HLC CSDP “ALCIDE DE GASPERI” August 2012-july 2013

2013
Airbus Military
CESAR SANCHEZ
LOPEZ
EF
[HANDBOOK - COMMON
SECURITY AND DEFENSE
TH
POLICY - 8 HIGH LEVEL
COURSE “ALCIDE DE
GASPERI” - 2012/2013 ]
[...]
FOREWORD
For more than 10 years, the Common Security and Defense Policy has been one of the crucial
topics within the European Union, in particular because this policy reflects the ambitions of the
Union and its Member States to be more active, more consistent and more capable.
The Union launched its first crisis management mission in 2003. Since then the Union has
deployed over 20 civilian and military missions and operations on three continents. From the start
of its operational engagement, the EU has tried to present its ability to deploy both civilian and
military instruments together as its particular strength, which is one of the main features of its
comprehensive approach to crisis management.
Training in general is an important aspect of such successful operational engagement and following
its comprehensive approach, training in civil-military co-ordination and co-operation is a special
requirement for the EU which needs to be met through special training and combined civilian and
military participation.
The European Security and Defense College is providing such training at the strategic level with
a mixed civil-military participation in all its courses and is so playing a significant role in the
implementation of the EU‘s comprehensive approach to crisis management.
The challenges and risks the Defense and Security sector is facing nowadays in Europe, and its
implications for the EU CFSP and its global leadership, must be tackled from a more
comprehensive approach. The EDTIB (European Defense and Technology Industrial Base)
role must be enhanced beyond from its traditional supply management. Increasingly important
today, this traditional focus on the ‖supply‖ must evolve to a more active involvement in the
―demand‖ definition and harmonization processes. Further engagement in the discussions and
decision making processes in the EU arena and with other key public stakeholders is paramount
step for the success of this process.
This handbook on CSDP, compiled during my participation in the HLC in the ESDC, mirrors this
approach and thus provides a sound documentation for professionals and officials dealing with
strategic aspects in the field of the European Security and Defense sector and beyond. It is also a
hope that it will also help to promote a better and comprehensive understanding of the Common
Security and Defense Policy, and its implication for the Industry.
César Sánchez López
Airbus Military - Strategy and GID
2
PREFACE
The overall aim of the High Level Course (HLC) is to promote a common European security culture
among senior officials dealing with strategic aspects in the field of CFSP/CSDP and to form a
European security and Defense community able to contribute to the further development of CSDP
and to cooperate effectively with the various actors in the field of CSDP through:
Updating course participants' knowledge of the developing EU Defense and security
architecture, the comprehensive nature of the CSDP as a key tool of CFSP, and its
complexity and interlocking structure;
Facilitating discussion on EU policies and their implementation in the overall context of
the international environment;
Providing a forum for further CSDP development, keeping in mind the long-term
objectives set for this policy area by the Treaty on European Union.
A major feature of the course is to promote networking among course participants and with
lecturers and faculty members.
3
4
CONTENT
1
AKU 1 - HISTORY AND CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY ....................... 16
1.1.1.1
General description............................................................................................................... 16
1.2
CHAPTER 1 - The Origins of European Co-Operation in the Security and Defense Field... 16
1.2.1.1
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 16
1.2.2
1. SETTING AN AMBITIOUS AGENDA - FROM THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY TO THE WESTERN
EUROPEAN UNION ..................................................................................................................................... 17
1.2.2.1
The European Defense Community ...................................................................................... 17
1.2.2.2
The Western European Union .............................................................................................. 18
1.2.3
2. SOWING THE SEEDS OF EUROPEAN COOPERATION: FROM THE DAVIGNON REPORT (1970) TO THE
PETERSBERG TASKS .................................................................................................................................... 19
1.2.3.1
European Political Cooperation ............................................................................................ 19
1.2.3.2
Linking the WEU and the EU ................................................................................................. 21
1.2.4
3. DEVELOPING THE EU'S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: FROM MAASTRICHT TO NICE........ 23
1.2.4.1
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) ................................................................................... 23
1.2.4.2
The Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997 ........................................................................................... 24
1.2.4.3
The Treaty of Nice, 2001 ....................................................................................................... 25
1.3
CHAPTER 2 - The development of European Security and Defense Policy ...................... 26
1.3.1.1
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 26
1.3.2
1. LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY (ESDP) ........................ 27
1.3.2.1
The Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defense, St. Malo, 1998 ........................ 27
1.3.2.2
Cologne European Council Meeting, 3-4 June 1999 ............................................................. 28
1.3.2.3
Helsinki European Council Meeting, 10-11 December 1999 ................................................ 29
1.3.2.4
Santa Maria da Feira European Council Meeting, 19-20 June 2000 ..................................... 30
1.3.3
2. LINKING CFSP AND ESDP/ CSDP ............................................................................................ 31
1.3.3.1
Complementary objectives ................................................................................................... 31
1.3.3.2
The Lisbon Treaty and CFSP/CSDP ........................................................................................ 31
1.3.3.3
The evolution of EU foreign policy ........................................................................................ 36
1.3.3.4
Basic Time-line of Events ...................................................................................................... 37
2
AKU 2 – THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY........................................................................ 39
5
2.1.1.1
General description............................................................................................................... 39
2.1.1.2
Learning objective ................................................................................................................. 39
2.1.1.3
Bibliography & Other Sources ............................................................................................... 40
2.2
CHAPTER 1 – Before the ESS ........................................................................................ 40
2.2.1.1
Strategic Divisions ................................................................................................................. 40
2.2.1.2
The EU Treaty Provisions ...................................................................................................... 41
2.2.1.3
Strategic Indications.............................................................................................................. 41
2.2.1.4
Unique Features .................................................................................................................... 42
2.2.1.5
Need for a Strategy ............................................................................................................... 42
2.3
CHAPTER 2 – Adoption of the ESS in 2003 .................................................................... 43
2.3.1.1
A Favorable Context .............................................................................................................. 43
2.3.1.2
The Drafting Process ............................................................................................................. 44
2.3.1.3
Basic Orientations ................................................................................................................. 45
2.3.1.4
Framework for Consensus .................................................................................................... 45
2.4
CHAPTER 3 - Summary of the ESS ................................................................................. 46
2.4.1.1
The Security Environment ..................................................................................................... 46
2.4.1.2
Strategic Objectives .............................................................................................................. 47
2.4.1.3
Policy Implication .................................................................................................................. 49
2.5
CHAPTER 4 – Main Characteristics of the ESS................................................................ 50
2.5.1.1
Recommended Reading ........................................................................................................ 50
2.5.1.2
The GPG Approach ................................................................................................................ 51
2.5.1.3
Haves and Have–nots............................................................................................................ 51
2.5.1.4
Long–Term vs. Short–Term Challenges ................................................................................ 52
2.5.1.5
The Keys for Implementation ............................................................................................... 52
2.6
CHAPTER 5 – The Role and impact of the ESS ............................................................... 54
2.6.1.1
A New Type of Power............................................................................................................ 54
2.6.1.2
A Positive Power ................................................................................................................... 55
2.6.1.3
The Role of the ESS ............................................................................................................... 56
2.6.1.4
The Impact of the ESS ........................................................................................................... 56
2.7
CHAPTER 6 – Prospects of Revision .............................................................................. 58
2.7.1.1
Recommended Reading ........................................................................................................ 58
2.7.1.2
A Report on Implementation ................................................................................................ 59
6
2.7.1.3
Questions for the Future....................................................................................................... 60
3
AKU 3 – ROLE OF EU INSTITUTIONS IN THE FIELD OF CFSP / CSDP ............................................. 62
3.1.1.1
General description............................................................................................................... 62
3.2
CHAPTER 1 - EU institutional structures involved in the field of CSDP ............................ 62
3.2.1.1
EU INSTITUTIONS .................................................................................................................. 62
3.2.1.2 COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY (CFSP)/ COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE
POLICY (CSDP) ....................................................................................................................................... 63
3.2.1.3
EUROPEAN COUNCIL ............................................................................................................. 63
3.2.1.4
COUNCIL ................................................................................................................................ 65
3.2.1.5
EUROPEAN COMMISSION ..................................................................................................... 67
3.2.1.6
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ...................................................................................................... 67
3.3
CHAPTER 2 - High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy ... 68
3.3.1.1
MULTIPLE ROLES AND TASKS ................................................................................................ 69
3.3.1.2
SUPPORTING INSTRUMENTS & STRUCTURES ....................................................................... 70
3.3.1.3
EU´s EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE .......................................................................................... 70
3.4
CHAPTER 3 - EU Council roles in the field of CSDP ......................................................... 72
3.4.1.1
CSDP CAPABILITIES ................................................................................................................ 73
3.4.1.2
CSDP MISSION SPECTRUM .................................................................................................... 74
3.4.1.3
CONDUCTING CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS ............................................................... 74
3.5
CHAPTER 4 - European Commission´s external activities ............................................... 75
3.5.1.1
EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND CFSP .................................................................................... 76
3.5.1.2
CO–ORDINATION WITH THE COUNCIL´S CFSP/CSDP ACTIONS AND OBJECTIVES ................ 77
3.6
CHAPTER 5 - European Parliament roles in the field of CFSP/CSDP ................................ 78
3.6.1.1
COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY / COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY. 79
3.6.1.2
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS ........................................................................................................... 81
3.6.1.3
LEGISLATIVE CO–DECISION PROCEDURE .............................................................................. 81
3.7
CHAPTER 6 - Financing CSDP ........................................................................................ 82
3.7.1.1
FUNDING MILITARY OPERATIONS......................................................................................... 84
3.7.1.2
START–UP FUND ................................................................................................................... 85
4
AKU 5 – EU CRISIS-MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT ................................................. 86
4.1.1.1
General description............................................................................................................... 86
4.1.1.2
Reading Directions ................................................................................................................ 86
7
4.1.1.3
Learning content ................................................................................................................... 86
4.1.1.4
Bibliography & Other Sources ............................................................................................... 87
4.2
CHAPTER 1 – Historical Context of Capability Development .......................................... 87
4.2.1.1
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 87
4.2.1.2
Landmarks and Engagements ............................................................................................... 88
4.3
CHAPTER 2 – Mechanism and Actors ............................................................................ 91
4.3.1.1
Capability .............................................................................................................................. 91
4.3.1.2
EU Capability Development .................................................................................................. 92
4.3.1.3
Availability of capabilities for EU crisis management ........................................................... 92
4.3.1.4
Actors in the EU´s capability–development process ............................................................ 93
4.3.1.5
The specific case of Military Rapid Response and the Battle groups ................................... 95
4.4
CHAPTER 3 – Military Capability Development ............................................................. 97
4.4.1.1
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 97
4.4.1.2
The Process ........................................................................................................................... 97
4.4.1.3
Military Capability Requirements ......................................................................................... 98
4.4.1.4
EU Capability Development .................................................................................................. 99
4.4.1.5
Shortfall implications and further action .............................................................................. 99
4.4.1.6
Capability Development Plan .............................................................................................. 101
4.4.1.7
Process Continuity .............................................................................................................. 101
4.4.1.8
Military Capability Development Areas .............................................................................. 103
4.4.1.9
Lessons Learned from the HLG 2010 process ..................................................................... 104
4.4.1.10
EU–NATO military capability development co–operation .............................................. 106
4.5
CHAPTER 4 - European Defense Agency...................................................................... 107
4.5.1.1
Enhancing European Defense Capabilities: The EDA Approach ......................................... 107
4.5.1.2
Why a European Defense Agency? ..................................................................................... 108
4.5.1.3
EDA in the CSDP Institutional Landscape ............................................................................ 108
4.5.1.4
Mission and functions ......................................................................................................... 109
4.5.1.5
EDA´s ‘Strategic Framework’............................................................................................... 109
4.5.1.6
Results – Projects ................................................................................................................ 109
4.5.1.7
Results – Invest More Together in Defense R&T ................................................................ 110
4.5.1.8
Results – Market ................................................................................................................. 110
4.6
CHAPTER 5 - Civilian Capability Development ............................................................. 110
8
4.6.1.1
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 110
4.6.1.2
Civilian Capability Development Process ............................................................................ 111
4.6.1.3
Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG 2008) ............................................................................. 112
4.6.1.4
Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (CHG 2010) ............................................................................. 114
4.6.1.5
Personnel Quality & Training .............................................................................................. 115
4.6.1.6
Concepts in Support of EU Civilian Crisis Management...................................................... 115
4.6.1.7
Civilian Capability Management Tool ................................................................................. 116
4.6.1.8
Wider Co–operation and Co–ordination ............................................................................ 117
4.6.1.9
Civilian Headline Goal 2010 Perspectives ........................................................................... 119
4.7
CHAPTER 6 - Perspectives for EU Crisis Management Capabilities ............................... 119
4.7.1.1
The Challenges of the Present ............................................................................................ 120
4.7.1.2
Permanent Structured Co-operation .................................................................................. 120
4.7.1.3
Perspectives of Civilian Capabilities .................................................................................... 121
4.7.1.4
From Capabilities to Operations and Missions ................................................................... 122
5
AKU 6 – PLANNING FOR CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS ................................................... 123
5.1.1.1
General description............................................................................................................. 123
5.1.1.2
Learning content ................................................................................................................. 123
5.1.1.3
Bibliography & Other Sources ............................................................................................. 124
5.2
CHAPTER 1 - About Planning ...................................................................................... 125
5.2.1.1
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 125
5.2.1.2
Functions of Planning .......................................................................................................... 125
5.2.1.3
Levels of Planning ............................................................................................................... 126
5.2.1.4
Types of Planning ................................................................................................................ 127
5.2.1.5
Planning Procedures ........................................................................................................... 127
5.2.1.6
Enabling Success ................................................................................................................. 129
5.3
CHAPTER 2 - Advance Planning .................................................................................. 131
5.3.1.1
Purpose of Advance Planning ............................................................................................. 131
5.3.1.2
Who Does What? ................................................................................................................ 132
5.4
CHAPTER 3 - Crisis–response Planning........................................................................ 133
5.4.1.1
Crisis–Response Planning for Military Operations.............................................................. 135
5.4.1.2
Crisis–Response Planning for Military Operations.............................................................. 136
5.4.1.3
Crisis–Response Planning for Civilian Operations............................................................... 138
9
5.5
CHAPTER 4 - Introduction to Operational Planning ..................................................... 139
5.5.1.1
Command Options .............................................................................................................. 139
5.5.1.2
Force Generation ................................................................................................................ 141
5.5.1.3
Operational Design Approaches ......................................................................................... 142
5.5.1.4
Operational Design Tools .................................................................................................... 142
5.6
CHAPTER 5 - Challenges and Prospects ....................................................................... 143
6
AKU 7 – THE IMPACT OF THE LISBON TREATY ON THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY ..... 145
6.1.1.1
General description............................................................................................................. 145
6.1.1.2
Learning Content................................................................................................................. 145
6.2
CHAPTER 1 - The Origins of the Lisbon Treaty ............................................................. 145
6.2.1.1
The Laeken Declaration....................................................................................................... 145
6.2.1.2
The Constitutional Treaty ................................................................................................... 146
6.2.1.3
The Lisbon Treaty ................................................................................................................ 147
6.3
CHAPTER 2 - Changes in the EU Framework ................................................................ 148
6.3.1.1
Major Changes .................................................................................................................... 148
6.3.1.2
European Parliament .......................................................................................................... 149
6.3.1.3
European Council ................................................................................................................ 149
6.3.1.4
Council of the European Union ........................................................................................... 150
6.3.1.5
The European Commission ................................................................................................. 150
6.4
CHAPTER 3 - Impact on the Common Security and Defense Policy............................... 151
6.4.1.1
Major Changes .................................................................................................................... 151
6.4.1.2
Recommended Reading ...................................................................................................... 152
6.5
CHAPTER 4 - Major Challenges as Regards Implementation ........................................ 153
6.5.1.1
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 153
6.5.1.2
The EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy ............................................. 153
6.5.1.3
The European External Action Service (EEAS)..................................................................... 153
6.5.1.4
Assistance and Solidarity Clause ......................................................................................... 155
6.5.1.5
CSDP Operations ................................................................................................................. 156
6.5.1.6
Permanent Structured Cooperation ................................................................................... 156
6.5.1.7
The creation of Permanent Structured Cooperation .......................................................... 157
6.5.1.8
Institutional Structure of Permanent Structured Cooperation .......................................... 157
6.5.1.9
Definition of Criteria for entry to Permanent Structured Cooperation .............................. 158
10
6.5.1.10
The contribution of the European Defense Agency........................................................ 158
6.6
CHAPTER 5 - Conclusions and Reflections ................................................................... 159
6.6.1.1
What´s next? ....................................................................................................................... 159
6.6.1.2
Conclusions ......................................................................................................................... 160
7
AKU 8 – NON-PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THEIR MEANS OF DELIVERY
162
7.1.1.1
General description............................................................................................................. 162
7.1.1.2
Learning Content................................................................................................................. 162
7.1.1.3
Selective Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 162
7.2
A. Proliferation phenomenon .................................................................................... 162
7.3
B. Nuclear proliferation ............................................................................................. 163
7.4
C. Biological & chemical proliferation......................................................................... 164
7.5
D. Ballistic missile proliferation .................................................................................. 164
7.6
E. EU against the proliferation of WMD ...................................................................... 165
7.7
F. Export Control Regimes.......................................................................................... 165
7.8
CHAPTER 1 - Risk and threat assessment at regional and international levels .............. 166
7.8.1.1
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 166
7.8.1.2
Motivations of proliferating countries ................................................................................ 167
7.8.1.3
Nuclear proliferation: historical perspective ...................................................................... 168
7.8.1.4
Nuclear proliferation: current situation.............................................................................. 168
7.8.1.5
Nuclear proliferation: global characteristics....................................................................... 168
7.8.1.6
Nuclear proliferation: ongoing crises.................................................................................. 169
7.8.1.7
Nuclear proliferation: medium and long–term risks .......................................................... 172
7.8.1.8
Chemical proliferation ........................................................................................................ 172
7.8.1.9
Chemical proliferation: new threats ................................................................................... 173
7.8.1.10
Chemical proliferation: allegations ................................................................................. 173
7.8.1.11
Biological proliferation .................................................................................................... 174
7.8.1.12
Ballistic missile proliferation ........................................................................................... 174
7.8.1.13
Cruise missiles ................................................................................................................. 176
7.9
CHAPTER 2 - Political and legal multilateral instruments ............................................. 176
7.9.1.1
Nuclear Non–Proliferation Treaty (NPT) ............................................................................. 176
11
7.9.1.2
NPT Review Conference (NPT RevCon) ............................................................................... 177
7.9.1.3
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ....................................................................... 177
7.9.1.4
IAEA Effective Safeguards ................................................................................................... 178
7.9.1.5
Comprehensive Nuclear–Test–Ban Treaty (CTBT) .............................................................. 180
7.9.1.6
The Fissile Material Cut–off Treaty (FMCT) ........................................................................ 180
7.9.1.7
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) ............................................................................... 181
7.9.1.8
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) ........................................................... 182
7.9.1.9
The Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC)................................................................................... 183
7.9.1.10
G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction 184
7.9.1.11
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) ............................................................................... 184
7.9.1.12
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 .......................................................... 186
7.9.1.13
Other multilateral instruments relating to WMD non–proliferation ............................. 186
7.10
CHAPTER 3 - EU Policy against the Proliferation of WMD ............................................ 187
7.10.1.1
EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD ..................................................................... 187
7.10.1.2
Active role in support of multilateralism ........................................................................ 188
7.10.1.3
WMD clause in relations with third countries ................................................................ 189
7.10.1.4
NPT – balanced approach required ................................................................................ 190
7.10.1.5
Nuclear non–proliferation .............................................................................................. 191
7.10.1.6
Strengthening export controls ........................................................................................ 192
7.10.1.7
Complying with and promoting UNSCR 1540 ................................................................. 193
7.10.1.8
EU support to international security initiatives .............................................................. 194
7.10.1.9
EU in the G8 .................................................................................................................... 194
7.10.1.10
Chemical Weapons.......................................................................................................... 194
7.10.1.11
Biological weapons.......................................................................................................... 195
7.10.1.12
Ballistic missiles ............................................................................................................... 196
7.10.1.13
Non–proliferation actions within the EU ........................................................................ 196
7.11
CHAPTER 4 - The European export control regime ...................................................... 197
7.11.1.1
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 197
7.11.1.2
Export control regimes – general characteristics ........................................................... 199
7.11.1.3
Implementing export control regimes ............................................................................ 201
7.11.1.4
European control regimes............................................................................................... 202
7.11.1.5
European industrial actors .............................................................................................. 204
12
7.11.1.6
News & Updates.............................................................................................................. 205
8
AKU 9 – THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ................................................... 206
8.1.1.1
General description............................................................................................................. 206
8.1.1.2
Learning Content................................................................................................................. 206
8.2
CHAPTER 1 - Climate Science and Physical Impact ...................................................... 206
8.2.1.1
Carbon Dioxide Heat Trapping ............................................................................................ 206
8.2.1.2
Burning Fossil Fuels ............................................................................................................. 207
8.2.1.3
Impact of Global Temperatures Rise .................................................................................. 207
8.2.1.4
For details, see also the following recommended readings... ............................................ 208
8.3
CHAPTER 2 - Climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’ of existing tensions and its
contribution to instability......................................................................................................... 208
8.3.1.1
The International System and Climate Change ................................................................... 209
8.3.1.2
Climate Change – disproportionate impact on the most vulnerable areas ........................ 210
8.3.1.3
The Threat of Mercantilism ................................................................................................ 210
8.3.1.4
Risk and International Security ........................................................................................... 211
8.3.1.5
For details please see the following recommended readings... ......................................... 211
8.4
CHAPTER 3 - Climate Security in the Context of Security Planning ............................... 212
8.4.1.1
Evolution of climate change in European and national security strategies........................ 212
8.4.1.2
An example of climate change incorporated at the national security level ....................... 214
8.4.1.3
Defense approaches to addressing climate change and environmental issues ................. 214
8.4.1.4
UK MOD climate change strategy ....................................................................................... 214
8.4.1.5
US Quadrennial Defense Review ........................................................................................ 215
8.4.1.6
French MOD environment action plan ............................................................................... 215
8.4.1.7
European Defense Agency .................................................................................................. 216
8.4.1.8
For details, please see also the following recommended readings... ................................. 216
9
AKU 10 – EU MEDIATION AND DIALOGUE CAPACITIES ........................................................... 217
9.1.1.1
General Description ............................................................................................................ 217
9.2
CHAPTER 1 - Introduction .......................................................................................... 217
9.2.1.1
DEFINITIONS ........................................................................................................................ 217
9.2.1.2
Styles of Mediation ............................................................................................................. 218
9.2.1.3
Levels of Mediation and Multi–Track Approaches ............................................................. 219
9.3
CHAPTER 2 – EU engagement in high–level mediation and dialogue ........................... 220
13
9.3.1.1
EU Political and Development Actors ................................................................................. 220
9.3.1.2
EU Security Actors ............................................................................................................... 221
9.4
CHAPTER 3 – EU support for mediation and dialogue led by others ............................. 222
9.4.1.1
Promoting Mediation .......................................................................................................... 222
9.4.1.2
Providing Technical Support ............................................................................................... 223
9.4.1.3
Providing Financial Support ................................................................................................ 223
9.4.1.4
Exerting Leverage on the Parties ........................................................................................ 224
9.4.1.5
Creating an environment that is conducive to a settlement .............................................. 225
9.5
CHAPTER 4 – The EU Concept´s guiding principles and recommendations for
strengthening mediation and dialogue capacities ..................................................................... 225
9.5.1.1
PRINCIPLES .......................................................................................................................... 226
9.5.1.2
RECOMMENDATIONS.......................................................................................................... 226
9.6
CHAPTER 5 – Other organizations engaged in peace mediation ................................... 227
9.6.1.1
Countries or States.............................................................................................................. 227
9.6.1.2
The United Nations (UN) ..................................................................................................... 227
9.6.1.3
Other Regional Organizations ............................................................................................. 229
9.6.1.4
NGOs/Private Diplomacy Organizations ............................................................................. 229
10
AKU 11 – AN INTRODUCTION TO GENDER-SENSITIVE OPERATIONS ............................................ 231
10.1.1.1
General description......................................................................................................... 231
10.1.1.2
Learning Content............................................................................................................. 231
10.1.1.3
Some useful links ............................................................................................................ 231
10.2
CHAPTER 1 - Introduction to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 .............................. 232
10.2.1.1
1325, what do these four digits mean? .......................................................................... 232
10.2.1.2
Facts and figures ............................................................................................................. 234
10.2.1.3
International Commitments............................................................................................ 235
10.2.1.4
International Commitments............................................................................................ 236
10.3
CHAPTER 2 - Gender–sensitive peacekeeping = Effective Peacekeeping ...................... 238
10.3.1.1
Multiple Approaches ....................................................................................................... 238
10.3.1.2
The Policy Cycle ............................................................................................................... 241
10.3.1.3
Roles and Responsibilities ............................................................................................... 242
10.3.1.4
Pre-deployment training ................................................................................................. 243
10.3.1.5
Accountability ................................................................................................................. 245
14
11
APPENDIX.................................................................................................................... 246
11.1
Summary of Acronyms .............................................................................................. 246
11.2
Summary of Definitions ............................................................................................. 250
15
1
AKU 1 - HISTORY AND CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE
POLICY
1.1.1.1 General description
This Autonomous Knowledge Unit gives an overview of the historical and geopolitical context within
which developed the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (re-named Common Security
and Defense Policy (CSDP), under the Lisbon Treaty). Specifically, it outlines the evolution of
European foreign policy cooperation - emphasizing the key political and diplomatic events that led
to the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and of the ESDP.
1.2 CHAPTER 1 - The Origins of European Co-Operation in the
Security and Defense Field
Describes the origins of foreign policy cooperation in Europe and examines
early attempts to establish a European Defense Community and the creation
of the Western European Union. It also identifies relevant concepts unveiled
in EU treaties and in European Council summit meetings.
1.2.1.1 Introduction
The origins of the security and Defense architecture of Europe can be found in the post-World War
II situation. Starting in the late 1940s, a number of initiatives set the stage for increased
cooperation across Europe. Examples include the launch of the U.S. sponsored Marshall plan in
1947, the signing of the Franco-British Treaty of Dunkirk (1947) containing a clause of automatic
armed assistance, the signing of the Brussels Treaty (1948) sowing the seeds for a Western
European Union, and the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington (1949). With the
gradual emergence of the Cold War, the first European institutions in this field had a pronounced
Euro-Atlantic dimension.
The desire to avoid future wars in Europe also played a key role for institutional development. The
European Coal and Steel Community created in 1951 placed strategic resources under a
16
supranational authority. It would later serve as a model for the European Economic Community
and the European Atomic Energy Community established in 1957 through the Treaty of Rome. The
three communities were merged in 1967, highlighting the trend towards legal arrangements to
move European co-operation forward. Follow-on treaties would develop closer collaboration in the
area of security and Defense, culminating with the Treaty of Nice in 2001.
1.2.2 1. Setting an ambitious agenda - from the European Defense
Community to the Western European Union
1.2.2.1 The European Defense Community
On 9 May 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman pronounced a plan calling for the
"Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole [to] be placed under a common High
Authority". Inspired by the French economist Jean Monnet, the Schuman Plan sought to lower the
potential for conflict in Europe by placing the control of these strategic resources at the
supranational level. The Schuman Plan also underscored the importance of a "united Europe" to
enable peaceful relations.
The Schuman Plan led to the establishment of the
European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 through the
Treaty of Paris. It included Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The breakout of
the Korean War in June 1950 made it urgent to find a
solution for a contribution by the newly created West
Germany to the West's Defense efforts. Inspired by the
Schuman Plan, Jean Monnet (then serving as head of
France's General Planning Commission) proposed the
creation of a unified European army. French Prime Minister Rene Pleven officially tabled a plan for
17
"the creation for the common Defense of a European army under political institutions of the united
Europe" in October 1950. This common army would respond to a European Defense minister, be
financed by a common budget and placed at the disposal of the unified Atlantic command. Known
as the European Defense Community, it would include Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and West Germany.
1.2.2.2 The Western European Union
The conception of the Western European Union (WEU) dates to the Brussels Treaty signed on 17
March 1948. Known as the Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration and Collective
Self-Defense, it calls for the member countries to assist each other in case one is "the object of an
armed attack in Europe". The signatories of the Treaty were Paul-Henri Spaak (Belgium), Georges
Bidault (France), Joseph Bech (Luxembourg), Baron von Boetzelaer (Netherlands), and Ernest
Bevin (United Kingdom).
The Modified Brussels Treaty, 1954
Image credit: Ministère des Affaires étrangères
- Service photographique
However, the WEU was not formally created until the signing of the modified Brussels Treaty on 23
October 1954. The treaty came in the wake of the failed European Defense Community. Signed in
Paris, it also included Germany and Italy. The treaty modified the original Brussels Treaty by
incorporating controls and ceilings on armed forces and armaments production. It also added a
new Article IV, based on Article V of the original Brussels Treaty, which recognized NATO's prime
responsibility for protecting Europe.
18
It became rapidly clear that a substantial portion of the WEU's portfolio overlapped with that of
other international institutions such as NATO and the Council of Europe. Over time, the WEU saw
many of its functions transferred away to these organizations. As a result, the WEU gradually
entered a dormant phase, focusing on lower profile activities such as monitoring arms production
and armaments stocks. An external presence was nonetheless facilitated through the WEU
Assembly with its status as the sole European parliamentary assembly with a mandate to monitor
Defense issues.
1.2.3 2. Sowing the seeds of European cooperation: From the Davignon
Report (1970) to the Petersberg tasks
1.2.3.1 European Political Cooperation
At the time the WEU entered a dormant phase, the European Community (EC) began to explore
ways in which to harmonize members' foreign policies. While the Treaty of Rome does not contain
any reference to cooperation in foreign policy nor, a fortiori, in the field of security and Defense,
the idea of some form of political cooperation began to appear in the informal framework of the
meetings of the European heads of state and government. At the Hague Summit held in December
1969, European leaders instructed their respective foreign ministers to examine the feasibility of
closer integration in the political domain.
In response, foreign ministers introduced the idea of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the
Davignon Report from October 1970. Also known as the Luxembourg Report, it defined its
objectives (harmonization of positions, consultation and, when appropriate, common actions) and
its procedures (six-monthly meetings of the Foreign Affairs Ministers, quarterly meetings of the
19
Political Directors forming the Political Committee). Overall, the EPC aimed to facilitate the
consultation process among EC Member States.
On 13 October 1981, the EC foreign ministers adopted the London Report on EPC. It noted that
although the EPC excludes Defense issues, it could extend to "certain important foreign policy
issues concerning political aspects of security". To give some substance to EPC, the report
introduced crisis procedures to enable the organization of emergency meetings within 48 hours if
needed and provided the rotating Presidency with a team of officials of the preceding and following
Presidencies ("troika" formula).
At the Stuttgart European Council held in June 1983, the heads of state and government of the
Member States of the EC issued a Solemn Declaration on European Union. Known as the Stuttgart
Declaration, it set the stage for the future Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
Finally, the Single European Act, signed in Luxemburg and The Hague in February 1986 (at twelve,
given the accession of Greece, then Spain and Portugal), incorporated the EPC into the Treaties.
The parties agreed to "endeavor jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy" and
to develop "a European identity in external policy matters". The Act provided a legal framework to
the EPC structures and procedures as well as to the European Commission's role. With the signing
of the Single European Act, a secretariat was set-up in Brussels under the Presidency's authority to
prepare and follow up on European Council meetings. The consistency between EPC, operating on
consensus, and Community processes was likewise strengthened.
20
1.2.3.2 Linking the WEU and the EU
In the 1980s, the Western European Union received new impetus. During the 1987 Hague
Platform, WEU members reaffirmed the obligations of the modified Brussels Treaty and posited the
idea of defining common positions on security policy matters. In 1988, the WEU carried out its first
military operation. Known as Operation Clean-Sweep, it coordinated mine clearance along a 300mile corridor around the Strait of Hormuz. Additional missions were carried out in the 1990s,
including a naval operation in the Adriatic (Sharp Guard), a police and customs operation (Danube
Operation), and a police operation in Mostar in 1993 on behalf of the European Union. Among the
WEU's last missions was a Multinational Advisory Police Element sent to Albania in 1997 to train
local police forces.
The signing of the Treaty on
WEU Membership (by membership category)
Members
(1954)
Associate
Members
(1992)
Austria
(1999)
(1995)
France
Hungary (1999)
Denmark
Germany
Iceland
Greece (1995) Norway
Italy
Poland (1999)
Luxembourg
Turkey
Netherlands
Partners
(1992)
Czech Republic
Belgium
Associate
Observers
Finland
(1995)
Ireland
Sweden
(1995)
(1994)
Bulgaria
European
Union
(TEU)
in
Maastricht in 1991 opened
the
door
to
closer
collaboration between the EU
and the WEU. In the TEU,
the WEU is recognized as "an
Estonia
Latvia
integral
part
of
the
development of the Union."
According to Article J.4 of the
Lithuania
TEU,
the
elaborate
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia (1996)
WEU
and
is
"to
implement
decisions and actions of the
Union which have Defense
implications."
Reflecting
a
closer relationship with the
Portugal
EU, the WEU Headquarters
(1990)
was relocated from London
Spain (1990)
to Brussels in 1993.
United
Kingdom
21
In 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers met in Petersberg (outside Bonn) and outlined a new
operational role for the organization. Ministers declared the WEU's readiness to make available
military units for a range of tasks: "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks
of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking." Collectively, these became known
as the Petersberg tasks.
With the gradual incorporation of WEU assets and functions into the European Union - such as the
WEU Satellite Centre (now the EU Satellite Centre) and the Petersberg tasks - the WEU once again
plays a limited role in the European security domain. As a result, EU-WEU relations are currently
less dynamic and intensive, even though the High Representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy / Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union is double-hated as the
Secretary-General of the WEU.
The WEU presently houses a small Secretariat-General in Brussels with residual functions.
Nonetheless, the WEU Assembly, now also known as the European Security and Defense
Assembly, continues its activities through its committees and bi-annual plenary sessions. In
addition, the WEU is still the guarantor of Article V on collective self-Defense of the Modified
Brussels Treaty.
In 1996, the WEU was involved in the establishment of a European Security and Defense Identity
(ESDI) within NATO. According to the Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North
Atlantic Council held in Berlin, the ESDI would "permit the creation of militarily coherent and
effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU."
The arrangement was significant, as it accommodated a "European pillar" within the Alliance,
22
facilitating the identification of capabilities that were separable - but not separate - and that could
be used in WEU-led operations. Moreover, as ESDI could rely on the newly established concept of
Combined Joint Task Forces, it also served to limit potential duplication. The groundwork laid via
ESDI would eventually serve as a template for the Berlin Plus Arrangements adopted in 2003
between NATO and the EU.
1.2.4 3. Developing the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: from
Maastricht to Nice
1.2.4.1 The Treaty on European Union (TEU)
The Treaty on European Union - often called the Maastricht Treaty - was signed in Maastricht (the
Netherlands) on 7 February 1992 and entered into force on 1 November 1993. Using the Single
European Act as its departure point, the Maastricht Treaty created a single institutional framework
(the European Union) based on three pillars. These pillars encompass community affairs (1st
pillar), common foreign and security policy (2nd pillar), and justice and home affairs (3rd pillar).
In spite of a single institutional framework, the roles of institutions in the decision-making process
differ considerably according to the pillar and policy area. In the 2nd and 3rd pillars, an
intergovernmental approach to policy making prevails. However, it should be noted that the
European Commission is "fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and
security policy field" (art. J9) and "may refer to the Council any question relating to the common
foreign and security policy and may submit proposals to the Council" (art. J8). Overall, CFSP aims
to enhance the EU's ability to address the growing number of challenges at the international level,
identifying five principal objectives.
23
CFSP is more far-reaching than European Political Cooperation in at least four ways. First, it breaks
new ground - Article J.4 of the TEU states that CFSP includes "all questions related to the security
of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common Defense policy, which might in time lead
to a common Defense." Second, the Maastricht Treaty introduces a new legal instrument - the
Joint Action - in support of the CFSP decision-making processes. A Joint Action enables the
mobilization of EU assets (human, financial, etc) to reach Council-defined objectives. Third, CFSP
encourages a closer consultation and co-ordination process, explicitly calling for national policies to
be consistent with Common Positions. Lastly, and as noted earlier, European leaders agreed at
Maastricht that the WEU forms an integral part of the development of the EU, tasking it to
elaborate and implement EU decisions and actions with Defense implications.
1.2.4.2 The Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997
The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed on 2 October 1997 and entered into force on 1 May 1999.
Building on the Treaty of Maastricht, its main contributions in the area of CFSP relate to
institutional arrangements and the decision-making process.
With respect to institution-building, the Treaty of Amsterdam created the post of a High
Representative for the CFSP to be held by the Secretary-General of the Council of the EU
(henceforth Council). The Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR) serves to improve the
efficiency and consistency of the CFSP by assisting with the formulation, processing, and
implementation of decisions. In support of the SG/HR's work, the Treaty of Amsterdam established
a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (now known as the Policy Unit) to provide the Council
24
with an early warning capability. The Policy Unit also facilitates joint analysis, thereby
strengthening the EU's capacity to support a Common Foreign and Security Policy.
Lastly, the Amsterdam Treaty supported closer institutional relations between the EU and the WEU
- including the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks into the TEU - with a view to the integration of
the WEU into the EU, "should the European Council so decide."
In the area of decision-making, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the concept of constructive
abstention. This mechanism makes it possible for an EU Member State to abstain in a CFSP-related
vote in the Council without blocking a unanimous decision. The Amsterdam Treaty also introduced
a new legal instrument to enhance coherence in the Union's external action: the Common
Strategy. These may be used to specify a political objective and the resources needed to achieve
the objective(s). To date, a limited number of Common Strategies have been formulated, including
one on Russia (1999), Ukraine (1999) and the Mediterranean (2000).
1.2.4.3 The Treaty of Nice, 2001
The Treaty of Nice was signed on 26 February 2001 and entered into force on 1 February 2003.
Coming in the heels of the St. Malo Declaration (1998) and numerous European Council meetings
focusing on crisis management capabilities (treated in greater detail in the next section), the
Treaty of Nice formalized European Security and Defense Policy by bringing it into the EU's
institutional structure.
For example, in line with the December 2000 European Council held in Nice establishing the
Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee, and the EU Military Staff, the
Treaty of Nice formally tasked the PSC to "monitor the international situation in the areas covered
by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering
opinions to the Council." In addition, the PSC is to "exercise, under the responsibility of the
Council, political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations."
In some areas of decision-making, the Nice Treaty extends the use of qualified majority voting. For
example, the Council may now rely on qualified majority voting when concluding international
agreements under the second pillar, specifically those needed to implement a joint action or
common position. Likewise, the concept of enhanced cooperation, introduced by the Maastricht
25
Treaty, is extended to the second pillar for the implementation of relevant joint actions or common
positions. Enhanced cooperation allows a number of Member States (at least eight are required nine under the Lisbon Treaty) that wish to work more closely on a specific area to do so. Under the
second pillar, however, enhanced cooperation may not have military or Defense implications.
1.3 CHAPTER 2 - The development of European Security and
Defense Policy
Presents the establishment of ESDP, its relation to CFSP, and how both
policies might evolve.
1.3.1.1 Introduction
Aceh Monitoring Mission,
3rd Phase of Decommissioning,
Nov. 2005
Photo credit: Council of the EU
While the European Union identified ambitious objectives in the area of external security and
Defense in 1992 through the Maastricht Treaty, it would not be until the late 1990s, in the
aftermath of the wars of secession in the Balkans, that concrete provisions were introduced to
endow the EU with tangible crisis management capabilities. Following the St. Malo Declaration in
1998, numerous European Council summit meetings defined the military and civilian capabilities
needed to fulfill the Petersberg tasks. Examples include the Helsinki European Council Meeting
(1999), which laid the foundations for the Headline Goal 2003, and the Santa Maria da Feira
European Council Meeting (2000) which identified four civilian priority areas. In 2003, ESDP
became operational through the initiation of the first ESDP missions, giving policy-makers
additional guidance on how to further develop CFSP and ESDP. Based on these and other
26
developments, the Lisbon Treaty offers several provisions to increase the Union's coherence in the
field of external security, signaling the movement towards a Common Security and Defense Policy
(CSDP).
1.3.2 1. Laying the foundations for European Security and Defense Policy
(ESDP)
1.3.2.1 The Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defense, St. Malo,
1998
A Franco-British summit was held in French port city of St. Malo on 3-4 December 1998. It was a
turning point in European public diplomacy, with the UK and France jointly underlining the growing
need for greater European engagement in the areas of security and Defense. The St. Malo
Declaration calls on the EU to have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible
military forces, the means to decide to use these forces, and a readiness to do so in order to
respond to international crises. In line with previous formulations, these capabilities should not
challenge the role of NATO as EU Member States should act "in conformity with the respective
obligations in NATO".
Recommended Reading
"Joint Declaration on European Defense" - issued at the
Franco-British Summit in Saint Malo on 4th of December,
1998
Texte en francais disponible ici
You can either access the external link to the document by
clicking on the title above or go back to "Reading Directions"
and click the document icon.
After reading the document you can come back to this page.
To better understand the context surrounding the St. Malo Declaration; it is useful to briefly
summarize some of the key British and French motives behind it. From the British perspective, an
27
important foreign policy concern during the post-World War II period was to maintain and
strengthen the transatlantic link between Europe and the US: The United Kingdom saw itself as a
bridge-builder between the two continents. However, the security system changed fundamentally
after the Cold War. After the bloodshed in the Balkans, the British government came to the
conclusion that the EU had to take on more responsibility for security and Defense. Furthermore,
Tony Blair's election as prime minister marked a fundamental shift in the United Kingdom's
approach to Europe. Blair favored a policy of constructive engagement within European
institutions. And in the field of security and Defense, the United Kingdom could offer both
credibility and leadership.
France, like the United Kingdom, was convinced that after the Cold War domestic stability and
integration into the EU no longer sufficed to ensure security in Europe. Moreover, a core objective
of French foreign and security policy had long been to create a (relatively) autonomous European
security and Defense policy to balance the US and complement NATO. France also hoped that such
a policy would lead to a more equitable transatlantic partnership. After St. Malo, a number of
European Council meetings from the late 1990s onward focused on providing ESDP with the
necessary tools to strengthen crisis management capabilities.
1.3.2.2 Cologne European Council Meeting, 3-4 June 1999
At the June 1999 European Council meeting held in Cologne (Germany), EU heads of state and
government reiterated the message contained in the St. Malo Declaration, calling on the EU to
acquire the necessary means and capacities to engage in EU-led crisis management operations.
Serving as the stepping stone for ESDP, they also made it clear that the EU's efforts in this area
should not challenge the role of NATO as the basis of collective Defense of all NATO members.
The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) aims to give the European Union the means to
assume its responsibilities in the fields of crisis prevention and management, in accordance with
28
the principles of the UN Charter. The Presidency Report states that "necessary arrangements must
be made in order to ensure political control and strategic direction of EU-led Petersberg
operations." To do so, the report identifies the need "for analysis of situations, sources of
intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning." It foreshadowed the need for, among
others:
A permanent body in Brussels (Political and Security Committee).
An EU Military Committee consisting of Military Representatives making recommendations
to the Political and Security Committee.
An EU military Staff and a Situation Centre.
Other resources such as a Satellite Centre and an Institute for Security Studies.
1.3.2.3 Helsinki European Council Meeting, 10-11 December 1999
The December 1999 Helsinki Summit focused mainly on the development of the EU's military crisis
management capability. It called on EU Member States to "be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60
days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the
full range of Petersberg tasks." The annex provides further details on the development of military
capabilities, including the need for forces that are "militarily self-sustaining with the necessary
command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and
additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements."
The specific operational requirements for the Petersberg tasks are provided in the Helsinki
Headline Goal Catalogue. Voluntary national contributions were pledged at the 2000 Capabilities
Commitment Conference in Brussels, and a pool of more than 100,000 personnel and
approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 naval vessels was constituted.
Despite some qualitative shortfalls, the EU declared ESDP operational at the December 2001
Laeken European Council meeting, stating that the EU was "capable of conducting some crisismanagement operations". This position was confirmed in May 2003 by the General Affairs and
External Relations Council (GAERC) which declared that "the EU now has operational capability
across the full range of Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls" in the
military sphere.
29
1.3.2.4 Santa Maria da Feira European Council Meeting, 19-20 June 2000
The Feira European Council meeting concentrated on the development of the EU's civilian crisis
management capabilities. Appendix 3 of the Annex identified four priority areas for civilian crisis
management:
Police
Strengthening the rule of law
Strengthening civilian administration
Civil protection
It should be noted that additional civilian priorities were added in later years. These include
monitoring, support for the EU Special Representatives, and the set-up of civilian response teams.
Within the police category, concrete targets were specified. By 2003, EU Member States were to
be able to provide up to 5,000 police officers to international missions. Of these, up to 1,000 police
should be available for deployment within 30 days. At the Goteborg European Council meeting held
in Sweden on 15-16 June 2001, additional targets were identified for the remaining categories. In
the area of rule of law, Member States were to be able to contribute up to 200 personnel
"adequately prepared for crisis management operations in the field of rule of law" on a voluntary
basis. Consisting of legal, judicial, and prosecution experts, such an element would be deployable
within 30 days.
In the area of civil protection, "Civil Protection intervention teams" consisting of up to 2,000
individuals were to be available by 2003 in response to major natural, technological, or
environmental emergencies. In addition, 2 to 3 assessment and/or co-ordination teams made up
of 10 experts should be available for deployment within 3-7 hours. Lastly, in the domain of civilian
administration, no numerical targets were provided. Instead, the Goteborg European Council
identified the need for a "pool of experts able on a voluntary basis to take on assignments within
civilian administration." All targets were later declared to be met. At the Civilian Capabilities
Commitment Conference held in Brussels on 22 November 2004, it was confirmed that "Member
States have well exceeded the concrete targets set by the European Council."
30
1.3.3 2. Linking CFSP and ESDP/ CSDP
1.3.3.1 Complementary objectives
There were clear links between the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European
Security and Defense Policy. Both serve to fulfill the EU's foreign policy objectives, and as shown in
the following diagram, ESDP was subsumed under the wider umbrella of CFSP. In addition, CFSP
and ESDP were to complement each other, with CFSP concentrating on foreign policy objectives at
the strategic level while ESDP enabling the EU to execute crisis management operations on the
ground.
With respect to ESDP, it is essential to underline that it included both military and civilian
dimensions. Many (erroneously) believe that ESDP only covers military missions. In fact, as of
2008, the majority of ESDP missions have been civilian in nature. Moreover, given the EU‘s strong
emphasis on civil-military co-ordination and its recognition that the new security threats cannot be
addressed through military means alone, many late ESDP crisis management operations include
both military and civilian components, even if they are not used simultaneously or in proximity.
While there are links between CFSP and ESDP, they are not fully synchronized. From a historical
perspective, when CFSP was established under the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s, there was
no formal ESDP. Ironically, when the first ESDP missions were launched in 2003 – providing a
strong push forward for the ESDP – CFSP was static due to differing European positions on the war
in Iraq. Thus, while ESDP was progressing rapidly, the same was not the case for CFSP.
1.3.3.2 The Lisbon Treaty and CFSP/CSDP
The Lisbon Treaty was signed on 13 December 2007 and entered into force on 1 December 2009
after all EU Member States – including Ireland following a second referendum on 2 October 2009 –
31
ratified it. The Treaty provisions pertaining to CFSP and ESDP are by and large identical to the
ones present in the failed Constitutional Treaty. Those provisions are about institutions, the scope
of activities that the EU will be able to perform under the new Treaty, and decision-making
processes.
a. Institutions
The Treaty renames ESDP as the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), to which it
dedicates a full section. CSDP is presented as an 'integral part of the common foreign and security
policy', and shall 'provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military
assets', that can be used 'on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and
strengthening international security'. Several institutions or positions falling within the CFSP/CSDP
framework are established, with the aim of enhancing the institutional coherence and the overall
effectiveness of EU action. Among the key new positions is the post of President of the
European Council and that of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy. Elected by the European Council by a qualified majority for a term of two and a
half years, renewable once, the President of the European Council will 'ensure the external
representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy'. The
former Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy was elected the first President of the European
Council on 19 November 2009. As such, he is responsible for chairing the European Council, drive
its work, and act as a consensus-builder within it.
The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy is appointed by the European Council, acting on a
qualified majority vote, and with the agreement of the President
of the Commission. The first holder of this position is Ms.
Catherine
Ashton,
a
British
national
and
former
Trade
Commissioner. The post merges the two positions of High
Representative for CFSP (held by Dr. Javier Solana between
1999-2009) and of Commissioner for External Relations (held by
Benita Ferrero-Waldner between 2004 and early 2010) and
symbolizes the disappearance of the pillar structure. The High
32
Representative also acts as Vice-President of the European Commission, giving the European
Parliament a say on his/her appointment as the Commission is accountable to the Parliament. In
her new position, Ms. Ashton represents 'the Union for matters relating to CFSP', conducts 'political
dialogue with third parties on the Union's behalf', and expresses 'the Union's position in
international organizations and at international conferences.' She also chairs the Foreign Affairs
Council (a new format of Council meetings, separate from the General Affairs Council), while one
of her representatives‘ chairs meetings of the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Overall, the
new High Representative contributes to the preparation of CFSP and ensures its implementation
(art.13A).
The High Representative will be assisted by a European External Action Service (EEAS) that
'shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise
officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the
Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States.'
(art.13A) The EEAS will be sui generis, distinct from the Commission and the Council Secretariat,
but bodies such as the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Civilian Planning
and Conduct Capacity (CPCC), and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) should be part of the EEAS.
European Commission Delegations become EU Delegations and are part of the EEAS.
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the division of tasks between the President of the
Council and the High Representative, as well as the responsibilities that each will assume, are not
clearly specified and are expected to be shaped in practice by the two incumbents. Likewise, the
role of the President of the Council vis-a-vis the still existing rotating presidencies is to be further
clarified. Formally, the creation of these positions puts an end to the rotating presidency in foreign
affairs.
At the institutional level, the Lisbon Treaty also formally endorses the creation of the European
Defense Agency, operational since 2004 with the mandate of harmonizing Defense spending,
supporting Defense research, and assisting member states to meet the capability commitments
(art.28D). Finally, the Treaty gives the EU a single legal personality (art.46A), something
previously enjoyed only by the European Communities.
33
b. Scope of activities
The Lisbon Treaty contains provisions on the activities of the EU in the fields of foreign and
security policy. In terms of missions, the Treaty formally endorses the extension of the socalled 'Petersberg Tasks', that now include ‗joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and
rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks,
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict
stabilization' (art.28B). These tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by
'supporting third states in combating terrorism on their territories'.
The Treaty also extends the concept of 'enhanced co-operation' to all EU policy areas, including
CSDP (art.10). 'Enhanced co-operation' - which allows EU Member States that wish to work more
closely together to do so - can be established by the Council and requires at least nine member
states participating in it. 'Enhanced cooperation' differs from 'permanent structured cooperation'
(see below) in that the latter is permanent and deals with Defense matters, while the former can
be activated in all EU policy areas and on a non-permanent basis.
The Treaty also unveils new mechanisms or commitments. For example, the Lisbon Treaty makes
it possible for a group of Member states 'which are willing and have the necessary capability' to
implement a task, within the Union framework, 'in order to protect the Union's values and serve its
interests' (art. 28A §5 and 28C). The EU-led Artemis operation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo or the deployment of a battle group provides examples of such tasks.
In the same vein, flexibility in the CSDP field is encouraged by the establishment of permanent
structured co-operation (art.28). EU Member States 'whose military capabilities fulfill higher
criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view
to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union
framework' (art.28A6). This aims at allowing Member States (with no minimum number of
countries involved) that are willing to move forward in the field of military cooperation to do so
without being hindered by others. The Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation refers to a
'new stage in the development of the European Security and Defense Policy'. The Battle group
Concept provides an example of what a permanent structured cooperation could look like, but
other types of military cooperation are foreseen, leading to the debate about a "hard core" Europe
34
or a two-speed Europe. At the financial level, the Treaty establishes a 'start-up fund' aimed at
allowing for urgent financing of initiatives in the framework of CFSP and EU-led missions that
cannot be charged to the Union budget (art.28§3).
Finally, political and military solidarity among EU
Member States is boosted by the inclusion of a
mutual
assistance
clause
(art.28A7),
and
a
'solidarity clause' (Title VII, art.188R1). The mutual
assistance clause is inspired by the Western European
Union Treaty's clause. It states that 'If a Member
State is the victim of armed aggression on its
territory, the other Member States shall have towards
it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means
in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter'. The importance of the
clause is watered down by the provision stating that it 'shall not prejudice the specific character of
the security and Defense policy of certain Member States', in reference to the role of NATO and its
collective Defense provisions.
The 'solidarity clause', which was introduced in the context of the terrorist attack in Madrid in
March 2004, states that 'The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if
a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster.'
(art.188R1)
c. Decision-Making Process
The unanimity rule prevails in the CFSP/CSDP decision-making processes, and the Treaty confirms
that 'Decisions relating to the common security and Defense policy, including those initiating a
mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously' (art.28
A4). However, exceptions are introduced in the Treaty. In particular, decisions pertaining to
'permanent structured co-operation', the procedures for setting up and administering the 'start-up
fund', or the appointment of the High Representative, are adopted by qualified majority. On the
other hand, the unanimity rule remains when deciding on the launch of a mission. In practice, this
35
means that states involved in permanent structured co-operation may not launch an operation on
behalf of the EU without having the formal approval of all EU Member States.
These different provisions aim at giving CFSP and CSDP more coherence and visibility. They lay
out a framework but most provisions are still unclear as to their practical implications and political
sensitivities. Implementation and the passage of time will play key roles in clarifying what is
possible and how it impacts on the way the EU conducts its foreign affairs and security policy.
1.3.3.3 The evolution of EU foreign policy
Over time, policy-makers have stressed the importance of enhancing the coherence not just
between CFSP and CSDP, but across all foreign policy-related tools. In fact, several provisions in
the Lisbon Treaty aim to improve the coherence across the EU's three pillars.
How CSDP and CFSP might evolve? The evolution of CSDP is partially visible in its two roadmaps:
the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 and the Headline Goal 2010 (which focuses mostly on military
capability development). Both headline goals identify the need for rapid response capabilities,
consistent with the establishment of Civilian Response Teams and EU Battle groups. They also
emphasize
the
importance
of
qualitative
aspects
of
capability
development
–
such
as
interoperability among military forces or advanced levels of training for civilian staff. Both headline
goals incorporate a systematic review process to ensure that the EU achieves the capabilities
needed to address current and future risks.
Aerial surveillance
during the EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission – May 2008
The evolution of CSDP is also subject to external factors. Examples include the future demand for
CSDP operations, the level of financial/ manpower resources made available for CSDP operations,
36
the speed at which new capabilities are acquired, the EU's relations with third states and
international organizations, and EU-specific developments such as enlargement. With some over
twenty CSDP missions either executed or currently underway, a number of lessons have been
identified which likewise impact the evolution of CSDP.
The evolution of CFSP is not as clear cut as that of CSDP. While the linkage to CSDP is likely to be
strengthened as policymakers strive to increase the coherence among tools in the foreign policy
arena, the actual level of "common" foreign policy across the range of EU Member States remains
to be seen. Given the volatile nature of politics, CFSP is more likely to evolve in a non-linear
fashion, with periodic improvements marked by occasional dips as external challenges complicate
the formulation of a common policy.
1.3.3.4 Basic Time-line of Events
Year
Event
1945
End of World War II
1946
Churchill's speech at the University of Zurich calling for a United States of
1947
Launching of the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan)
1948
Signing of the Brussels Treaty
1949
Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty
1950
1951
1954
Europe
Unveiling of the Schumann Plan
Outbreak of the Korean War
Signing of the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community
Failure of the European Defense Community
Signing of the Modified Brussels Treaty formally creating the WEU
1955
Establishment of the Warsaw Pact
1956
Suez Canal Crisis
1957
Signing of the Treaties of Rome
1961
Construction of the Berlin Wall
1969
The Davignon Report introduces the idea of European Political Cooperation
37
1975
Adoption of the Helsinki Final Act
1983
Stuttgart Declaration ('Solemn Declaration')
1986
Signing of the Single European Act
1989
Fall of the Berlin Wall
1990
Signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
1992
Signing of the Treaty on European Union (in force 1993)
1993
Official creation of the EUROCORPS
1996
Reinforcement of ESDI within NATO at the Berlin Summit
1997
Signing of the Amsterdam Treaty (in force 1999)
1998
Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defense (St. Malo)
1999
Cologne and Helsinki European Council Meetings lay the foundations for
2000
Santa Maria da Feira European Council
2003
2004
2009
ESDP
Adoption of the European Security Strategy
Adoption of the Berlin Plus Arrangements
Headline Goal 2010 / Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (updated in 2007 to CHG
Entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on the European Union. New
activities, and decision-making in CFSP/ CSDP
38
2010)
institutions, scope of
2
AKU 2 – THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY
2.1.1.1 General description
AKU2 is dedicated to the study of the European Security Strategy (ESS). It consists of an
introductory part, of 6 chapters focusing on relevant aspects of the ESS, and of a concluding part.
2.1.1.2 Learning objective
After reading Chapter 2 ―Adoption of the ESS in 2003‖, you are strongly recommended to read the
text of the ―European Security Strategy‖

