ustivi h y ed work sot ay v e need to seaitatrs actual gu e remost a ion u first at ii has a prLaflou and curious sort of claim w iuc ii mit a c’ank u Iarionshg \ll 1 hase done in this chapter, of course, is we an ‘otenti H go 1w thee than the existing work. I do not sh’ ‘w tc mat calk show why we )ught to do so, or precisely how we should do y cle’ s’ rIm rhat exist g work tins Ii mIs does not mean that those sk I now take ted lhrs is not ‘litly n if the rde r. i that n pi elections, tatlIr vi ipping the represer tative claim . work on the theors of political representation leaves us with a range ot important issues to deal with. A good deal of existing usage is, among other things, too statu ii and inflexibk, dryly taxonon ic, too exclusively built around I at d somewhat two thmensiona in that the chara legitirr a o rep e tee tate ‘ii to b’ ‘ixeu or unprobier rat c in this ch’i ad it i osi i e r od’ el rhorate and defend o in rk introduced n passing it Ch plc aim Ira n rei ese t 0 tI rough wI eh to nalyze political representat prim r 1 packing th notion of thr representative clan we can begin to a oh key limits of existing approaches, viewing representation in a theoretiealI more rounded and empirically rich way by taking on board, for example, its constitutive, boundary-crossing, dynamic, and ubiquitous character. Picking up the key “remainder” points from Chapter 1 in particular, the discussion here and in Chapter 3 focuses on how the representatixe claim framework (a) helps to illuminate how the definition of representation derives iltrin tely from events notably elams and not ftxed s n tional o esci e, md how the ways in which representation is do e i the o in reinforces (or becomes); what (h) it is to and onclitions m truetedness” f representation(s) ( ) bri ag s’ t the fact c t symboli and cultural aspects of representation to bear on ti relilterpretati fruitful the fosters politi al r”pr ‘sentation; (d) bows dard typologies of representational roles as resources for claims, ( the sheer sariabiity of the phenomenon of representation; (ft expresses how by its nature representation is less “contained,” for example, within the nation-state, than is conmionly assumed; and (g) stresses the erfor inative, “staged” side of representation as well as its more conventionally institutional side. In Chapter 1 1 argued that despite its strengths recent ‘ siupp1?ie tin reprcst i1atnv Alapping the representative rIain F u1 tins Impa to show that these moses are both genuine advances on hr s, inn lit implicatise in the sense that each advance r hn id cons F in ii sohei here is n Is, an nnp in prt S p c/ann about the subjects proffered to them by others’ claims Each ot tlic elements making up a representative claim in principle is explored ii thi chapter, and t w varied links between hese elenien r iscusse It is rucial 5 otc and as I h pe to demonstrate entirely ight t. sq i se itatiss. slams (and therefore political representatn x in thi abstrac. form, can cover a wide di ersity of ass ing ía niliar binary I stinctions, in principle I overs formal nd inlori electoral and non-electoral, and democratic and undemocratic claims (amongst others I consider in detail in Chapter 3 key lines of sariatioii of representative claims). To get a sense of this definition’s wide applica bility, it is helpful to consider briefly some basic examples of representatis ci ims fitting this schema: , RIiFNI \LIVF Cl M ill hO us k uk at what exactly is going on when representative I no iains an iiiade What s in this claim? It begins with the familiar idea miii ition n individual or a collective stands thr, speaks for, t at in is an n an olj c )ect st tlisi, i word i art ) I IF it silo I is 1 nk° v ii F is he Ca 0 sentl oak c ti i ci ferent’ ( e pohticiar i sakes ci called vhich is hi g it iii nell Is sub,ect’ ss iii stands h,r n object, thc object i his idea of his unstitus net ‘gon 1, hard-working folk” fin example rather than t[ic 15 hire 0, wlsicl li uP the other things the onstjtuency is, or might his nerds, -ii I Ii is, an “audience” which receives the claims \il Ilierefo crc ire different ‘mu es tF is Fr cr s u ker ive object r hi cnt a n ft kng ‘cc i e ci is sn d out ide icj or in s icc 1 I- spi c IH his to so the ci mci s f the rcpi escntati c claim appear ,O Or ‘i a linear miatif n. I lowever, it is better understood as a circular rclution, Cii