsize estimates (Matt & Cook, 1994). Upon averaging the weighted
effect sizes, the overall effect size was converted back into a Pearson
correlation for clarity of presentation.
8.2.3. Categorical moderator analyses
We compared weighted mean effect sizes from different levels of
the same moderator with the Q test statistic. The Q statistic is a
between-group homogeneity test, analogous to a pairwise comparison with two categories, derived from formulae in Hedges and Olkin
(1985), and defined as Q = Σwi (ESi − ES)2 (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001).
The Q statistic is distributed as a chi-square with k − 1 degrees of
freedom, where k is the number of groupings. If the Q statistic exceeds
the corresponding chi-square critical value, one can infer that the
effect differs across groups (e.g., the relation is different in male than
in female).
9. Results
8.2. Data analytic strategy
9.1. Hypothesis 1: Primary meta-analysis
In total, this search strategy yielded 47 articles suitable for the
current meta-analysis (see Tables 2, 3, and 4). Of these articles, five
included more than one sample. For Hypothesis 1, we aggregated 52
effect sizes (N = 17,620) for the meta-analysis. In exploratory
analyses, these studies were further evaluated for use in categorical
moderator analyses relevant to age, gender, and population. For the
analysis of age, 12 studies (n = 4340) reported the relation in nonpsychiatric child samples and 19 studies (n = 3,628) in nonpsychiatric adults samples. Because no studies reported the relation
in psychiatric child samples, we excluded psychiatric adult samples
from this analysis. For the analysis of gender, eight studies reported
the relation in male (n = 1037) and female (n = 1072) separately. For
the analysis of population type, 7 studies (n = 921) reported the
relation in psychiatric adult populations and 19 studies (n = 3628)
reported the relation in non-psychiatric (and non-forensic) adult
populations.
For Hypothesis 2, the moderator analyses investigated whether
the relationships between widely used measures of trait fear and trait
anxiety differed significantly across measures. In the first analysis, we
compared the relations between trait anxiety and 3 different phobic
We computed 52 effect sizes from the studies in the target
literature. Of these effect sizes, 39 (75%) were significantly positive, 12
(23%) were nonsignificant, and 1 (2%) was significantly negative.
Tables 1, 2, and 3 display effect sizes and relevant study characteristics
for each study included in the analysis. Results of the main metaanalysis are consistent with Hypothesis 1 and indicated a moderate
relationship (r = 0.32) between trait fear and trait anxiety scales, with
correlations ranging from − 0.22 to 0.81. Fail-safe N calculations
(Rosenthal, 1979) indicated that an additional 114 studies reporting
null results would be required to reduce the overall correlation to
0.10, and 1612 studies to reduce the overall correlation to 0.01.
9.2. Hypothesis 2: Self-report measure as a moderator
9.2.1. Fear measure as a moderator
We computed the relations between trait anxiety and 3 measures
of phobic fear using 34 effect sizes (5 BFNE samples, 5 FQ samples,
and 24 FSS samples). Consistent with Hypothesis 2, our results
indicated that the relation with trait anxiety is significantly different
P. Sylvers et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 31 (2011) 122–137
(Q = 43.32, df = 2, p b 0.05) between the BFNE (r = 0.45), FQ
(r = 0.32), and FSS (r = 0.45). In subsidiary analyses using only one
measure of anxiety, 16 effect sizes (4 FQ and 12 FSS) were computed
measuring the relation with the STAI-T. Consistent with Hypothesis
2, our results indicated that the relation with trait anxiety is
significantly weaker (Q = 39.45, df = 1, p b 0.05) for the FQ
(r = 0.32) than for the FSS (r = 0.48).
We also tested whether the relations differed between HA
measures (6 MPQ-HA, 3 PPI-F, 2 APQ, and 1 Stressful Situations
Questionnaire — Physical Danger Scale (Hodges & Felling, 1970)
sample) and physical phobic fear measures (FQ and FSS) with trait
anxiety. As HA measures were only assessed in adult samples, we only
used phobic fear studies in adults (4 FQ and 18 FSS) as a comparison.
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, our results indicated that the relation
between trait anxiety and HA measures (r = 0.14) is significantly
weaker (Q = 308.29, df = 1, p b 0.05) than the relation between trait
anxiety and phobic fear measures (r = 0.46).
9.2.2. Anxiety measure as a moderator
We used 19 effect sizes (12 STAI-T samples and 7 MAS samples) to
test whether the relations with trait fear differed across anxiety
measures. Contrary to Hypothesis 2, our results indicated that
relations with the FSS are not significantly different (Q = 0.22, df = 1,
p = ns) in the STAI-T (r = 0.48) compared with the MAS (r = 0.46).
9.3. Exploratory analyses: Age, gender, and psychiatric status as
moderators
9.3.1. Age as a moderator
Thirty-one effect sizes (12 child samples and 19 adult samples)
were computed from the studies in the target literature. Our results
indicated that the correlation between fear and anxiety measures is
not significantly different (Q = 2.38, df = 1, p N 0.05) in adults
(r = 0.44) and children (r = 0.42).
9.3.2. Gender as a moderator
Sixteen effect sizes (8 male and 8 female) were computed to test
whether gender moderated the association between trait fear and
anxiety (see Table 5). Our results indicated that the relationship is
nonsignificantly different (Q = 1.50, df = 1, p = ns) in male (r = 0.41)
and female (r = 0.46).
9.3.3. Psychiatric status as a moderator
To test the moderating influence of psychiatric status on the
relation between trait fear and anxiety, 26 effect sizes (7 psychiatric
and 19 non-psychiatric samples) were computed. Our results
indicated that the relation is nonsignificantly different (Q = 0.16,
df = 1, p = ns) between psychiatric (r = 0.45) and non-psychiatric
(r = 0.44) populations.