A Secure Europe In A Better World – The European Security Strategy, approved by the
European Council held in Brussels on 12 December 2003 and drafted under the responsibilities
of the EU High Representative JAVIER SOLANA.
– English version,
– French version
Before the start of Chapter 4 ―Main Characteristics of the ESS‖ you are recommended to read:

Sven Biscop, The ABC of European Union Strategy – Ambition, Benchmark, Culture
(Egmont Paper No. 16). Brussels, Egmont, 2007
At the beginning of Chapter 6 ―Prospects for Revision‖ you are recommended to read:

EU Council, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – ―Providing
Security in a Changing World‖ Brussels, December 2008
...and at the end of Chapter 6 ―Prospects for Revision‖ you are recommended to read:

Sven Biscop (ed.), The Value of Power, the Power of Values. A Call for an EU Grand
Strategy (Egmont Paper No. 33). Brussels, Egmont, 2009 (pages 1–13 highly
recommended).
39
2.1.1.3 Bibliography & Other Sources
The following sources were consulted during the preparation of AKU2. Should you wish to deepen
your understanding of ESS aspects covered in the AKU2, please feel free to explore them upon
completing this AKU.








Sven Biscop, The European Security Strategy – A Global Agenda for Positive Power.
Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing, 2005.
Sven Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson (eds.), The EU and the European Security Strategy –
Forging a Global Europe. London, Routledge, 2007.
Alyson Bailes, The European Security Strategy – An Evolutionary History (Policy Paper
No.10), Stockholm, SIPRI, 2005 at http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP10.pdf
Roland Dannreuther and John Peterson (eds.), Security Strategy and Transatlantic
Relations. London, Routledge, 2006.
Bastian Giegerich, European Security and Strategic Culture. National Responses to the
EU´s Security and Defense Policy. Baden–Baden, Nomos, 2006.
Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defense Policy in the European Union. Basingstoke,
Palgrave, 2007.
Christoph O. Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture. Changing Norms on
Security and Defense in the European Union. Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2006.
Asle Toje, The 2003 European Union Security Strategy: A Critical Appraisal, European
Foreign Affairs Review, 10, 2005, 1, pp. 117–133.
For a broader documentation on CSDP related subjects, whenever necessary, you are invited to
visit the CSDP Knowledge-base at http://esdc.mil-edu.be
2.2 CHAPTER 1 – Before the ESS
EU evolutions and context which led eventually to the EU´s Security
Strategy.
2.2.1.1 Strategic Divisions
When ESDP (now CSDP) was created in the wake of the 1998 Franco–British meeting in St–Malo,
there was strong agreement on the need to tackle the military means, but there consensus ended.
Member States differed widely on the political–strategic dimension, a debate which goes far
beyond ESDP, beyond the CFSP even, but which concerns the whole of EU external action, across
the pillars. What should be the scope of the EU´s foreign and security policy ambitions? What
degree of autonomy should the EU have? And what then should be the precise role of the military
instrument in EU external action? Even on the assessment of the security environment, Member
States differed, with threat perceptions being influenced by individual States´ proximity to specific
unstable regions. Because of these deep–running divisions and in order not to lose the
momentum, it was decided to push through with those elements on which an agreement existed,
40
i.e. the means and institutions of ESDP, assuming that once these were in place the strategic
debate would inevitably have to follow.
2.2.1.2 The EU Treaty Provisions
European Union: Maastricht Treaty document,
February 7, 1992.
Online Photograph. Encyclopedia Britannica Online.
26 May 2008,
http://www.britannica.com/eb/art-93977
Accordingly, following the December 1999 European Council in Helsinki, where the ‗Headline Goal‘
was defined, the EU started building military and civilian capabilities for crisis management,
without possessing an overall strategic framework for its external action. In Article 11, the Treaty
on European Union (TEU) does define the objectives of the CFSP, but these are statements of
principle rather than policy objectives and hence far too general to provide a framework for daily
policy–making. As to the role of the military instrument, the TEU stipulates which types of
operations the EU can launch, by including the Petersberg Tasks, but it provides no guidelines as
to the circumstances under which the use of the military instrument can be considered.
2.2.1.3 Strategic Indications
That is not to say that EU external action has been completely ad hoc. Over the years, a distinctive
European approach to security has emerged, which can be characterized as integrated,
multidimensional or comprehensive. A comprehensive approach is particularly characteristic of EU
policy with respect to its neighboring States, which it attempts to integrate in an encompassing
network of relations: witness the Stability Pact for the Balkans, the Euro–Mediterranean
Partnership, and the successful transition of Central and Eastern Europe, probably the most
significant European achievement since the start of the European integration project itself. Under
41
the heading European Neighborhood Policy, this approach has now been adopted as an enhanced
framework for relations between the EU and its neighbors.
2.2.1.4 Unique Features
02.01 2003, OHR/EUSR ASHDOWN and EUPM Police Commissioner FREDERIKSEN
talk to returnees in front of the mosque of Mujkanovici in Kozarac area
(Prijedor municipality) where an explosive device was thrown.
Credit “The Council of the European Union”
When it comes to long–term policies, this comprehensive approach has emerged as the
predominant characteristic of EU external action. The EU´s profile is that of an actor which seeks
to influence the international environment in the long term, which operates mainly through
economic, diplomatic and ideological power and via multilateralism, and which is inspired not only
by material interests, but also by norms and ideas. A number of implicit strategic assumptions
have guided EU policy in this regard; this represents an important acquis. Yet these assumptions
needed to be substantiated and policy areas needed to be integrated in order to arrive at a
framework for maximally consistent, coherent and effective external action.
2.2.1.5 Need for a Strategy
For when the EU is confronted with acute crises, such as the one in Iraq, these implicit
assumptions have proved to be insufficient to arrive at a common policy. More often than not, the
EU has failed to achieve consensus on how to respond to such crises, even when the instruments
and means to do so were at hand. A clear–cut strategy should be able to avoid internal divides and
ensure the EU´s participation in international decision–making. Thus the taboo on strategic
42
thinking at European level needed to be broken and the strategic concepts of the individual
Member States – some more, others less elaborate – aligned. A strategy would not only provide
the reference framework that is needed for day–today policy–making. It should also determine the
instruments and capabilities that are being developed, rather than the other way around. This is
especially so with regard to ESDP: the EU´s ambitions and the role it sees for the military
instrument should guide force planning at the EU level.
2.3 CHAPTER 2 – Adoption of the ESS in 2003
The favorable context that allowed ESS elaboration and consensus on its
basic principles.
2.3.1.1 A Favorable Context
It seems as if the intra–European crisis over Iraq finally provided the stimulus that made a
breakthrough possible toward a European Security Strategy. On the one hand, the Member States
supporting the invasion would have been motivated to demonstrate that the EU does care about
the security threats perceived by the US and that the transatlantic Alliance is viable still. Hence the
similarity between the threat assessment in the ESS and the 2002 US National Security Strategy
(NSS), which must be seen as a political message to Washington, and the strong emphasis in the
ESS on transatlantic partnership. On the other hand, the Member States opposing the invasion
would have been equally eager to show that even though the threat assessment is to a large
degree shared with the US – be it perhaps not the perception of the intensity of the threat – there
are other options available to deal with these threats. The context of mid–2003 partially also
favored the adoption of the ESS: the successful conclusion of the European Convention and the
grand and – then still – promising undertaking to draw up a Constitutional Treaty created a climate
in which the elaboration of a strategy seemed more feasible than before. Prominent members of
the Convention, such as Wim van Eekelen, former WEU Secretary–General, had explicitly called for
the formulation of a strategic concept. The summer of 2003 also witnessed the first EU military
operation without the use of NATO assets and outside of Europe: Operation Artemis in the DRC (12
June – 1 September).
43
2.3.1.2 The Drafting Process
At the informal meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council in Greece on 2 and 3
May 2003, High Representative Javier Solana was thus – rather unexpectedly – tasked with
producing a draft strategic document. At its meeting in Thessaloniki (19–20 June), the European
Council welcomed the document submitted by Solana, A Secure Europe in a Better World, and
charged him with taking the work forward with a view to completing a strategy by its next
meeting. The EU then organized three seminars, in Rome (19 September), Paris (6–7 October)
and Stockholm (20 October), bringing together officials from the Member States, the future
Member States and the European institutions, as well as experts from the academic world, NGOs
and the media. This innovative process allowed the High Representative to collect comments and
suggestions from a wide variety of actors and observers, number of which found their way into the
final European Security Strategy, which was duly adopted by the European Council meeting on 12
December 2003. At the same time, drafting by a select group of high–level collaborators of Solana,
rather than by committee and involving Member States´ delegations, ensured a concise and very
readable document.
44
2.3.1.3 Basic Orientations
Issues discussed.
The main reason why these partly contradictory motivations led to results is that the EU was able
to build on an extensive foreign policy acquis. Many of the strategic choices contained in the ESS
were already evident as emerging strategic orientations in actual EU policies. Rather than adopting
a fundamentally new orientation, to a large extent therefore the ESS must be seen as the
codification of existing foreign policy guidelines. In other words, although the context of the Iraq
crisis would suggest a deep division between Member States, the ESS actually builds on a strong
consensus on the basic orientations of EU foreign policy. Indeed, the real intra–European divide
over Iraq did not concern the substance and principles of policy. Based on an assessment of past
policies, it can safely be argued e.g. that all Member States agree that in principle the use of force
is an instrument of last resort which requires a Security Council mandate. As in 1999, the real
issue at stake was still the nature of the transatlantic partnership. If the US reverts to the use of
force in a situation in which the EU in principle would not do so, or not yet, what then has priority
for the EU: steering an autonomous course, based on its own principles, or supporting its most
important ally? Besides, it should not be forgotten that on a number of foreign policy issues the EU
had already unanimously taken positions contrary to those of the US, e.g. on the ICC, on the
Kyoto Protocol and on various trade issues.
2.3.1.4 Framework for Consensus
If the motivation to effectively pursue this codification and draft the document was context–
specific, the ESS itself thus is not. Because it builds on the past, on existing guidelines established
during ten years of CFSP, and even before, the ESS has been able to transcend the context of its
adoption. It thus has the potential to have a durable impact on the future of EU foreign policy–
making, as is testified to by its omnipresence in EU foreign policy documents. Codification creates
45
a framework from which it is afterwards more difficult to depart; it circumscribes the room for
maneuver of future policy–making.
EUROPEAN COUNCIL
INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE,
Brussels, 12 and 13 December 2003
Credit “The Council of the European Union”
To the extent that the ESS will now effectively function as a reference framework for daily
decision–making in all fields of foreign policy, it will promote consistency and the emergence of a
strong strategic culture. The fact that the ESS, as a European Council declaration, is politically
rather than legally binding is of less importance in this context. Naturally, the ESS is not perfect. It
can only build on consensus in areas where that existed. On a number of issues it remains
particularly vague because consensus was absent or not yet strong enough. Many issues are
mentioned in the ESS, because not to do so would have invoked strong criticism, but no more than
that: no real choices are made on notably the nature of the transatlantic partnership and the
degree of autonomy of the EU as an international actor. This divide remains a fundamental
obstacle to a fully cohesive and resolute CFSP. Nevertheless, the ESS does contain a number of
clear choices and thus certainly has the potential to serve as a strategic framework for EU foreign
policy.
2.4 CHAPTER 3 - Summary of the ESS
The provisions of the Strategy: security environment, strategic objectives
and policy implications
2.4.1.1 The Security Environment
Under the heading of ‗global challenges‘, the starting point of the analysis of the security
environment is the impact of globalization. On the one hand, globalization has ‗brought freedom
46
and prosperity to many people‘, but ‗others have perceived globalization as a cause of frustration
and injustice‘. Globalization has ‗increased European dependence – and so vulnerability – on an
interconnected infrastructure, in transport, energy, information and other fields‘; as a consequence
of globalization, ‗the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked‘. The ESS then
goes on to specify a number of the worrying features of this globalized world: poverty; disease,
especially AIDS; competition for scarce resources, notably water; global warming; migratory
movements; and Europe´s energy dependence. In the second part of the analysis of the security
environment, which recognizes that ‗large–scale aggression against any Member State is now
improbable‘, a jump is then made to the identification of five ‗key threats‘, which are seen as being
closely interconnected:





Terrorism, for which ‗Europe is both a target and a base‘; the ESS notes that terrorism
‗arises out of complex causes‘, including ‗the pressures of modernization, cultural, social and
political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies‘;
Proliferation of WMD, ‗potentially the greatest threat to our security‘, which in ‗the most
frightening scenario‘ could be acquired by terrorists;
Regional conflicts, both worldwide and at the borders of the EU, which ‗impact on
European interests directly and indirectly‘ and which ‗can lead to extremism, terrorism and state
failure‘;
State failure, which ‗undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability‘ and
which ‗can be associated with obvious threats, such as organized crime or terrorism‘;
Organized crime, an internal threat with ‗an important external dimension‘, such as ‗cross–
border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons‘ as well as gemstones and
timber; organized crime ‗can have links with terrorism‘ and is ‗often associated with weak or
failing states‘.
2.4.1.2 Strategic Objectives
‗Addressing the threats‘ is the first of three strategic objectives outlined in the ESS, which first
lists the initiatives which the EU has already taken in this field:



The European Arrest Warrant, measures addressing terrorist financing and an agreement
on mutual legal assistance with the US;
The EU´s long–standing non–proliferation policies, highlighting its commitment to strong
and verifiable multilateral treaty regimes;
Its interventions to help deal with regional conflicts, notably in the Balkans, Afghanistan
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The ESS then outlines the approach which the EU will continue to pursue in dealing with the ‗key
threats‘, taking into account the nature of these threats and the exigencies of the new globalized
security environment. ‗In an era of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as
47
those that are near at hand‘, therefore ‗the first line of Defense will often be abroad‘; this
statement confirms that the EU cannot be but a global actor. ‗The new threats are dynamic‘ and
‗spread if they are neglected‘, therefore ‗conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too
early‘. ‗None of the new threats is purely military, nor can any be tackled by purely military
means‘, therefore prevention will require the application of ‗a mixture of instruments‘. ‗The
European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi–faceted situations‘, it is
stressed.
‗Building security in our neighborhood‘ is the second strategic objective. ‗Even in an era of
globalization, geography is still important‘, the ESS points out: ‗neighbors who are engaged in
violent conflict, weak states where organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding
population growth on our borders all pose problems for Europe‘. Therefore ‗a ring of well–governed
countries‘ must be established, ‗with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations‘. This is
to be achieved through partnership and action in the political, economic and cultural spheres as
well as in the security field.
This ‗ring of friends‘ or ‗neighborhood‘ is seen to include:




The Balkans, where Europe´s substantial achievements must be consolidated;
‗Our neighbors in the East‘, to whom ‗the benefits of economic and political cooperation‘
should be extended;
The Southern Caucasus;
The Mediterranean or the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership.
As final strategic objective, the ESS names the establishment of ‗an international order based
on effective multilateralism‘, i.e. ‗a stronger international society, well functioning international
institutions and a rule–based international order‘. The centre of that system is the UN, hence
‗equipping it to fulfill its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority‘. The
institutional architecture further comprises global organizations like the WTO and the international
financial institutions on the one hand, and regional organizations such as the OSCE, the Council of
Europe, ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union on the other hand. The transatlantic
relationship, of which ‗NATO is an important expression‘, is also defined as a core element; it is in
the EU´s bilateral interest, but also in that of the international community as a whole.
48
Through this network of regimes and institutions, what amounts to global governance must be
pursued, which implies: ‗spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform,
dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human
rights´, as well as ‗assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures‘. As it is
highlighted in the ESS: ‗The best protection of our security is a world of well–governed democratic
states‘. But the ESS also emphasizes that for international organizations, regimes and treaties to
be effective, the EU must be ‗ready to act when their rules are broken‘; hence States that ‗have
placed themselves outside the bounds of international society‘ are reminded that ‗there is a price
to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union‘.
2.4.1.3 Policy Implication
The EU has ‗instruments in place that can work effectively‘, but should ‗make a contribution that
matches [its] potential‘. Therefore under the heading of ‗policy implications‘, in its final chapter the
ESS calls for an EU that is more active, more capable, more coherent and works with others.
‗More active‘ means that the EU should ‗develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and
when necessary, robust intervention‘, in order to act ‗before countries around us deteriorate, when
49
signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise‘ – what the ESS
calls ‗preventive engagement‘. This applies to ‗the full spectrum of instruments for crisis
management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and
civilian, trade and development activities‘.
In order for the EU to become ‗more capable‘, foremost is the need to further ‗transform our
militaries into more flexible, mobile forces and to enable them to address the new threats‘. To that
end, the ESS also calls for ‗more resources for Defense‘ and ‗more effective use of resources‘, as
‗systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads, and, in the
medium–term, increase capabilities‘. Other fields mentioned are civilian resources, diplomatic
capacity and intelligence sharing.
Under the heading of ‗more coherent‘, the ESS states that ‗the challenge now is to bring together
the different instruments and capabilities‘, for ‗diplomatic efforts, development, trade and
environmental
policies, should
follow
the
same
agenda‘
–
an
unambiguous
call
for a
comprehensive approach, which should also embrace ‗the external activities of the individual
Member States‘.
Finally, the ESS states that the EU will be ‗working with partners‘, and this ‗both through
multilateral cooperation in international organizations and through partnerships with key actors‘.
The former are listed in the paragraph on ‗effective multilateralism‘; the latter are deemed to
include first of all the US and Russia, and then also Japan, China, Canada and India, ‗as well as all
those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support‘.
2.5 CHAPTER 4 – Main Characteristics of the ESS
The main characteristics discussion in the Global Public Goods perspective
and under the long vs. short term priority challenge.
2.5.1.1 Recommended Reading

Sven Biscop, The ABC of European Union Strategy – Ambition, Benchmark, Culture
(Egmont Paper No. 16). Brussels, Egmont, 2007
50
The main characteristic of the ESS is its comprehensive, integrated or holistic nature, i.e. the
integration of all dimensions of foreign policy, from aid and trade to diplomacy and the military.
2.5.1.2 The GPG Approach
This comprehensive approach can be conceptualized through the notion of Global Public Goods
(GPG), which emerged in the context of the UN at the end of the 1990s. Starting point is the
assumption that there are a number of ‗goods‘ that are global or universal in the sense that it is
generally felt – at least in Europe – that every individual is entitled to them. If to a certain extent
the definition of the core GPG is a political and normative choice, many elements have been
recognized as being universal beyond any doubt, notably in the field of human rights. Like in the
‗human security‘ approach, the individual is the point of reference. These goods are public in the
sense that their provision cannot be left to the market but should be supervised by government at
the different levels of authority (local, national, regional and global). These core GPG can be
grouped under four broad headings:




physical security or ‗freedom from fear‘;
economic prosperity or ‗freedom from want‘;
political freedom or democracy, human rights and the rule of law;
social wellbeing or access to health services, to education, to a clean and hazard–free
environment etc.
2.5.1.3 Haves and Have–nots
These GPG are strongly interrelated: ultimately, one cannot be ensured or enjoyed without access
to the other; the four categories are therefore equally important. Effective global governance
means ensuring access to GPG; a system that fails to provide the core GPG lacks legitimacy.
Global stability, and therefore the security of all States, depends on the availability of sufficient
access to the core GPG. Rather than terrorism, WMD or other military threats, the most important
threat is the ever growing gap between haves and have–nots, a gap which can be best expressed
in terms of access to the essential GPG. While this gap and the feelings of exclusion,
marginalization and frustration resulting from it certainly do not justify conflict, they do help to
explain it, which is a prerequisite for prevention and resolution of conflicts. The gap between haves
and have–nots is foremost among the challenges of the globalized world, because it is a threat of a
systemic nature, i.e. it results from the malfunctioning of, and impacts on, the global order itself.
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For unless mechanisms of governance are created or rendered more effective that can alleviate
this situation, at a certain level of inequality, the resulting political upheaval, and extremisms of all
kinds, economic uncertainty and massive migration flows will become uncontrollable. Because of
this interdependence GPG are non–exclusive, like true public goods: ultimately maintaining our
access to GPG requires improving others´ access. Since it denies access to core GPG to a large
share of the world´s population, the status quo is not an option.
2.5.1.4 Long–Term vs. Short–Term Challenges
Against this background, specific politico–military challenges do stand out. They include regions of
chronic tension and long–standing disputes and conflicts, failed States and civil wars, proliferation
of WMD and excessive militarization, and terrorism. These challenges directly threaten people,
States and regions. They have to be tackled head–on, but as they are symptoms of the ‗dark side
of globalization‘, effective global governance, improving access to GPG, must be pursued at the
same time as the key to preventing such threats. Of course, the strength of the causal relationship
amongst, on the one hand, the gap between haves and have–nots in the broadest sense and, on
the other hand, specific politico–military issues differs from case to case. Nonetheless, in the long
term no durable solution of politico–military problems can be achieved unless the stability of the
world system itself is assured.
2.5.1.5 The Keys for Implementation
The keywords when implementing a comprehensive or holistic approach, based on the notion of
GPG, are integration, prevention and multilateralism. At the heart of the approach is integration.
Because the core GPG are inextricably linked together, action must be undertaken to address all of
them simultaneously and in a coordinated fashion, by all relevant actors, in all fields of external
policy, putting to use all the instruments at their disposal, including trade, development, the
environment, police, intelligence and legal cooperation, diplomacy, and security and Defense.
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First contacts between EUFOR Tchad/RCA troops and villagers
Credit “The Council of the European Union”
Although policies in all of these fields must be integrated under the same overall objective of
increasing access to GPG, in order to avoid contradictory actions being undertaken, each policy
should continue to operate according to its own rationale and dynamic. ‗Securitization‘, i.e. the
instrumentalization of non–military dimensions of external policy in function only of ‗hard‘ security
concerns or ‗freedom from fear‘, must be avoided, for it ignores the intrinsic importance of the
other GPG. An integrated approach deals with all GPG simultaneously, but does not require that all
issues must be put under the label of security. On the contrary, although this may raise their
importance in the eyes of States, it also blurs the distinctions between policy areas. Poverty or
HIV/AIDS are of a different nature than terrorism, proliferation or conflict: they can be life–
threatening but they do not imply a threat of violence and cannot be tackled by politico–military
means. Accordingly, rather than including all challenges under the label of security, issues must
not be dealt with as security threats unless they pose an effective threat of violence. In that sense,
the ESS has perhaps not really been aptly named. It really is a foreign policy strategy, or ―grand
strategy‖ rather than just a security strategy.
By thus addressing the root causes of conflict, a policy oriented on the core GPG emphasizes
structural conflict prevention. This presents a formidable challenge: it implies dealing with more
issues, related to all the core GPG, at an earlier stage, before they become security threats.
Effective prevention is much more than mere appeasement: it demands a proactive stance, aiming
to change circumstances that induce instability and conflict. A policy oriented on GPG will thus in
fact be quite intrusive, which can make it rather contentious with the target countries. But as it is
in the very nature of GPG that pursuing them is in the mutual interest of all concerned, it is at the
same time a very positive approach, contrary to other, threat–based strategies. ‗For whom‘ rather
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than ‗against whom‘ is the question that determines policy. The sincere pursuit of GPG will bring
greatly enhanced legitimacy.
As effective action in all policy fields concerned requires the cooperation of a wide range of actors
at many different levels, a GPG–oriented policy implies multilateralism: an intricate web of
States, regimes, treaties and organizations, i.e. multi–level governance, implicating all levels of
authority in a coordinated effort to improve people´s access to GPG. Although in the spirit of
human security the individual is taken as point of reference, the State indeed remains a primary
partner, for no effective arrangements can be made with weak and failed States. Third States
must therefore be seen as partners for cooperation rather than as mere subjects of EU policies;
the aim is to influence rather than to coerce, to use the carrot rather than the stick. There will be
cases where the use of force is inevitable, for not all actors are amenable to preventive initiatives
and security threats will arise. But in the framework of multilateralism, the use of force can only be
a measure of last resort to be mandated by the Security Council. In those cases, the legitimacy
acquired through the pursuit of GPG can be capitalized upon.
2.6 CHAPTER 5 – The Role and impact of the ESS
The role and impact of a strategy for a new type of power, with a
constructive approach.
2.6.1.1 A New Type of Power
The ESS unequivocally expresses the EU´s ambition to be a global actor and as such can be seen
as a mission statement. This global ambition is not limited to aid and trade, areas in which the
EU has long been a global power, but includes the politico–military dimension. The military is
however an instrument of last resort. The emphasis is on a holistic approach, putting to use the
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full range of instruments, through partnerships and multilateral institutions, for a permanent policy
of prevention and stabilization.
Does this approach constitute a ‗European way‘ that makes the EU into a distinctive type of power?
Is the EU a power at all, a notion which the ESS itself does not mention? Yet, implicitly the ESS
certainly expresses the EU´s ambition to be a global power, although in reality the united will to
act on that is lacking all too often still. Nevertheless, the EU does influence events and
developments worldwide, certainly in the economic sphere, also in the sphere of norms and
values, and much less consistently but increasingly so in the politico–military sphere. The
comparison with the indeed much more purposive and resolute American power hides the fact that
after the US the EU is generally seen as the world´s second power – or who else would that be?
Part of the reason why the perception is often distorted is that the EU consciously uses its power in
a different way than the US, preferring persuasion over coercion, multilateralism over
unilateralism, and diplomacy over the military. Different characterizations of the EU have been
provided: a soft power, preferring non–military instruments; a civilian power, aimed at changing
the international environment rather than expanding its interests (or at ‗milieu‘ rather than
‗possession goals‘); a normative power, a model for others in terms of norms and values; a
transformative power, seeking to export its own political, social and economic model; or a tranquil
power (‗puissance tranquille‘), averse to power projection.
2.6.1.2 A Positive Power
All of these catch part of what the EU is doing. The core of EU strategy is indeed to transform
others by exporting its own model. Linking together political, economic and social reform and
security cooperation through partnership and conditionality, this holistic approach, if it is
effectively implemented, is actually very proactive and intrusive. Being a model for others to
emulate is not sufficient to be a power. Power cannot be tranquil but implies the will to actively
shape events and developments, in casu to proactively promote what according to the political
choice made by the EU are the core Global Public Goods (GPG). Furthermore, hard power, from
economic sanctions to military intervention if necessary, is part of the EU toolbox, as an
emergency brake in case of grave human rights violations, the invocation of the ‗responsibility to
protect‘ (R2P), and threats to peace and security. The EU´s distinctiveness lies perhaps in the
positive, indeed progressive tone of its project. Rather than being threat–based, it is constructive,
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aimed at achieving positive objectives, which are of course in the enlightened self–interest of the
EU – that is what policy is about – but which also directly benefit others and thus express a feeling
of responsibility for and solidarity with the have–nots. In that sense, the EU could also be
described as a positive power.
2.6.1.3 The Role of the ESS
Because it so clearly expresses the choice for the holistic approach, the ESS at the same time is
more than a mission statement or expression of ambition. It really is a strategy in the broad,
public management meaning of the term: a policy–making tool which, on the basis of EU values
and interests, outlines the long–term overall policy objectives to be achieved and the basic
categories of instruments to be applied to that end, which serves as a reference framework for
day–to–day
policymaking
in
a
rapidly
evolving
and
increasingly
complex
international
environment, and which guides the definition of the means – i.e. the civilian and military
capabilities – that need to be developed. The ESS is indeed not a strategy in the narrow, military
sense of the term. Nor was it meant to be: in spite of its misleading – and perhaps mistaken –
title, rather than a security or Defense strategy it is an international or foreign policy strategy that
addresses the whole of external action. As on the international scene it is much more than a
military actor, no useful analysis of EU strategy can be limited to military strategy. Such a foreign
policy strategy, or ―grand strategy‖, is of course not an operational document, but has to be
translated into sub-strategies, policies and actions – including a military strategy – for each
dimension of foreign policy. This applies to the US National Security Strategy (NSS) as well; both
the ESS and the NSS are at the very top of the hierarchy of documents. In fact, if the ESS is read
together with the many existing documents – e.g. on the Neighborhood, Africa, terrorism, WMD –
that de facto are sub–strategies to the ESS, the EU probably has a much more explicit strategic
concept than many of the individual Member States.
2.6.1.4 The Impact of the ESS
The choice for the holistic approach is not a new, let alone a revolutionary one. Rather the ESS is
the codification of a strategic orientation that had already emerged through the practice of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which came into being ten years before its adoption
and which in turn had its roots in European Political Cooperation (EPC) of the 1970s–1980s. Herein
lies the strength of the ESS: it represents a fundamental consensus between the Member States,
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the roots of which go much deeper than the temporary circumstances surrounding the documents
adoption.
Withdrawal of the Indonesian National Armed Forces
from Aceh, Indonesia, 20–21 September 2005
Credit “The Council of the European Union”
Nevertheless there was a chance that the ESS would disappear soon after its adoption, that it
would be nothing more than a one–off demonstration of regained unity after the intra–European
divide over Iraq, a step of high symbolic value but with little impact on actual policy–making. A
stratagem rather than a strategy... The ESS has proved to be too evoking a document for that to
happen however. It is indeed one of the most spread and read EU documents among the general
public and frequently appears on reading lists at colleges and universities around the world. Within
the EU, in many policy documents and decisions on different aspects of foreign policy, especially
those relating to the CFSP and the CSDP, the guidelines fixed by the ESS are constantly being
referred to, as in the speeches by the High Representative and in the discourse of EU
representatives generally. The ESS also serves as the connecting thread throughout the courses of
the ESDC. In the decision–making process, the European institutions as well as a number of
Member States make good tactical use of the ESS: the more convincingly a proposed initiative can
be linked to it, the more difficultly it can be opposed.
That does not mean that the ESS is always first on policy–makers minds when policies have to be
designed and decisions made. In many cases, its presence is implicit and it is de facto being
implemented, precisely because it is an expression of continuity in EU foreign policy practice. But
even though it is not always explicitly referred to, the codification of this strategic orientation in
the ESS is important, because it strengthens its status and makes it more difficult – though not
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impossible – to transgress the boundaries of this reference framework, and thus promotes
coherence and consistency. Because the ESS has remained so present in the official discourse and
in the academic and political debate, it has effectively become the benchmark to judge EU
performance. This certainly holds true for third States and organizations: even if it would want to,
the outside world would not allow the EU to forget the ESS, which it reads as a binding statement
of what the Union aims to achieve and which therefore generates demands and expectations. The
ESS has thus very much become part of the identity of the EU. It is true to say however that the
links between the ESS and daily policy–making could have been more explicit. That would have
required clearer institutional ownership, e.g. entrusting the High Representative and the Policy
Unit with the implementation and further development of the ESS, and setting explicit deadlines
for reporting.
2.7 CHAPTER 6 – Prospects of Revision
The need to answer questions of implementation in ever changing
circumstances.
2.7.1.1 Recommended Reading

EU Council, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – ―Providing
Security in a Changing World‖ Brussels, December 2008
European Council, Brussels, 11–12 December 2008
Credit “The Council of the European Union”
In the fall of 2007 French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt put a
revision of the ESS on the agenda as an objective for their upcoming Presidencies. This idea did
not meet with universal enthusiasm. While not everybody was convinced that the ESS was already
in need of updating, some also feared that too divisive debates would be provoked, particularly on
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Russia, and that the EU would end up with a worse rather than a better document. Hence the
somewhat cautiously expressed mandate given to High Representative Javier Solana by the
December 2007 European Council: ―to examine the implementation of the Strategy with a view to
proposing elements on how to improve the implementation and, as appropriate, elements to
complement it‖. The debate was concluded by the adoption of a Report on the Implementation of
the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World by the December 2008
European Council, which decided to leave the text of the ESS itself untouched. The Report ―does
not replace the ESS, but reinforces it‖ and the ESS remains in force.
2.7.1.2 A Report on Implementation
That the European Council decided to leave the ESS untouched should in itself not be a reason for
disappointment. If the EU today is not the global power that it could have been, it is not because
its strategy is not valid, but because it has been half–hearted in implementing it. All of the so–
called new threats and challenges are already mentioned in the ESS. It could indeed say more
about Russia, climate change or energy, but adding a few words here and there is not what
matters most – implementation does. If anything, the Georgian crisis confirms the EU strategy of
engaging global actors like Russia by pulling them into the multilateral system, just like the
financial crisis confirms the need for effective multilateral rules and institutions in the economic
sphere.
This is not a call for complacency though. It is not sufficient to have a strategy – one must then
also do strategy.
On the positive side, Solana did not allow the debate to be hijacked by the events of August 2008
– strategy should not be about the last thing that happened to occur, but about fundamental
interests and principles and long–term objectives. The Report provides a concise overview of
implementation and confirms the holistic and multilateral approach. Interestingly, it mentions
human security: ―We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality,
promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root
causes of conflict and insecurity‖. Absent from, though implicitly present in the ESS, human
security, can be a useful organizing concept, binding everything together and explaining the core
aim of the EU´s holistic approach as a global actor: making sure that every individual,
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everywhere, has access to physical security, economic prosperity, political freedom and social
wellbeing. To realize this for its own citizens is the fundamental interest of the EU; to realize it for
citizens worldwide is the means to defend that interest and a positive objective in its own right at
the same time.
EU NAVFOR Somalia: Frigate PSARA,
Force headquarters of EU NAVOR Somalia,
December 2008
Credit “The Council of the European Union”
The Report ends with a firm call to action: ―To build a secure Europe in a better world, we must do
more to shape events. And we must do it now‖. But it offers little in terms of concrete
recommendations. Nor did the European Council provide a follow–up mechanism to ensure that
implementation of the ESS would be stepped up and the linkages between the ESS and decision–
making enhanced. That would require more political courage, more as well as better capabilities,
and, in a number of areas, the definition of clearer ―sub–strategies‖ to the ESS.
2.7.1.3 Questions for the Future
As it is, the broad approach of the ESS has – rightly – been reaffirmed in the Report, but offering
little in terms of recommendations for the future, the Report creates an impression of unfinished
business. This the EU can ill afford now that the Lisbon Treaty has changed the institutional set–
up, NATO has launched a strategic debate to which an EU contribution is essential, and the EU
risks being overshadowed by the much more purposive emerging powers or BRICs (Brazil, Russia,
India, China).
The ESS mostly tells us how to do things (in a holistic, preventive, and multilateral way), but
needs to be translated in more specific objectives: what to do? The following priority areas require
60
the identification of specific EU interests and the definition of concrete objectives, in order to direct
policies and actions:






The Neighborhood: What is the desired end–state of the Neighborhood Policy? Can only
democracy create a consensual value–based community and thus safeguard our interests, or
will democratization create such upheaval that our interests would be damaged? Only when our
interests and red lines are clear can a true strategic partnership with Russia be pursued.
Enlargement: A successful instrument so far, further enlargement is determining for
relations with Russia and for the geopolitical position of the EU – and cannot proceed therefore
without strategic debate.
Regional objectives: A reluctance to discuss interests and join up the different European
presences, from aid and trade to diplomacy, has undermined policies towards Central Asia, the
Gulf and Africa. Other regions too, such as Asia, Latin America and the Arctic need a thorough
assessment of EU interests to determine whether or not our presence should be stepped up.
Global and institutional objectives: The EU must sharpen its view about the multilateral
architecture, reconciling reform with increased effectiveness of EU representation. That should
inform a really strategic use of its strategic partnerships with the BRICs, the existence of which
too often seems more important than their content.
Conflict resolution and crisis management: A white book should define Europe´s ambition
as a security actor. Regardless of whether in a specific case Europeans deploy under the flag of
CSDP, NATO or the UN: which types of operations must European forces be capable of, which
priority regions and scenarios require intervention, and which is the scale of the effort to be
devoted to these priorities?
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, how autonomous does the EU want to be as an
actor vis–à–vis the US?
A more detailed discussion on the future of the European Security Strategy can be found
in:

Sven Biscop (ed.), The Value of Power, the Power of Values. A Call for an EU Grand
Strategy (Egmont Paper No. 33). Brussels, Egmont, 2009 (pages 1–13 highly
recommended).
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3
AKU 3 – ROLE OF EU INSTITUTIONS IN THE FIELD OF CFSP / CSDP
3.1.1.1 General description
AKU3 is dedicated to the role of EU Institutions in shaping the Union´s Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) and its subsequent Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). It consists
of an introductory part, of 6 chapters focusing on relevant institutions and mechanisms, and of a
concluding part.
3.2 CHAPTER 1 - EU institutional structures involved in the field of
CSDP
Short overview of the EU Institutions involved in policy shaping and
decision–making in the field of CFSP/CSDP.
The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009 when the European Community was
replaced by the European Union which succeeds it and assumes all its rights and obligations. The
Treaty on European Union keeps the same name and the Treaty establishing the European
Community becomes the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Now you are invited to
read a summary of the changes brought by the Treaty
– Click on the icon
3.2.1.1 EU INSTITUTIONS
Article 13 of the TEU states that the Union´s institutions (in the strict sense) in general will be:
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3.2.1.2 COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY (CFSP)/ COMMON
SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY (CSDP)
As Article 42 (1) TEU states, the CSDP is an integral part of the CFSP. It provides the Union with
an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use those assets on
missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international
security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter.
The following institutions are involved in shaping the CFSP/CSDP and will be discussed here:
3.2.1.3 EUROPEAN COUNCIL
Article 15 (1) TEU states that: “The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary
impetus for its development and shall define the general political directions and priorities thereof.
It shall not exercise legislative functions.”
Article 15 (2) TEU states that “The European Council shall consist of the Heads of State or
Government of the Member States, together with its President and the President of the
Commission. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall take
part in its work.” Pursuant to Article 15 (3) TEU “The European Council shall meet twice every six
months, convened by its President. When the agenda so requires, the members of the European
Council may decide each to be assisted by a minister and, in the case of the President of the
Commission, by a member of the Commission. When the situation so requires, the President shall
convene a special meeting of the European Council.”
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President of the European Council,
Herman Van ROMPUY
Credit “The Council of the European Union”
Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Council became an institution. It does not exercise
legislative functions in the sense of creating EU Law (e.g. directives and regulations) but adopts
recommendations and decisions that are politically binding on the EU Member States´
governments. A new political figure has come onto the scene since the entry into force of the
Treaty of Lisbon: the permanent President of the European Council.
Under Article 15 (5) TEU “The European Council shall elect its President, by a qualified majority,
for a term of two and a half years, renewable once. In the event of an impediment or serious
misconduct, the European Council can end the President´s term of office in accordance with the
same procedure.”
At their informal meeting in Brussels on 19 November 2009, ahead of the entry into force of the
Treaty of Lisbon, EU Heads of State or Government agreed on the election of Mr Herman Van
Rompuy as the President of the European Council. He was subsequently formally elected on 1
December 2009.
On 1 March 2012, the EU heads of state or government unanimously re–elected Herman Van
Rompuy as president of the European Council for a second term of two and a half years, from 1
June 2012 to 30 November 2014. Herman Van Rompuy was also designated as president of the
Euro Summit for the same term of office.
Read more about the President of the European Council here
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– Click on the icon
Pursuant to Article 15 (6) of the Treaty on European Union, the President of the European Council:




Chairs it and drives forward its work;
Ensures the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation
with the President of the Commission, and on the basis of the work of the General Affairs
Council;
Endeavors to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council;
Presents a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the European
Council.
Also, he “shall, at his level and in that capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on
issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”
The European Council is assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council. The staff of the General
Secretariat is therefore at the President´ disposal. The President has his own private office.
Source: http://euro–med.dk/bil/billedereuropean–council4.gif
3.2.1.4 COUNCIL
There is only one Council (of the EU), which can meet in different configurations. The Council
configurations can be extended or limited in numbers by the Heads of State or Government.
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On Council configurations please explore the Council website section.
Article 16 (7) TEU states: ―A Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Governments
of the Member States shall be responsible for preparing the work of the Council.‖ (see also
Article 240 TFEU), thus re–affirming the role of COREPER (the abbreviation for this committee).
Source: http://www.pedz.uni–mannheim.de/webpics/e07minrat.gif
In the post–Lisbon TEU, the General Affairs Council (GAC) and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC)
are the only Council formations which are explicitly mentioned. The Foreign Affairs Council
elaborates “the Union´s external action on the basis of strategic guidelines laid down by the
European Council and ensures that the Union´s action is consistent.” (Article 16 (6) TEU, 3rd
sentence). “The General Affairs Council shall ensure consistency in the work of the different
Council configurations. It shall prepare and ensure the follow–up to meetings of the European
Council, in liaison with the President of the European Council and the Commission” (id., 2nd
sentence).
The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative, shall ensure consistency
between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies and
shall cooperate to that effect (Article 21 (3) TEU).
The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), who is
also one of the Vice–Presidents of the European Commission, chairs the Foreign Affairs Council,
contributes through proposals towards the preparation of the CFSP and ensures implementation of
the decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council. The HR is assisted by the
European External Action Service (EEAS).
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3.2.1.5 EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Relating to external affairs, the Commission manages and implements EU external relations
policies other than the CFSP (e.g. development) and the budget (incl. the CFSP budget) and also
represents the EU on the international stage, except on CFSP issues and where the Treaties
provide otherwise, for example by negotiating agreements between the EU and other countries.
The Commission services co–operate with the European External Action Service (EEAS) which was
formally launched on 1 January 2011.
The role of the EEAS is to support the High Representative in fulfilling the mandate to conduct the
EU´s CFSP. As part of this, the EEAS has 140 Delegations and Offices around the world. For over
50 years, these Delegations and Offices have acted as the eyes, ears and mouth piece of the
European
Commission
vis–à–vis
the
authority
and
populations
in
their
host
countries.
The EEAS is a functionally autonomous European Union body – although its activities are legally
bound to be consistent with other policies of the EU. This is achieved partly by the High
Representative also having high office in two of the EU´s key institutions in this field, being a
Vice–President of the European Commission with responsibilities for External Relations and
President of the Foreign Affairs Council. The EEAS diplomatic service also supports High
Representative Catherine Ashton in these capacities.
3.2.1.6 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
The European Parliament generally exercises functions of political control and consultation as
laid down in the Treaties, and, jointly with the Council, exercises legislative and budgetary
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functions (Article 14 TEU). Its role in relation to the CFSP is laid down in Article 36 TEU. This
provision also tasks the High Representative with working with the European Parliament: the HR
regularly consults the EP on the main aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP, incl. CSDP,
informs it on how this policy evolves, and will ensure that the views of the EP are duly taken into
consideration.
3.3 CHAPTER 2 - High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy
The role, functions and tasks of the High Representative in the field of
CFSP/CSDP.
Ms. Catherine ASHTON, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
Credit “The Council of the European Union”
At the informal meeting in Brussels on 19 November 2009, ahead of the entry into force of the
Treaty of Lisbon, EU Heads of State or Government reached a political agreement on the
appointment of Ms Catherine Ashton as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy. Ms Ashton was subsequently appointed by the European Council with the
agreement of the President of the Commission. Her term of office (five years) coincides in principle
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with the Commission´s term of office. This appointment was made pursuant to Article 18 (1) TEU:
“The European Council, acting by a qualified majority, with the agreement of the President of the
Commission, shall appoint the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy. The European Council may end his term of office by the same procedure.”
The High Representative is also a Vice–President of the European Commission and is subject,
together with the President of the Commission and the other members of the Commission, to a
vote of consent by the European Parliament.
Read more on the Union´s High Representative here
– Click on the icon
3.3.1.1 MULTIPLE ROLES AND TASKS
The High Representative exercises, in foreign affairs, a number of functions which were previously
exercised to some extent by the six–monthly rotating Presidency, the High Representative for the
CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations. The post of the High Representative is
designed to enhance the consistency and unity of the EU´s external action. According to Articles
18 and 27 of the Treaty on the European Union, the High Representative:






Conducts the Union´s common foreign and security policy (Article 18 (2) TEU);
Contributes by her proposals to the development of that policy, which she will carry out as
mandated by the Council, and ensures implementation of the decisions adopted in this field
(Article 18 (2) TEU);
Presides over the Foreign Affairs Council (Article 18 (3) TEU and Article 27 (1) TEU);
Is one of the Vice–Presidents of the European Commission. She ensures the consistency of
the Union´s external action. She is responsible within the Commission for responsibilities
incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union´s external
action (Article 18 (4) TEU);
Represents the Union for matters relating to the CFSP, conduct political dialogue with third
parties on the Union´s behalf and expresses the Union´s position in international organizations
and at international conferences (Article 27 (2) TEU);
Exercises authority over the European External Action Service and over the Union
delegations in third countries and at international organizations.
Further tasks and functions encompass also:




International representation of the EU, in particular on CFSP issues (without prejudice to
the role of the President of the European Council at his level);
Proposing the Appointment of EU Special Representatives;
Head of the European Defense Agency (EDA);
Chair of the board of the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS) and of the
European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC).
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In fulfilling this extensive mandate, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy and Vice–President of the European Commission, is answerable to respectively the
European Council and the European Commission.
3.3.1.2 SUPPORTING INSTRUMENTS & STRUCTURES
The High Representative is assisted by a European External Action Service (EEAS) and has
authority over 140 Delegations and Offices of the Union in third countries and to international
organizations. She benefits from the support from the Council and Commission services, as
appropriate.
Under Article 33 TEU ―The Council may, on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, appoint a special representative with a mandate in relation
to particular policy issues. The special representative shall carry out his mandate under the
authority of the High Representative.‖
For details on EU Special Representatives please explore the dedicated Council
website section (Click on the left icon)
3.3.1.3 EU´s EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE
Article 27 (3) TEU, introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, constitutes the legal basis for the External
Action Service (EEAS) and the Council decision on the organization and functioning of the EEAS. It
states that:
“In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action
Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States
and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council
and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member
States. The organization and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be
established by a decision of the Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from the High
Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the
Commission.”
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The decision on the EEAS was adopted by the Council on 26 July 2010.
The EEAS helps the High Representative ensure the consistency and coordination of the Union´s
external action as well as prepare policy proposals and implement them after their approval by
Council. It also assists the President of the European Council and the President as well as the
Members of the Commission in their respective functions in the area of external relations and
ensures close cooperation with the Member States. The EEAS is composed of single geographical
(covering all regions and countries) and thematic desks, which continue to perform under the
authority of the High Representative the tasks executed by the relevant parts of the Commission
and the Council Secretariat before 2010. Trade and development policy as defined by the Treaty
remain the responsibility of relevant Commissioners.
EEAS staff is appointed by the High Representative and is drawn from three sources: relevant
departments of the General Secretariat of the Council, of the personnel of the Commission and of
national diplomatic services of the Member States. In order to enable the High Representative to
conduct the CSDP, the EU´s crisis management structures are part of the EEAS while taking full
account of their specificities. These include the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
(CMPD), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the Military Staff (EUMS).
The EEAS is a service sui generis, separate from the Commission and the Council Secretariat. It
has autonomy in terms of administrative budget and management of staff. The EEAS has its own
section in the EU budget, to which the usual budgetary and control rules will apply.
The former Commission´s Delegations and Offices around the world became Union delegations
under the authority of the High Representative and are now part of the EEAS structure.
Delegations contain both regular EEAS staff (including Heads of Delegation) and staff from
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relevant Commission services. All staff work under the authority of the Heads of Delegation. EU
delegations work in close cooperation with diplomatic services of the Member States. They play a
supporting role as regards diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries
upon request of Member States.
Effective consultation procedures were established between the EEAS and the services of the
European Commission with external responsibilities, including those in charge of internal policies
with significant external dimensions.
For more details on the EEAS please explore its website. (Click on the image at left)
3.4 CHAPTER 3 - EU Council roles in the field of CSDP
Role of the Council and Member States in making decisions related to,
providing capabilities for, and engaging in CSDP missions and operations.
Under Article 42 (4) TEU, decisions relating to CSDP “shall be adopted by the Council acting
unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State. The High Representative may propose the use
of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where
appropriate.” This is consistent with decision–making in the CFSP more generally: Article 31 (1)
TEU provides that: “Decisions under this Chapter shall be taken by the European Council and the
Council acting unanimously, except where this Chapter provides otherwise”.
Lisbon Treaty seals
Credit “European Commission”
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However, abstentions do no prevent the adoption of a decision. Moreover, a ―constructive
abstention‖ can be used by Member States, pursuant to Article 31 (1), second subparagraph TEU,
which provides that: “Decisions under this Chapter shall be taken by the European Council and the
Council acting unanimously, except where this Chapter provides otherwise. The adoption of
legislative acts shall be excluded ... When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may
qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that
case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the
Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action
likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States
shall respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way
represent at least one third of the Member States comprising at least one third of the population of
the Union, the decision shall not be adopted.”
3.4.1.1 CSDP CAPABILITIES
According to Article 42 (3) TEU, “Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities
available to the Union for the implementation of CSDP, to contribute to the objectives defined by
the Council. Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make
them available to the CSDP”; “Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their
military capabilities” and those member States “whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and
which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most
demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework.
Such cooperation shall be governed by Article 46 ... ”
Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation and which
fulfill the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities set out in the protocol
on permanent structured cooperation, ―shall notify their intention to the Council and to the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.‖ (Article 46 (1) TEU). ― ... the
Council shall adopt a decision establishing permanent structured cooperation and determining the
list of participating Member States. The Council shall act by qualified majority after consulting the
High Representative.‖ (Article 46 (2) TEU). ―Any participating Member State which wishes to
withdraw from permanent structured cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council, which
shall take note that the Member State in question has ceased to participate.‖ (Article 46 (5) TEU).
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The Lisbon Treaty Protocol on Permanent Structured Co–operation further elaborates on the
permanent structured cooperation.
You may wish now to read a short policy analysis on Permanent Structured Co–
operation: Sven BISCOP and Jo COELMONT, Permanent Structured Cooperation – In
Defense of the Obvious, Royal Institute for International Relations, Security Policy
Brief No. 11, 2010. (Click on the left icon)
3.4.1.2 CSDP MISSION SPECTRUM
According to Article 42 (1) TEU, the CSDP shall provide the Union with an operational capacity
drawing on civilian and military assets which the Union may use ―on missions outside the Union for
peace–keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the
principles of the United Nations Charter‖.
These tasks ―in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include
joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance
tasks, conflict prevention and peace–keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management,
including peace–making and post–conflict stabilization. All these tasks may contribute to the fight
against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their
countries.‖ (Article 43 (1) TEU). Relating to these task, the ―Council shall adopt decisions ...,
defining their objectives and scope and the general conditions for their implementation. The High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, acting under the authority of
the Council and in close and constant contact with the Political and Security Committee, shall
ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such tasks.‖ (Article 43 (2) TEU).
3.4.1.3 CONDUCTING CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Relating to these task, the ―Council shall adopt decisions ..., defining their objectives and scope
and the general conditions for their implementation. The High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, acting under the authority of the Council and in close and
constant contact with the Political and Security Committee, shall ensure coordination of the civilian
and military aspects of such tasks.‖ (Article 43 (2) TEU).
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Pursuant to Article 38 TEU: ―the Political and Security Committee [PSC] shall exercise, under the
responsibility of the Council and of the High Representative, the political control and strategic
direction of the crisis management operations‖ and ―The Council may authorize the Committee, for
the purpose and for the duration of a crisis management operation, as determined by the Council,
to take the relevant decisions concerning the political control and strategic direction of the
operation‖. The PSC normally meets twice a week in Brussels.
The Council ―may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of
Member States in order to protect the Unions values and serve its interests‖ (Article 42 (5) TEU).
In that case, within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 43, ―Those
member States, [which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task,] in
association with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall
agree among themselves on the management of the task.‖ (Article 44 (1) TEU). Those Member
States which are participating in the task are obliged to keep the Council regularly informed of its
progress on their own initiative or at the request of another Member State. They shall also inform
the Council immediately should the completion of the task entail major consequences or require
amendment of the objective, scope and conditions determined for the task in the decisions
referred to in paragraph 1. In such cases, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions.
3.5 CHAPTER 4 - European Commission´s external activities
Brief presentation of European Commission´s external activities and their
co–ordination with the Union´s Common Foreign and Security Policy.
The European Commission is independent of national governments. Its job is to ―promote the
general interest of the Union and take appropriate initiatives to that end‖ (see Article 17 TEU).
It inter alia:




Drafts proposals for new European laws, which it presents to the European Parliament and
the Council.
Is the EU´s executive arm – in other words, it is responsible for implementing the
decisions of Parliament and the Council. That means managing the day–to–day business of the
European Union: implementing its policies, running its programmes and spending its funds.
With the exception of the CFSP and other cases provided for in the Treaties, it ensures the
Union´s external representation.
Oversees the application of Union law under the control of the Court of Justice.
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Like the Parliament and the Council, the European Commission was set up by the EU´s founding
treaties. A new Commission is appointed every five years.
3.5.1.1 EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND CFSP
Under the pre–Lisbon TEU, the Commission was fully associated with CFSP (ex–Article 27 TEU).
The post–Lisbon TEU no longer includes this provision but the Commission is still involved in the
CFSP.
It has the right to support an initiative by the High Representative and in some cases to submit a
joint proposal, but no longer has an independent right of initiative on CFSP issues. It participates
in decision–shaping, including in the Political and Security Committee (PSC) which is the linchpin of
CFSP.
The Common Security and Defense Policy which is an integral part of CFSP, was given a range of
crisis management functions. Some of these are clearly military, and here the Commission´s role
is primarily to strive towards ensuring that non–CFSP activities which accompany or follow on a
military crisis operation proceed smoothly and coherently. Others are civilian. The Commission has
a greater role in civilian missions, in particular through its responsibility for implementing the CFSP
budget, from which these missions are normally funded. The budget is implemented by the Service
for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) under the High Representative acting as Vice–President of the
Commission.
In addition, the Commission may carry out activities in other EU policy areas than the CFSP, which
may contribute to crisis management, e.g. as part of development policy or humanitarian aid.
Furthermore a whole range of topics which come up in CFSP directly affect policies implemented by
the Commission. These include terrorism, sanctions policy, human rights and democracy. The
Commission has specific tasks in all these areas, and in some it has its own instruments.
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One example:
For more details on the Commission´s role in external activities, including
Development and Cooperation (DEVCO/EuropeAid),
Enlargement,
European Neighborhood Policy,
Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI),
Humanitarian Aid and Civilian Protection (ECHO),
Trade.
please consult the European Commission central web page. (Click on the above image)
3.5.1.2 CO–ORDINATION WITH THE COUNCIL´S CFSP/CSDP ACTIONS AND
OBJECTIVES
As mentioned earlier in this learning unit, coordination of all EU external activities is crucial to
ensure consistency.
Article 21 (3) TEU emphasizes the role of the Council and the Commission in order to ensure
consistency in the field of external actions as follows: ―The Union shall ensure consistency between
the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies. The Council and
the Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect.‖
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As Article 42 (4) TEU states, decisions relating to CSDP ―shall be adopted by the Council acting
unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State. The High Representative may propose the use
of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where
appropriate.‖
The Lisbon treaty aims to contribute to greater efficiency and coherence of the EU´s external
action and security policy. It has given the tools to develop a more comprehensive, integrated
approach and make the EU more effective as a world player. It created the post of the High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who conducts the EU´s CFSP. It gave birth
to the EEAS to assist the High Representative in the preparation and conduct of her policy. All this
supports the development of a coherent EU strategy to prevent and tackle crisis and make use of
all
the
available
tools,
–
diplomatic,
economic,
developmental,
humanitarian
and
crisis
management – in a coordinated manner, so that they complement and reinforce each other.
In crisis management, the missions and operations are instruments serving a more global policy
and a common political objective. During the last years, closer links with the geographical desks
and with relevant EU Commission services through reinforced coordination processes were
developed. The Crisis Platform structure, at the management level, is a very useful tool in that
respect as are the crisis management coordination meetings at the staff level. However, such
―triangular‖ cooperation between the ―3Ds‖ – diplomacy, development and Defense/security – was
created, i.e. the geographical desks, crisis management structures and the Commission.
Shaping the comprehensive approach also involves the working more closely with partners such as
the UN, NATO, the African Union and third countries, in order to pool EU efforts better and
combine EU instruments.
3.6 CHAPTER 5 - European Parliament roles in the field of
CFSP/CSDP
The
consultation
and
budgetary
control
Parliament in CFSP/CSDP.
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functions
of
the
European
European Parliament session
Credit “European Commission”
The European Parliament consists of 751 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) including
the President of the European Parliament. The number of MEPs cannot exceed 751 and the
breakdown of parliamentary seats between Member States will be digressively proportional. The
Treaty of Lisbon also stipulates that no Member State can have fewer than 6 or more than 96
seats.
As Article 14 (3) TEU states, ―The members of the European Parliament shall be elected for a term
of five years by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot.‖ Pursuant to Article 14 (4)
TEU: ―The European Parliament shall elect its President and its officers from among its members.‖
The European Parliament also ―... shall elect the President of the Commission.‖ Article 14 (1) TEU.
Pursuant to Article 14 (1) TEU, ―The European Parliament shall, jointly with the Council, exercise
legislative and budgetary functions. It shall exercise functions of political control and consultation
as laid down in the Treaties‖. The European Parliament also ―... shall elect the President of the
Commission.‖ Article 14 (1) TEU.
The EP´s Committees include the Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET), with subcommittees on
Human Rights (DROI) and Security and Defense (SEDE) and Development (DEVE).
3.6.1.1 COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY / COMMON SECURITY
AND DEFENSE POLICY
The CFSP ―shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting
unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise.‖ The CFSP ―shall be put into effect by
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by Member States,
... The specific role of the European Parliament and of the Commission in this area is defined by
the Treaties.‖ (Article 24 (1) TEU).
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According to Article 36 TEU ―The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy shall regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of
the common foreign and security policy and the common security and Defense policy and inform it
of how those policies evolve. He shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly
taken into consideration. Special representatives may be involved in briefing the European
Parliament.
The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it and to
the High Representative. Twice a year it shall hold a debate on progress in implementing the
common foreign and security policy, including the common security and Defense policy.‖
Sometimes the EP expresses its views and opinions on certain foreign and security policy issues
via resolutions. These are usually prepared by reporters and pass through the relevant EP
committee(s). There may also be declarations of prominent members of the EP.
In addition, in the areas of CFSP/CSDP the European Parliament exercises its budgetary powers.
The budgetary control function mainly relates to the CFSP budget for CSDP civilian missions and
other EU external actions funded from the CFSP budget. It also covers the European External
Action Service (EEAS).
Furthermore, Article 10 of the Protocol (No. 1) on the role of national parliaments in the European
Union (to the Treaty of Lisbon) provides that: ―A conference of Parliamentary Committees for
Union Affairs may submit any contribution it deems appropriate for the attention of the European
Parliament, the Council and the Commission. That conference shall in addition promote the
exchange of information and best practice between national Parliaments and the European
Parliament, including their special committees. It may also
organize inter-parliamentary
conferences on specific topics, in particular to debate matters of common foreign and security
policy, including common security and Defense policy. Contributions from the conference shall not
bind national Parliaments and shall not prejudge their positions‖.
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For details on European Parliament external activities please explore the
dedicated website. (Click on the left icon)
3.6.1.2 LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
The European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union are
involved in the law–making process at EU level.
Decisions in the area of CFSP/ CSDP are taken by the Council and they are now all called ―Council
Decisions‖ (they include the former ―Joint Actions‖); such Council Decisions are not legislative acts.
Directives and regulations are the main forms of EU law, applicable to all EU Member States. New
legislation is generally proposed by the European Commission, but it is the Council and the
European Parliament that pass the laws. EU Law in general is subject to the ordinary legislative
procedure (Art. 294 TFEU), now based on the co–decision principle (sometimes still called ―the co–
decision procedure‖). The CFSP budget approval falls under this legislative procedure.
3.6.1.3 LEGISLATIVE CO–DECISION PROCEDURE
In this procedure, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the Parliament shares legislative
power equally with the Council. In the meantime the co–decision procedure applies to most EU
law–making. This procedure gives the European Parliament the opportunity to negotiate directly
with the Council in a conciliation committee, composed of equal numbers of Council and Parliament
representatives, and in which the Commission also takes part. This only happens in the event of
lack of agreement on a proposal. Once this committee has reached an agreement (time limit 6
weeks), the text is sent once again to Parliament and the Council so that they can finally adopt it
as law. The Council and the European Parliament have six weeks to adopt the legislative act. The
Council generally takes a decision by qualified majority, while the European Parliament has to
approve the legislative act by a majority of the votes cast. However, if the Council and the
European Parliament do not both approve the legislative act within the time limit of six weeks, the
proposal is automatically rejected. Conciliation is becoming increasingly rare. Most laws passed in
co-decision are, in fact, adopted either at the first or second reading.
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3.7 CHAPTER 6 - Financing CSDP
Brief overview of the funding mechanisms for CSDP civilian missions and
military operations.
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Unless the Council unanimously decides otherwise, civilian crisis–management operations are
funded from the CFSP budget, which is established following the budgetary procedure laid down
for the Union budget. The Union´s CFSP budget was grew from approx. 35 million Euros prior to
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2004 to approx 280 million in 2010. Operations with military implications or Defense operations
cannot be financed from the Union budget. For the common costs of such operations, the Council
of the EU established a special mechanism (ATHENA) in March 2004 (see below).
The Treaty of Lisbon introduced a provision stating that: ―The Council shall adopt a decision
establishing the specific procedures for guaranteeing rapid access to appropriations in the Union
budget for urgent financing of initiatives in the framework of the common foreign and security
policy, and in particular for preparatory activities for the tasks referred to Article 42 (1) and Article
43. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament.‖ (Article 41 (3), first subparagraph TEU).
3.7.1.1 FUNDING MILITARY OPERATIONS
ATHENA was set up by the Council on 1 March 2004. This mechanism administers the financing of
common costs of EU operations and charged to the Member States in accordance with their GNP. A
review is foreseen after every operation and at least every 18 months respectively. ATHENA is
managed by a Special Committee (SC) composed of representatives of EU States (contributors).
The European Commission attends the SC meetings.
he Operations Commander is the authorizing officer for the operation he commands. Where there
is no Operations Commander, ATHENA´s administrator is the authority officer. Member States
have the choice either to pay contributions in anticipation of a possible rapid reaction operation or
to pay within five days.
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For details on the Athena mechanism please explore the dedicated EU Council website
pages. (Click on the left icon)
3.7.1.2 START–UP FUND
Article 41 (3) TEU, an innovation inserted by the Treaty of Lisbon, provides that: “Preparatory
activities for the tasks referred to in Article 42 (1) and Article 43 TEU which are not charged to the
Union budget shall be financed by a start–up fund made up of member States contributions.
The Council shall adopt by a qualified majority, on a proposal from the High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, decisions establishing:



The procedures for setting up and financing the start–up fund, in particular the amounts
allocated to the fund;
The procedures for administering the start–up fund;
The financial control procedures.
When the task planned in accordance with Article 42(1) and Article 43 cannot be charged to the
Union budget, the Council shall authorize the High Representative to use the fund. The High
Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this remit.”
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4
AKU 5 – EU CRISIS-MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT
DISCLAIMER
The views expressed in this AKU DO NOT represent the official position of EU
Institutions.
4.1.1.1 General description
The theme of AKU5 is the study of the European Union´s Crisis–Management Capability
Development (CMCD). It consists of an introductory part, of 6 chapters focusing on relevant
aspects of the CMCD and a concluding part.
4.1.1.2 Reading Directions
Before starting Chapter 5 “Civilian Capability Development”, you are strongly recommended to
read:

Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference, Civilian Headline Goal 2010 – Conclusion
document, Brussels 2007.
– Click on the icon
Before starting Chapter 6 “Perspectives for EU Crisis Management Capabilities”, you
are strongly recommended to read:

EU Council, Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities – Brussels, December 2008.
Click on the icon
–
4.1.1.3 Learning content
AKU5 will touch upon the following aspects of the CMCD:
Chapter 1 Context and history – policy rationale and the landmarks of the EU crisis–
management capability development in the context of increasing CSDP missions and
operations.
Chapter 2 Mechanism and actors – basic notions and the overall capability development
mechanism, with the major institutional actors´ role within it.
Chapter 3 Military capability development – military capability development process
and basic documents, and discussion of results and associated co–operation with NATO.
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Chapter 4 European Defense Agency – role and place of EDA in the military capability
development process, and presentation of its major action lines and results.
Chapter 5 Civilian Capability Development – civilian capability development process
and basic documents, and discussion of results and associated wider co–operation.
Chapter 6 Perspectives for EU crisis management capabilities – impact on capability
development of the possible future mechanisms for permanent structured co–operation in
the Defense field and the trend toward harmonization of EU civil–military capability
development.
4.1.1.4 Bibliography & Other Sources
The following sources were consulted during the preparation of AKU5. Should you wish to deepen
your understanding of aspects of EU crisis management capability, please feel free to explore them
after completing this AKU.






EU Council document, Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP,
EU Council Press Office, Development of European Military Capabilities, Factsheet,
Brussels, July 2009,
EU Council Press Office, European Security and Defense Policy: the civilian aspects of crisis
management, Factsheet July 2009,
Civilian Crisis Management Capabilities – Reference documents of the EU Council
Military Crisis Management Capabilities –
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1349&lang=EN
Conclusions du Conseil sur la Politique europeenne de securité et de défense (PESD),
Novembre 2008, a:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/fr/gena/103924.pdf
For a broader documentation on CSDP related subjects, whenever necessary, you are invited to
visit theCSDP Knowledge-base at http://csdp.mil-edu.be
4.2 CHAPTER 1 – Historical Context of Capability Development
Introducing the policy rationale and the landmarks of the EU crisis–
management capability development in the context of increasing CSDP
missions and operations.
4.2.1.1 Introduction
“... A more capable Europe is within our grasp, though it will take time to realize our full potential.
Actions underway (...) take us in the right direction. To transform our militaries into more flexible,
mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for Defense and
more effective use of resources are necessary. Systematic use of pooled and shared assets would
reduce
duplications,
overheads
and,
in
the
medium
term,
increase
capabilities.
In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos. We
need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post–crisis
situations. Stronger diplomatic capability: we need a system that combines the resources of
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Member States with those of EU institutions. (...) The EU–NATO permanent arrangements, in
particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for
the strategic partnership between the two organizations in crisis management. This reflects our
common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century... .”
European Security Strategy – December 2003
The above quotation encapsulates the policy rationale, the conceptual basis, and the action
framework shaping the development of the EU´s crisis management capabilities.
December 2003 Credit “The Council of the European Union”
Developing EU capabilities for global crisis management is an evolving process, which started
early, from the beginning of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). This context was
shaped by landmark events and by the EU´s operational engagements.
4.2.1.2 Landmarks and Engagements
1999 – Amsterdam Treaty
In accordance with the Amsterdam Treaty, the so–called Petersberg Tasks cover humanitarian and
rescue tasks, peace–keeping tasks, and combat forces´ tasks in crisis management, including
peace–making. The crisis management tasks have subsequently been specified also to include
joint action in the field of disarmament, counseling and support in military matters, conflict
prevention and post–conflict stabilization.
1999 – Helsinki European Council
The Council concluded the European Union should have the autonomous capacity to take decisions
and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and then to conduct EU–led military
operations in response to international crises in support of the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP). The action by the Union will be conducted in accordance with the principles of the
UN Charter and the principles and objectives of the OSCE Charter for European Security.
1999 – Helsinki Headline Goal
The Member States agreed to put at the Union´s disposal by 2003, on a voluntary basis, forces
capable of carrying out the tasks set out in Article 17(2) of the Treaty on European Union in
operations up to army corps level (50 000 to 60 000 troops) with the necessary command, control
and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as
appropriate, air and naval elements. The forces should be able to deploy in full at this level within
60 days, with their deployment sustainable for at least a year.
88
2000 – Feira European Council
The Member States identified 4 priority action areas for civilian aspects of crisis management: (1)
Police, (2) Rule of Law, (3) Civil Administration, and (4) Civil Protection.
2003 – European Security Strategy
The European Security Strategy, which was approved in December 2003 and implementation
assessed in December 2008, provides a framework for the Union´s security policy action. The
EU´s common interests, strategic goals and capability requirements are determined based on the
security environment and threat assessments.
2003 – Start of the first EU CSDP
mission – EU Police Mission in Bosnia–
Herzegovina (EUPM)
Arrival at the EUPM HQ (from left to right):
Commissioner Sven FREDERIKSEN,
SG/HR Javier SOLANA, OHR/EUSR ASHDOWN
January 2003 Credit “The Council of the European
Union”
Mar–Dec 2003 – EU Military
Operation in former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia
(Concordia)
Jun–Sep 2003 – EU Military
Operation in Democratic Republic
of Congo (Artemis)
Dec 2003 – Start of EU Police
Mission in former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (Proxima)
2004 – Military Headline Goal 2010
In order to bring the EU´s capability development in line with the ambitions set out in the
European Security Strategy, the European Council endorsed, in June 2004, a Military Headline Goal
with a 2010 horizon and an Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP.
Dec 2004 – Start of the EU Military Operation in Bosnia–Herzegovina (EUFOR
Althea)
2004 – Establishment of EDA
The European Defense Agency was established under a Joint Action of the Council of Ministers on
12 July 2004, ―to support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European
Defense capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the Common Security and
89
Defense Policy as it stands now and develops in the future‖.
2004 – Civilian Headline Goal 2008
EUPOL COPPS Daily activity
February 2006 Credit ―The Council of the
European Union‖
The Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP of June
2004 defined ―measures to be carried out in order to
develop and operationalise civilian capabilities,
including work on a consolidated Civilian Headline
Goal.‖ This work began in the second half of 2004 and
led to the endorsement by the European Council, in
December 2004, of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008.
Thus, the European Council put both military and
civilian capability development on separate parallel
tracks.
Jul 2004–Jul 2005 – EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia (EUJUST Themis)
Apr 2005 – Start of EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC) (EUPOL Kinshasa)
Jun 2005 – Start of EU Security Sector Reform mission in DR Congo (EUSEC RD
Congo)
Jul 2005 – Start of EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX)
Jul 2005 – Start of EU Support to AMIS (Darfur)
Sep 2005 – Dec 2006 – Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)
Nov 2005 – Start of EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the
Palestinian Territories (EU BAM Rafah)
Dec 2005 – End of EU Police Mission in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(Proxima)
Dec 2005–Jun 2006 – Start of EU Police Advisory Team in former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (EUPAT)
Jan 2006 – Start of EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL
COPPS)
Apr 2006–Nov 2006 – EU Military Operation in RD Congo (EUFOR RD Congo)
2007 – Civilian Headline Goal 2010
At the ministerial Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference of 2007, EU Ministers have decided
to adopt a new headline goal for civilian crisis management capabilities, the Civilian Headline Goal
2010.
90
Jun 2007 – Start of EU Police Mission
in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan)
Jun 2007 – End of EU Police Mission in
Kinshasa (DRC) (EUPOL Kinshasa)
Jun 2007 – Start of EU Police Mission
in RD Congo (EUPOL RD Congo)
Dec 2007 – End of EU Support to AMIS
(Darfur)
Feb 2008 – Start of EU Rule of Law
Mission in Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO)
Feb 2008–Mar 2009 – Military
Operation in Chad & RCA (EUFOR
Tchad/RCA)
(Credit German Navy) – EU NAVFOR Atalanta
prevents hijacking, 4 March 2009
Credit “The Council of the European Union”
Jun 2008 – Start of EU Mission support of Security Sector reform in Guinea–
Bissau (EU SSR Guinea–Bissau)
Oct 2008 – Start of EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM)
Start of EU Military Operation against piracy off the Somali coast (EU NAVFOR
Somalia)
Nowadays, the EU is operating a full set of concepts, structures, and procedures toward meeting
the crisis management capability objectives set in the two Headline Goals for 2010. The following
chapters will look into the details of this current picture.
4.3 CHAPTER 2 – Mechanism and Actors
Presents the basic notions and the overall capability–development
mechanism, together with the major institutional actors´ role within it.
4.3.1.1 Capability
Fig. 5.2.1 What makes a capability?
To achieve its goals, particularly to meet its requirements for crisis management operations, the
EU
needs
Member
States
contributions
in
military
and
civilian
capabilities.
EU crisis management capabilities are understood as the overall set of means (including
91
manpower, equipment, concepts, organization and procedures), at a quantitative and qualitative
level, required to enable the successful conduct of a CSDP mission or operation (Fig 5.2.1).
4.3.1.2 EU Capability Development
The EU´s Capability–Development Mechanism (CDM) was adopted in 2003, taking into account the
‗Berlin Plus‘ agreement. Its aim is to enable the European Union to encourage the achievement of
the Member States´ capability commitments and to evaluate them, as well as, if necessary, to
revise the actual capability goals. The CDM operates in four areas:






Definition of military capabilities required to deliver meet EU objectives, and of the MS
potential contributions to meet these requirements;
Identification of potential shortfalls and evaluation of progress made to solve them;
Remedying shortfalls (essentially MS responsibility, but which can be facilitated – e.g. EDA
on military capability shortfalls);
Ensuring coherence, transparency and mutually reinforcing development of capability
requirements common to the EU and NATO.
The mechanism is based on two core principles:
The autonomy of EU decision making;
The voluntary nature of Member States´ contributions.
In order to avoid duplication, civil–military synergies are sought wherever possible between the
civilian and military capability development processes, while fully respecting their specificities.
Work focuses in particular on concrete areas including dual use capabilities (transportation,
logistics, medical support, space, communications…) and horizontal civil–military domains such as
training and intelligence.
4.3.1.3 Availability of capabilities for EU crisis management
The implementation of the EU´s civilian and military Headline Goals is voluntary in two respects:


First, to the extent that the declared contributions to the respective catalogues comprise
only that proportion of national armed forces or civilian personnel/units which individual
Member States are prepared to commit freely in response to the identified requirements;
this does not constitute a binding commitment in the event of potential crisis situations.
Second, to the extent that making assets available in a concrete crisis situation
requires a further “case–by–case” decision at national level. Member States are free to
decide upon their actual commitments to real operations and missions.
92
4.3.1.4 Actors in the EU´s capability–development process
Following the core principles of crisis–management capability development, the key actors within
this process are Member States. At EU level, in various supervising and supporting roles, the major
actors involved are shown below (Fig 5.2.2):
The Political and Security Committee (PSC), under the auspices of the Council, assumes
responsibility for the political direction of the development of military capabilities, taking into
account the type of crisis to which the EU wishes to respond. It should be noted in this regard that
the PSC also exercises, under the Council´s authority, political control and strategic direction of
crisis management operations. As far as the development of military capabilities is concerned, the
PSC receives the opinion of the EU Military Committee assisted by the EU Military Staff. You can
read the Council Decision establishing the PSC here.
The EU Military Committee (EUMC) is the source of military advice based on consensus. It is
the forum for military consultation and cooperation between the EU Member States in the field of
conflict
prevention
and
crisis
management.
It
provides
military
advice
and
makes
recommendations to the PSC, at the latter´s request or on its own initiative, acting within
guidelines forwarded by the PSC, in particular on the elaboration, assessment and review of
capability objectives, according to agreed procedures. You can read the Council Decision
establishing
the
EUMC
here
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/l_02720010130en00040006.pdf).
The Political Military Group (PMG) is the preparatory working party of the PSC, assisting it with
political and military issues and ensuring the co–ordination and coherence of CSDP military
aspects. Within its preparatory and co–ordination role, the PMG helps ensure improvements to the
EU´s military–capability development processes.
The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) is the working party of
the Council, established to ensure co–ordination, coherence, pooling of resources, and to
disseminate lessons learned and best practices in non–military EU crisis management missions.
Within its role, the CIVCOM helps ensure improvements in the crisis–response capabilities of the
European Union that are available both for EU missions and those led by other international
93
organizations. The preparatory document on the establishment of a civilian crisis–management
committee
is
available
here.
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/
Preparatory%20document%20CESDP%20-%20Committee.pdf)
The Council General Secretariat (CGS). As a permanent and independent European public
service, the Council General Secretariat (CGS) assists the Council, under the responsibility of a
Secretary–General appointed by the Council.
Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) – This directorate was created on 16
November 2009 headed by a Deputy Director General. CMPD is responsible for the politico–
strategic level planning of CSDP civilian and military missions, and also for supporting the various
aspects of CSDP development. It represents an integrated capability, seeking to develop and
exploit the synergies between the civilian and military elements of CSDP as part of the
comprehensive approach to crisis management. This includes military and civilian capability
development
functions,
planning
functions,
partnerships
with
other
crisis
management
international actors, and other horizontal issues, dealt with in integrated civ–mil teams. CMPD also
provides support to Council bodies on CSDP related issues.
EU Military Staff (EUMS) – the EU Military Staff (EUMS) is to perform early warning, situation
assessment and strategic planning for missions and tasks referred to in Article 17(2) of the TEU,
including those identified in the European Security Strategy. In particular, the EUMS contributes to
the process of elaboration, assessment and review of the capability goals, taking into account the
need, for those Member States concerned, to ensure consistency with NATO´s Defense Planning
Process (DPP) and the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP) in accordance
with agreed procedures. It works in close coordination with the European Defense Agency. You can
read
the
Council
Decision
establishing
the
EUMS
here.
(http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_132/l_13220050526en00170024.pdf)
After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, at this stage work is in hand toward the
establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) as a permanent
autonomous European public service under the authority of the new High Representative
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice–President of the European Commission.
The EEAS is to include (amongst other Commission and CGS bodies) the present EUMS
and CMPD.
94
Follow the news on EEAS here.
The European Defense Agency (EDA http://www.eda.europa.eu) is an EU Agency under
Pillar 2. It operates under the authority and the political supervision of the Council, to which it
provides regular reports and from which it receives regular guidelines. It is open to participation by
all Member States, and currently works with 26 of them owing to Denmark´s opting–out on CSDP.
The Head of the EDA is the Secretary–General High Representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy. There is more on the EDA in Chapter 4. You can read the Council Joint Action
establishing
the
EDA
here.
(http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l_245/l_24520040717en00170028.pdf)
Fig. 5.2.2 EU Crisis–Management capability development major actors.
4.3.1.5 The specific case of Military Rapid Response and the Battle groups
Military Rapid Response is in itself an important ability to address acute crises, and an
important instrument in the EU´s crisis management tool–box. Military Rapid Response is the
acceleration of the overall approach which encompasses all interrelated measures and actions in
the field of intelligence collection, decision–making, planning, force generation and deployment,
together with the availability of assets and capabilities, and potential Command and Control (C2)
options, in order to enable a swift and decisive military response to a crisis. The overall time, from
the Council decision to launch an operation, until operations commence in the Joint Operations
95
Area (JOA), should not exceed 30 days. Military Rapid Response represents an ambition and
not a capability as such. The EU military Rapid Response concept was updated in January 2009
in order to consider military response in all three environments; maritime, land and air in general
terms, and also how a Joint Military Rapid Response could be delivered. Work on examining the
contribution that naval and air forces can make to CSDP rapid response operations has resulted in
the adoption by the EUMC in late 2007 of a Maritime Rapid Response Concept and an Air Rapid
Response Concept.
Battlegroups represent the EU´s capability to deploy forces very rapidly, which is a key aspect of
the Headline Goal 2010. They provide one possible answer to situations requiring a military rapid
response and are a specific case to be considered in the planning phase and force–generation
process for an operation and are not part of the capability–development process.
Already by 1 January 2007, the EU had acquired full operational capability to conduct two rapid
response operations of the size of a Battle group (BG) of 1 500 men, which can be launched
almost simultaneously.
Since then, Member States have been taking turns to make permanently available to the EU two
BGs which remain on standby for six months and can be deployed in the framework of a rapid
response operation for a maximum of four months. A Battle group Coordination Conference is
organized every six months to receive new offers from Member States and update the standby
roster. It is for the Member States concerned to resolve any difficulties concerning compatibility
with their commitments to other organizations, in particular in the NATO Response Force (NRF).
You
can
read
more
on
BG
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/91624.pdf)
96
here
4.4 CHAPTER 3 – Military Capability Development
Explains the military capability development process and its basic
documents, and discusses results and associated co–operation with NATO.
4.4.1.1 Introduction
In June 2004, EU Member States (MS) set themselves a new military Headline Goal 2010 (HLG
2010) built upon the Helsinki Headline Goal with a view to capturing the new security paradigm
which was reflected in the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted in December 2003.
According to the new Headline Goal, the EU should be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and
decisive action to the whole spectrum of Crisis Management Operations (CMO).
4.4.1.2 The Process
The current military capability development process was distilled within the implementation of HLG
2010. Based on the policy vision of the European Security Strategy, under the political direction of
the Council, in brief it encompasses (fig. 5. 3.1):


The formulation of military capability requirements, leading to the Requirements
Catalogue.
The voluntary force contribution offers, leading to the Force Catalogue.
97

The evaluation of contributions against current requirements, with identification of
shortfalls in the Progress Catalogue, as well actionable conclusions for CMO and for future
capability development, formulated in the Capability Development Plan.
The current process is seen as rather linear and open, adjustable to the real–life changing
environment at all stages, therefore no mechanical repetition (cycling) can be foreseen. In the
following, the process triggered by the adoption of the HLG 2010 will be described in more detail.
4.4.1.3 Military Capability Requirements
The process of developing EU military capabilities within the framework of the HLG 2010 started
with the elaboration of five Illustrative Scenarios, including planning assumptions, in order
to cover the possible spectrum of military operations (including concurrency options):