example, audiences aie not simply passive recipients of es iliax inaL counterclaims about themselves as subjects, or lairns , - “I \ 1 stars Is to JO ( iii rtha’r 4’ I ,,IC’ (I that is Fr orw’i to a r ‘frr h WI and is ( Ifs red ccr( — 1 Ii MP nake offers hiniselforhersdf subject) a 1 i n dim ns ituc w n rests (thje o) to that constituen y (a id u. rcfc rent is ti i tual, flesh and blood people of the -o is uener object invol ‘s a selective portrayal of constituencs inter ‘sts. 2. lhe Liberal Party (maker) offers itself (subject) as standing for tis interests of the “family” (object) to the electorate (audience), 3 Marx (maker) offered the working class (subject) as the symbol of revo lutionary hope (object) to the would-he members of that elms (audience 4 A itiglobahzation demonstrators (makers set up themselve and velU iits subjects) as repiesentatives of the oppressed id in lized (c I ject o Western governments (audience) t u I less, we hays a variety of claims. Whether they involve dc’ oral poh or not, they incorporate a symbolic dimension; being elected does not taks away the need to make symbolic claims, it merely establishes a particular frame within which tlie claims are made (a frame that often has a serious impact on tile plausibility of the claim, as we see in Chapter 6 in part icu lar) Note too that claims can be cast as long term (as in the Ma example), or short term (for instance, the Liberal Party mmgh l e iiurs a pragmatis and temporary electoral strategy in its family-b i d ci i i They can incorporate a wide variety of ii dividual and c fleet e as and i volve a great diversity of types of claims and aud ci c addres I hese examples help to demonstrate how that s andy flows troni a suitably abstract starting point, and also as a by--product to show how : Mappi rig the represen tat i vt’ cia i to iif)?csi’tlkflhle c attn a rush o ,iarniaiivs iudgmem about Igitimatc or democratic escntat i in :an help to op n our eves to that variety. a ann to represent or to know what rpres ntat is Lnm Hit or something It is a iaim; it may or lafto tt of ci sJt s the extent to wr wh how we might Li h r iuhn 0 i n( I o an t Ow ip in I ild c II partic iple, r s n ntr m n t I y 1 y ) t 5 ght i thence, wh i lireeled i L of if s rot H n d p ox watt r dispersed or self aware or ’he in .1 d, t might onk consist of me. In other 1 p ior itt lilms iog bw mdlv \\htlgenstuinian thinking, a “family” of hat ommId ‘easorihh be taken as contriouting content to the general mLtcrent. Putting it schiematiciy, I could tiist a ii e i. H stinct e esileS La n r s. sO I i p rson woup m tint 1 i UNL)FRLYING P[IRSPI’Cl’IVES: REPRiShxTA I IrON AS PRFSENCE ANI) AS F\’ENl Representat n may well have o ore meaning male in some Sen tat is literally absent (e.g., as Hanna ontra 1 a e F at it is the rendering of s I cHin r tost e al understa iding polithal repiesentati ii lb say ti t ‘r presentation means this, ointing or prac 1 r t the most interesting or importan p represent i o It is less about pinning down meaning , Hi” it mime rmml wsibmlit’ odw m( thu i as I as pr our ler1saa ems a whir h form tI os 5 of cci ‘coon i I ii )lOi on) It mepreseni ejiresentatien as mini. ehlectual and e iltura] i etmally ii as a fac n elicit atively ,‘ckftori 1 iwhih tdei a i uncle lyi ig 1 w of claim mak w dec yes i spec ii mt to n a more abort i how meanings are generated and contested; or, again, how sonte lung absent is rendered as present. How is the impression of prescnLe ten structed, defended, and contested? What determines the success 01 faiiurc of the effort to construct such an impression? in short, the how ather than the what questions are the ones that are pressing, net Least at a rime hen traditional modes of political representation are facing serious challcnce and new or merging. Further, it is common N slide from ii i “representation i cans this to ‘representation is en bodied in ti uth n rid i tF one’ to ti ink that rep ‘esentat em h s a loeatee p w ice ii the w irld most often in tern e I if e craNe ii It is i t the fact, not the nalloyed presene ii presenta ought to be asserted, hut rallier representation as a set ot practi iF events and in particular of claims, claims to be representan’. e. Buor fleshing out further the idea of the representative claim, I explore s nue deeper roots of time claim based approach the underlying cent mast between presence and event perspectives. The presence approach centers upon providing a suitable detinitmom mit this term in ( rder to pm down its meaning. Advocair $ of, or iii se otherwise w Irk within, the presence ipproacf offer st ip dative dcl i s of rep esentatto i A stipulative definition is One th it is o denot tion with d stinetive analytical or empirical ad intages I presence perspective, we riced at accurate and agreed share I ii meaning ‘hould ideally he settled prior to in ocatior of the m. analysis e I v tried social and political invocatior ‘ 1 mns in time tIne udmne ‘1 i could nature am P tHat hit p thin limits e.g n >rsentaent !