9.4. Summary of our meta-analytic findings
In summary, the overall relation between measures of trait fear
with measures of trait anxiety was moderate. The association was
significantly weaker among measures of HA than measures of phobic
fear. Among phobic fear measures, the relation of trait anxiety with
the FQ was significantly weaker than with the FSS. The relation
between measures of trait fear and trait anxiety was not moderated by
age, gender, or psychiatric status.
There were several limitations to our meta-analysis. First, it is
unlikely that the search strategy located all relevant studies. Although
the strategy was intensive, correlations of interest were often buried
within studies as secondary analyses. Therefore, even fairly comprehensive database searches are likely to overlook pertinent studies.
Second, the effect sizes were derived from presumably flawed
measures. Although error variance is inherent in all self-report
133
measures, a portion of the error variances in these measures was
probably systematic due to their flawed conceptualizations of trait
fear and anxiety. Third, the data collected for the meta-analysis were
not sufficient for testing the potential moderating effect of subtype of
phobic fear (e.g., social versus physical injury) on the relation
between trait fear and trait anxiety.
10. Discussion and implications
Our review points to three broad implications regarding the
relation between trait fear and trait anxiety. First, a wealth of research
across scientific disciplines suggests that trait fear and trait anxiety
reflect different emotions with separable correlates. Second, these
literatures suggest that avoidance behaviors across several situations
characterize trait fear, whereas sustained hypervigilance and prolonged hyperarousal while approaching several situations characterizes trait anxiety. These literatures dovetail with our finding that
the relation between trait fear and trait anxiety was especially weak
when the trait fear measures emphasized avoidance (viz., HA). Third,
results from the meta-analysis suggest that the subjective experiences
of trait fear and trait anxiety are largely independent, although
probably at least somewhat overlapping, phenomena.
Although the differentiation and operationalization of trait fear
from trait anxiety remains a contentious topic among clinical
theorists, the preponderance of research evidence we have reviewed
demonstrates that the two emotions are separable and derived largely
from different etiological substrates. First, the neurobiological
literature suggests that state fear and state anxiety are differentiated
primarily by activation in the CeA and BNST, respectively. More
provisionally, this literature also suggests that trait anxiety is
characterized by increased left frontal hemispheric activity, whereas
trait fear is characterized by increased right hemispheric activity.
Consistent with the neurobiological findings, diagnostic and behaviorgenetic studies have found that disorders characterized by trait fear
versus trait anxiety load on separable factors and differ in their
genetic underpinnings.
The neurobiological literature further supports a behavioral
distinction between state fear and state anxiety. Although both
emotional states are experienced as aversive and motivate behavior,
they push behaviors in opposite directions. State fear is an aversive
emotional state during which an organism is motivated to escape a
specific and imminent threat. The characteristics of state fear include
short-lived arousal that quickly dissipates after the threat is avoided.
Trait fear, therefore, is the persistent and pervasive experience of state
fear across situations. In colloquial terms, a “scaredy cat” is a vivid
description of a trait fearful individual, who avoids taking risks that
most perceive as relatively benign but does not appear distressed
when these risks are absent.
State anxiety, in contrast, is an aversive emotional state that occurs
while an organism approaches an ambiguous and uncertain threat.
The behavioral characteristics of state anxiety include sustained
hypervigilance and hyperarousal, which persist even after the
potential for threat is removed. Trait anxiety is therefore the
persistent and pervasive experience of state anxiety across situations.
In colloquial terms, a “worry wart” is a vivid description of a trait
anxious individual, who does not avoid situations but remains
persistently hypervigilant for potential threats (Barlow, 2002).
Our meta-analysis suggests that the subjective experiences of trait
fear and trait anxiety are distinguishable. Nevertheless, one major
limitation to this meta-analysis was the content overlap between selfreport measures of trait fear and trait anxiety. Our finding from the
investigation of self-report measure as a categorical moderator
suggests that the relation is significantly weaker with reduced
content overlap. This finding suggests that a refinement of self-report
measures of fear and anxiety to reduce cross-contamination of
constructs and construct-irrelevant variance (Messick, 1995) is
134
P. Sylvers et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 31 (2011) 122–137
warranted. Specifically, self-report measures of trait fear should
emphasize freezing and avoidance behaviors aimed at an array of
specific threats, whereas self-report trait anxiety should emphasize
hypervigilance, uncertainty, and hyperarousal. In this respect,
measures of HA, which our analyses showed to be the most
independent of trait anxiety, are presumably more valid for detecting
trait fear than are measures of phobic fear, which our analyses showed
to be moderately correlated with trait anxiety. Moreover, these
measures should directly assess the degree that an individual displays
a propensity for these traits, rather than measuring a clinical
syndrome (e.g., the inclusion of depression items on the STAI-T).
10.1. Implications for diagnostic classification systems
Our literature review and meta-analysis lend some support to
Epstein's (1972) clinical conceptualizations of trait fear and anxiety as
separable phenomena with differing etiologies, whereas they call into
question Beck and Emery's (2005) clinical conceptualization as
slightly different aspects of a single underlying phenomenon.
Although data from the meta-analysis do not provide unambiguous
support for Tellegen's (1985) assertion that trait fear and trait anxiety
are virtually orthogonal constructs, our moderator analyses suggested
that inappropriate item overlap across scales inflated the relationship.
Therefore, Tellegen's position cannot be falsified based on the present
results. Moreover, our moderator analyses suggested that, consistent
with Tellegen's position, measures of trait anxiety and HA are at best
only when weakly correlated. Our results are also consistent with
recent analyses suggesting that disorders of fear and disorders of
anxiety warrant classification in separate higher-order categories.
Results from our meta-analysis point to the need to devise
consistent operationalizations of trait fear and trait anxiety in the
personality and clinical literatures, and to develop self-report
measures consistent with these operationalizations. Because our
review indicates that trait fear and trait anxiety are largely independent, it supports Krueger's (1999) and Watson's (2005) contention
that the current diagnostic category of anxiety disorders is not justified
on empiric grounds. Moreover, it suggests that studies investigating
levels of trait fear and anxiety characteristic of mental disorders is
warranted. With appropriate assessment measures, these empirical
questions would be testable and clearer conceptualizations of the role
of trait fear and anxiety in mental disorders would be possible.