Separation of Parties by Force (SOPF)
Stabilization, Reconstruction and Military Advice to Third Countries (SR)
Conflict Prevention (CP)
Evacuation Operation (EO)
Assistance to Humanitarian Operations (HO)
From these, a Detailed List of Required Capabilities (DLRC) that the EU should have at its
disposal was produced. Generic Force Packages identifying the type of force groupings the EU
would require to solve the crises, and a list of Reference Units (RU) were added to form
the Requirements Catalogue 2005 (RC 05) listing in detail the actual types of units, resources
and assets required (fig 5.3.2).
Fig. 5.3.2
The HGQ is the Information Gathering (IG) Tool used in the HLG 2010 process in support of
the EU Military Capability Development Process. The HGQ is based on the NATO NDPASS 2004 to
98
maintain a certain level of compatibility between the EU process and NATO DPP. This was
developed in 2005 through technical cooperation between EU and NATO staffs.
4.4.1.4 EU Capability Development
MS were then asked to what extent they could offer
assets and resources to meet these requirements.
This
was
done
through
the Headline
Questionnaire
The
scrutinizing
opportunity
to
Goal
(HGQ).
methodology
conduct
the
offered
MSes
necessary
the
Self–
Assessment of their contributions. In order to have a
better
view
of
Clarification
the
capabilities
Dialogue
contributed
was
a
held.
These steps (Fig. 5.3.3) led to the development of
Fig. 5.3.3
the Force Catalogue 2007 (FC 07), which describes
the capabilities made available by MSes in qualitative
and quantitative terms. It provides a view of the
military capabilities available by 2010.
4.4.1.5 Shortfall implications and further action
The FC 07 is the basis for EU shortfall identification. Briefly, the Progress Catalogue identifies
shortfalls by comparing requirements with contributions (see fig. 5.3.4)
Fig. 5.3.4
99
The operational risk reflects the impact of
the capability shortfalls identified (risk
level) against the characteristics of small
scale/rapid response, medium scale/long
endurance, large scale/limited duration
operations and concurrencies. This was
achieved by reflecting the key parameters,
which were expressed and encapsulated in
the Illustrative Scenarios and the
associated Strategic Planning Assumptions
(SPA). These parameters constitute the
first dimension for the weighting of the
capability shortfalls for an analytical
approach to prioritization.
In addition, the level of operational risk per
capability shortfall had to be considered in
conjunction with the likelihood of using a
capability in each scenario and
concurrencies in order to provide an initial
orientation for the capability shortfalls. This
further step allowed the identified
capability shortfalls to be arranged into
three groups. The most critical ones apply
to the areas of survivability, deployability
and information superiority.
It
provides
Assessment
a
structured
of
Capability
shortfalls and an Evaluation of
their potential implications for all
military
crisis
This
tasks
associated
management
informs
MSes´
operations.
short–to–
medium–term capability planning
decisions
and
represents
the
fundamental added value of the
Progress Catalogue. The risks from
qualitative
shortfalls
will
be
present across the spectrum of
operations whereas the risk from
quantitative
shortfalls
increases
with the increase in scale or with
concurrency.
In summary, the current military capability development process can be summarized as in fig
5.3.5
100
with
4.4.1.6 Capability Development Plan
In parallel to the development of the Progress Catalogue, the EDA participating Members States
(pMS) decided in December 2006 to prepare a Capability Development Plan (CDP), through
EDA and in close cooperation with the EUMC. The CDP is a shorter–to–longer term, comprehensive
and dynamic tool to assist their decision–making processes in Defense investment and the
development of future military capabilities (see fig. 5.3.6). The Progress Catalogue represents a
cornerstone for the CDP, providing the baseline of capability shortfalls and associated risks derived
from the HLG2010.
In June 2008 the CDP suggested to MSes some ―actionable conclusions‖ to address the shortfalls.
The CDP provides the framework for assisting MSes to reach decisions on capability development
from a shared global picture. The period since mid–2008 has already provided some indication of
how far MSes are willing to commit themselves in a shared capability development at EU level.
4.4.1.7 Process Continuity
To
the
Based on the results of the PC 07, the EUMC
capabilities – grouped according to their core
decided to establish a First Prioritization,
shortfalls – were condensed into capability areas
which
as
2010
priorities for capability development in the
Superiority,
short–to–medium–term within the context of
they
establish
are
(Survivability,
a
first
expressed
prioritization,
in
Information
the
HLG
101
reflects
collectively
established
Sustainability,
Protection,
Command,
and
the HLG 2010 and associates them with
Engagement Effectiveness). This grouping was
higher or lower importance within the Critical
utilized in order to be answerable to the
(capability shortfalls, which have the highest
ambition established in the HLG 2010 and also
impact on the most scenarios and result in a
to compile additional information in a structured
High or Very High operational risk – see fig
way. For further elaboration in the framework of
5.3.7).
the CDP these groups can be translated into
which carry a moderate impact on most
established
scenarios or carry a Very High operational risk
IDTs.
Intermediate
(capability
shortfalls
The capability groups were confronted via their
only in a concurrency situation) and Minor
core shortfall with the Additional Information in
(remaining capability shortfalls, which impact
order to validate the weighting of capability
on
shortfalls as established in the Initial Orientation
scenarios/concurrencies and/or only carry a
and
limited impact) groups.
draw
observations
for
the
continuing
a
limited
number
of
process.
Fig. 5.3.7
In addition, a EUMC Study on Interoperability was conducted. The purpose of the study was to
assess the interoperability issue in the framework of HLG 2010 from an EU military perspective,
with a view to contributing to capability development. The study identified 78 EU Interoperability
Requirements. The results have a clear focus on conceptual issues. EU future efforts within the
102
area of Comprehensive Approach are assessed to give most added values. In addition, efforts in
the areas of establishing a Common Operational Picture and conceptual development regarding
Joint Fire Support, Joint Targeting and Joint Embargo Operations are assessed as bringing value.
4.4.1.8 Military Capability Development Areas
The aim of the CDP, worked out in close cooperation between the EDA, the EUMC and the Member
States, is to provide the latter with evolving information which could facilitate their decision–
making in the context of national capability choices, stimulate their cooperation and facilitate
the launching of new joint programmes which overcome present and future EU shortfalls. It
aims at providing guidelines for future work in the fields of research and technology, armaments
and industry and will form the cornerstone of the EDA´s activities. However, it will not under any
circumstances be a supranational plan: it is created by and for the Member
States.
When the initial CDP was worked out, the following were taken into consideration:




The consequences of Headline Goal 2010, based in particular on the conclusions of the
2007 Progress Catalogue and other information useful for decision–making concerning the
management of shortfalls, such as the capability analyzed in the framework of Civilian Headline
Goal 2008, proceedings conducted in the context of other pillars of the European Union or
additional capability or assets that could be made available to the EU in an operation calling
upon common NATO capabilities and assets;
An estimate of the capability required in 2025, on the basis of research into foreseeable
developments of global strategic contact, available technology and potential threats;
Current plans and programmes announced by the Member States;
Lessons learned from operations with regard to capabilities.
This plan is moreover one of the components of a longer–term objective: ensuring convergence
of Member States´ capability scenarios.
From the initial CDP conclusions, Member States selected a first tranche of 12 selected actions to
be addressed first (see also Ch.4, EDA):










Measures to counter man-portable air Defense systems
Computer network operations
Mine counter–measures in littoral sea areas
Comprehensive approach – military implications
Military human intelligence and cultural/language training
Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance architecture
Medical support
Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear Defense
Third–party logistical support
Measures to counter improvised explosive devices
103


Increased availability of helicopters
Network–enabled capability (NEC)
Other actions resulting from the CDP could be initiated at a later stage. In addition, emphasis was
laid on the need to ensure the best possible coordination with similar work carried out by NATO.
An Update of the Force Catalogue was finalized in April 2009, establishing the FC 09. The main
conclusions in the new prioritization 2009 is that the conclusions from the PC 07 remains valid and
the EU can conduct the full spectrum of military ESDP operations within the parameters of the
Strategic Planning Assumptions, with different levels of risks caused by recognized shortfalls. The
most critical shortfalls still apply in the areas of survivability, deployability, and information
superiority.
The EUMC Prioritization of Capability Shortfalls 2009 represents the current EUMC guidance for
addressing capability shortfalls identified within the context of the HLG 2010. Together with the
Lessons Learned from Operations and the Interoperability Study, this will form the EUMC input to
the update of the EDAs Capability Development Plan 2010.
4.4.1.9 Lessons Learned from the HLG 2010 process
104
The majority of the lessons identified recommendations are taken into account in the Headline
Task Force Work programme for the first semester of 2009 (e.g. Interoperability Study,
Measurement of Progress, IG Tool) and have been reported in the Single Progress Report I/2009.
The first Lessons Learned (LL) report provides the toolbox, taking into consideration the ongoing
development in both EU and NATO, and the requirement to establish a ―common language‖ for
capability development within the EU as well as to produce a common IG Tool, available to both
organizations used for the different planning processes in EU and NATO. The added value of this
toolbox is in the structured linkage between the tasks established in the GETL, the required
capabilities and their associated Reference Units with the respective description (capability
statements and structure). This linkage is compatible with the tools used in NATO, allowing the
harmonized use of language between both organizations, giving MS a composite picture of their
individual contributions.
The final report on Lessons Learnt from the HLG 2010 process (to include the results stemming
from the assessment and evaluation phases) will be reported by mid 2010 after the finalization of
the current ongoing measurement of progress and reviewing of priorities.
Addressing Critical Shortfalls – an example
Strategic Transport
The Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP of June 2004
defined ―measures to be carried out in order to develop and
operationalise civilian capabilities, including work on a
consolidated Civilian Headline Goal.‖ This work began in the
second half of 2004 and led to the endorsement by the
European Council, in December 2004, of the Civilian Headline
Goal 2008. Thus, the European Council put both military and
civilian capability development on separate parallel tracks.
The Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP of June 2004
defined ―measures to be carried out in order to develop and
operationalise civilian capabilities, including work on a
consolidated Civilian Headline Goal.‖ This work began in the
second half of 2004 and led to the endorsement by the
European Council, in December 2004, of the Civilian Headline
Goal 2008. Thus, the European Council put both military and
civilian capability development on separate parallel tracks.
Meeting between Jaap de Hoop
105
Scheffer, NATO Secretary–General,
and Javier Solana, Secretary–
General of the Council of the
European Union and High
Representative for the CFSP
Credit “The Council of the European
Union”
4.4.1.10
EU–NATO military capability development co–operation
The Nice European Council has set three specific aims for EU Capability development:
– To enable the EU to monitor and facilitate progress towards the honoring of undertakings to
achieve
the
overall
goal,
in
both
quantitative
and
qualitative
terms;
– To enable the EU to evaluate and, if necessary, to review its defined capability goals in order to
meet the requirements of the full range of Petersberg tasks in the light of changing
circumstances;
– To help achieve consistency between the pledges undertaken in the EU framework and, for the
countries concerned, the force goals agreed to in the context of NATO planning or the Partnership
for Peace (PARP).
To achieve these aims, an EU Capability Development mechanism has been set up. It defines the
EU military capability development process. It also contributes to ensuring consistency between
the
pledges
undertaken
in
the
EU
framework
and,
for
the
countries
concerned,
the
Force/Partnership goals agreed to in the context of NATO planning or the PARP, as well as to
ensuring mutual reinforcement of the EU´s headline and collective capability goals and those of
NATO where they overlap. The setting of political goals and guidance affecting capability
development will fully respect the political autonomy of EU and NATO decision–making.
106
An EU–NATO Capability Group was established in order to ensure the transparent and coherent
development of capabilities and provide a forum for addressing where relevant, from the strategic
point of view, the overall coherence and complementarily of proposed specific goals, commitments
and priorities. It is up to the EU, NATO and Member Nations of both organizations to draw
conclusions from the Group´s discussions, as appropriate, in the further development of respective
goals and capabilities.
You can read HERE the background note to „Berlin Plus Arrangements‟
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-1111%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf)
You can read HERE a synthesis on „NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and
Operations‟
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78414%20%20EUNATO%20Consultation,%20Planning%20and%20Operations.pdf)
4.5 CHAPTER 4 - European Defense Agency
This Chapter will present the role and place of the European Defense
Agency (EDA) in the EU military capability development process, outlining
its mission and functions, as well as the major action lines and results.
4.5.1.1 Enhancing European Defense Capabilities: The EDA Approach
107
4.5.1.2 Why a European Defense Agency?
Improving Military Capabilities = EDA´s „Raison d´ Être‟
Fragmentation in Europe:
– National military requirements –> diverging demand
– National R&T + procurement –> different equipment
– National Defense industry –> ‗national‘ production
Effects:
– Operations: lack of standardization and interoperability
– Defense budgets: waste of money
– Industry: lack of adaptation to a competitive market
Some key data:
– 23 different types Armored Fighting Vehicles
– 16 national naval shipyards (US: 3)
– 53% spent on personnel (US: 20%); approx. 21% spent on investment (US: 36%)
– approx. 85% of Defense R&T and 80% of equipment procurement = national
– 80 000 military deployed (US: 200 000)
4.5.1.3 EDA in the CSDP Institutional Landscape
108
4.5.1.4 Mission and functions
4.5.1.5 EDA´s ‘Strategic Framework’
Capability Development Plan
– ‗Overall strategic tool‘, driving R&T, Armaments and Industry
– Connecting short–, medium– and longer–term capability needs
– Not a ‗Force Plan‘, but telling in what future ‗Capabilities‘ to invest
– 12 prioritized actions (incl. helicopters, C–IED, MMCM)
European Defense R&T Strategy
– In ‗what‘ technologies to invest & ‗how‘ to do this better
Armaments Co–operation Strategy
– How to develop effective and efficient armaments co–operation programmes
European Defense Technological and Industrial Base Strategy
– Future European industrial ‗landscape‘
4.5.1.6 Results – Projects
Helicopters: training, Future Transport Helicopter
Air Transport: European Air Transport Fleet
Unmanned Air Vehicles/UAV: insertion into normal airspace; MIDCAS project
(Sense & Avoid technologies)
EU Network Enabled Capability/NEC: civil–military connectivity
Multinational Space–based Imaging System/MUSIS: next generation European
military earth observation satellites
Maritime Surveillance: networking; civil–military (Wise Pens)
Airworthiness: common EMARs (saving billions)
Biological Defense: detection & monitoring (Bio EDEP program)
Third Party Logistics Support (TPLS) Platform
EU Satellite Communications Procurement Cell
Intelligence Pilot Courses (OSINT and others)
109
4.5.1.7 Results – Invest More Together in Defense R&T
New Formula: „Joint Investment Programme‟ (JIP)
– Fund instead of project –> more money, higher speed contracting
– Competition instead of ‗juste retour‘ –> more open market
– Consortia instead of national –> European R&T networking
Two JIPs „Up & Running‟
– JIP–Force Protection: 20 countries, € 55m (+ additional money industry)
– JIP–Innovative Concepts and Emerging Technologies: 11 countries, € 16m
European Framework Cooperation for Security and Defense Research
– Systematic synchronization of civilian security, space and Defense research
4.5.1.8 Results – Market
Code of Conduct Defense Procurement
– Covering Art. 296 EC Treaty (exempting common market rules), now Art. 346
– Run through Electronic Bulletin Board
– Defense governmental Defense contracts with value > € 1m
– ‗Active‘ since 1 July 2006: 470 contracts published
– Approx. 260 contracts awarded under competition; value nearly € 4 bn; of which 29%
awarded cross–border
Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain
– Covers industry–to–industry (sub) contracts
– ‗Active‘ since 1 April 2007
Code of Conduct on Offsets
– Transparency, not an end to offsets
– 100% ceiling (as of 1 Oct. 2010)
– ‗Active‘ since 1 July 2009
4.6 CHAPTER 5 - Civilian Capability Development
Explains the civilian capability–development process with its basic
documents, and discusses results and associated wider co–operation.
Before
the
start
of
Chapter
5 “Civilian
Capability
Development”,
you
are
strongly
recommended to read

Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference, Civilian Headline Goal 2010 – Conclusion
document, Brussels 2007.
– Click on the icon
4.6.1.1 Introduction
In order to bring the EU´s capability development into line with the ambitions set out in the
European Security Strategy, the European Council endorsed, in June 2004, a Military Headline Goal
110
The Action Plan defined ‗measures to be carried out in order to develop and operationalise civilian
capabilities, including work on a consolidated Civilian Headline Goal.‘ This work began in the
second half of 2004 and led to the endorsement by the European Council, in December 2004, of
the Civilian Headline Goal 2008. Thus, the European Council put both military and civilian
capability development on separate parallel tracks, where the civilian process was to take place
over a shorter timeframe (2008) than the military process (2010).
4.6.1.2 Civilian Capability Development Process
The civilian capability–development process has so far gone through 2 stages, defined by the set
targets for EU civilian crisis–management capabilities: the Civilian Headline Goal 2008, followed by
the Civilian Headline Goal 2010. Together with the CHG 2010, a Civilian CSDP Capability Planning
Process
has
been
agreed
111
(see
diagram
above).
The CHG process is seen as adapting from one CHG to the next in response to realities and needs,
as perceived by Member States (MS). Within each CHG stage, the process involves a yearly update
on targets with a situation report, thus keeping the CHG process sharp, transparent and
responsive.
It is overseen by the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC), supported by the EU Committee
for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM).
In order to achieve the successive CHG targets, a number of analytical methodologies were
developed, challenges identified, and management tools implemented.
4.6.1.3 Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG 2008)
Capability planning under the CHG 2008 was based on virtual planning scenarios (‗illustrative
scenarios‘) representing a selection of possible situations calling for EU action under CSDP.
112
Subsequently, a detailed list of personnel required for possible civilian CSDP missions to be
launched in those situations was established, and EU Member States were invited to indicate
personnel that could potentially be made available. A comparison between the Member States´
indications and the capabilities required provided a comprehensive picture of the actual state of EU
preparedness for civilian CSDP missions.
Certain non–EU states (Canada, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland,
Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine) were also invited to indicate, under the CHG
2008, their possible contributions to civilian CSDP.
Some scenarios called for the deployment of ambitious large–scale civilian CSDP missions. This
large–scale approach was consistent with the CHG 2008 mandate, which stipulated that the EU
must be equipped ‗to conduct several civilian CSDP crisis–management missions concurrently,
calling on different capabilities, including at least one large civilian substitution mission at short
notice in a non–benign environment.‘ (EULEX KOSOVO type).
113
The establishment of a comprehensive list of required capabilities for possible civilian CSDP
missions was a central achievement of the CHG 2008. It provided, for the first time, a detailed
qualitative overview of civilian functions required to meet ambitions deriving from the European
Security Strategy. The list contained core elements of job descriptions for mission personnel. It
allowed the EU to convert the blunt instrument of ‗target numbers only‘ into a precision tool to
match anticipated civilian CSDP mission needs with professional profiles.
4.6.1.4 Civilian Headline Goal 2010 (CHG 2010)
After thoroughly evaluating the progress made with the CHG 2008 and the challenges ahead, at
the ministerial Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference of 2007, EU Ministers decided to
adopt the new Civilian Headline Goal 2010 for civilian crisis–management capabilities. On the basis
of this guidance, the CHG 2010 started in 2008 by reviewing illustrative scenarios, assessing new
required capabilities and surveying civilian capabilities. Under the CHG 2010, the following priority
objectives were set:







Strengthening the EU´s capability to plan and deploy several missions at the same time, in
particular in rapid–response situations;
Continuing to develop suitable management tools for efficiently mobilizing capabilities
needed for civilian missions;
Improving training for personnel likely to be deployed on missions, and continuing to
strengthen civilian response teams;
Developing the administrative, financial, logistical and human resources aspects of the
mission support function, including by seeking to optimize the synergy between civilian and
military assets;
Developing national strategies to facilitate the deployment of mission personnel and
encourage exchange of good practices between Member States;
Strengthening coherence and synergies between CSDP missions and other European Union
instruments;
Introducing a proper feedback system for CSDP civilian missions.
114
While keeping the proven planning methodology, the CHG 2010´s added value is mainly in terms
of new, more comprehensive scenarios, better exploring of cooperation and co–ordination inside
and outside the EU, but also in developing and implementing specific new concepts and civilian
capability management tools, as well as addressing more quality issues at all levels.
Moreover, the CHG 2010 sets the military and civilian–capability development processes on a
synchronized track, which inherently facilitates synergy.
4.6.1.5 Personnel Quality & Training
In civilian crisis management under CSDP, training as a vehicle for quality improvement is
especially important because the majority of the personnel originates from national civil services
and is seconded by Member States´ governments to EU missions on a temporary basis. The
background of these personnel tends to lie in national rather than international deployment, and
crisis areas may constitute a challengingly new working environment. Furthermore, CSDP is a
relatively new political reality that is going through a phase of important transition and growth.
The list of required capabilities emanating from the CHG process provides a detailed overview of all
personnel categories involved. This important source of information can be used as a basis for
systematically
matching
specific
earmarked
personnel
categories
with
available
training
opportunities. A comprehensive catalogue of training opportunities is available under the EU
Training Programme in CSDP, which is a rolling multi–annual (3–year) list of all planned training
activities in the field of CSDP provided by the EU and individual Member States. This is but one
example of how quality improvement can be systematically pursued at both EU and national level.
4.6.1.6 Concepts in Support of EU Civilian Crisis Management
Another strand of work under the CHG involved the development of new concepts and capabilities.
An initial concept was agreed for civilian mission support, i.e., the more ‗managerial‘ aspects of
civilian CSDP missions such as finance, human resources, procurement, logistics, medical
care/evacuation, communication and information systems, information technology and security.
The EU has designated this concept as ‗initial‘ because further conceptual development is deemed
necessary to simplify procedures, notably in view of more rapid deployability of civilian CSDP
missions.
115
A concept was also agreed for Civilian Response Teams (CRTs). The CRT capacity is essentially
a tool for quickly gathering information on political crisis for the benefit of EU political decision–
making, which may also be deployed to provide instant support for agreed EU political crisis–
management actions. The CRT pool comprises up to 100 named experts nominated by Member
States, potentially deployable at 5 days´ notice for a total duration of up to three months. Experts
in the CRT pool receive specific training financed by the European Commission.
Work has also been undertaken on rapidly deployable police elements, notably Integrated
Police Units (IPUs) and Formed Police Units (FPUs). This concerns, inter alia, the transition of
rapidly deployable police elements that are under temporary military responsibility to a civilian
chain of command, and the coordination between rapidly deployable police elements and rule–of–
law elements. Work on these issues is ongoing.
4.6.1.7 Civilian Capability Management Tool
The Civilian Capability Management Tool (CCMT) is a database to support future EU civilian
capability development and to considerably expedite civilian CSDP mission planning and
preparation.
116
Its concept and development is based on CHG 2008 findings, on real–life experiences from past
CSDP missions and on the ‗EU Training Programme in the Field of ESDP‘. Starting from the CHG
2008 List of Required Capabilities, the first elements of the CCMT are already operational.
In terms of mission personnel, it should facilitate the matching of specific personnel categories
(defined via the standard job–description catalogues) with available training opportunities.
In terms of mission equipment, the CCMT will provide an assessment mechanism of needs vs.
provision with which to expedite mission preparation, while drawing on lessons identified and
sharing good practices.
In terms of decision–making, the CCMT will provide a catalogue of agreed concepts and a decision
progress indicator, both of which are expected to expedite the EU decision making process in a
transparent manner.
4.6.1.8 Wider Co–operation and Co–ordination
The CHG process is taking into consideration capabilities across the EU institutions and explores
synergies
with
international
organizations
(IOs),
non–EU
States
and
non–governmental
organizations (NGOs).
Crisis situations cannot be labeled as ‗military‘ or ‗civilian‘ per se. In order to be prepared for the
widest possible range of situations, the EU capability planners should ensure compatibility and
complementarities between EU civilian and EU military capabilities and coordinate their
work where possible. In order to increase coherence, civilian and military capability development
could be based on a single set of common illustrative scenarios containing identical parameters.
117
This said, the respective processes, whilst in the future possibly based on the same scenarios,
would remain technically distinct in order to take account of the respective specific capabilities
needed for civilian and military crisis management. Work in this field is ongoing.
Coherent use of the European Commission´s and Member States´ civilian instruments is of key
importance to an overall improvement in the EU´s capacity to act. The European Commission has
been fully associated in the CHG process, in which its representatives actively participate. Training
of the CRTs was developed with the financial support of the European Commission. To this effect,
partners in the European Community Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
closely cooperate with the EU Council Secretariat. All assets and capabilities registered in the
database of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism were presumed to be available also for civil
protection interventions in the framework of CSDP, unless Member States explicitly excluded them.
The CHG 2008 process fostered a useful exchange of views between the EU and
International Organizations (IOs), non–EU partner States and NGOs. This enhanced the
EU´s understanding of the capabilities, best practices and experiences of these actors and of their
views and expectations as regards cooperation with the EU. As set out earlier, certain non–EU
States (Canada, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Norway, Russia,
Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine) were invited to indicate the capabilities they would be able to
contribute to possible future civilian crisis–management actions in the framework of CSDP. It was
understood that their contributions were to be considered as supplementary to the overall EU
capacity rather than an integral part thereof. In the framework of the CHG 2008 process, the
European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) acted as the EU´s principal interlocutor with
European Peacebuilding NGOs, networks of NGOs and think–tanks active in the field of peace
building, which share an interest in promoting sustainable peace building policies among decision
makers in the EU.
118
4.6.1.9 Civilian Headline Goal 2010 Perspectives
Most personnel in civilian crisis–management missions under CSDP are seconded by EU Member
States. Consequently, the wide range of different ministries, services, judicial councils, etc.,
involved in the secondment process directly influences the EU´s capacity to act. It was therefore
important to ensure that the CHG–process findings, ranging from the conceptual to the very
practical, would find their way into Member States´ national administrations. To this end, Civilian
Capability Improvement Conferences were held in 2005, 2006 and 2007. These Conferences – a
kind of intermediate evaluation at ministerial level – enabled ministers to guide the CHG 2008
process and to enhance its political visibility.
Several Member States managed to translate recommendations and guidelines emanating from
the CHG process into practical terms, often resulting in closer cooperation between the different
stakeholder ministries involved.
Clearly, the CHG 2010 is not only about numbers. Several Member States declared that they have
created structures to facilitate the recruitment, training, deployment, etc., of personnel. It is
clearly a task for the EU to facilitate and promote equal preparation of Member States so that all
may usefully contribute to civilian CSDP. The CHG 2008 has certainly achieved encouraging results
in this respect but more needs to be done.
4.7 CHAPTER 6 - Perspectives for EU Crisis Management
Capabilities
Discusses the impact on capability development of the possible future
mechanisms for Permanent Structured Co–operation in the Defense field,
and the trend toward harmonization of EU civil–military capability
development.
119
Before the start of Chapter 6 “Perspectives for EU Crisis Management Capabilities”, you are
strongly recommended to read

EU Council, Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities – Brussels, December 2008.
Click on the icon
–
4.7.1.1 The Challenges of the Present
The efficiency problem of Europe´s armed forces is well known: of an impressive overall number of
over two million men and women in uniform in the EU–27, only a meager 10 to 15% are estimated
to be deployable. The causes are manifold: the low cost–effectiveness of a plethora of small–scale
capabilities, unnecessary intra–EU duplications, the presence of large numbers of quasi non–
deployable conscripts, capability gaps in terms of ‗enablers‘ (strategic transport, command, control
and communications), and, although all EU Member States are conscious of the challenge and are
implementing measures, slow transformation nonetheless from territorial Defense to expeditionary
warfare.
The question must be asked whether the existing mechanisms, in CSDP as well as NATO, are
sufficient to achieve the required transformation within a reasonable timeframe.
The primary cause of this problematic state of affairs is the still almost exclusively national focus of
Defense planning, while capability gaps at the aggregate EU and NATO level are being ignored.
Therefore, the only way to achieve the quantum leap that is necessary to realize Defense
transformation is through pooling which, by reducing intra–European duplications, can produce
much more deployable capabilities within the current combined Defense budget of the EU–27.
4.7.1.2 Permanent Structured Co-operation
From that point of view, Permanent Structured Co–operation, the new mechanism to be
established by the Lisbon Treaty for ‗those Member States whose military capabilities fulfill higher
criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view
to the most demanding missions‘ (Art. 28A 6), has enormous potential. For the first time,
―enhanced cooperation‖ between a group of Member States in the field of Defense will be possible
within the Treaty. One could argue that the solutions to Europe´s capability conundrum are in
120
effect well known – the question is whether PermStrucCoop can be the platform that convinces the
Member States to implement them.
PermStrucCoop can be a very flexible instrument, allowing all EU Member States to participate, if
they so choose, at their own level of means, in the way that they choose:





Member States wanting to take part can formulate an ―expression of interest‖. Such a
declaration would outline, in broad terms, what contribution, of what size, in what timeframe
might be considered. The aim should be for each participating Member State to generate
additional ―usable‖ capabilities, either in one or more specific shortfall areas as identified in the
Progress Catalogue, and/or through force packages covering several capability areas, and/or
with regard to longer–term, future capabilities in the light of the trends identified in the EDA´s
Capability–Development Plan (CDP).
Simultaneously, the participating Member States, with the support of the EDA, can agree
on criteria for participation that apply to each specific contribution, regardless of size, in terms
of deployability, sustainability, interoperability and per capita investment in equipment. An
additional criterion might be actual participation in operations (regardless of the framework, EU,
NATO, UN or ad hoc). To be avoided are general budgetary criteria, such as spending 2% of
GDP on Defense: laudable though they may be, they are also unrealistic and will not generate
additional capabilities in the short to medium term.
The EDA can then assess the opportunities for different forms of cooperation and pooling
in the light of Member States´ declared intentions, allowing Member States to decide which
contributions they will offer on a national basis and which in cooperation, in their preferred
format, with other Member States. Pooling of forces offers the greatest added value. Member
States can contribute national squadrons or battalions to a multination fighter force or army
division, while everything above and below that (command & control, logistics, maintenance,
training) could be fully integrated and located at a reduced number of bases, thus creating huge
synergies and effects of scale. The World War II RAF can serve to illustrate the model:
comprising clearly identifiable Belgian, Dutch, Czech and Polish squadrons, it obviously did not
have a separate Belgian airfield or Polish logistics ... The beauty of PermStrucCoop is its
flexibility however: each Member State can participate in the way it prefers.
This process will result in a set of concrete capability objectives, to be achieved by pre–
identified units, some national, some multinational, in an agreed timeframe.
The EDA is responsible for monitoring progress and assessing contributions against the
agreed criteria and the evolving needs, as well as continuously updating and proposing
opportunities for cooperation, in the light of the CDP. It is important that the EDA should be
empowered by the Member States to play this role to the full, in order to realize the potential
of PermStrucCoop.
4.7.1.3 Perspectives of Civilian Capabilities
In the civilian area, Member States are taking initiatives to each create a pool of trained experts,
from police, justice and other sectors. Deployability remains an issue though: while for the military
expeditionary operations are the core business, for the various civilian institutions it is an ad hoc
task, to be undertaken in addition to national duties, usually against the background of national
claims for ―more police on the street‖, etc. Even though the demand for civilian deployments is
continually increasing, it will be difficult therefore to substantially increase the numbers. One
121
option that may be considered is the recruitment by the EU itself of a central pool of civilian
experts, in order to always have a minimal capacity available.
One possible approach to making civil–military capability development more effective is illustrated
bellow.
Harmonizing EU Civil–Military Capability Development beyond HG/ CHG 2010,
Explanatory note accompanying the EU Council Swedish Presidency´s invitation to the
dedicated
expert
seminar
of
September
2009
here
(http://esdc.adlunap.ro/data/esdc_v1/lm_data/lm_1164/scos/6/files/AKU5%200[1].2e%20Harmo
nising%20civ-mil%20capability%20development%20beyond%202010.pdf)
4.7.1.4 From Capabilities to Operations and Missions
PermStrucCoop is not the silver bullet that will solve all the problems of Europe´s military. But
because it is in the Treaty and Member States therefore have to consider whether and how to
make use of it, it presents a window of opportunity to further CSDP. If a critical mass of Member
States willing to go ahead with PermStrucCoop can be found, the desire to ―be in‖ will probably
lead many others to participate. Once in, peer pressure and the need to avoid exclusion for
ceasing to fulfill the criteria should stimulate Member States´ efforts. The only ―carrot‖ that can
stimulate Member States to set demanding criteria in the first place however is the one that should
appeal to Finance Ministers: the potential of increasing the efficiency of the Defense budget.
PermStrucCoop is not an end in itself, but a means towards generating more deployable forces –
which in turn is only a means towards deploying Europe´s forces in the service of global peace and
security. Ultimately therefore, even if the capabilities are available, political willingness, to commit
troops where necessary and to act as the EU is the key. But the more integrated Europe´s military
capabilities will be, the more EU Member States will be pushed to act as one.
122
5
AKU 6 – PLANNING FOR CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
5.1.1.1 General description
This AKU concerns planning for CSDP crisis–response missions and operations. This is shorthand
for saying this discussion is about the planning of CSDP military operations and civilian missions,
with a focus on the political and strategic level. The AKU6 consists of an introductory part, of 5
chapters focusing on relevant aspects of the planning mechanism and a concluding part.
5.1.1.2 Learning content
AKU6 will touch upon the following aspects of the CSDP mission planning:





Chapter 1 About Planning – planning functions, levels, type of planning and procedural
foundations at EU political and strategic level.
Chapter 2 Advance Planning – the purpose and types of advance planning and who is doing
what at the EU political and strategic level.
Chapter 3 Crisis–response Planning – sequence of events and documents for planning
CSDP military operations and civilian crisis–response missions.
Chapter 4 Introduction to Operational Planning – operational level command options,
force generation process and operational design tools, which further shape the outcome of the
CSDP mission planning process.
Chapter 5 Challenges and Prospects – directions and challenges in the likely development
of the EU´s mission planning practice and procedures.
During your study, it is highly recommended that you read the following:

*.*.* Draft EU Concept for Comprehensive Planning, Council General Secretariat

13983/05dated 3 November 2005.
– Click on the icon
* * * EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic Level, Council General

Secretariat 10687/08 dated 16 June 2008.
– Click on the icon
* * * EU Concept for Force Generation, Council General Secretariat 10690/08 dated 16

June 2008, pages 6–7.
– Click on the icon
* * * Draft guidelines for improving Force Generation for civilian ESDP missions, Council
General Secretariat. 8276/09 dated 1 April 2009, pages 3–7.
123
– Click on the icon
In
A.
support
of
List
of
your
study
you
are
Abbreviations
advised
to
used
consult
in
the
this
following
AKU
annexes:
(here).
B. CSDP Planning Documents referred to in this AKU (here).
5.1.1.3 Bibliography & Other Sources
Should you wish to deepen your understanding of the topics covered in this AKU, you may
consider exploring the academic literature on the subject. For this purpose, you can make use of
the bibliography below.







* * * Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management,
Council General Secretariat11127/03 dated 03 July 2003 (here)
Grevi, Giovanni, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane, 2009. European Security and Defense
Policy: The First Ten Years (1999–2009). Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP_10–web.pdf
–> An overall view of the institutional architecture and workings of the ESDP plus an overview
of every ESDP operation conducted so far.
Gross, Eva. 2008. EU and the Comprehensive Approach. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for
International
Studies
(DIIS
Report
2008:13).
http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/diis/0013100/f_0013100_10668.pdf
–> A critical assessment of where the EU stands in pursuing civil–military coordination.
Hansen, Annika. 2006. Against all Odds – The Evolution of Planning for ESDP Operations:
Civilian Crisis Management from EUPM onwards. Berlin: Zentrum für Internationale
Friedenseinsätze
(ZIF
Study
10/06).
http://www.zifberlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/veroeffentlichungen/
Evolution_of_Planning_for_ESDP_Operations_11.06.pdf
–> A more detailed discussion of planning civilian operations.
Kem, Jack D. 2009. Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade. 3rd ed. Kansas: U.S. Army
Combined
Arms
Center.
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgibin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/p4013coll11&CISOPTR=1080&filename=1081.pdf
–> An introduction to campaign design and operational planning tools.
Korski, Daniel and Richard Gowan. 2009. Can the EU Rebuild Failing States? A Review of
Europe´s Civilian Capabilities. London: European Council on Foreign Relations.
http://ecfr.eu/page/–/documents/civilian–crisis–report.pdf
–> A critical audit of the EU‟s civilian crisis capabilities.
Mattelaer, Alexander. 2008. The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations – The Case of
EUFOR Tchad/RCA. Brussels: Institute for European Studies (IES Working Paper 5).
http://www.ies.be/files/repo/IES%20working%20paper%205_Alexander%20Mattelaer.pdf
–> A detailed discussion of the planning cycle of one individual operation and what it implies for
the planning of military operations in general.
Another major source of information on the planning of operations is military doctrine. One
reference document course participants may find particularly useful is the following:

Joint Doctrine Publication 3–40 – Security and Stabilization: The Military Contribution.
London: Ministry of Defense. http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/C403A6C7–E72C–445E–8246–
D11002D7A852/0/jdp_3_40_nov09.pdf
124
For a broader documentation on CSDP related subjects, whenever necessary, you are invited
to visit the CSDP Knowledge–base at http://esdc.mil–edu.be
5.2 CHAPTER 1 - About Planning
General discussion introducing the planning functions, levels, types of
planning and procedural foundations at EU political and strategic level.
5.2.1.1 Introduction
CSDP military operations and civilian missions
(in generic terms ‗CSDP missions‘ – when not
otherwise
specified)
range
from
short–term
crisis management to long–term stabilization,
and from small advisory teams to large military
or civilian deployments. In organizational terms,
these are complex undertakings. The EU deploys
soldiers as well as civilians to address the causes
of conflict or at least mitigate its consequences.
One useful place to start when considering
planning for these missions is the question:
what is the purpose of ‗mission planning‘?
5.2.1.2 Functions of Planning
In this context, planning serves two distinct functions: a procedural one as well as a conceptual
one.
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Firstly, planning serves to structure and enable an efficient organizational process.
Preparing to conduct CSDP operations involves a wide range of different actors. Planning
procedures dissect this complex process into small steps that provide a temporal as well as a
functional framework. In other words, it provides the answers to the question ‗who has to do what,
when and where?‘
Secondly, planning provides the context in which operations are designed in conceptual
terms. This is the creative process, in which a planner should determine how an operation can
achieve or at least contribute to the political objectives. It is important to keep in mind this twin
function of planning: the final purpose is not merely to launch an operation. It is about launching
operations that deliver the intended political results.
5.2.1.3 Levels of Planning
CSDP mission planning is conducted at several levels. The EU institutions in Brussels – the Council
of the EU and all its supporting structures – represent the political and strategic level. This is
the level where the political objectives of CSDP missions are determined and the appropriate
resources are committed. In other words, it is the level at which strategic guidance is formulated
and political control is exercised. This guidance and control reaches the mission/operation via the
EU chain of command. This chain of command normally features strategic and operational
levels. The military or civilian strategic level is just below the political level. This military or civilian
strategic level is designed to translate political guidance into operational terms, provide outline
planning for the operation before it is deployed and subsequently facilitate dialogue between the
political and operational levels. The operational level covers overall coordination and management
of a CSDP mission or operation once it is deployed on the ground. The tactical level covers direct
126
action on the ground. In addition to these conventional, detailed chains of command, there is room
for ad–hoc arrangements when a different structure has to be tailored to a specific action.
At the political and strategic level – the main focus of this AKU – planning assumes the form of an
iterative dialogue between the political authorities and the staff tasked with the actual planning.
The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is the working body of the political authority, whereas
various branches within the European External Action Service (EEAS) each play their part in the
actual planning work. The PSC receives advice from the European Union Military Committee
(EUMC) and from the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). This
dialogue starts with very general ideas of CSDP action and gradually works its way up to a detailed
operational plan ready for execution, then continues with mission execution (including, if
necessary, plan review) and termination aspects. As it is an iterative process, it allows the political
authority to exercise political control and provide strategic guidance on a continuous basis.
5.2.1.4 Types of Planning
It is common practice to consider two types of planning: advance planning and crisis response
planning. Advance planning concerns planning for potential future scenarios with the aim of
reducing response time if an actual crisis should materialize. It is only when a specific crisis has
been identified and the Political and Security Committee has agreed that ‗EU action is appropriate‘
that the switch is made from advance planning to crisis response planning. Advance planning thus
relates to continuous planning for potential crises, whereas crisis response planning concerns the
development of a response to an actual crisis.
5.2.1.5 Planning Procedures
In the aftermath of the European Council meeting in Nice in December 2000, the so–called Crisis
Management Procedures laid down the reference framework for planning CSDP missions and
operations. As a living document, the Crisis Management Procedures (CMP) were updated
continuously over the following few years. The 2003 version serves as the basic reference
document (doc # 11127/03). However, a number of additional documents have been drawn up
that provide more detailed guidance on mission planning along military or civilian lines. The most
relevant are:
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The EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic Level (doc # 10687/08).
The EU Concept for Military Command and Control.
The EU Concept for Force Generation (doc # 10690/08)1.
The draft EU Concept for Comprehensive Planning (doc # 13983/05).
The draft Guidelines for the Command and Control Structure for EU Civilian Operations in
Crisis Management.
The draft guidelines for improving Force Generation for civilian CSDP missions (doc #
8276/09).






EU SSR Guinea–Bissau: Ingore Border Police,
25 June 2009
After the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was set–
up. This heralded a major organizational change in the way the EU responds to international
crises. At the time this AKU was last revised procedural revisions were still underway and it is
likely that new reference documents will be forthcoming in the near future. New developments
include for example the establishment of an EEAS Crisis Management Board and Crisis Response
System.
As an intellectual discipline, mission planning has its historical roots in military affairs. Centuries
ago, military campaigns already required great effort to manage issues such as logistics,
intelligence and lines of communication. Later on, much of the military vocabulary made its way
into the civilian world. Civilian crisis management constitutes a policy area that is highly
experimental in nature and for which there are practically no external sources on which to draw.
However, there are 10 years´ practical experiences in CSDP missions. Nevertheless, no consensus
has yet emerged amongst the different Member States as to what should be the final form of these
civilian planning concepts. As planning doctrine represents the codification of past experience, it is
always a moving target that must evolve to take new realities into account.
1
Force generation is the process whereby Member States commit assets and capabilities to an actual operation. It will
be discussed in greater detail in chapter 4.
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5.2.1.6 Enabling Success
The following chapters focus on the procedural mechanisms for planning CSDP missions and
operations, to make for an efficient organizational process. It should be kept in mind that the
process should not be confused with the final product. Procedures do not provide the conceptual
content of how an operation can achieve its political objectives. Good planning is more than ticking
a few boxes: it requires creative imagination on the part of planners! There is no definite recipe for
how to make an operation or mission yield the desired results. CSDP missions and operations take
place in a complex and constantly changing political environment.
Understanding the context and thinking creatively about how to influence the situation
at hand will be essential to developing planning products that enable success. Planning
procedures and conceptual tools can foster this process, but they should not be treated as the Holy
Scripture. They are guidelines to enable effective action; they do not constitute an objective in
their own right.
Advance Planning is conducted to allow the EU to
deal with potential crises. Advance Planning is sub–
Advance Planning
divided into two categories: Generic and
Contingency.
CEP is a national (host nation) civil responsibility.
Its planning parameters can vary from country to
Civil Emergency
Planning
CEP
country. During the crisis management process,
CIMIC facilitates, within security constraints, co–
ordination of military plans with existing CEP plans
(National, UN and NATO). CEP might affect freedom
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of movement and actions, and the military plan
must take into account the need to protect the civil
population, as well as the need to maintain vital
functions of society. It is thus essential that CIMIC
elements establish links with the relevant CEP
agencies and determine how planned and
implemented CEP measures will affect EU–led CMO.
Contingency planning is the production of detailed
planning documents for potential operations where
Contingency Planning
the planning factors have been identified or have
been assumed. They include an indication of
resources needed and the deployment options. They
may form the basis for subsequent planning.
Generic Planning is the production of basic
planning documents for potential operations where
Generic Planning
some planning factors have not yet been fully
identified or have not been assumed. It identifies
the general capabilities required.
Under the military direction of the EUMC, the Op
Cdr, assisted by the EUMS, will be responsible for
Military Operational Planning, including the
coherence of plans developed at subordinate levels.
Military Operational
Planning
It includes the production of a Concept of
Operations (CONOPS) and the production of a full
Operation Plan (OPLAN). Furthermore, the Op Cdr is
responsible for elaborating a set of Rules of
Engagement (ROE) and the Force Activation Process
including the elaboration of the Statement of Forces
Requirement (SOR).
Military Planning is an iterative process which
Military Planning
needs to analyze all relevant factors to determine
the military mission. At the Political and Strategic
130
level this will include analysis of the implication of
political objectives, desired end state, restraints and
constraints as well as an analysis of the capabilities
needed, in order to develop potential military
options balanced against those capabilities offered
or potentially available.
Planning for the preparation and conduct of
Operational Planning
military operations at strategic, operational and
tactical level.
5.3 CHAPTER 2 - Advance Planning
Introducing the advance planning purpose and types, and describing who
does what at the EU political and strategic level.
5.3.1.1 Purpose of Advance Planning
The purpose of advance planning is simple: it is to be prepared for all kinds of eventualities. One
of the defining characteristics of crisis situations is that they tend to develop very quickly and
leave only limited time to develop an adequate policy response.
The main function of advance planning is to reduce the response time needed when a crisis occurs.
Of course, some of this is highly sensitive from a political point of view. The point is to be prepared
for eventualities: advance planning should not trigger the anticipated events or indicate that EU
action may be forthcoming before the political decision has been taken. The culture of contingency
planning is being developed only very slowly.
131
Advance planning can be divided into two sub–disciplines: generic planning and strategic
contingency planning. Generic planning involves drawing up generic concepts as well as
catalogues of what capabilities are available for pre–identified standard scenarios. Strategic
contingency planning involves the ongoing monitoring of the security environment, drawing up
country books (i.e. ‗travel guides for crisis management purposes‘) and contingency plans to
inform political decision–making.
5.3.1.2 Who Does What?
Generic planning covers a wide range of topics. It includes the development of concepts relating
to how the CSDP system is supposed to work. But it also includes more detailed work in terms of
generic scenarios. For example, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) has developed five illustrative
scenarios for military crisis management (see figure). These are for developing generic force
packages that are used as benchmarks in the EU crisis–management capability development
process.
Contingency Planning. The EEAS´ Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD), supported
by the EUMS and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), is in the lead for
contingency planning. This normally takes the form of policy papers for consideration by the
Political and Security Committee and other advisory bodies. In the narrow sense of the word,
contingency plans take the following form: ―if event X were to occur in country Y, the EU could
respond by means of Z‖. It is about planning for events that would trigger a crisis situation before
these events have occurred, and these events may very well never happen. Contingency plans can
also concern more practical issues such as deployment options and logistical feasibility studies.
Once an emerging crisis has been identified, it leads to the immediate mobilization of all relevant
EU resources in accordance with the EEAS Crisis Response System. This may also involve the
132
dispatching of fact–finding missions (FFM) to collect information with a view to considering possible
EU action.
In all of the practices described above, the political authorities are mostly in a ‗reading mode‘,
digesting all the input produced by the planning community. Most advance planning documents
are food–for–thought products. The two exceptions in this regard are the concepts describing how
the EU goes about its business, which require political approval, and the option papers proposing
EU action, which require a political decision. The conclusion that ‗EU action is appropriate‘
constitutes a mandate for the development of a number of consecutive planning documents.
5.4 CHAPTER 3 - Crisis–response Planning
Explaining the sequence of events and documents for planning CSDP
military operations and civilian missions.
For explanations, examples and templates of the planning documents mentioned in this chapter,
please
consult
Annex
B
here
(http://esdc.adlunap.ro/data/esdc_v1/lm_data/lm_7968/scos/3/pdf/AKU6_0.2b_Annex_B.pdf)
In response to the outbreak of a crisis, the EU planning process can be broken into three main
phases: the establishment of an EU–wide strategic approach, a CSDP planning phase, and an
implementation/review and closure phase. In order to establish an EU–wide strategic approach,
the Member States or the EEAS can initiate the drafting of a single strategy or framework
document in line with the EEAS Crisis Response System. This may lead to a subsequent decision
taken by the Member States in the Political and Security Committee (PSC) to deem CSDP action
appropriate. This marks the official start of the crisis response planning sequence that eventually
leads to a detailed operation plan, ready for execution.
The first step is the development of a Crisis Management Concept by the EEAS´ CMPD. At this
stage it is not necessarily clear whether the eventual action will be of a military or civilian nature,
or both. Beyond this point, however, the procedures for planning military operations and civilian
missions start to diverge – although this is an issue that the 2012 review of the Crisis Management
Procedures seeks to address. For this reason, the details of the military and civilian planning
processes are presented separately. However, the logic of developing a CMC as a first step,
133
strategic options in an (optional) second step and operational planning documents in a third step
stays the same.
A clear and concise statement of the line of action
Concept of Operations
CONOPS chosen by a commander in order to accomplish his
mission.
A conceptual framework describing the EU´s overall
approach to the management of a particular crisis,
addressing the full range of EU activities (diplomatic,
economic, humanitarian, military) and may include
Crisis Management
Concept
CMC
the definition of politico–military objectives for any
possible military activities. The crisis management
concept is an important tool to ensure the coherence
and the comprehensiveness of possible EU actions by
taking account of the range and scale of the different
instruments available to the Union.
On the basis of the Military Strategic Option selected
by the Council, the EUMS will prepare a draft Initiating
Military Directive, which will be submitted to the EUMC
for consideration, endorsement and advice before
being presented to the PSC for approval. Once
approved by the PSC, the EUMC will authorize the IMD
for the Op Cdr. While the content of the IMD will, to
Initiating Military
Directive
IMD
some extent, depend on the particular circumstances
of each crisis, it will normally provide a clear
description of political objectives and the envisaged
military mission to contribute to these objectives. It
should also include any political limitations and
assumptions that the Op Cdr should take into account
during CONOPS and OPLAN development. This
directive should as well contain any politically
desirable supporting tasks that the Council has
134
directed the EU´s military forces to be prepared to
take.
A plan for a single or series of connected operations
to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is
usually based upon stated assumptions and is the
form of directive employed by higher authority to
Operation Plan
OPLAN
permit subordinate commanders to prepare
supporting plans and orders. The designation ―plan‖ is
usually used instead of ―order‖ in preparing for
operations well in advance. An operation plan may be
put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and
then becomes the operation order.
5.4.1.1 Crisis–Response Planning for Military Operations
Step one: Within the EEAS the CMPD is in the lead for drafting the CMC. The EUMS will provide
extra military expertise as required. Once the draft CMC is submitted to the Political and Security
Committee (PSC) for political consideration, first the CIVCOM will analyze the draft and submit to
the PSC its advice and recommendations. The EUMC, supported by the EUMS, will also provide
military advice on the draft CMC. On the basis of these multiple sources of advice, the PSC will
agree upon the final version of the CMC before forwarding it (via COREPER) to the Council for
approval.
Step two: Following the approval of the CMC by the Council, the PSC may request – if deemed
advisable – the EUMC to issue a Military Strategic Options Directive, whereby the EUMS is
instructed to prepare military strategic options (MSO). These MSOs generally reflect different
levels of ambition in terms of resources and military tasks. They are prioritized by the EUMS in
135
terms of feasibility and acceptability of risk. The EUMC evaluates these MSOs and provides military
advice to the PSC. The Commission can provide input on relevant accompanying measures such as
in the area of development and humanitarian aid, etc ... The PSC in turn evaluates these options
from a political perspective and drafts a decision on the preferred strategic option. This suggestion
is forwarded to the Council, which decides by unanimity whether or not to take action. This
decision is formally executed by means of a Council Decision, which is drafted on behalf of the
Council in the Relex Counselors Group, (with contributions from relevant institutional actors).
5.4.1.2 Crisis–Response Planning for Military Operations
Step three: Once the Council Decision has been approved, the PSC issues political guidance for
the operational planning. The PSC issues guidance as necessary for the EUMC to direct the EUMS
to draft the Initiating Military Directive (IMD). The IMD includes those directives required by the
OpCdr to enable him to draw up the necessary planning documents. The PSC approves the IMD
before the EUMC authorizes its release to the Operation Commander (OpCdr) designated in the
Council Decision.
The OpCdr (supported by his Operation Headquarters – OHQ) then develops the operational
planning documents: the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), including guidelines on the use of force
and the Statement of Requirements (SOR), and afterwards the Operation Plan (OPLAN). This
process will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4. In short, a CONOPS is a concise outline of the
operation, whereas an OPLAN represents a detailed script of the operation. Both the CONOPS and
136
the OPLAN have to be agreed by the PSC and approved by Council. Once the OPLAN has been
approved by the Council and all the required resources have been made available via force
generation, the operation can be launched. The full process of planning military CSDP operations
can be summarized as in the above sketch.
It is important to keep in mind, however, that the planning line may be adapted to the
circumstances at hand and to the time available. See on the left the ‗theory vs. practice‘ table,
illustrating the planning line in actual operations. The 2012 review of the Crisis Management
Procedures, furthermore, seeks to reduce the number of steps required, e.g. by making the
development of strategic options optional and introducing a fast track–procedure based on the
compression of CONOPS and OPLAN into a single document.
EUFOR
Concordia Artemis Althea RD
Congo
EUFOR
Tchad/RCA
Atalanta
CMC
+
+
+
+
+
+
MSOD
-
-
+
-
-
-
MSO
-
-
+
-
+
+
IMD
+
-
+
+
+
+
CONOPS
-
-
+
+
+
+
OPLAN
+
+
+
+
+
+
For more details on crisis–response planning for CSDP military operations, please read.

* * * EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic Level, Council General
Secretariat, 10687/08, dated 16
137
5.4.1.3 Crisis–Response Planning for Civilian Operations
Step one: Within the EEAS the CMPD is tasked with drafting the CMC. The CPCC will provide extra
civilian expertise as required. The civilian options contained herein are reviewed in detail by
CIVCOM. CSDP civilian capabilities include police, rule of law, civilian administration, civil
protection, monitoring and mission support. The PSC agrees upon the CMC and forwards it to the
Council for approval.
Step two: Within the EEAS, the CPCC is tasked with the development of civilian strategic options
(CSOs). Similarly to MSOs, these will reflect different levels of ambition in mandated tasks and
required resources. The Commission provides input on accompanying measures within its remit.
CIVCOM comments upon these CSOs or PSOs and the PSC chooses which option to pursue. This
again requires the formal approval of the Council. Again the 2012 CMP review is likely to make this
step optional only.
Step three: The CPCC is also charged with writing the CONOPS, as the Director of CPCC is
normally the overall Civilian Operations Commander. As the financial arrangements for funding
civilian missions, an important planning tool, should be indicated in the Council Decision, in this
138
case the CONOPS precedes the Council Decision (in contrast to the military operation planning
sequence). The civilian CONOPS is commented upon by CIVCOM and agreed upon by the PSC, and
finally adopted by the Council. At this point in time, the Council Decision can be passed, including
the selection of a civilian Head of Mission (HoM) and the budget (―financial statement‖).
Subsequently the HoM develops the CONOPS into a fully–fledged OPLAN. The 2012 CMP review,
furthermore, may end up shifting responsibility for the civilian OPLAN to the Civilian Operations
Commander – this streamlining civilian and military procedures – and at the same time ensure
that civilian HoMs and their teams are involved in the early planning stages from CONOPS
onwards.
5.5 CHAPTER 4 - Introduction to Operational Planning
Introducing the operational–level command options, force generation
process, and operational design tools, which further shape the outcome
It is an oft repeated maxim that a good planner should be aware of what goes on at the levels
above as well as below that where he or she happens to be. For this reason, the present chapter
will introduce some basic concepts used in operational planning as well as the major crosscutting
issues that extend over several levels.
5.5.1.1 Command Options
EUFOR Tchad/RCA Medal parade at the OHQ
20 March 2009
Credit: EUFOR Tchad/RCA
As explained earlier, the relevant EEAS services conducts advance planning (including early
assessment of operational matters) for CSDP operations and missions. However, the detailed
preparatory work and planning will be done by those authorities that are designated to command
the operation or mission. In a nutshell, the machinery in Brussels decides the menu, after which
139
the Operation Commander can start doing the shopping and the cooking. As anybody with cooking
experience can attest, it is always useful to have a good match between grocery shopping and
cooking. For this reason, the following overview of command options is provided.
For civilian missions, the institutional command set–up is fairly straightforward. The early planning
work (CMC development) is led by the CMPD with input from CPCC, after which planning authority
shifts to the Director of CPCC, as permanent civilian operations commander. The CPCC normally
drafts the strategic options. Following Council approval it develops the CONOPS for the chosen
strategic option. By means of a Council Decision, the Council appoints a Head of Mission, who
drafts the OPLAN. The Head of Mission is entrusted with operational control of all the mission´s
capabilities and resources. He or she embodies the operational level of command and reports back
to the Director of CPCC.
The situation is more complex for military operations. The CMPD and the EUMS draft the planning
documents at the political and strategic level. Afterwards, planning and command authority needs
to be given to a military–strategic Operation Commander (with supporting operation headquarters)
that is designated in the Council Decision. In this regard, there are three distinct possibilities for
provision of the Operation Headquarters:

Operation Headquarters provided by a Member State for an EU operation
–> National headquarters that are activated for an EU operation and subsequently
multinationalised by means of „augmentee‟ personnel from all the Member States participating
in the operation. Five Member States (France, Germany, the UK, Italy and Greece) have
declared such headquarters to be available. So far, three have been used in practice: the French
OHQ was used for operations Artemis and EUFOR Tchad/RCA, the German OHQ was used for
EUFOR RD Congo and the British OHQ is currently being used for the counter–piracy operation
Atalanta.
140


EU OHQ at SHAPE (NATO strategic headquarters) following recourse to the NATO
command structure and designation of NATO´s DSACEUR as EU Operation Commander.
–> via the Berlin Plus mechanism, the EU can request NATO to make use of its integrated
command structure. An EU military operation would then be commanded by the Deputy
Strategic Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR). The position of DSACEUR is always filled by a
European four–star general. This command option has been used twice in practice, namely for
Operation Concordia (in FYROM) and Operation Althea (in Bosnia).
Operations
Centre
within
the
EUMS
–> this can only be used for autonomous operations, in particular where a joint civil/military
response is required, and when no national headquarters are identified. When activated (as
currently the context of the Horn of Africa) it is staffed by double–hated personnel from the
EUMS as well as by personnel seconded from the Member States (see HERE more on EU Ops
Centre).
Before proceeding to the next heading, you are strongly recommended to read:

*.*.* EU Concept for Force Generation, General Secretariat of the Council, doc. 10690/08,
dated 16 June 2008, pages 6–7
– Click on the icon
5.5.1.2 Force Generation
Force generation is the process whereby Member States make the assets and capabilities required
for a CSDP operation available to the Operation Commander or Head of Mission. Force generation
runs parallel to the operational planning process. During the development of the CMC, indicative
contribution meetings can be held to provide an early indication of the willingness of the Member
States to provide resources for the operation or mission that is being planned. The formal start of
force generation, however, is the approval of the CONOPS. A CONOPS normally contains a
Statement of Requirements (SOR). This is a shopping list of all the capabilities that are needed to
execute the mission, encompassing human, material and financial resources. In a series of force
generation conferences the Member States sit around the table and provide the assets the OpCdr
or HoM asks for. What is important to keep in mind is that the statement of requirements is a
wish–list: the Member States will not necessarily provide everything that is asked for. It is up to
the OpCdr or HoM to decide whether all the mission–critical requirements have been provided.
Only at that point in time can the operation be launched. More on force generation for civilian
missions in

*.*.* Draft guidelines for improving Force Generation for civilian ESDP missions, General
Secretariat of the Council, doc. 8276/09, dated 1 April 2009, pages 3–7
icon
141
– Click on the
5.5.1.3 Operational Design Approaches
Mission planning is not only about structuring an organizational process. The eventual missions
and operations also need to be designed on a conceptual level. Any CONOPS or OPLAN is intended
to link the use of resources to the desired political outcomes. The designing of operations already
starts on the political and strategic level, even if most of the work will need to be done at the
military–strategic or operational levels. After all, the CMC contains the blueprint of the ensuing
strategic options, and these are in turn the blueprints of the eventual CONOPS. The design of
missions and operations is a creative process: there are no silver bullets in what is inevitably a
complex exercise in linking ends and means. Nonetheless, doctrinal planning tools can help with
this process. There are essentially two different ways of approaching operational design,
depending on whether one starts the process with the means or the ends.


The first can be labeled the programmes–based approach. Here one starts with what is
given. Planners will receive a certain amount of resources and capabilities as well as political
guidance on what decision–makers want. One can thus try to shape the use of these resources
into a number of programmes that can each play a positive role in pushing the conflict situation
in the right direction. This is a bottom–up process of using the resources that are given to foster
progress, or at least to facilitate conditions that may lead to progress. The advantage of this
approach is that it can always be applied, regardless of the level of resources that are available.
In essence, the programmes–based approach boils down to an attempt to make the best use of
the resources one has been given. It can be labeled a process–based approach because the
end–state is not necessarily clear.
The second can be labeled the objectives–based approach (common in Western military
doctrines). In this approach, operational design starts with an analysis of the mission´s desired
end–state and objectives, and then reverse engineers what needs to be done in order to achieve
those objectives. In a second stage, one can determine what resources are needed in order to
do so, and arrive at the Statement of Requirements (SOR).
5.5.1.4 Operational Design Tools
There are many conceptual tools available to facilitate the objectives–based operational design. In
management literature, one will often read about SWOT analysis (strengths, weaknesses,
142
opportunities & threats). In military doctrine, the most common tools for operational design are
centre of gravity (CoG) analysis, decisive points and lines of operation. Centre of gravity analysis
is a methodology to identify the sources of strength of any conflict actor. The centers of gravity
(one´s own and the opponent´s) have certain capabilities, requirements and vulnerabilities that
need to be protected against or that can be exploited. Points from which such a centre of gravity
may be threatened can be linked into lines of operations, i.e. series of ´decisive points‘ that serve
to neutralize or protect any actor´s centre of gravity. In this way, an operational design aimed at
defeating or protecting any given actor can be visualized as in the above picture. Several lines of
operations connect decisive points and converge towards an actor´s centre of gravity, the
neutralization or protection of which in turn constitutes (part of) the desired end–state. In order to
allow for more complex operations (or to be prepared for contingencies), one can introduce
branches and sequels to the lines of operation as well as phase the operation in time.
More on operational design tools in Kem, Jack D. 2009. Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade.
3rd
ed.
Kansas:
U.S.
Army
Combined
Arms
Center
at
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/utils/getfile/collection/p4013coll11/id/1080/filename/1081.pdf
5.6 CHAPTER 5 - Challenges and Prospects
Concluding discussion on directions and challenges in the likely
Over the past years, the EU has launched more than 25 crisis management and stabilization
operations of both a civilian and a military nature. It has also developed an elaborate procedural
framework for planning such operations. It should be kept in mind that this planning model is only
an enabler for effective action: the process should not be confused with the product. Planning
procedures tend to be short–circuited or tailored to fit the planning cycle of the crisis at hand.
Conceptual planning tools can structure and facilitate the planning dialogue yet they can never
fully replace the creativity and ingenuity required from the planning staff. On the other hand, a
procedural planning model has important merits in that it structures an inherently messy dialectic
process. In so doing it provides a reference framework for checking whether all key elements of
sound planning are present. The presence of a shared reference framework in the form of
conceptual planning tools serves the purpose of codifying professional expertise. Furthermore, it
makes the planning process less dependent on mere personalities.
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(From left to right) Mr. Jose Luis RODRIGUEZ ZAPATERO, Spanish Prime Minister Mrs. Catherine ASHTON,
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Mr. Jerzy Buzek, President of the European
Parliament Credit “The Council of the European Union”
The CSDP mission/operation planning procedures and realities are not perfect – especially as the
current system is undergoing major reform by its incorporation into the EEAS. Although the EU
often prides itself on developing a comprehensive approach towards crisis management, the
integration of civilian and military tools remains limited. The establishment of the CMPD
constituted an important step forward in this process. Existing civil–military integration is focused
on the joint development of the CMC. Afterwards, the planning process becomes stove–piped
along civilian or military lines. Perhaps most importantly, it should be kept in mind that the EU´s
various instruments for conducting foreign policy continue to be distributed between the EEAS and
the European Commission. This means that even a fully integrated CSDP still leaves out a large
amount of the EU´s potential. With the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is expected to
move towards a more integrated approach to crisis–management. The institutional architecture for
planning CSDP operations is therefore likely to undergo further changes. This could include, for
example, the setting–up of a permanent EU Operational Headquarters.
That said, it remains equally true that the CSDP is a highly innovative policy domain. Especially the
civilian crisis management instruments constitute a policy tool that is still experimental in nature.
An operational planning culture is now being exported beyond the ranks of the military. This opens
up the prospect of developing more versatile and dynamic tools for managing international crises.
Whether this potential will bear fruit in practice will it depend both on political willingness to think
out of the box and on well–trained personnel. If this AKU has at least made a minor contribution to
that crucial second factor, one will be in a good position to conclude ‗mission accomplished‘.
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6
AKU 7 – THE IMPACT OF THE LISBON TREATY ON THE COMMON SECURITY
AND
DEFENSE POLICY
6.1.1.1 General description
AKU7 is dedicated to the study of the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the Common Security and
Defense Policy. It consists of an introductory part, of five chapters focusing on relevant aspects of
the Lisbon Treaty, and of a concluding part.
6.1.1.2 Learning Content
AKU7 will touch upon the following aspects of the Lisbon Treaty:





Chapter 1 The Origins of the Lisbon Treaty – From Laeken to Dublin, the evolution of
the Treaty.
Chapter 2 Changes in the EU Framework – An overall insight into the key changes
introduced by the Treaty into the EU framework.
Chapter 3 Impact on the Common Security and Defense Policy – The analysis of the
major changes introduced in Security and Defense.
Chapter 4 Major Challenges as regards Implementation – An in–depth analysis of the
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in the areas of Security and Defense.
Chapter 5 Conclusions and reflections – In which direction is the Union going in the
areas of security and Defense? What are its goals?
6.2 CHAPTER 1 - The Origins of the Lisbon Treaty
From Laeken to Dublin, the evolution of the Treaty.
6.2.1.1 The Laeken Declaration
In order to understand the Lisbon Treaty, we must first reflect on its ―Constitutional‖ origins, which
are based on the 2001 Laeken Declaration. Under the Belgian Presidency, the EU acknowledged
the existence of two major challenges, the democratic challenge facing Europe, and Europe´s new
role in a globalised world. This statement also acknowledges the expectations of Europe´s citizens,
and asks for reforms in the European Union. This vision will influence the design of and desire for a
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Constitution. The new draft Constitution required more intervention by the Union in the areas of
external relations and security and Defense. The aim was also to define the areas of exclusive
competence of the Union vis–á–vis its Member States and areas of shared competence. Shortly
after the declaration, representatives of Member States (MS) present in Laeken and 12
membership candidates began a process to examine the challenges faced by a future European
Constitution.
6.2.1.2 The Constitutional Treaty
The ceremony of the Lisbon Treaty.
Source: http://www3.uma.pt/nunosilvafraga/wp–content
/uploads/2008/04/tratadolisboa.jpg
The Constitutional Treaty defined for the first time the system of competences of the Union, while
reviewing the Union´s institutional structure to make it more democratic and efficient.
Concurrently, the Fundamental Rights Charter, the flag and anthem, were formally included in the
Treaty. Another innovation was the end of the system of ―pillars‖ of the Union, which started in
Maastricht and which was intended to simplify the decision–making process in the EU.
Simultaneously, the Constitutional Treaty was designed to be used as an easy–to–read text,
replacing the previously used technique of treaty amendments, thereby bringing EU citizens closer
to the EU institutional framework.
The need to simplify the EU set of treaties is not new. In fact, the question of the EU Treaty´s
intelligibility to the average citizen has been a topic for discussion since the debates on the
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. When creating the European Union, the Treaty absorbed but
did not extinguish, the previous three European Communities. So, the Maastricht Treaty had
become a complex tangle of rules, which was difficult to understand and comprehend. This is
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clearly one of the causes of the separation between EU citizens and EU institutions. The
Constitutional Treaty was also intended to remedy this situation.
The Constitutional Treaty was signed in Rome on October 29th, 2004 by twenty–five Member
States, and has been ratified by eighteen of them. However, the process was interrupted by the
negative referenda in France and the Netherlands. Much has been written about the real political
reasons for the refusal, but to the majority of the authors, those refusals are not related to the
Constitutional Treaty, and were really a demonstration of an internal discontent with their own
governments. This decision led the EU into a political impasse. The solution was found at the
European Council in June 2007, where the Portuguese Presidency received a mandate to draft a
Reform Treaty, less ambitious than the constitution, but with the aim of addressing the Laeken
challenges. Thus, during the Portuguese Presidency, the Lisbon Treaty was signed on December
13th, 2007.
6.2.1.3 The Lisbon Treaty
The entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1st, 2009.
Source: http://soerenkern.com/web/wp
–content/uploads/2008/06/lisbon–treaty–summit1.jpg
The first big difference between the Lisbon Treaty and the Constitution is the shape. The
Constitutional Treaty would have merged the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European Community. The Treaty of Lisbon chooses to keep the two documents
separate, amending the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union. Lisbon also takes out of the Treaty the references to the
147
symbols of the Union, the flag and the anthem, and also does not refer explicitly to the principle of
the primacy of Community law over national law of Member States. In the same way, the Charter
of Fundamental Rights is removed from the body of the Treaty. However a reference to this
document is made, proclaiming that the Union recognizes the principles set out in the latter.
The Lisbon Treaty was finally ratified by all EU MS. The Hungarian legislature was the first to
approve the treaty, on December 17th, 2007. In 2008 the Irish referendum blocked the ratification
of the treaty, which raised several questions regarding its future. Still, this decision was reversed
in a second referendum in 2009, and the Treaty was finally approved. The Czech instrument of
ratification was the last to be deposited in Rome on 13 November 2009, leading to its entry into
force on 1 December 2009. The Lisbon Treaty is therefore aimed at increasing democracy within
the Union, improving its functioning and, at the same time, increasing the EU capability to cope
with global challenges, taking Europe into the 21st century.
‗Laeken Declaration‘, which you can download now.