ìç’ sdi 10 imase pit lerent ‘su 5 ict cling e ut whit tog, in I dlustiatittg the representativt claim and its t term tic ome 1 this book. As part of the foundation of this .mymI ye that wi exp etc what assumptions lie iH h at ‘his P. mm Pu something Pitkin an pow t — A/lapping the representatn’c claim pulatse e huition idut ed I y Is ocates at the ass I as rq lien s wt X sE s for 11 c n dir t n lick dul I ni if a 1 ture Land n for, en. Hip I(5 it his or I constitu ncy is thus a rcprcsentatsac and tiw social fau involved is representation. lit. pat seine per spet.’twe holds that representation can he singularly ogniied a present in the world, hilly present to us rid susan I iguoisk i oc in its hateve t, c un ‘ific p I al contr rsies a I I 11 Of lit Is a e c ci at I t r, ci tn r a) e pri of u des, si Ln $ “dde and tee”; n si Lit at is ass I se nc, tst itesi iii electoral processes’ (c a s urrcs ut pent e where reformers of political Philisps I s’flj5jisiTi can taha the rendering preScilt of by ar X sufficiently in thi is orung ali i it s ‘strue ii nip poser sing institutions; air 1) nse pici silk. 2000 6 7). a Yc s hea ii is mt 1 pie Ii was ed 1 and i sho ) ely ide r lyr ii nse at tern Ihus idir stipulal Sc dehnitn is is not a straightforward business, of cans I eiiutatssc meanings in a dicnonarv, for example, cannot easily ‘c’s ‘I,, axe f sr , ,aative nit snings within and a russ cultures and nue t the I lit. IO S C St i Y f P ol a o n t at u al ed by 0 ter as c pt i a it evil t oes no i pern ens. It ems s s •s wla i a un-u stance of the general stipulation a I. ‘1ur is a aample, that “ars deeted leg slator is the representative of his or her astitueiwv” is the I as’us and limit ot political representation rides into air t’olit stidics i lie back h the seen i p naturaliiatton of the more Our ‘r, a ansi the of s h con— rat ‘bicif nih litit. 50 fO opi veh I it in for et S I I ai )H I’he pren sppruaali, irs debasing representation, importantly defines it. lcs it is riot \s ale I, till exanipic, it encourages and enables a specilic h. I asnilias is . — — type of thinking about political representation: binary thinking Wntings on pout cal repre ntation at replete with binary dist r ctio j nial v ‘us i fort 1, s 11 au thoriied versus democratic ally uthorizc e ersus degate, leg tin ate versus illegitimate, and liber 1 vcrsus lye Ihese can be useful enough as analytical tools, short of strong ontc logical claims, but even at that level the consequences of their deployment can be unfortunate. Consider, for instance, one common equation: legitimate representation requires formal authorization by others see Figure ‘1,1) The c nmon hinar distincti ins set out ‘r Figure ) a mid an of of c insider t o i c me haps by a process of natural ‘d s i a ii ffect ye y ole i. ut a xistenc types and D 11 y voul ed out beca at if cont tuafly we cannot look for them, we nay not hem (or, if we do, we may downgrade unduly their relevance). ‘Ibis effect, iii turn, stands to reduce the richness of political representation. I hope to show, for instance, that inf&mal processes of other-authorized represen tation (to use this language for the moment) are common, and I real democritic significance Such distinctions can also ‘idcline in pa ant ways in vhich hers. are degrees of other authorization, degrees c f t , etc n Figure 2 1, for example, there arc elements or shadows ) iii 2 and 2 in 1; 3 in 4 and 4 in 1. 