10.2. Clinical implications
Anxiety disorders, along with impulse control disorders, are
among the most commonly diagnosed mental disorders (DuPont et
al., 1996). Given the gravity and prevalence of these disorders,
research efforts investigating their pathogenesis, differential characteristics, and treatment are numerous. Although many of these
studies use measures designed to assess symptoms rather than
underlying personality features, there is sufficient evidence for the
differentiation of the two emotion systems to suggest that including
theoretically and empirically sound measures of trait fear and anxiety
in these studies is warranted. Moreover, including measures of trait
fear and anxiety in treatment outcome studies of anxiety disorders
may help us better understand the mechanisms of change in
psychotherapy (e.g., do changes in trait anxiety precede changes in
trait fear or vice versa?).
10.3. Implications for neuroscience
These findings also bear important implications for neuroscience
research related to the treatment of anxiety disorders. When using selfreport measures based on questionable conceptualizations of trait fear
and anxiety to study the neurobiological underpinnings of these
emotional dispositions, research is unlikely to yield replicable findings
across measures and studies. As Heller's et al. (1997) findings suggest,
the conflation of the constructs can produce ambiguity in the literature
on cerebral laterality and probably other psychophysiological phenomena. Therefore, a refined operationalization of trait fear and trait anxiety,
along with construct measures deduced from these definitions, may
better elucidate the neural underpinnings of these trait emotions.
10.4. General summary and future directions
Overall findings from our review and meta-analysis suggest that
trait fear and trait anxiety are separable constructs. Nevertheless,
many widely used self-report measures used to assess these
constructs are largely inadequate in light of the existing clinical and
neuroscience literatures. Therefore, studies aimed at developing more
construct valid – and less construct contaminated – self-report
measures of trait fear and anxiety are warranted.
In closing, our review suggests several fruitful directions for future
research. First, studies should strive to develop self-report measures
of trait fear and trait anxiety based on the well-developed neurobiological and diagnostic research literatures. Such work should help to
ascertain the extent to which the low to moderate correlations
between trait fear and trait anxiety measures are due to artifacts, such
as method covariance or content overlap, as opposed to genuine
substantive overlap. Second, studies should investigate the neurobiological, cognitive, and behavioral correlates of these measures to
better ascertain their etiological underpinnings. Functional brain
imaging studies examining the patterns of neural activation in fear
versus anxiety, at both state and trait levels, are especially needed.
Third and finally, studies should investigate the relationships of
both self-reported trait fear and trait anxiety with psychological
disorders. Such work should help to ascertain which disorders
currently housed within the broad anxiety disorders category are
primarily disorders of trait fear as opposed to trait anxiety. Moreover,
such work may bear implications for a number of conditions outside
the current anxiety disorders category but in which abnormal (either
high or low) levels of fear or anxiety play a prominent role, such as
somatoform disorders, impulse control disorders, childhood disruptive disorders, and personality disorders. For example, although a
number of authors (e.g., Lykken, 1995) have argued that psychopathy
is characterized by low trait fear, this claim remains controversial, in
part because the negative correlations between psychopathy and trait
fear are often low in magnitude (Schmidt & Newman, 1999).
Moreover, it is unclear which, if any, psychopathological syndromes
are characterized by low trait anxiety (Watson & Clark, 1984). A
clearer conceptual and empirical delineation between fear and anxiety
will be an essential first step toward addressing these questions.
Acknowledgements
We thank Drs. Patricia A. Brennan, Michael Davis, Stephan
Hamann, Stephen Nowicki, Jr., and Drew Westen for their feedback
regarding this article.
References1
Aggleton, J. P. (1992). The functional effects of amygdala lesions in humans: A
comparison with findings from monkeys. In J. P. Aggleton (Ed.), The amygdala:
Neurobiological aspects of emotion, memory, and mental dysfunction (pp. 485−503).
New York: Wiley-Liss.
Aguilar, R., Gil, L., Gray, J. A., Driscoll, P., Flint, J., Dawson, G. R., et al. (2003). Fearfulness
and sex in F2 Roman rats: Male display more fear though both sexes share the same
fearfulness traits. Physiology & Behavior, 78, 723−732.
American Psychiatric Association (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental
disorders (Revised), 4th ed. Washington, DC: Author.
Antony, M. M., Orsillo, S. M., & Roemer, L. (Eds.). (2001). Practitioner's guide to
empirically based measures of anxiety. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum.
1
* indicates references used in the meta-analysis.
P. Sylvers et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 31 (2011) 122–137
Arrindell, W. (1980). Dimensional structure and psychopathology correlates of the fear
survey schedule in a phobic population. Behavioral Research & Therapy, 18,
229−242.
Barlow, D. H. (2002). Anxiety and its disorders: The nature and treatment of anxiety and
panic. New York: Guilford Press.
*Bates, H. D. (1971). Factorial structure and MMPI correlates of a fear survey schedule in
a clinical population. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 9, 355−360.
Beck, A. T., & Emery, G. (2005). Anxiety disorders and phobias: A cognitive perspective.
New York: Basic Books.
Berg, W. K., & Davis, M. (1985). Associative learning modifies startle reflexes at the
lateral lemniscus. Behavioral Neuroscience, 99, 191−199.
Bieling, P. J., Antony, M. M., & Swinson, R. P. (1998). The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory,
Trait Version: Structure and content re-examined. Behavior Research and Therapy,
36, 777−788.
Bishop, S., Duncan, J., Brett, M., & Lawrence, A. D. (2004). Prefrontal cortical function
and anxiety: Controlling attention to threat-related stimuli. Nature Neuroscience, 7,
184−188.
Blair, R. J. R. (2003). Neurobiological basis of psychopathy. British Journal of Psychiatry,
182, 5−7.
Blanchard, D. C., & Blanchard, R. J. (1972). Innate and conditioned reactions to threat in
rats with amygdaloid lesions. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology,
81, 281−290.
Blanchard, R. J., & Blanchard, D. C. (1990). An ethoexperimental analysis of defense, fear
and anxiety. In N. McNaughton, & G. Andrews (Eds.), Anxiety (pp. 124−133).
Dunedin: Otago University Press.
*Blankstein, K. (1976). Relationship between Speilberger trait anxiety and Lykken
social and physical trait anxiety. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 34, 781−782.
Blundell, J., & Adamec, R. (2007). The NMDA receptor antagonist CPP blocks the effects
of predator stress on pCREB in brain regions involved in fearful and anxious
behavior. Brain Research, 1136, 59−76.
Blundell, J., Adamec, R., & Burton, P. (2005). Role of NMDA receptors in the syndrome of
behavioral changes produced by predator stress. Physiology & Behavior, 86,
233−243.
Brown, J. S., Kalish, H. L., & Farber, I. E. (1951). Conditional fear as revealed by
magnitude of startle response to an auditory stimulus. Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 41, 317−328.
Buss, A. H. (1962). Two anxiety factors in psychiatric patients. Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology, 65, 426−427.
*Byrne, B. (2000). Relationship between anxiety, fear, self esteem, and coping strategies
in adolescence. Adolescence, 35(137), 201−215.
*Carleton, R. N., Collimore, K. C., & Asmundson, G. J. G. (2007). Social anxiety and fear of
negative evaluation: Construct validity of the BFNE-II. Journal of Anxiety Disorders,
21, 131−141.
*Carsrud, A. L., & Carsrud, K. B. (1979). The relationship of sex role and levels of defensiveness
to self-reports of fear and anxiety. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 35, 573−575.
*Church, T. (1994). Relating the Tellegen and five-factor models of personality
structure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 898−909.
Cloninger, C. R., Przybeck, T. R., & Svrakic, D. M. (1991). Tridimensional Personality
Questionnaire: US normative data. Psychological Reports, 69, 1047−1057.
Cohen, H., Zohar, J., Matar, M. A., Zeev, K., Loewenthal, U., & Richter-Levin, G. (2004).
Setting apart the affected: The use of behavioral criteria in animal models of post
traumatic stress disorder. Neuropsychopharmacology, 29, 1962−1970.
Cook, E. W., Davis, T. L., Hawk, L. W., Spence, E. L., & Gautier, C. H. (1992). Fearfulness
and startle potentiation during aversive visual stimuli. Psychophysiology, 29,
633−645.
Cooper, A. B., & Guynn, R. W. (2006). Transcription of fragments of lectures in 1948 by
Harry Stack Sullivan. Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological Processes., 69, 110−112.
Crawley, J. N. (1981). Neuropharmacologic specificity of a simple animal model for the
behavioral actions of benzodiazipines. Pharmacology, Biochemistry, and Behavior,
15, 695−699.
Crestani, F., Lorez, M., Baer, K., Essrich, C., Benke, D., Laurent, J. P., et al. (1999).
Decreased GABAA-receptor clustering results in enhanced anxiety and a bias for
threat cues. Nature Neuroscience, 2, 833−839.
Davidson, R. J. (2002). Anxiety and affective style: Role of prefrontal cortex and
amygdala. Biological Psychiatry, 51, 68−80.
Davis, M. (1998). Are different parts of the extended amygdala involved in fear versus
anxiety? Biological Psychiatry, 44, 1239−1247.
Davis, M. (2006). Neural systems involved in fear and anxiety measured with fearpotentiated startle. Journal of Neuroscience, 22, 2343−2351.
de Wit, S., Yutaka, K., Balleine, B. W., & Dickinson, A. (2006). Dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex resolves response conflict in rats. Journal of Neuroscience, 26, 5224−5229.
Degroot, A., & Nomikos, G. G. (2005). Fluoxetine disrupts the integration of anxiety and
aversive memories. Neuropsychopharmacology, 30, 391−400.
*Dien, J. (1999). Differential lateralization of trait anxiety and trait fearfulness: Evoked
potential correlates. Personality and Individual Differences, 26, 333−356.
Dupont, R. L., Rice, D. P., Miller, L. S., Shiraki, S. S., Rowland, C. R., & Harwood, H. J. (1996).
Economic costs of anxiety disorders. Anxiety, 2, 167−172.
Edinger, K. L., & Frye, C. A. (2006). Intrahippocampal administration of an androgen
receptor agonist, flutamide, can increase anxiety-like behavior in intact and DHTreplaced male rats. Hormones and Behavior, 50, 216−222.
Engels, A. S., Heller, W., Mohanty, A., Herrington, J. D., Banich, M. T., Webb, A. G., et al.
(2007). Specificity of regional brain activity in anxiety types during emotion
processing. Psychophysiology, 44, 352−363.
Epstein, S. (1972). The nature of anxiety with emphasis upon its relationship to
expectancy. In C. D. Spielberger (Ed.), Anxiety: Current trends in theory and research,
Vol. 2. (pp. 291−337)New York: Academic Press.
135
Fendt, M., & Fanselow, M. S. (1999). The neuroanatomical and neurochemical basis of
conditioned fear. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 23, 743−760.
Fenz, W. D., & Epstein, S. (1965). Manifest anxiety: Unifactorial or multifactorial
composition? Perceptual and Motor Skills, 20, 773−780.
Funayama, E. S., Grillon, C., Davis, M., & Phelps, E. A. (2001). A double dissociation in the
affective modulation of startle in humans: Effects of unilateral temporal lobectomy.
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 13, 721−729.
Furmark, T., Fischer, H., Wik, G., Larsson, M., & Fredrikson, M. (1997). The amygdala and
individual differences in human fear conditioning. Neuroreport, 8, 3957−3960.
Geer, J. H. (1965). The development of a scale to measure fear. Behaviour Research and
Therapy, 3, 45−53.