1 do not condemn binary reaso sing in general; much less than that, I want to point out that in cases such as this one, it can stymie the productiveness of alternative modes, such as rela tional reasoning. in suns regarding the presence approach the limited ground fer ‘nec, and usefulness of the stipulated definition is always in angc of revelation ‘Where effective revelation occurs, the resulting des tu a lion can render the seemingly given as optional. The underlying p bilk ty of full presence is a precondition for presence in the key political sense that representation Xin some way renders Ypresent (despite Y’s absencet. Recognizing that relation as profoundly unstable is significant. — 3 Self authodzed 4. Other authorized 1, Formal 2. Into nat A ‘3 C 0 Figure 2,1 Representation and binary distinctions Mapping the representative clu un tot the wn. ng thing to do, ut fir t too I untiy, ci ii I lt I ii wn an tha a w nice r hi ncr sou, s 1 Ic the que d Ic’ me ini t lb guI s. tng piesen approaches, the author or speaker is positioning lout ,o herself as an idjudicator ot occut rence when it is representation, not ‘Ihis might ul one sensi ol what Bauman (1992) wrote I hen “roe he analy t ‘he cued t inteip a ‘1 II “Ic r h ‘e a I II pi 1 a gt nccal roach epic te bu in ci self ai pointed ioi t one cit scha and svb t Is not legitimate representation. Such ci t ‘slii anne, clifiers su’.:citantially from efforts to specify the conditions aidet win Ii repiesentative claims might be accepted as democratically e 1 hap c ounat t pies i is a ap ‘r h i th I to ci v t c ion its s nst I o nt, a racti e, x it 1 i i ii ipheated mvocati i and enact nent. a inc Iki ic mug s hi picscnt moo” is the product ot a performance, both in the sense of a Uteaticat perhti mance, and more technically in the sense of being perfor h scay that Butler (1990) claims that “gender” is -an’ “is g’ Jci ed Meai s irnpb d in mv ition; it volves i loin y pi 0 Ic cx I tin er tird enta no in ineand stior , — ‘ availability of notions such as trusteeship or stewardshi” can be i oked the Ian ant’s idvantage ‘hese resourc. $ are culturally r i cci r pertoir r clan i iaking performances (some of th in c vhat Mu. covici (1 )88) ailed “social representations’ There are many points of contrast between the two approaches. Wheic the presence approach stipulates meaning, the event approach deters it (or better: deflects it back into the claim-making context). Where the presence approach posits full presence, the event approach is haunted In neser s never quite clear where or hov invoc t 1 ot luite-preser -c(s) r presci tat o might gain some purchase Where for th Pr U p oack Sc i te X stands ft r some I for the event approa th there i in that some X, by virtue of some alleged capacity or attribute, can sp ak for Y to Y, and a wider audience. The presence approach tends to posit a given subject, where the event approach posits an invoked or summoned sub jectivity. The presence approach tends to lead to a view of representation as practiced within a ettled set f institutional domains (elective tes in particul r), while he event approach is m e open h H un tth of what may be regarded as domains or spaces where repiesentath cc. s This di cussion of the underlying contrast between presence a x’ vent perspectives has been brief, and the contrast has been quite tightly drawn I take the discussion no further here; my primary interest lies in tile politics of tile claim, rather than the conception of the event underpinning it. However, the character of, and the basis for, this underlying distinction will continue to inform the analysis throughout the hook t) Is presi pm te sy del eprese t ion” as making approach, for example, looks at cong tha is absent, the event “Csc t 0)1 Lii mc that git’e the unpresmrn a making present. A political figure who attempts th is impression or an thserver who points to such an impres So, a It u ‘sentutiv’ horn is a laim to represent is ion a ci torn hat irIs 1cm r torn ‘thing. rtuol 1 1 h 1 gr to S[ / by tule In ‘cam 5 ph, rest nm i, nvseh i periornii g lie wIt I delegate, iustec, or gent Whti the presence approach see as representative roles, the event ap— groach additn>nalis sees as iesources Oar representative claims; the cultural WI’ TI-Ill ELEMEN I’S OF TI-IL REPRESENTA1 IVF CLAIM Because representation is more an event, or a series of events, than a bounded and clear presence, the world of political representation is a world of claim-malung rather than the operation of formal inst t i ons In be u e, the ‘e a e more things in the political world than claii IS t e a’e &inands, for example. And not all claints are representativ u is though nany wifi I even if not explicitly