Gewirtz, J. C., Falls, W. A., & Davis, M. (1997). Normal conditioned inhibition and
extinction of freezing and fear-potentiated startle following electrolytic lesions of
medical prefrontal cortex in rats. Behavioral Neuroscience, 111, 712−726.
Gray, J. A. (1976). The behavioural inhibition system: A possible substrate for anxiety. In
M. P. Feldman, & A. M. Broadhurst (Eds.), The theoretical and experimental bases of
behaviour modification. London: Wiley.
Gray, J. A. (1982). The neuropsychology of anxiety, 1st Ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gray, J. A., & McNaughton, N. (2000). The neuropsychology of anxiety, 2nd Ed. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Grillon, C., & Ameli, R. (2001). Conditioned inhibition of fear-potentiated startle and
skin conductance in humans. Psychophysiology, 38, 807−815.
Grillon, C., Pellowski, M., Merikangas, K. R., & Davis, M. (1997). Darkness facilitates the
acoustic startle reflex in humans. Biological Psychiatry, 42, 453−460.
*Grossberg, J. M., & Wilson, H. K. (1965). A correlational comparison of the Wolpe-Lang
Fear Survey Schedule and Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale. Behaviour Research &
Therapy, 3, 125−128.
*Gullone, E., & King, N. J. (1992). Psychometric evaluation of a revised fear survey
schedule for children and adolescents. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 33,
987−998.
Gur, R. C., Gur, R. E., Skolnick, B. E., Resnick, S. M., Silver, F. L., Chowluk, J., et al. (1988).
Effects of task difficulty on regional cerebral blood flow: Relationships with anxiety
and performance. Psychophysiology, 25, 392−399.
*Hagopian, L. P., & Ollendick, T. H. (1996). Behavioral inhibition and anxiety sensitivity:
A reanalysis. Personality and Individual Differences, 21, 247−252.
Hamm, A. O., & Vaitl, D. (1996). Affective learning: Awareness and aversion.
Psychophysiology, 33, 698−710.
Hayden, E. P., Dougherty, L. R., Maloney, B., Durbin, E. C., Olino, T. M., Nurnberger, J. I.,
et al. (2007). Temperamental fearfulness in childhood and the serotonin
transporter promoter region polymorphism: A multimethod association study.
Psychiatric Genetics, 17, 135−142.
Hedges, L. V., & Olkin, I. (1985). Statistical methods for meta-analysis. Orlando: Academic Press.
*Helfritz, L. E., & Stanford, M. S. (2006). Personality and psychopathology in an
impulsive aggressive college sample. Aggressive Behavior, 32, 28−37.
Heller, W., Nitschke, J. B., Etienne, M. A., & Miller, G. A. (1997). Patterns of regional brain
activity differentiate types of anxiety. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 106,
376−385.
*Hersen, M. (1971). Fear scale norms for an in-patient population. Journal of Clinical
Psychology, 27, 375−378.
Hitchcock, J. M., & Davis, M. (1991). The efferent pathway of the amygdala involved in
conditioned stimulus: Effect of lesions of the amygdala. Behavioral Neuroscience,
105, 826−842.
*Hodges, W. F., & Felling, J. P. (1970). Types of stressful situations and their relation to
trait anxiety and sex. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 34, 333−337.
Izard, C. E., & Ackerman, B. P. (2000). Motivational, organizational, and regulatory
functions of discrete emotions. In M. Lewis, & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), Handbook
of emotions (pp. 253−264)., 2nd Ed. New York: Guilford Press.
Jovanovic, T., Norrholm, S. D., Keyes, M., Fiallos, A., Jovanovic, S., Myers, K. M., et al.
(2006). Contingency awareness and fear inhibition in a human fear-potentiated
startle paradigm. Behavioral Neuroscience, 120, 995−1004.
Kalin, N. H., Shelton, S. E., & Davidson, R. J. (2004). The role of the central nucleus of the
amygdala in mediating fear and anxiety in the primate. Journal of Neuroscience, 24,
5506−5515.
Kalisch, R., Salome, N., Platzer, S., Wigger, A., Czisch, M., Sommer, W., et al. (2004). High
trait anxiety and hyporeactivity to stress of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex: A
combined phMRI and Fos study in rats. Neuroimage, 23, 382−391.
Kendler, K. S., Prescott, C. A., Myers, J., & Neale, M. C. (2003). The structure of genetic
and environmental risk factors for common psychiatric and substance use
disorders in men and women. Archives of General Psychiatry, 60, 929−937.
*Kent, G., & Keohane, S. (2001). Social anxiety and disfigurement: The moderating
effects of fear of negative evaluation and past experience. British Journal of Clinical
Psychology, 40, 23−34.
Kessler, R. C., Chiu, W. T., Demler, O., & Walters, E. E. (2005). Prevalence, severity, and
comorbidity of 12-month DSM-IV disorders in the national comorbidity survey
replication. Archives of General Psychiatry, 62, 617−627.
*Kilpatrick, D. G., & McLeod, P. G. (1973). Trait anxiety and fearfulness. Social Behavior
and Personality: An International Journal, 2, 119−122.
*Kilpatrick, D. G., Sutker, P. B., Roitzsch, J. C., & Mason, R. L. (1975). Self-reported fears
and electrodermal responsiveness of high and low trait anxious subjects to fear of
failure and other stressors. Social Behavior and Personality, 3, 205−211.
King, N. J., & Campbell, I. M. (1986). A manifest anxiety scale from MMPI-168. Journal of
Clinical Psychology, 42, 748−751.
*King, N. J., Gullone, E., & Ollendick, T. H. (1992). Manifest anxiety and fearfulness in
children and adolescents. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 153, 63−74.
Klorman, R. (1974). Habituation of fear: Effects of intensity and stimulus order.
Psychophysiology, 11, 15−26.
136
P. Sylvers et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 31 (2011) 122–137
*Kocovski, N. L., & Endler, N. S. (2000). Social anxiety, self-regulation, and fear of
negative evaluation. European Journal of Personality, 14, 347−358.
*Kogan, J. N., & Edelstein, B. A. (2004). Modification and psychometric examination of a
self-report measure of fear in older adults. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 18,
397−408.
Krueger, R. F. (1999). The structure of common mental disorders. Archives of General
Psychiatry, 56, 921−926.
Lang, P. J., Davis, M., & Öhman, A. (2000). Fear and anxiety: Animal models and human
cognitive psychophysiology. Journal of Affective Disorders, 61, 137−159.
*Lang, P. J., & Lazovik, A. D. (1963). Experimental desensitization of a phobia. Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 66, 519−525.
LeDoux, J. E., Cicchetti, P., Xagoraris, A., & Romanski, L. M. (1990). The lateral
amygdaloid nucleus: Sensory interface of the amygdala in fear conditioning. Journal
of Neuroscience, 10, 1062−1069.
LeDoux, J. E., Iwata, J., Cicchetti, P., & Reis, D. J. (1988). Different projections of the
central amygdaloid nucleus mediate autonomic and behavioral correlates of
conditioned fear. Journal of Neuroscience, 8, 2517−2529.
*Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2001). Fear, anger, and risk. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 81, 146−159.
Lilienfeld, S. O. (1990). Development and preliminary validation of a self-report measure of
psychopathic personality. Doctoral dissertation: University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis.
Lilienfeld, S. O., & Andrews, B. P. (1996). Development and preliminary validation of a
self report measure of psychopathic personality traits in noncriminal populations.
Journal of Personality Assessment, 66, 488−524.
Lipsey, M. W., & Wilson, D. B. (2001). Practical meta-analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.
Lykken, D. T. (1995). The antisocial personalities. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum.
*Lykken, D. T., Tellegen, A., & Katzenmeyer, C. G. (1973). Manual for the Activity
Preference Questionnaire. Report No. PR-73-4, Reports from the Research Laboratories. Minneapolis: Department of Psychiatry, University of Minnesota.
Macleod, C., & Rutherford, E. M. (1992). Anxiety and the selective processing of emotional
information: Mediating roles of awareness, trait and state variables, and personal
relevance of stimulus materials. Behavior Research and Therapy, 30, 479−491.
*Manosevitz, M., & Lanyon, R. I. (1965). Fear survey schedule: A normative study.
Psychological Reports, 17, 699−703.
Marks, I. M., & Matthews, A. M. (1979). Brief standard self-rating for phobic patients.
Behavior Research & Therapy, 17, 263−267.
Martinot, J. H., Allilaire, J. F., Mazolyer, B. M., Hantouche, E., Huret, J. D., Legaut-Demare,
F., et al. (1990). Obsessive–compulsive disorder: A clinical neuropsychological and
positron emission tomography study. Acta Psychiatrica Scandanavica, 82, 233−242.
Matt, G. E., & Cook, T. D. (1994). Threats to the validity of research synthesis. In H.
Cooper, & L. V. Hedges (Eds.), The handbook of research synthesis (pp. 503−520).
New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
*Mattick, R. P., & Clarke, J. C. (1998). Development and validation of measures of social
phobia, scrutiny fear, and social interaction anxiety. Behaviour Research and
Therapy, 36, 455−470.
McNaughton, N., & Corr, P. J. (2004). A two-dimensional neuropsychology of defense:
Fear/anxiety and defensive distance. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Review, 28,
285−305.
McNaughton, N., & Gray, J. A. (2000). Anxiolytic action on the behavioural inhibition
system implies multiple types of arousal contribute to anxiety. Journal of Anxiety
Disorders, 61, 161−176.
McNaughton, N., Kocsis, B., & Hajos, M. (2007). Elicited hippocampal theta rhythm: A
screen for anxiolytic and procognitive drugs through changes in hippocampal
function? Behavioural Pharmacology, 18, 329−346.
*Mellon, R. (2000). A Greek-language inventory of fears: Psychometric properties and
factor structure of self-reports of fears on the Hellenic Fear Survey Schedule. Journal
of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 22, 123−140.
Messick, S. (1995). Validity of psychological assessment: Validation of inferences from
persons' responses and performances as scientific inquiry into score meaning.
American Psychologist, 50, 741−749.
Milad, M. R., Quinn, B. T., Pitman, R. K., & Orr, S. P. (2005). Thickness of ventromedial
prefrontal cortex in humans is correlated with extinction memory. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences, 102, 10706−10711.
Milad, M. R., Wright, C., Orr, S., Pitman, R., Quirk, G., & Rauch, S. (2007). Recall of fear
extinction in humans activates the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and hippocampus in concert. Biological Psychiatry, 62, 446−454.
Miller, K. A., Garner, J. P., & Mench, J. A. (2006). Is fearfulness a trait that can be
measured with behavioural tests? A validation of four fear tests for Japanese quail.
Animal Behaviour, 71, 1323−1334.
Mineka, S. (1979). The role of fear in theories of avoidance learning, flooding, and
extinction. Psychological Bulletin, 86, 985−1010.
Morgan, M. A., Romanski, L. M., & LeDoux, J. E. (1993). Extinction of emotional learning:
Contribution of medial prefrontal cortex. Neuroscience Letters, 163, 109−113.
Morinaga, K., Akiyoshi, J., Matsushita, H., Ichioka, S., Tanaka, Y., Tsuru, J., et al. (2007).
Biological Psychology, 74, 34−38.
Morrissette, S. B., Tull, M. T., Gulliver, S. B., Kamholz, B. W., & Zimering, R. T. (2007).
Anxiety, anxiety disorders, tobacco use, and nicotine: A critical review of
interrelationships. Psychological Bulletin, 133, 245−272.
*Muris, P., Merckelbach, H., Mayer, B., van Brakel, A., Thissen, S., Moulaert, V., et al.
(1998). The Screen for Child Anxiety Emotional Disorders (SCARED) and traditional
childhood anxiety measures. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental
Psychiatry, 29, 327−339.