Convent onal accou ts of political representation often assume that if someone is duly elected to office, then that person is not only “a representative,” hut that they are ‘t4appzr La Va us rse h is I t e, ii hlight d the act in ertain dcctoiai and partY systems, and indeed in certain national, uiturI and politic i1 contests sorie socntal groups are overrepresented ‘Ic al 1 lau m ‘,a the r ‘rr en d (Cu 1 er 1 n Iii ig us lyz ; ). ii nI gi cc. n I pes, of LOt i espondutce between s oters and elected repr. sentatne’ H in ano Karps i9 7. Binghani Powell 2004). But there c pci stent iobii, niti slid, f out “tIns P elect d ther fore h or e e t t ‘1 I t e ft at , - In tlwt in IccIcd w. ,Or is representatise is stiaightforward and rca.unaNe ciiou;is, I ot to lide this forr iai, achieved status with their i p ‘re it U p( on hcy n nge i ci ted Li °‘ 0(1. icco’J cpu. ‘1 10 1 it itivcness so U ugly built ii to the notion of being and not without sonic reason that consideration of how other Lou. it R be raprLseIttatisc li rowthd out thus (I argue) reducing I yn ut ( ep ‘C C C it t u a dpi ic us hic gr variety of ‘H ( coin, a id rgtnu.ati Os take pail, electoral actors through elective pro CLw., 10(1 other nturs through thei processes Representation is a in 1’ Ia i in’ ft ‘i i er tl i a f t est lishe by ii itutio tal ‘ S t i. i the epresentative rlann interests. In this senK, representation is is mud constitutive is relic ‘tive of facts about interests and capacities. 6 And it is through the process ot claim-making that the work of constituting is pursued. Seen i this ight, n w uld he representative n cludir g an e ected e, c n fully act v rese itatioii o he fully representative, acts n .y be facts, but claims are contestable and contested; there as no churn to be representative of a certain group that does not leave space h)r its contesta lion o rejection by the would be audience or constituency, ii by (ther political act l’Fi oint s far ‘ithar ‘nough fron observati ii o toni politics Candidates ompet over the definition of c nstatucncv interests, and electoral victories of over 70 percent of the popular vote are rare in established democracies. But still the power of elections as producing c resentation’ often overshadows this point. Ii haptcr 1, I x 1 iui it s I 1 IdCLU S tflat bun WI dl can oc clauncu V iii cLUid regard to representation on the basis of due election. The representative claim, then, consists at the most general level of five Key, interconnecting dimensions maker, subject, object, referent, nid audience Path as crucial, or so I argue, to a robust, detailed, and ‘Bun i lating account of the world of representative politics. It is unusual to bring together all of these dimensions in accounts of representation; this set encapsulates an effort to bring together certain themes in the history of the idea that have for a long time been held separate (as noted in he tntrodnctk n’l I nnw briefly draw cut their kt y attdhutes and ‘ounc 1 ‘ “ i1i short Lii cc rcplcscntdtiun as a lad arising from (in particular) due dopt Lu consentional rather than an accurate description. i r ‘vel Ho. sly 1 tog i s C a lot ii ies many if h, ,sill cut ncr in a iili ,ther ii cm iplev ways, and will divide as i as uiuw Wouki-lic lepresentatives, of whatever type, must of & wit piLk ii ch se. pi pose id tab hate disti tive ‘u d limited n r H s i r i S f latti V • ii no usil tens epr ilL i ear I enconipas. ig se of ,instltuen(s intere,ts s remote, at best Would-he representatives have to ‘naPe i’lahns, about themselv”s and their would-be constituencies, and use is i dci ti y up w our a be in i articular 1 ci a ui .1 r lit sl ikir hr th se ‘C’ tioll Is to o ft .n ‘ IHE MAKI RS OF REPRESENTATIONS We saw in Chapter 1 how Pitkins analysis influentially sidelined the makers of representations (or, representative claims), at least with respect to their political importance. In other works, the same problem emerges mm a differe it angle Representation is often seen especially in the w k I cultural and aesti’ etic theorists, as triangular in conception -- sub cct, object, and referent.’ But representation does not just happen as the result a process or by the functioning of familiar (e.g., electoral) institutions; t is claimed as the key part of someone making it happen tF rough he iepk yr tent r ex loitation of a wide variety of formal and n or ‘ii