*Muris, P., Meesters, C., Mayer, B., Bogie, N., Luijten, M., Geebelen, E., et al. (2003). The
Koala Fear Questionnaire: A standardized self-report scale for assessing fears and
fearfulness in pre-school and primary school children. Behaviour Research and
Therapy, 5, 597−617.
Nader, K., & LeDoux, J. (1999). The dopaminergic modulation of fear: Quinipirole
impairs the recall of emotional memories in rats. Behavioral Neuroscience, 113,
152−165.
*Newman, J. P., & Schmidt, W. A. (1998). Passive avoidance in psychopathic offenders: A
replication and extension. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 107, 527−532.
Oei, T. P. S., Evans, L., & Crook, G. (1990). Utility and validity of the STAI with anxiety
disorder patients. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 29, 429−432.
Oei, T. P. S., Moylan, A., & Evans, L. (1991). Validity and clinical utility of the Fear
Questionnaire for anxiety patients. Psychological Assessment, 3, 391−397.
Öhman, A. (1986). Face the beast and fear the face: Animal and social fears as
prototypes for evolutionary analyses of emotion. Psychophysiology, 23, 123−145.
Öhman, A. (1993). Fear and anxiety as emotional phenomena: Clinical phenomenology,
evolutionary perspectives, and information-processing mechanisms. In M. Lewis, &
J. M. Haviland (Eds.), Handbook of emotions (pp. 511−536). New York, NY: Guilford
Press.
Öhman, A. (2008). Fear and anxiety: Overlaps and dissociations. In M. Lewis, J. M.
Haviland-Jones, & L. F. Barrett (Eds.), Handbook of emotions (pp. 709−729)., 3rd Ed.
New York, NY: Guilford Press.
*Ollendick, T. H. (1983). Reliability and Validity of the Revised Fear Survey Schedule for
Children (FSSC-R). Behavior, Research, and Therapy, 21, 684−692.
Onaivi, E. S., & Martin, B. R. (1989). Neuropharmacological and physiological validation
of a computer-controlled two-compartment black and white box for the
assessment of anxiety. Progress in Neuropsychopharmacology and Biological
Psychiatry, 13, 963−976.
*Peleg-Popko, O., & Dar, R. (2001). Marital quality, family patterns, and children's fears
and social anxiety. Contemporary Family Therapy, 23, 465−487.
*Perkins, A. M., Kemp, S. E., & Corr, P. J. (2007). Fear and anxiety as separable emotions:
An investigation of the revised reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality.
Emotion, 7, 252−261.
Pine, D. S., Fyer, A., Grun, J., Phelps, E. A., Szeszko, P. R., Koda, V., et al. (2001). Methods
for developmental studies of fear conditioning circuitry. Biological Psychiatry, 50,
225−228.
Porges, S. W. (1995). Orienting in a defensive world: Mammalian modifications to our
evolutionary heritage. A polyvagal theory. Psychophysiology, 32, 301−318.
Poythress, N. G., Edens, J. F., Landfield, K., Lilienfeld, S. O., Skeem, J. L., & Douglas, K. S.
(2008). A critique of Carver and White's (1994) Behavioral Inhibition Scale (BIS) for
investigating Lykken's theory of primary psychopathy. Personality and Individual
Differences, 45, 269−275.
Quirk, G. J., Russo, G. K., Barron, J. L., & LeBron, K. (2000). The role of the ventro-medial
prefrontal cortex in the recovery of extinguished fear. Journal of Neuroscience, 20,
6225−6231.
Reiman, E. M., Raichle, M. E., Robins, E., Mintum, M. A., Fusselman, M. J., Fox, P. T., et al.
(1989). Neuroanatomical correlates of lactate-induced anxiety attack. Archives of
General Psychiatry, 46, 493−500.
Rhudy, J. L., & Meagher, M. W. (2000). Fear and anxiety: Divergent effects on human
pain thresholds. Pain, 84, 65−75.
Rosenthal, R. (1979). Comment: Assumptions and procedures in the file drawer
problem. Psychological Bulletin, 86, 638−641.
Ruiz-Padial, E., & Vila, J. (2007). Fearful and sexual pictures not consciously seen
modulate the startle reflex in human beings. Biological Psychiatry, 61, 996−1001.
*Scherer, M. W., & Nakamura, C. Y. (1968). A Fear Survey Schedule for Children (FSSC):
A factor analytic comparison with manifest anxiety. Behaviour, Research, and
Therapy, 6, 173−182.
*Schmidt, N. B., & Mallott, M. (2005). Evaluating anxiety sensitivity and other
fundamental sensitivities predicting anxiety symptoms and fearful responding to
a biological challenge. Behavior Research and Therapy, 44, 1681−1688.
*Schmidt, W. A., & Newman, J. P. (1999). Are all psychopathic individuals low anxious?
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 108, 353−358.
*Schroeder, H., & Craine, L. (1971). Relationships among measures of fear and anxiety
for snake phobics. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 36, 443.
*Sellbom, M., & Ben-Porath, Y. S. (2005). Mapping the MMPI-2 restructured clinical
scales onto normal personality traits: Evidence of construct validity. Journal of
Personality Assessment, 85, 179−187.
Shadish, W. R., Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (2001). Experimental and quasiexperimental design for generalized causal inference. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
*Shore, G. N., & Rapport, M. D. (1998). The Fear Survey Schedule for Children—Revised
(FSSC-HI): Ethnocultural variations in children's fearfulness. Journal of Anxiety
Disorders, 12, 437−461.
*Silverman, W. K., Fliesig, W., Rabian, B., & Peterson, R. (1991). Childhood anxiety
sensitivity index. Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, 20, 162−168.
*Stanley, M. A., Beck, J. G., & Zebb, B. J. (1996). Psychometric properties of four anxiety
measures in older adults. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 34, 827−838.
Sierra-Mercado, D., Corcoran, K. A., Lebrón-Milad, K., & Quirk, G. J. (2006). Inactivation
of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex reduces expression of conditioned fear and
impairs subsequent recall of extinction. European Journal of Neuroscience, 24,
1751−1758.
Sotres-Bayon, F., Cain, C. K., & LeDoux, J. E. (2006). Brain mechanisms of fear extinction:
Historical perspectives on the contribution of prefrontal cortex. Biological
Psychiatry, 60, 329−336.
Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L., Lushene, R., Vagg, P. R., & Jacobs, G. A. (1983). Manual
for the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Form Y). Palo Alto: Mind Garden.
Straub, T., Schmidt, S., Weiss, T., Mentzel, H., & Miltner, W. H. R. (2009). Dynamic
activation of the anterior cingulated cortex during anticipatory anxiety. Neuroimage, 44, 975−981.
P. Sylvers et al. / Clinical Psychology Review 31 (2011) 122–137
Stravynski, A., Basoglu, M., Marks, M., Sengun, S., & Marks, I. M. (1995). The
distinctiveness of phobias: A discriminant analysis of fears. Journal of Anxiety
Disorders, 9, 89−101.
Tang, J., & Gibson, S. J. (2005). A psychophysical evaluation of the relationship between
trait anxiety, pain perception, and induced state anxiety. Journal of Pain, 6,
612−619.
Taylor, J. A. (1953). A personality scale of manifest anxiety. Journal of Abnormal and
Social Psychology, 48, 285−290.
Tellegen, A. (1982). Brief manual for the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire.:
University of Minnesota.
Tellegen, A. (1985). Structures of mood and personality and their relevance to assessing
anxiety, with an emphasis on self-report. In T. A. Hussain, & J. D. Maser (Eds.), Anxiety and
the anxiety disorders (pp. 681−706). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Tellegen, A., & Waller, N. G. (2007). Exploring personality through test construction:
Development of the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Trull, T. J., & Hillerbrand, E. (1990). Psychometric properties and factor structure of the
Fear Questionnaire phobia subscale items in two normative samples. Journal of
Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 12, 285−297.
*Uzieblo, K., Verscuerea, B., & Crombez, G. (2007). The Psychopathic Personality
Inventory: Construct validity of the two-factor structure. Personality and Individual
Differences, 43, 657−667.
Vendruscolo, L. F., Takahashi, R. N., Brüske, G. R., & Ramos, A. (2003). Evaluation of the
anxiolytic-like effect of NKP608, a NK1-receptor antagonist, in two rat strains that
differ in anxiety-related behaviors. Psychopharmacology, 170, 287−293.
Vrana, S. R., & Lang, P. J. (1990). Fear imagery and the startle-probe reflex. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology, 99, 189−197.
Walker, D. L., & Davis, M. (1997). Anxiogenic effects of high illumination levels assessed
with the acoustic startle paradigm. Biological Psychiatry, 42, 461−471.
*Waller, N. G., Lilienfeld, S. O., Tellegen, A., & Lykken, D. (1991). The Tridimensional
Personality Questionnaire: Structural validity and comparison with the
Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire. Multivariate Behavioral Research,
26, 1−23.
*Walters, G. D. (2001). State-trait anxiety and existential fear: An empirical analysis.
Personality and Individual Differences, 30, 1345−1352.
Watson, D. (2005). Rethinking the mood and anxiety disorders: A quantitative
hierarchical model for DSM-V. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 114, 522−536.
137
Watson, D., & Clark, L. A. (1984). Negative affectivity: The disposition to experience
aversive emotional states. Psychological Bulletin, 96, 465−490.
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Harkness, A. R. (1994). Structures of personality and their relevance to psychopathology. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 103, 18−31.
*Weeks, J. W., Heimberg, R. G., Fresco, D. M., Hart, T. A., Turk, C. L., Schneier, F. R., et al.
(2005). Empirical validation and psychometric evaluation of the brief fear of
negative evaluation scale in patients with social anxiety disorder. Psychological
Assessment, 17, 179−190.
Whalen, P. J., Rauch, S. L., Etcoff, N. L., McInerney, S. C., Lee, M. B., & Jenike, M. A. (1998).
Masked presentations of emotional facial expressions modulate amygdala activity
without explicit knowledge. Journal of Neuroscience, 18, 411−418.
White, T. L., & Depue, R. A. (1999). Differential association of traits of fear and anxiety
with norepinephrine- and dark-induced pupil reactivity. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 77, 863−877.
Wilensky, A. E., Schafe, G. E., Kristensen, M. P., & LeDoux, J. E. (2006). Rethinking the fear
circuit: The central nucleus of the amygdala is required for the acquisition,
consolidation, and expression of Pavlovian fear conditioning. Journal of Neuroscience, 26, 12387−12396.
Williamson, D. E., Coleman, K., Bacanu, S., Delvin, B., Rogers, J., Ryan, N. D., et al. (2003).
Heritability of fearful–anxious endophenotypes in infant rhesus macaques: A
preliminary report. Biological Psychiatry, 53, 284−291.
*Wilson, K. A., & Hayward, C. (2006). Unique contributions of anxiety sensitivity to
avoidance: A prospective study in adolescents. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 44,
601−609.
Winslow, J. T., Noble, P. L., & Davis, M. (2007). Modulation of fear-potentiated startle
and vocalizations in juvenile rhesus monkeys by morphine, diazepam, and
buspirone. Biological Psychiatry, 61, 389−395.
Wolpe, J. (1987). The promotion of scientific psychotherapy: A long voyage. In J. K. Zeig
(Ed.), The evolution of psychotherapy (pp. 133−142). New York: Routledge.
Wolpe, J., & Lang, P. J. (1964). A fear survey schedule for use in behaviour therapy.
Behavior Research and Therapy, 2, 27−30.
Zinbarg, R. E., & Mineka, S. (2007). Is emotion regulation a useful construct that adds to
the explanatory power of learning models of anxiety disorders or a new label for
old constructs. American Psychologist, 62, 259.