– Click on the icon
6.3 CHAPTER 2 - Changes in the EU Framework
An overall insight into the key changes introduced by the Treaty in the EU
framework.
6.3.1.1 Major Changes

The most important conceptual changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty concern the EU´s
legal personality, enabling the Union to speak and express itself as one entity; the choice
of the ordinary legislative co–decision process, thereby increasing the legitimacy of Union
acts from a democratic perspective; and the clarification made regarding the competences
of
the
Union,
in
particular
the
distinction
between
―exclusive
jurisdiction‖
(the
establishment of competition rules, monetary policy, customs, common commercial policy,
conservation of marine biological resources and negotiation of international agreements
when they involve an EU legislative act), and ―shared jurisdiction– with MS (internal
market; agriculture; fishing; economic and social cohesion; environment; consumer
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protection; European transport network; energy; freedom, security and justice). In the
areas of research and development, outer space, and as well development and
humanitarian aid, the EU has the competence to act independently, without taking away
the States´ ability to function independently.

At the institutional level, two institutions are recognized and formally incorporated in the
Union: the European Council and European Central Bank. Just as in the Constitutional
Treaty, the ―pillars‖ system established in Maastricht is also abolished under the Treaty of
Lisbon, which has repercussions for the institutional decision making process.
6.3.1.2 European Parliament
Herman van Rompuy,
President of the European Council.
Source: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
ewebeditpro4/upload/vanrompuy-officialpix2.jpg
The European Parliament is limited to 751 Members (MEPs), including its the President,
representing 492 million European citizens, compared with the previous figure of 785. The
European Parliament also strengthens its competences through the ordinary legislative procedure
(co-decision), with the result that it now works even more closely with the Commission and with
the Council when it comes to approving the EU budget.
6.3.1.3 European Council
The European Council is now formally integrated into the institutional framework of the EU,
and its main duty is to give the necessary overall political direction to the Union. It maintains its
―emergency brake‖ system, under which EU MS can block a decision by invoking fundamental
issues regarding their sovereignty. With this new Treaty, the European Council also has a
permanent President, with a two– and –a –half year term, renewable once. The impact of this new
post on Security and Defense issues will be analyzed in Chapter 3.
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6.3.1.4 Council of the European Union
Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
Source: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ewebeditpro4/upload/ashton-pix2.jpg
The Council represents the Member State governments and takes different configurations pending
on the issue to be discussed. With the Treaty of Lisbon, the General Affairs and External Relations
Council formally splits into two – a General Affairs Council and an External Relations Council. The
first will have the responsibility of working with the European Council and the Commission. The
Foreign Relations Council will deal exclusively with the External Relations of the Union, and will be
chaired by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
Another significant change in the Council is the new voting system, where qualified majority voting
(QMV) is applied in more areas, maintaining the current proportions. However, from November
1st, 2014 the rules will change and a decision must be approved by at least 55% of Member
States, representing 65% of the population.
6.3.1.5 The European Commission
José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission.
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/images/news/news_speeches_59.jpg
The European Commission is an autonomous body of the EU. Its main functions are to prepare and
submit to the European Parliament and the Council new legislative proposals, implementing its
decisions, and to ensure compliance with Community law, with the support of the European Court
of Justice. The Treaty of Lisbon details the powers of the Commission, but in general terms does
not alter them. What it does do is change the Commission´s configuration. Upon unanimous
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decision by the European Council, from 2014, the Commission should be reduced by 2 / 3 of the
number of Member States, including the President and the High Representative, allowing greater
consistency and efficiency. One other change in the Commission is that the High Representative is
also the Vice–President of the Commission, and his nomination –as Vice–President – has to be
approved by the Parliament. This whole construction is – at least – sui generis, when one
considers that the Lisbon Treaty is intended to reform and clarify the responsibilities of the Union.
In practice, the system created will require greater coordination and cooperation between
institutions. The existence of checks and balances could bring a greater consistency to EU policy
but, on the other hand, in the event of a crisis, could lead to paralysis. In the next chapter we will
analyze in depth the impact on Security and Defense issues.
You can read more about the European Institutional Framework here: http://europa.eu/about–
eu/institutions–bodies/index_en.htm
6.4 CHAPTER 3 - Impact on the Common Security and Defense
Policy
The analysis of the major changes introduced in the Security and Defense.
6.4.1.1 Major Changes
After having reviewed the most important changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, this section
will concentrate on the major changes introduced in the Security and Defense area.
Following the logic of the earlier analysis, we will start by addressing the differences between the
Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty, now focused on Security and Defense. In fact, the
French and Dutch rejection was not linked to the ESDP/CSDP. Thus most of the content of the
Constitutional Treaty remained unchanged in the Lisbon Treaty except in semantic terms.
In semantic terms, the Lisbon Treaty changes the ―European Security and Defense Policy‖ (ESDP)
to ―Common Security and Defense Policy‖ (CSDP). Also, the High Representative is now named
―High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy‖, being also the Vice–President of the
European Commission with responsibility – in the Commission – for the Commission´s External
Relations. Another important innovation – widely discussed – is the creation of ―Permanent
Structured Cooperation‖ in the security and Defense area. In addition, it includes the solidarity
151
clause and assistance clause, and creates an EU External Action Service. Later on we will focus on
each of these items in particular.
The Treaty also makes a specific reference to NATO, stating clearly that the CSDP should ―respect
the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common Defense realized in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)‖.
In addition to the Petersberg tasks, the Lisbon Treaty broadens the spectrum of missions that the
EU can undertake, such as joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military
advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace–keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces
in crisis management, including peace–making and post–conflict stabilization, including supporting
third countries in combating terrorism in their own territories. These new missions will provide
better alignment between the European Security Strategy – and its implementation report for
2008 – and the missions revitalized by the treaty.
Another innovation is the recognition of the legal personality of the Union. Not having an
immediate impact in the area of security and Defense, in the long run this change will allow the
Union to apply for membership of international organizations. We can only speculate on this issue,
but it allows the EU to become a UN member.
Regarding the decision–making process, and although the pillar structure is formally abandoned in
the Treaty, some safeguards have been taken regarding the decision–making process in the areas
of Foreign Policy and Security and Defense.
Another innovation is the inclusion in the Treaty of the European Defense Agency, which leads us
to conclude that Member States aim to strengthen the Agency´s role, in relation to the capacity
building of the Union.
6.4.1.2 Recommended Reading

―The impact of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP and ESDP‖, by Sophie Dagand, you can
download now.
– Click on the icon
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6.5 CHAPTER 4 - Major Challenges as Regards Implementation
An in–depth analysis of the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in the
areas of Security and Defense.
6.5.1.1 Introduction
In this chapter we intend to analyze the implications of the existence of a High Representative, the
establishment of an External Action Service of the Union with the solidarity and assistance clauses
as well as the Permanent Structured Cooperation, and to assess their impact on the EU CSDP.
6.5.1.2 The EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy
The High Representative (HR) will chair the Foreign Affairs Council, leading the dialogue on behalf
of the Union, expressing its position in international organizations. The High Representative will
also contribute with proposals in the area of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, giving consistency
and coherence to the Union´s Common Foreign and Security Policy. In the HR´s capacity as the
Commission´s Vice–President (VP), increased coordination with the Commission is expected.
Some issues may arise in this current configuration. The HR/VP is bound to follow the decisions of
the Council, has a hierarchical link with the President of the Commission, and, a political
responsibility before the Parliament, as Vice–President of the Commission. We can also reasonably
predict the amount of work that the High Representative and Vice–President of the Commission
will have. To deal with this issue, the HR/VP will have two deputies, one for the post of Vice–
President and one for the post of High Representative.
However, this current configuration will bring greater coherence to EU Foreign Policy, allowing the
Council and the Commission to work more closely, and, thereby, increasing the number of tools
and the consistency of the Union.
6.5.1.3 The European External Action Service (EEAS)
The creation of this new post of HR/VP, coordinating all the EU Foreign Policy, needed to be
supported by a single service that concentrated all the information regarding EU´s external
relations. Therefore, this is an indispensable tool for the HR/VP.
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The Lisbon Treaty does not define in great depth the skills or the organization of the Service,
stating briefly that the EEAS will be composed of officials from both the Commission and Council,
and will cooperate with the diplomatic missions of the Member States. We are expecting that the
Commission´s and the Council´s services dealing with external relations to be merged in the
EEAS. There are also currently around 128 EU delegations, which employ about 7000 staff,
representing the Union vis–á–vis third countries. These delegations will come into the External
Action Service, and it is expected that efficient lines of communications will be created between
them, as well as with the diplomatic missions of the Member States.
This new tool is expected to enhance both EU and MS diplomatic missions. EU Delegations are
expected to work with MS diplomatic missions, reinforcing the synergies between both entities. For
many MS do not have the capacity – e.g. due to their size – to have a diplomatic mission, the
EEAS can provide an antenna. Another possible approach is to co–locate/integrate certain services
of the External Action Service and diplomatic missions of Member States, thereby reducing the
number of support staff needed to operate a full mission (in theory multiplied by 27). Although a
concrete implementation model is still to be developed, and will surely have a variable geometry in
order to adapt to each case, it is likely intended to become a powerful tool that can be used both
by MS and by the EU as such.
As early as January 1st, all 136 Commission Delegations were renamed ―EU Delegations‖. Of those
136, 54 were already given new powers in line with the new names, taking on the role (previously
carried out by the national diplomatic mission of the Member State holding the six–month EU
presidency) of coordinating the work of the Member States´ diplomatic missions to those
countries. Similarly, the heads of these new delegations were also empowered to speak on behalf
of the EU as a whole. Eight of the new–model units are in Europe: Armenia, Georgia, Macedonia,
Moldova, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland and Ukraine. Twelve are in Asia and the Pacific Ocean area:
Afghanistan, Australia, China, East Timor, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Papua
New Guinea, Thailand and Vietnam.
Many more are in Africa: Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, the
Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast,
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda,
154
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zimbabwe and the
delegation to the African Union in Addis Ababa.
6.5.1.4 Assistance and Solidarity Clause
The Mutual Assistance Clause is defined thus by the Treaty: ―If a Member State is the victim of
armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of
aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and Defense policy of
certain Member States‖. In accordance with this article, MS have an obligation of aid and
assistance, but they may decide – internally – what kind of help to offer.
MS that also belong to NATO were not forgotten, the Treaty stating that ―commitments and
cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their
collective Defense and the forum for its implementation‖.
Unlike the provision of mutual assistance, which is automatic, the Solidarity Clause´s application
has to be triggered by a demand from the competent authorities of the State where a terrorist
attack or a natural or man–made disaster has taken place, in order to become effective. In this
case, the Council may decide by qualified majority, except where Defense issues are concerned, in
which it shall act unanimously.
The Solidarity Clause raises an interesting question. On the one hand, this clause is related to civil
protection units and assistance within the Union. Yet, what would be the scenario if a country were
so damaged by a terrorist attack or an earthquake that it needed military and police assistance?
There is no consensus among scholars regarding this issue, due to lack of details in the text of the
clause. This somewhat vague explanation also stems from a lack of unanimity among the Member
States, thus not contributing to the definition of the issue.
The Treaty of Lisbon does not change – by itself – the Union into a military alliance. The current
clauses are largely symbolic, and are useful because they clearly define the objective the EU wants
to achieve.
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6.5.1.5 CSDP Operations
At first glance the Lisbon Treaty has no implications for the development of CSDP operations.
However, after closer observation, we found two minor amendments.
The first appears to us in Article 42, paragraph 5, which states that the Council may ―entrust the
execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect
the Union´s values and serve its interests‖. Article 44 paragraph 1 states that these ―Member
States, in association with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy, shall agree among themselves on the management of the task‖.
The words ―entrusts the execution of a task‖ lead us to understand the planning and the definition
of command and control tasks hitherto performed by the Council. If this is also the Council´s
interpretation, we can say that it opens the door to a streamlining of procedures for Command and
Control. As we have seen in AKU6 – Planning Missions and Operations, this is still a very
bureaucratic and slow path, which by definition does not address the need for speed and
confidentiality needed in this process.
6.5.1.6 Permanent Structured Cooperation
One of the most debated issues within the academic community has been the creation, with the
Treaty of Lisbon, of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PermStrucCoop). The Lisbon Treaty
provides that ―Member States whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have
made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding
missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework‖.
For its creation, the Treaty does not provide any minimum number of participants, nor does it
provide any convergence criteria, opting for structural definition, and leaving to future negotiations
most of the details. On the structural definition, the Treaty states that PermStrucCoop is created
by a qualified–majority voting (QMV) decision of the Council. Once established, if a Member State
fails to comply with the criteria, participants may – also by QMV – arrange for its suspension.
However, in practice, all other decisions within PermStrucCoop will be taken unanimously.
The creation of this instrument is seen as the answer to some of the major problems of the EU in
the area of Defense. Currently the EU has around two million soldiers. However, it is estimated
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that only 10 to 15% are deployable for missions outside of Europe. The causes of this situation
have long been known, inter alia the low cost–effectiveness of capacity development at national
level, the existence of duplication in terms of the 27 Member States, even the existence of a large
number of conscripts who cannot serve outside the country, and almost no inter–operable means
of projection and strategic command and control. PermStrucCoop will allow a deepening of EU MS
integration in the areas of Defense, therefore allowing them to be more cost–efficient.
6.5.1.7 The creation of Permanent Structured Cooperation
Under the Treaty of Lisbon, within three months of notifying the Council by a group of MS
interested in developing deeper cooperation, and after the High Representative is heard, the
Council will act – by QMV – to establish PermStrucCoop. Any MS which later wants to join the
PermStrucCoop shall notify the Council and High Representative. The Council then – and after
consulting the High Representative – will act by QMV – to allow that MS into PermStrucCoop,
basing its decision in meeting the criteria of Articles 1 and 2 of the PermStrucCoop Protocol. With
this agreement no MS has a veto capability on the creation, inclusion or exclusion of another MS in
PermStrucCoop. All other decisions are taken by unanimity among the participants.
6.5.1.8 Institutional Structure of Permanent Structured Cooperation
As mentioned above, PermStrucCoop is established by the Council, but only the participating MS
have the ability to make decisions. Thus, we can only deduce that the MS not participating in the
PermStrucCoop may attend its meetings, but without voting power, like the Eurogroup in the
ECOFIN.
However, a pertinent question is the level of involvement in PermStrucCoop of the ESDP structures
established well before and kept within the Lisbon Treaty institutional architecture. What will be
the role of the Political and Security Committee and the European Union Military Staff in
PermStrucCoop? Similarly, only by analogy with the Eurogroup, the preparatory meetings of these
bodies in order to address issues related to the PermStrucCoop will have the participation of all
MS, but only those who are a part of the PermStrucCoop will be able to vote.
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6.5.1.9 Definition of Criteria for entry to Permanent Structured Cooperation
The definition of criteria for entry to permanent structured cooperation is hardly mentioned in
Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol 10 to the Treaty of Lisbon. In particular, paragraph 1 states that
PermStrucCoop
is
open
to
any
Member
State
that
is
committed
to:
(a) Proceeding more intensively to develop its Defense capacities through the development of its
national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main
European equipment programmes, and in the activity of the Agency in the field of Defense
capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defense Agency), and
(b) Having the capability to supply by 2010 at the latest, either at national level or as a component
of multinational force groups, targeted combat units for the missions planned, structured at a
tactical level as a battle group, with support elements including transport and logistics, capable of
carrying out the tasks referred to in Article 43 of the Treaty on European Union, within a period of
five to 30 days, in particular in response to requests from the United Nations Organization, and
which can be sustained for an initial period of 30 days and be extended up to at least 120 days.
The definitions – even if without great detail – of the targets in a) and b) are themselves quite
demanding. The first question we might raise is still about conditionality. Is it a) and b), or a) or
b)? Another interesting point is that the protocol does not specify the criteria for participation in
CSDP missions and operations, which means that PermStrucCoop will focus mainly on capacity–
building. By taking this option, EU keeps the door open for participation in CSDP missions and
operations of MS not participating in the PermStrucCoop.
6.5.1.10
The contribution of the European Defense Agency
The European Defense Agency will have a key role as regards capability–building within
PermStrucCoop. This agency has great potential to assist, define and monitor the criteria of the
PermStrucCoop. It´s expected that the EDA will be pivotal for the institutional implementation of
PermStrucCoop, similar to the role played by the Commission in controlling and monitoring the
convergence criteria of the euro zone.
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6.6 CHAPTER 5 - Conclusions and Reflections
In which direction is the Union going in the areas of security and Defense?
What might be its goals?
6.6.1.1 What´s next?
There is not much to be told about a treaty that has only now entered into force. However, it
seems important at this stage to provide some reflections on the possible future of European
integration. Firstly, one should note that the Lisbon Treaty does not aim at creating a State or a
European Super State, nor is it intended to be the last revision of the founding treaties. Therefore,
the Lisbon Treaty is not an end in itself but a means to achieve greater coherence in the
functioning of the European Union.
First, we would like to focus on how the fact of ―sharing‖ capabilities does not reduce, but
increases the sovereignty of States. Currently, many States have no capability to initiate an
operation of some duration on an independent basis. Therefore, the sovereignty issue is already
somewhat illusory. However, by sharing, the EU MS can develop skills, increase the efficiency of
their Defense budgets, and therefore, increase their capability to act. To this end, it seems
important to share Command and Control and Logistics Support structures.
From this viewpoint, the next step for the EU is the establishment of permanent Command and
Control facilities, which will support the growing number and diversity of CSDP missions and
operations. This will require solid command and control structures with a parallel, or integrated,
civilian component. This does not mean a ―zero–sum‖ EU relationship with NATO, nor do we
advocate a duplication of NATO structures in Europe, but rather an adjustment or a rationalization
of existing structures.
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6.6.1.2 Conclusions
EU Flag in the ATALANTA Operation.
Source: http://www.eunavfor.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2009/10/090714-EUFLAG.jpg
We would not like to conclude this AKU without stating some brief conclusions. The first one is that
there are three major constraints that will define the success (or failure) of the Treaty of Lisbon.
The first is the need to win the ―hearts and minds‖ of the Europeans. To this end, the EU must be
able to explain to its citizens the importance of the steps that we are now taking. Second, the
Union cannot isolate itself from NATO. The success of a future European Defense integration also
involves capacity building in partnership with NATO. Third, and most importantly, the Union must
continue to develop and strengthen its capacities for crisis management, showing that it is able to
cope with future challenges.
We would also like to point out that the development of a common security and Defense does not
necessarily require the development of a common foreign policy. The best example that the Union
has of this duality is the EULEX Mission in Kosovo. In this particular case, despite publicly known
differences in the foreign policy of the EU MS, divided between those who recognize and those who
do not recognize the sovereignty of Kosovo, the EULEX mission in Kosovo did not have encounter
objections from any MS. Therefore, when CFSP fails, CSDP may be the factor that unites EU MS as
a whole in terms of political motivation.
In conclusion, we believe that the Lisbon Treaty establishes a number of innovations in the field of
Common Foreign and Security Policy, and particularly in area of the Common Security and
Defense, both through the institutional approach and through the decision–making process. The
creation of a High Representative (with three ―hats‖), an External Action Service and Permanent
160
Structured Cooperation appear to be the most important innovations that will surely have a major
impact on the future of the European Union.
Recommended Reading

―European Defense beyond the Lisbon Treaty‖, pages 49 to 61 of the paper ―European
Defense in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty‖ by Bruno Angelet and Ioannis Vrailas, you can
download now.
– Click on the icon
161
7
AKU 8 – NON-PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND
THEIR
MEANS OF DELIVERY
7.1.1.1 General description
AKU8 deals with the current important aspects of non–proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, from a European perspective.
7.1.1.2 Learning Content
AKU8 will touch upon the following aspects of WMD non–proliferation:




Chapter 1 Risk and threat assessment at regional and international levels –
Overview of the current situation and prospects for nuclear, chemical, biological and ballistic
missile proliferation, with a brief analysis of motivations, characteristics and typical cases.
Chapter 2 Political and legal multilateral instruments – Presentation of the most
important WMD political and legal multilateral instruments relating to non–proliferation, and
description of their role, evolution, characteristics and perspectives.
Chapter 3 EU Policy against the Proliferation of WMD – Summary of the EU objectives
and policy in the field of non–proliferation, with an illustration of its positions, activities to
support implementation, and funding efforts worldwide.
Chapter 4 Export control regimes – Brief explanation of the international and European
export control regimes, differentiating between the international structures and the EU
structures relating to export controls and identifying the principles that govern an export control
regime. The chapter also highlights some of the most obvious improvements observed in the
European export control regime as progressively set up by the successive legal acts.
7.1.1.3 Selective Bibliography
7.2 A. Proliferation phenomenon
Joseph Cirincione et al., Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second
Edition Revised and Expanded, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2005
Shirley A. Kan, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues,
New York, Nova Science Publishers, 2010, page 85
162
Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, February 2, 2010
Internet resources:
UN

Security
Council
Resolution
1540
(2004) Select
full
text
from
http://www.un.org/docs/sc/unsc_resolutions04.html

Bulletin de l´Observatoire de la Non–Prolifération, CESIM


Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
The
Nonproliferation
Review,
James
Martin
Center
for
Nonproliferation
Studies
7.3 B. Nuclear proliferation
J.C. Archambault, C. Grand, X. Pasco, B. Sitt, Dynamique des pouvoirs proliférants – Pour une
nouvelle approche interdisciplinaire, Annuaire Français de Relations Internationales, Ed Bruylant,
Vol.3 (2002), pp. 591 – 613
Nuclear black markets: Pakistan and the rise of proliferation networks, a net assessment, IISS
report, May 2007
Scott
Sagan,
‗Why
Do
States
Build
Nuclear
Weapons?
Bomb‘, International Security, No. 3, Vol. 21, Winter 1996/97
Statutes of IAEA, NSG, INFCIRC 154, 166, 540, CTBT
Internet resources:

FAS Strategic Security Blog
163
Three
Models
in
Search
of
a

Global Security Newswire
7.4 C. Biological & chemical proliferation
Olivier Lepick et Patrice Binder, Les armes biologiques, Que sais–je?, PUF, 2001
Claude Meyer, L´arme chimique, Ellipse, 2001
Edward M.Spiers, Chemical and Biological Weapons, Reaktion Books, London, 2010, page 222
Patrick Berche, L´histoire secrète des guerres biologiques, 2009, Editions Robert Laffont
Statutes of BTWC and CWC
Internet resources:

ChemBio Weapons and WMD Terrorism News Archive
7.5 D. Ballistic missile proliferation
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Report No
10, 310 09 85 092009
Dennis Gormley, Missile Contagion, Greenwood Publishing, May 2008
Steven Hildreth, Iran´s Ballistic Missile Programs: an Overview, CRS report, February 2009
Iran´s Nuclear and Missile Potential, EastWest Institute report, 2009
Iran´s Ballistic Missile Capabilities. A Net Assessment, IISS report, 2010
Daniel A. Pinkston, The North Korean Missile Program, Strategic Studies Institute, February 2008
Mark Stokes and Yan Easton, Evolving Aerospace Trends in the Asia–Pacific Region, Project 2049
Institute, May 2010
Theodore Postol, A Technical Assessment of Iran´s Ballistic Missile Program, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology
164
Internet resources:

Stéphane Delory, État de la menace balistique des pays proliférants, Recherche &

Documents No 02/2010, FRS
Robert H. Schmucker and Markus Schiller, The DPRK Missile Show, A Comedy in
(Currently) Eight Acts (draft)

ArmsControl Wonk (blog) in Global Security Newswire

MTCR Guidelines
7.6 E. EU against the proliferation of WMD
Internet resources:


EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2003)
New lines for action by the European Union in combating the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and their delivery systems (December 2008)



Note on the implementation of the WMD clause (January 2009)
Council Decision 2010/212/CFSP of 29 March 2010 relating to the position of the European
Union for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non–Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons
European
Council
Conclusions
(June
2010)
Declaration on Iran, annex II, pages 14–15
7.7 F. Export Control Regimes
Quentin Michel, The evolution of weapons of mass destruction. Export control regime: from export
control list to catch–all clause, in Studia Diplomatica Vol. LIII–LV, no 5–6, 2002
Quentin Michel, The European Union Export Control Regime: Comment on the Legislation: article
by article, European Studies – Political Science Department – Faculty of Law and Political Science –
Liege University, January 2010
Internet resources:
165

Council Regulation No 428/2009 of 27 August 2009 setting up a Community regime for the

control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual–use items
European Commission – Trade, Dual use including links to the Member States´ national
authorities

Fact sheet, Dual–use export controls in the European Union, December 2009
7.8 CHAPTER 1 - Risk and threat assessment at regional and
international levels
Overview of the current situation and prospects for nuclear, chemical,
biological and ballistic missile proliferation, with a brief analysis of
motivations, characteristics and typical cases.
7.8.1.1 Introduction
The concept of „Weapons of Mass Destruction‟ (WMDs) came into being after World War II.
It was first used in 1947 by the United Nations Commission on Conventional Armaments to
distinguish so–called ―conventional‖ weapons from nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and
all weapons capable of producing comparable effects.
The concept has been strongly debated ever since, but has nevertheless been very widely
adopted. It should be noted that it entails a number of fine distinctions. WMDs are commonly
distinguished from the less lethal ―weapons of mass disruption‖, the typical example of which is a
radiological or ―dirty‖ bomb. Moreover, nuclear terrorism threat analyses distinguish in particular
between the acquisition of fissile material for the manufacture of an Improvised Nuclear Device
(IND) and the use of radiological materials for the manufacture of a dirty bomb or Radiological
Dispersal Device (RDD).
The concept of „Proliferation‟ is more recent. In the diplomatic language of the 1950s, the
terms ‗proliferation‘ and ‗dissemination‘ were used without distinction for both conventional and
non conventional weapons. It was not until the early 1960s, with the start of negotiations on the
Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), that the concept of proliferation became a major
international security issue. This led to the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution of 31
January 1992 proclaiming that WMD proliferation is ―a threat against peace and security‖. More
166
recently, proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery were recalled in UN Security Council
Resolution 1540 in 2004 and Resolution 1887 in 2009 as a ―threat to international peace and
security‖.
7.8.1.2 Motivations of proliferating countries
A variety of studies on the motivations leading a State to proliferate were conducted in the 1990s.
This was a decade that witnessed at once active implementation of non–proliferation measures
(signature of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993, effective since 1997, extension of the
Non–Proliferation Treaty for an indefinite period effective since 1995, and subsequent efforts
towards its universalisation, adoption of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards
Agreement, etc.), enforced disarmament and counter–proliferation action (disarmament of Iraq,
South Africa and Libya) and the emergence of a new wave of secondary proliferation, nuclear and
ballistic for the most part (Indian and Pakistani tests in 1998, North Korean ballistic and nuclear
tests, revelations on the existence of a proliferation network orchestrated by Pakistani scientist
A.Q. Khan, Iranian nuclear proliferation crisis, growth of ballistic proliferation in several regions of
the world, particularly in the Middle East and Northeast Asia, etc.).
The literature in English on the proliferation phenomenon (S. Sagan, K. Waltz, P. Lavoy, T. Ogilvy–
White in particular) has focused on the development of reference models and standards (security
standards, internal policies) that have been implemented in France since 1999.
GSPP approach identifies seven decisive factors:







National resources
Historical and strategic context
Type of political regime
Personal history and characteristics of the country´s leader
International dependencies and alliances
Internal power elites and mediators
Public opinion
These models and standards were based on a geo–socio–psycho–political (GSPP) approach
proposed by a special working group devoted to the analysis of the proliferation decision–making
dynamics within a proliferating State.
All the studies on WMD proliferation indicate the essentially regional nature of acquisition decisions
(Israel) and de–proliferation decisions (South Africa, Brazil and Argentina).
167
7.8.1.3 Nuclear proliferation: historical perspective
The history of nuclear proliferation can be divided into three periods:



1945 – 1970: Bilateral arms race, emergence of the nuclear proliferation threat, birth of
the nuclear non–proliferation regime;
1970 – 1991: Implementation of the nuclear non–proliferation regime;
1991 – 2010: New wave of nuclear proliferation, emergence of counter–proliferation
efforts.
7.8.1.4 Nuclear proliferation: current situation
The current situation regarding nuclear weapons can be summarized in three groups:
1. Nuclear weapon States (NWS) recognized as such by the NPT (States having conducted
nuclear tests prior to 1 January 1967), and parties to the NPT (USA, Russia, UK, France, and
China)
2. Non–nuclear weapon States (NNWS) having ratified the NPT (currently 184 States),
including some non–nuclear States protected under a security umbrella within the framework of an
alliance with a nuclear State (NATO members, Japan, South Korea) and non–nuclear States in
Nuclear Weapon–Free Zones (NWFZ) – the entire southern hemisphere is currently covered by
NWFZ agreements. North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, but the grounds
for invoking the withdrawal clause in Article X of the NPT are still subject to controversy.
3. Nuclear weapon States not having signed the NPT – often referred to as de–facto nuclear
powers (Israel, India and Pakistan).
7.8.1.5 Nuclear proliferation: global characteristics
The nuclear proliferation phenomenon exhibits five global characteristics:
1. A multifactor phenomenon (motivations): There is no single nuclear proliferation factor, but
rather a combination of factors to be considered until successful nuclear testing has been
conducted. Since 1942, a total of approximately 30 States have seriously considered equipping
themselves with nuclear weapons at one point or another, and half of them have made significant
investments for this purpose.
168
2. A reversible phenomenon (most frequent case): Cases of de–proliferation are considerably
more frequent than cases of proliferation. Here again, multiple factors are involved: international
law and the need to be recognized as a responsible international actor within the international
community, pressure from an allied country (South Africa), peaceful regime change (South Africa),
cost and feasibility of nuclear programmes (Indonesia), pressure and internationally enforced
disarmament (Iraq), internal opposition (Sweden), etc.
3. A complex phenomenon (mechanisms): The new wave of nuclear proliferation since the 1980s,
identified with the disclosure of the A.Q. Khan network, has shed light on the complexity of the
phenomenon. The questions now considered concern funding, financial transactions, industrial
connections and the dissemination of scientific knowledge and technologies in a world far more
open than it was 20 years ago as a result of globalization.
4. Importance of the national resources factor: At global level, the nuclear proliferation
phenomenon is essentially linked to the possibility of acquiring fissile material, and to the
possibility of acquiring and developing associated technologies. Nuclear proliferation programmes
require extensive mobilization of critical national resources for many decades: human resources
(top–level scientists and industrialists), infrastructures and equipment, funding, energy, and time.
This situation increases the importance of the national resources factor when analyzing the
phenomenon. Therefore, the suspicions or even allegations of proliferation (as is currently the case
with Myanmar) associated with the renewed interest in civil nuclear energy among a number of
States (edge strategy) need to be put very much in perspective. Moreover, once a country has
acquired nuclear weapons, it will still need to allocate a large amount of its national resources
annually to maintain its nuclear arsenal, to secure it and keep it safe, and to train its strategic
forces.
5. An essentially subjective phenomenon (analysis of standpoints): Nuclear proliferation is
considered as a risk (report submitted by Henry Stimson in 1945) or a threat (Western position
since the end of the Cold War). Nuclear proliferation is part of a standpoint? And can be used as an
argument and an instrument.
7.8.1.6 Nuclear proliferation: ongoing crises
When assessing nuclear risks and threats at regional level, three ongoing crises are identified:
169
Open proliferation path: Iran
Iran is a classic example of a country suspected of nuclear and ballistic proliferation, in violation of
its obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions and under the terms of the safeguards
agreements concluded with the IAEA. The development of Iran´s ―civil‖ nuclear programme is
based on a framework of nuclear proliferation: its uranium enrichment equipment (IR–1
centrifuges) was acquired from the Khan network in the 1990s, and its enrichment efforts are
themselves in violation of four successive UN Security Council resolutions calling for a cessation of
operations. Iran´s nuclear programme, declared as geared toward civilian needs (fuel intended for
the planned Darkhovin plant), could actually cover a military programme intended to produce
limited quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU). IAEA inspection efforts have led to the
following conclusions:
 First of all, on–site inspections of Iran´s declared uranium enrichment facilities
revealed no violations of NPT obligations since 2003.
 Secondly, the implementation of an undeclared production strategy in violation of
the safeguards agreements (modified code 3.1) was revealed by the discovery
of the Fordow site.
 Finally, strong suspicions remain regarding the development of a military
programme (project 111 devoted to nuclear weapon–directed activities, signs of
a covert programme for producing a nuclear weapon, etc.).
The Iranian nuclear proliferation strategy seems to be based on acquiring the expertise needed to
enrich uranium to weapon–grade levels, while simultaneously acquiring knowledge of how to build
a nuclear weapon. The different steps adopted (3.5% enrichment for civilian fuel production, and
subsequent production of 20% enriched uranium ostensibly to fuel research reactors) may be
precursors to achieving a nuclear threshold capability. In any case, such ambiguities illustrate the
loopholes in the current IAEA comprehensive safeguards system (by which a large number of
States are still bound). The implementation of the additional protocol and the modified code 3.1.
would give much stronger assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and
materials.
170
Syria
Syria emerged as a potential nuclear proliferator after the destruction of a suspect site by the
Israeli Air Force at Deir Al Zour on 6 September 2007. The site was allegedly home to a nuclear
reactor in construction, of North Korean origin, designed to produce plutonium. Syria agreed to an
on–site IAEA inspection with great reluctance, after leveling the site. The inspection, combined
with the verification of declared facilities, revealed the presence of undeclared androgenic nuclear
material. The Syrian authorities continue to refuse to cooperate with the IAEA in order to identify
the origin of the uranium particles found at the Deir Al Zour site. They also refuse to cooperate on
the issue of relations with North Korean entities and on the origin of certain equipment observed at
the Deir Al Zour site. The IAEA is still forbidden access to sites adjacent to Deir Al Zour. Finally,
the inspections conducted in the MNSR facility have compelled Syria to reveal the undeclared
acquisition of uranyl nitrate (resulting from the purification of yellow cake, used to produce
uranium tetrafluoride).
Nuclear proliferation outside the framework of the NPT: North Korea
North Korea is an example another classic case, that of nuclear proliferation outside the framework
of the NPT. North Korea has been developing a nuclear programme since the 1960s. In 1992, it
ratified the NPT but did not allow the necessary safeguards. The framework agreement of 1994
made it possible to determine the progress of the North Korean nuclear programme and to
partially interrupt its development (the investigations conducted led to the identification of
activities relating to the production of plutonium but did not eliminate doubts about the production
171
of enriched uranium). With the implementation of the KEDO programme, it was believed for a long
time that North Korea perceived its nuclear programme as a tool for national preservation, as well
as a negotiating tool (the dismantling of uranium production infrastructures having been
associated with the creation of a civil nuclear programme and with the implementation of an
economic assistance programme to prevent the collapse of the regime). However, North Korea´s
withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 (justified by the hardening of the US position in response to
Pyongyang´s violations), the two nuclear tests conducted in 2006 and 2009, and North Korea´s
inflexibility throughout the six–party negotiation process all tend to show the importance of
nuclear weapon possession for the stability and the survival of the regime, and the durability of
the Kim dynasty. Moreover, this crisis further illustrates China´s ambiguous behavior vis–à–vis the
nuclear proliferation phenomenon. Finally, the case of North Korea shows that the poorest nations
have the minimum capacity required to develop technologies allowing the production of nuclear
devices with outside help. The exact origin of these devices remains to be demonstrated, with
various signs suggesting the possibility of technological cooperation with other nuclear States.
7.8.1.7 Nuclear proliferation: medium and long–term risks
When considering medium – and long–term nuclear proliferation risks, very close attention must
be paid to proliferation contagion and the domino effect. This applies particularly in:


the Middle East in the event of Iranian acquisition of a nuclear first–strike capability (e.g.
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey), and
Southeast Asia (possibly) in the light of the evolving strategic balance in the region
(weakening of US safeguard policies in particular, and emergence of a more aggressive Chinese
position).
7.8.1.8 Chemical proliferation
While nuclear proliferation requires large specific investments, chemical and biological proliferation
can take advantage of existing industrial and academic assets and can become rampant.
Nevertheless, the problem in the chemical field is quite different from the problem in the biological
field, owing largely to the fact that the Chemical Weapons Convention has a dedicated regime of
verification implemented by an international organization (Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons – OPCW).
172
The destruction of declared stocks of chemical
weapons
and
infrastructure
used
for
the
production of prohibited chemical products is not
sufficient
to
eliminate
all
risks.
Moreover,
scientific developments increase the challenge
posed
by
industrial
facilities
with
a
low
Other Chemical Production Facilities
(OCPF)
Definition given in the CWC: ―facilities that over
the past calendar year have synthetically
produced over 200 tones of defined organic
chemical compounds not listed in a table;
facilities comprising one or more plants that
over the past calendar year have synthetically
produced over 30 tones of a defined organic
chemical compound not listed in a table and
containing phosphorous, sulfur or fluorine‖.
proliferation potential. This is particularly the case with production facilities not producing
substances that are prohibited (toxic agents) or subject to inspection (precursors) and facilities
producing low quantities of such substances. It is currently estimated that out of 5,225 such
facilities, identified as Organic Chemical or Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPF) in the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 10 to 15% possess technical characteristics making them
potentially usable for proliferation purposes. The globalization of chemical production systems and
the development of systems facilitating mass production within smaller infrastructures (i.e. multi–
criteria facilities, micro–reactors) significantly accentuate the problem.
7.8.1.9 Chemical proliferation: new threats
The associated risks are increasing mainly because the technologies implemented are creating new
prospects for misuse. Combinatorial chemistry (which consists in combining molecules to create
new ones) is undergoing a revolution because of the implementation of high–throughput screening
and parallel synthesis methods. Moreover, the toxicity of compounds coming from combinatorial
chemistry can be tested quickly by using lab–on–a–chip devices. In addition, the use of micro–
reactors, which are very small, and basic production units could facilitate the implementation of
highly furtive programmes. Thus, in addition to the existing threat of nations illicitly building up
chemical warfare agent stocks, a wide spectrum of new threats is emerging. For instance, the
synthesis of new chemical agents, possibly produced with precursors not subject to inspection by
the OPCW, may bypass the verification procedures.
7.8.1.10
Chemical proliferation: allegations
There are strong allegations that Syria is pursuing an offensive chemical programme. There were
also allegations that Iran, which is a State Party of the CWC (and also the BTWC), has a stock of
vesicant and possibly neurotoxic agents, and is pursuing a vectorization strategy in cooperation
with Syria. China and Myanmar are also subject to recurring suspicions, as is North Korea, which is
173
still suspected of possessing the most extensive chemical warfare programme, and which has
allegedly vectorized various types of agents on ballistic missiles.
7.8.1.11
Biological proliferation
In the bio and bio–synthetic area, advances in genetic engineering and chemical synthesis of
genes and whole genomes might allow the creation of novel organisms in the future.
The use of biotechnologies is less and less limited (e.g. high–tech companies and
pharmaceutical industries). The rapid pace of scientific developments in the field of biotechnology
is increasing the risk of diversion (for example, in the bio and biosynthetic area, the use of high–
potential sequencers could allow the development of new biochemical warfare agents). The
application of biotechnologies in the military sphere is probably no longer beyond the reach of
States which would illicitly embark on the development of biological warfare programmes.
However, this is still not the case for non–governmental terrorist groups.
The BTWC does not yet have any verification regime. BTWC States Parties have agreed to
put confidence–building measures in place, which are submitted annually on a voluntary basis and
are intended to increase transparency and confidence between States Parties.
The number of countries possibly engaged in developing biological weapons remains
limited. A number of States located in unstable regions have not yet ratified the BTWC, causing
concern to the international community (e.g. some think–tanks are of the opinion that Syria and
Egypt may possess stocks of vectorized agents). However, there is no reliable evidence proving
that both countries have successfully weaponized biological agents in an effective delivery
system).
7.8.1.12
Ballistic missile proliferation
Ballistic missile proliferation has been defined as a ―threat to international peace and security‖ by
UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1887 and by several UNGA Resolutions, especially those
referring to The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (commonly
abbreviated HCOC). UN Security Resolution 1929 (2010) also addresses ballistic missile
proliferation in Iran. Ballistic missiles developed or acquired by proliferating countries tend to
affect regional balances considerably. Such States often attempt to acquire more substantial
174
indigenous design and production capabilities (i.e. allowing evolution and adaptation of missile
forces) before adopting positions likely to significantly transform the established relationship with
major powers. In most proliferating States, reverse engineering of SCUD missiles has served as
the foundation for implementing the first such industrial programmes. As for Pakistan, it received
assistance from China on more sophisticated missile systems (M–9 and M–11).
Progress in acquiring indigenous industrial capabilities is clearly perceptible in North Korea and
Iran.
The liquid–fuelled ballistic missiles currently in service in Iran (Shahab–1 and 2 based on SCUD–B
and C technology, and Shahab–3 and Ghadr–1 based on North Korean No–Dong technology) are
more or less copies of North Korean models. In the field of solid fuel, over the past 25 years Iran
has procured a series of licensed solid–propellant production lines and developed an indigenous
industrial infrastructure that is robust and capable, accumulating the knowledge needed to support
future endeavors. The rapid growth of Iranian expertise in both ballistic and space programmes,
which are, to some extent, dual activities, strongly suggests the existence of at least initial
cooperation with foreign entities. States not benefiting from such extended foreign assistance
experience genuine difficulties when attempting to modernize their missiles at national level, most
of them being technically incapable of surpassing SCUD technology. It is nevertheless probable
that the growing demand from supposedly non–proliferating States for in–depth conventional
strike capabilities is contributing to promoting the proliferation of missile technologies. The most
blatant example of this is the cooperation between China and Turkey on a short–range ballistic
missile system (P–611).
North Korea´s development of an intercontinental range missile (Taepo Dong–2) remains erratic,
and Iran barely has the industrial capacity to develop delivery vehicles capable of reaching the
fringes of the European continent (2500 km). A genuine threat is nevertheless emerging at
regional level, particularly in the Persian Gulf. However, the main objective of proliferating States
may be first and foremost to achieve strategic dissuasion against nations perceived as hostile,
rather than to acquire battlefield capability. In this respect, it is imperative to increase the
constraints on the dissemination of missile technologies and to strengthen treaties and regimes
dedicated to those constraints. Technical constraints associated with the design of medium–range
175
ballistic missiles (3000–4000 km) remain for the moment an extremely limiting factor for
proliferating States and have a very negative impact on their programme development.
7.8.1.13
Cruise missiles
Finally, it should be stressed that the risks of proliferation of cruise missile technology have been
largely
underestimated
although
these
weapon systems
are
capable
of
delivering
both
conventional and non–conventional payloads (nuclear, chemical or biological). The number of
indigenous developments of such systems in proliferating States is increasing regularly; the
performances of those new cruise missiles (performance and payload) could very well affect
regional balances in the coming decades.
7.9 CHAPTER 2 - Political and legal multilateral instruments
Presentation of the most important multilateral political and legal
instruments relating to WMD non–proliferation, with their role, evolution,
characteristics and perspectives.
7.9.1.1 Nuclear Non–Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
The Nuclear Non–Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a landmark international treaty. It recognizes the P5
(China, France, Russia, the UK and the US) as nuclear–weapon States. All other signatories
undertake not to acquire nuclear weapons. In return all parties commit to general and complete
disarmament (with no time frame) and all parties have the right to develop nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes. These three mutually reinforcing ―pillars‖ constitute the NPT´s ―grand bargain‖
in order to:



Prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology;
Further the goal of achieving general and complete disarmament pursuant to Article VI of
the NPT;
Promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. In total, 189 countries have
joined the Treaty, as of June 2010 (Taiwan has also adhered to the Treaty but is not officially
counted).
176
7.9.1.2 NPT Review Conference (NPT RevCon)
The NPT Review Conference (RevCon) is a five–yearly meeting at which signatories review
progress made since the previous RevCon and agree on action to strengthen the Treaty´s
implementation. The 2010 RevCon took place in New York from 3 to 28 May and a Final Document
was agreed, with an action plan which, for the first time, presented concrete proposals on all three
pillars of the Treaty. The adoption of a final Document was in itself a success. It reiterated the
commitment of the whole international community to the international non–proliferation regime.
Since it entered into force, the NPT has served the world well. The number of States with nuclear
weapons remains in single digits and global stocks of nuclear weapons are at their lowest since the
1950s. However, the NPT has come under unprecedented pressure. Most countries believe that the
original grand bargain on which the NPT was founded remains fit for purpose and is the basis for a
win/win outcome for all NPT States parties. The 2005 RevCon was widely perceived to be a failure,
as no final document was agreed. The 2010 RevCon marked both a reaffirmation of the States
parties´ collective commitment to the Treaty and its core principles and a balanced mandate for
action to strengthen the NPT.
7.9.1.3 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
The IAEA is a UN agency
created in 1957 (click on the
icon for the IAEA website).
Following the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non–Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968,
the IAEA became the instrument for verifying that the ―peaceful use‖ commitments made under
the NPT or similar agreements are kept, through performing what is known as its ―safeguards‖
role.
Under the NPT, governments around the world have committed to three common objectives:
preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; pursuing nuclear disarmament; and promoting
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT has made it obligatory for the entire non–nuclear
weapon States Parties to submit all nuclear material in nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards, and
to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency.
177
Safeguards are a set of activities by which the IAEA seeks to verify that a State is living up to its
international undertakings not to use nuclear programmes for nuclear weapon purposes. The
safeguards system is based on assessment of the correctness and completeness of the State´s
declarations to the IAEA concerning nuclear material and nuclear–related activities. States enter
into safeguards agreements with the IAEA, submitting nuclear materials, facilities and activities to
the scrutiny of IAEA´s safeguards inspectors. IAEA verification helps to provide assurance that
such items are not diverted or misused in order to assemble nuclear weapons and that no items
required to be declared under safeguards are undeclared. This, in turn, helps to allay security
concerns among States with respect to the development of nuclear weapons.
The IAEA´s safeguards system aims to provide assurance not only that declared material is not
diverted, through more effective international safeguards, but also to provide assurance that there
are no undeclared nuclear activities.
7.9.1.4 IAEA Effective Safeguards
Under a safeguards system that is based on
INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) alone, the capability of the
IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities is
limited.
IAEA
inspections
have
focused
on
declared nuclear material, and were centered on
strategic
points
in
declared
facilities.
The
developments in the 1990s prompted the IAEA
to
develop
and
implement
new
measures
Strengthening the Effectiveness and
Efficiency of Safeguards
The discovery in the early 1990s of a
clandestine nuclear weapons development
programme in Iraq demonstrated the need to
further strengthen the IAEA safeguards system
in order to increase the likelihood of detecting
possible undeclared nuclear activities. Also
prompting such improvements was the
experience gained in verifying South Africa´s
dismantlement of its nuclear weapons
programme, and the verification challenges
encountered in the Democratic People´s
Republic of Korea (DPRK).
designed to improve its ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and nuclear–related activities.
The strengthened safeguards system, based on ―comprehensive‖ safeguards agreements and
―additional protocols‖ to those agreements, has established a new and higher standard for
effective, cooperative verification of States´ nuclear undertakings.
Under an Additional Protocol (based on INFCIRC/540 (corr.)), which is the key to the strengthened
safeguards system, a State is required to provide the IAEA with broader information covering all
aspects of activities relating to its nuclear fuel cycle, including research and development and
uranium mining. States must also grant the Agency broader access rights and enable it to use the
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most advanced verification technologies. Specific measures provided for in an Additional Protocol
include:





Information about, and access to, all aspects of States´ nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium
mines to nuclear waste and any other locations where nuclear material intended for non–nuclear
uses is present;
Short–notice inspector access to all buildings on a nuclear site;
Information on the manufacture and export of sensitive nuclear–related technologies and
inspection mechanisms for manufacturing and import locations;
Access to other nuclear–related locations;
Collection of environmental samples beyond declared locations when deemed necessary by
the IAEA.
With wider access, broader information and better use of technology, the Agency´s capability
to detect and deter undeclared nuclear material or activities is significantly improved. For that
reason, successive IAEA Directors General have underlined, most recently at the 2010 NPT Review
Conference, that without an Additional Protocol, the Agency cannot do its work in a credible
manner.
Ultimately the strength of the IAEA safeguards system depends upon three interrelated elements:



The extent to which the IAEA is aware of the nature and locations of States´ nuclear and
nuclear–related activities;
The extent to which IAEA inspectors have physical access to relevant locations for the
purpose of providing independent verification of the exclusively peaceful intent of a State´s
nuclear programme;
The will of the international community, through the United Nations Security Council, to
take action against States that are not complying with their safeguards commitments to the
IAEA.
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7.9.1.5 Comprehensive Nuclear–Test–Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The Comprehensive Nuclear–Test–Ban Treaty (CTBT) was signed in 1996, although the CTBT has
been signed by 182 States and ratified by 153, it has still not entered into force. It will enter into
force when the 44 countries possessing nuclear research reactors and electronuclear power plants
on their territory will have ratified it. To date, China, Iran, Israel, and the United States are among
the countries that have signed but not yet ratified the treaty. The DPRK, India, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia and Syria have not signed the treaty. It prohibits all nuclear explosions and establishes an
extensive verification regime to monitor compliance with this obligation. The CTBT Organization´s
Preparatory Commission (comprising the Signatory States) and Provisional Technical Secretariat
are based in Vienna. Work is underway on building the International Treaty Monitoring System
consisting of seismic, hydro-acoustic, infrasound and radionuclide
stations and an on-site inspection capability.
Further details of the Treaty and its current status can be found on the CTBTO website (Click the
icon).
7.9.1.6 The Fissile Material Cut–off Treaty (FMCT)
Negotiations have not yet been launched on a treaty; such an agreement might prohibit the
production of fissile material for nuclear explosives and the production of such material outside of
international safeguards. Such a treaty might extend verification measures to fissile material
production facilities (i.e. enrichment and reprocessing) that are not currently subject to
international monitoring. An FMCT ban on un–safeguarded production of fissile material would
place a quantitative constraint on the amount of fissile material available for use in nuclear
weapons.
In December 1993, the UN General Assembly passed a consensus resolution (48/75L) on cut–off,
calling for the negotiation of a ―non–discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively
verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices‖. The resolution called for the IAEA to provide assistance in examining
verification arrangements. In March 1995, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) agreed by
consensus to establish an Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate to negotiate a cut–off treaty based
on the 1993 UN General Assembly resolution. In 2009, all parties at the Disarmament Conference
180
agreed on a Working Programme and in May 2010, at the Non–proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review
Conference, NPT parties reaffirmed the urgent need to negotiate and conclude the treaty called for
in 1993.
7.9.1.7 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) supplements the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) – see Article IX.
The CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997, and is often regarded as one of the most successful
disarmament
and
non–proliferation
treaties
currently
in
existence.
The
CWC
bans
the
development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and requires the destruction of
existing weapons or stockpiles by fixed deadlines under strict international monitoring and
verification procedures. It also prohibits the use as weapons of any chemical substance, including
industrial ones.
As of June 2010, 188 States have acceded to the CWC, with only 7 States (Signatory Parties:
Israel, Myanmar; non–State Parties: DPRK, Somalia, Angola, Syria and Egypt) remaining outside
of the regime. One third of the 8.6 million chemical munitions and containers covered by the
Convention and one third of the world´s declared stockpile of approximately 71,000 metric tons of
chemical agent have been verifiably destroyed. The US and Russia hold the biggest stockpiles to
be destroyed. The latest deadline by which declared chemical weapon stockpiles must be
destroyed is 29 April 2012, although now it is known that this deadline will not be met.
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is the implementing body of the
CWC. The OPCW is responsible for ensuring that the provisions of the CWC are implemented,
including those on international verification of compliance with the Convention, and for providing a
forum for consultation and
cooperation
Parties.
181
between
States
Further information on the CWC and the work of the OPCW can be found on the OPCW website
(click on the icon).
7.9.1.8 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which supplements the Geneva Protocol,
entered into force on 26 March 1975. The 1925 Geneva Protocol (Protocol for the Prohibition of the
Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare)
prohibited the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare. The Protocol was drawn up and
signed at the conference for the supervision of international trade in arms and ammunition, which
was held in Geneva under the auspices of the League of Nations from 4 May to 17 June 1925, and
it entered into force on 8 February 1928. As of June 2010, there are 163 States Parties, 13
Signatory States, and 19 non–State Parties. The BTWC effectively prohibits the development,
production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of biological and toxin weapons and is a key
element in the international community´s efforts to address the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
The 6th Review Conference in December 2006 agreed an Intercessional Work Programme 2007–
2010
to
strengthen
the
Convention.
Annual
meetings
discuss
and
promote
common
understandings on national implementation (2007), bio-safety and bio-security, awareness–
raising, education, outreach and codes of conduct (2008), capacity building in the fields of disease
surveillance, detection, diagnosis and containment of infectious diseases (2009), and assistance in
cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons (2010). The BTWC 7th Review Conference
(RevCon) in 2011 will consider renewing this intercessional work programme. The annual meetings
are chaired in rotation by representatives of the three recognized BTWC regional groups (Non–
Aligned Movement – NAM, Eastern European Group – EEG, and Western European and Others
Group – WEOG)). The 6th Review Conference also agreed to create and fund an Implementation
Support Unit (ISU) within the Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) of the United Nations Office
in Geneva. The ISU is to support the work of States Parties:



During the 2007 – 2010 Intercessional process;
In the comprehensive implementation and universalisation of the Convention;
Through the exchange of confidence–building measures (CBMs).
182
The 7th RevCon in 2011 presents an opportunity to further strengthen the convention and
will, in this regard, allow States Parties to consider key issues such as progress made on the
implementation of their obligations under the Convention and new scientific and technological
developments relevant to the Convention. The RevCon will also provide an opportunity to look at
the Implementation Support Unit´s performance and consider renewing its mandate. States
Parties are tasked to consider the intercessional work programme and the outcome of the four
annual rounds of meetings and decide on any further action. Finally, the 6th Review Conference
agreed that the implementation of the CBMs merited further comprehensive attention at the
Seventh Review Conference. More information about the BTWC and ISU can be found
at http://www.unog.ch.
7.9.1.9 The Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC)
There is no treaty regulating ballistic missile proliferation. However, the HCoC, brought into effect
in 2002, is one of the very few multilateral instruments dealing with ballistic missile proliferation.
130 States are already signatories of the Code. Its aim is to bolster efforts to curb ballistic missile
proliferation worldwide. It is not an export control regime, but a voluntary international instrument
instituting transparency–building measures (TCBMs) and confidence–building measures (CBMs);
these include the submission of annual declarations detailing a subscribing State´s annual activity
in the field of ballistic missiles and space launches. The second part of the CBM is the submission
of pre–launch notifications (PLNs) before the launch of a ballistic missile or space launch vehicle.
This provides information on the date, direction and launch of the missile or the space launch
vehicle. The HCoC does not cover cruise missiles. It is intended to supplement, not supplant, the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), as it has a very different purpose: the MTCR is an
export control regime; the HCOC is an international code of conduct with transparency and
confidence–building measures.
The HCOC was approved by UN General Assembly resolutions 60/62 in 2005 and 63/64 in 2008.
Indeed, a resolution supporting the Code is traditionally adopted every two years at the UNGA (the
last traditional UNGA Resolution on the HCOC was adopted in 2008).
The United States has regularly provided the HCOC with annual reports but it has never supplied
PLNs, and Moscow stopped notifying HCOC members of its ballistic missile launches in 2008.
183
However, the United States has recently agreed (May 2010) to provide PLNs for the majority of its
ballistic missile and satellite launches.
The HCoC does not formally employ staff, nor does it have a budget. However, Austria serves as
the
Immediate
Central
Contact
(Executive
Secretariat)
and
therefore
coordinates
HCOC
information exchange. The current Chair of the Code is France which will conduct outreach
activities on behalf of the subscribing States, in order to promote the Code and its universalisation.
This will include efforts to increase compliance with the confidence–building measures and to
increase membership (as of June 2010, 130 countries had subscribed). More information can be
found atwww.hcoc.at.
7.9.1.10
G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and
Materials of Mass Destruction
The G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction was
set up at the G8 Summit in 2002 as a 10–year initiative to address non–proliferation,
disarmament, counter–terrorism and nuclear safety issues. The G8 committed to rise up to USD
20 billion. Although the initial focus was on Russia and Ukraine, projects have been progressively
undertaken globally and with support from some 14 non-G8 partners. The 2009 G8 summit in
L´Aquila released a statement on non–proliferation
7.9.1.11
– Click on the icon
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was launched by President Bush in Krakow in May 2003,
as a fresh element in the international community´s efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials. The increasingly aggressive
efforts by proliferators to stand outside or to circumvent existing non–proliferation norms, and to
profit from such trade, continually require new and stronger action by the international
community.
The PSI seeks to involve all States that have the ability and willingness to take steps to stop the
illicit trafficking of such items at sea, in the air, or on land. All actions taken in support of PSI are
consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law, existing treaties, regimes
and frameworks, including United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.
184
The PSI is not a formal institution, nor is it a treaty organization. PSI participants are committed to
a set of interdiction principles to improve their efforts to impede and stop shipments of WMD,
delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non–state actors of
proliferation concern.
PSI
Supporting
Activities
Besides actual collaborative interception of illicit
WMD-related
The
Statement
of
Interdiction
Principles, agreed in Paris in September 2003,
calls
on
all
nations
concerned
with
WMD
trafficking to:






Undertake effective measures, either
alone or in concert with other states, for
interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD–
related cargo
Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid
exchange of relevant information
Work to strengthen their relevant
national legal authorities to accomplish these
objectives
and
work
to
strengthen
international law and frameworks
Board and search suspect vessels flying
their flags, and consent under the appropriate
circumstances to the boarding and searching
of their own flag vessels by other states
Require suspect aircraft that are
transiting their airspace to land for inspection,
and deny aircraft transit rights through their
airspace
Prevent their ports, airfields, or other
facilities from being used as transshipment
points for WMD–related cargo.
As
of
June
2010,
97
countries
have
expressed their support for this statement of
principles.
trafficking,
PSI
participants
undertake a range of supporting activities: they
have been participating in exercises - principally
but not exclusively military in nature - both to
demonstrate
collective
interdictions
and
to
will
to
develop
undertake
their
own
capabilities to conduct the full range of activities
associated with interdictions. Around four major
exercises are conducted each year, with a major
gaming exercise about every eighteen months.
Workshops with industry are held about once a
year. These activities are overseen by the
Operational Experts Group (OEG), a group of 20
countries (soon to be 21) including 10 EU
Member States, which brings together officials
from the Ministries of Defense, the Armed
Forces, and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs,
legal advisers, law enforcement officers and
Intelligence representatives. The OEG meets
once
a
issues,
year
to
discuss
including
legal,
proliferation-related
law
enforcement,
intelligence and exercise planning. The most
recent OEG was held in Miami in May 2009 and
185
the next one will be in Japan in September 2010.
7.9.1.12
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540
In 2004, the United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, adopted the first Security
Council Resolution devoted to non–proliferation: UNSCR 1540. UNSCR 1540 calls on UN member
states to enact legislation and to take effective measures to prevent non–State actors, and
terrorist groups in particular, from obtaining weapons of mass destruction. UNSCR 1540 also
obliges States to report on measures they have taken to fulfill the substantive requirements of the
resolution. In addition, UNSCR 1540 established an ad hoc committee (―the 1540 Committee‖) to
receive States´ reports and in turn to report to the Security Council on implementation of the
resolution.
Select here the full text of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 of 2004
– Click on the
icon
7.9.1.13
Other multilateral instruments relating to WMD non–
proliferation
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the global standard–setter on countering money
laundering and terrorist financing. There are 40 standards on money laundering (ML) and 9 special
recommendations on terrorist financing (TF). The 34 FATF members (as of June 2010) are
assessed on their compliance with the standards through a peer review process. The FATF has not
set standards on proliferation financing (PF) but in 2008 its mandate was expanded beyond money
laundering and terrorist finance to consider other emerging threats, including PF.
In February 2010, the plenary adopted a report on the fight against proliferation financing. At the
plenary session in Amsterdam (June 2010), the FATF decided to work on an Action Plan on the
basis of the proposals in the report. The FATF is currently considering this issue and work is
ongoing. More details can be found on the FATF website at: http://www.fatf–gafi.org/
Multilateral instruments relating to export control: a number of multilateral instruments
relating to export control have a bearing on international transfers of WMDs and their means of
186
delivery, as well as of WMD–related materials, equipment and technologies. While these
instruments will be discussed in Chapter 4, it is worth briefly mentioning now:




The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG): set up in 1992 (and derived from the London Club
created in 1985), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a group of 46 nuclear supplier countries
(as of June 2010) that seek to limit nuclear proliferation through the implementation of two sets
of guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear–related exports.
The Zangger Committee (ZC) formed in 1971 as an informal group with 37 members
(as of June 2010), all of which are party to the Nuclear Non–Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and
members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The ZC was formed out of a desire by major
nuclear suppliers to reach a common understanding of how to implement the NPT clause on the
transfer of fissionable material and/or related equipment or technologies.
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR): created in 1987 by the G7, the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a voluntary association of 34 countries as of June
2010, which share the goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of
delivering weapons of mass destruction, and which seek to coordinate national export licensing
efforts aimed at preventing their proliferation.
The Australia Group: an informal forum of 41 participants (as of June 2010) which,
through the harmonization of export control lists and guidelines, seeks to ensure that exports
do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons.
7.10 CHAPTER 3 - EU Policy against the Proliferation of WMD
Summary of the EU objectives and policy in the field of non–proliferation,
with an illustration of its positions, implementation supporting activities,
and funding efforts worldwide.
7.10.1.1
EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD
In 2000, Europeans were divided over the US–led invasion
of Iraq, where no weapons of mass destruction were found
in the end. At the same time, paradoxically, there was a
growing awareness that proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems among State
and non–State actors poses an increasing threat to
international security.
Europeans were quick to recognize this threat. The EU and
its Member States has traditionally been a major donor in
the field of non–proliferation and disarmament,
contributing a total of EUR 550 million to various assistant
programmes in the period 1992–2001. In 1999, for
example, the Council adopted a Joint Action with a budget
of nearly EUR 9 million to help Russia and Newly
Independent States in the destruction of chemical weapons
and the storage and disposal of plutonium.
187
The EU is actively supporting the
strengthening of the global non–
proliferation
regime
and
in
particular the multilateral treaty–
based
system.
support
This
for
includes
international
conventions, treaties and other
instruments
(e.g.
NPT,
CWC,
BWC, CTBT, FMCT, UNSCR 1540,
and
HCOC)
organizations
and
(e.g.
CTBTO, OPCW).
But it was not until 2003 that the Council instructed the EU
High Representative, in association with the European
Commission and the Political and Security Committee, to
draw up a broader strategy with concrete objectives to
guide EU action in the field of non–proliferation and
disarmament.
In December 2003, the European Council adopted the
European Security Strategy, “A secure Europe in a better
world”. This strategy identifies five key challenges to
international security: terrorism, proliferation of WMD,
regional conflicts, State failure and organized crime. The
proliferation of WMD was defined as potentially the
greatest threat to European security.
international
UN,
IAEA,
In parallel, the European Council adopted a Strategy
against Weapons of Mass Destruction defining three main
principles for EU action in this field: effective
multilateralism, prevention and cooperation.
The EU policy is to pursue universalisation of international instruments, to enhance their national
implementation and to assist and cooperate with third countries in achieving these goals. The EU is
also taking internal measures to comply with international non–proliferation obligations and
strengthen its own CBRN prevention and response capacity.
These key policy orientations are expressed in European Council Strategies, Council Conclusions,
Decisions and Joint Actions as well as in Council and European Commission Regulations.
Here you can read the EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD (December 2003)
–
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/st15/st15708.en03.pdf
The EU contributes to the effective functioning of the international non–proliferation regime
through regular voluntary contributions by EU Member States to international organizations and
international initiatives. The EU provides significant support through the CFSP budget and relevant
Community instruments, such as the Instrument for Stability.
7.10.1.2
Active role in support of multilateralism
In its relations with third countries, the EU carries out regular political dialogue at the level of
Council Working Groups (CONOP – non–proliferation, CODUN – global disarmament and arms
188
control, DUWP – dual use) with the US, Russia, China, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Ukraine, Brazil
and Egypt. These meetings take place once or twice a year between officials representing the
services of the High Representative of the Union and the country concerned. Non–proliferation
issues are regularly discussed at ministerial meetings with third countries and are included in
Summit Declarations and other relevant documents.
7.10.1.3
WMD clause in
relations with third
countries
On the basis of instructions issued by
The first paragraph of the WMD clause refers to the
commitment of the parties to respect and fully
implement their existing obligations in the field of nonproliferation and disarmament.
The second paragraph refers to the cooperation
commitments between the parties involving taking steps
to sign, ratify, or accede to, as appropriate, and fully
has
been
including
a
specific
implement other relevant international instruments and
to establish a system of export controls for dual–use
article/clause
referring
to
non–
goods, including end–use controls on dual–use
technologies and effective sanctions for breaches of
proliferation of WMD in its contractual
these controls.
the Council in November 2003, the EU
agreements with third countries. The
clause, usually referred to as the WMD
The third paragraph refers to the establishment of a
regular political dialogue between the parties.
clause, has been negotiated with more than 100 countries and has been included in all the
relevant mixed agreements (Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, Association Agreements,
etc.) and political agreements that the EU has negotiated with third countries.
Here you can read the Note on the implementation of the WMD clause (January
2009)
–
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st05503.en09.pdf
When adopting the WMD clause, the EU agreed a standard text for this article. The first paragraph
of the WMD clause is considered an essential element of the agreement of which the WMD clause
is part. This means that any breach of the provisions under this paragraph can lead to the
immediate suspension of the agreement by one of the parties. The EU has decided that this
essential element should be systematically included in the WMD clause and in the Human Rights
clause.
189
The adoption of the WMD clause between the EU and third countries has served as the legal basis
for the provision of assistance by the EU to help countries implement their national obligations
under international non-proliferation and disarmament instruments.
7.10.1.4
NPT – balanced approach
required
The EU continues to regard the Treaty on the
Non–Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as
the cornerstone of the global nuclear non–
proliferation regime, the essential foundation for
the
pursuit
of
nuclear
disarmament
in
Whereas the EU is united in the field of non–
proliferation, there are certain differences of
opinion with regard to disarmament and nuclear
energy. In fact, the EU position is said to
provide a good compromise for a wider NPT
audience since it combines the views of Nuclear
Weapon States, non–Nuclear Weapon States,
NATO countries, countries not militarily aligned,
countries promoting or using nuclear energy
and countries opposed to its promotion.
accordance with Article VI of the NPT, and an important element in the future development of
nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes.
Member States agreed on a comprehensive EU position for the 2010 NPT Review Conference held
in New York in May 2010 (see reference document).
Here you can read Council Decision 2010/212/CFSP of 29 March 2010 relating to the
position of the European Union for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non–Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
– Click on the icon
The EU successfully promoted a substantive and balanced outcome of the Review Conference, in
particular the adoption of concrete action plans on all three pillars of the NPT – disarmament, non–
proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
The EU and its Member States will work on the implementation of the NPT Review Conference
outcome, including the understandings reached on the Middle East providing for the organization
of an international conference in 2012 on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The EU has offered to organize a preparatory
seminar in order to facilitate this process.
190
7.10.1.5
Nuclear non–proliferation
The EU continues to be very active in the nuclear non–proliferation field, in particular through
cooperation with international organizations in charge of verification activities. The strengthening
of the IAEA safeguards system remains a key priority for the EU.
The EU cooperates closely with the IAEA on strengthening global nuclear security. Since 2004, the
EU has become the major contributor to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) and more than EUR
30 million have been committed to it. Through the IAEA NSF, the EU supports nuclear security
projects in almost 100 countries in order to prevent, detect and react to risks posed by nuclear
terrorism.
The EU also supports efforts to promote the concept of multilateral nuclear approaches, including
through the establishment of an IAEA–controlled nuclear fuel bank, to which the EU has pledged a
financial contribution of up to EUR 25 million.
The EU continues to promote the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) through diplomatic efforts, in particular in the ―Annex II States‖ whose ratification is
required for the Treaty´s entry into force. The EU has also made a series of financial contributions
since 2006, amounting to more than EUR 10 million, for projects to strengthen the monitoring and
verification capabilities of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).
191
Another important priority for the EU is to launch negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament
on a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons (Fissile Material Cut–Off
Treaty, FMCT) and its verification provisions.
The EU is keeping a close eye on regional proliferation crises.
Iran
The EU is actively involved in efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.
On the basis of the double–track approach, combining incentives with pressure, the EU High
Representative has been involved since 2004 and has been leading efforts since 2006 to bring Iran
back to meaningful negotiations about its nuclear programme.
(See here the Declaration on Iran, European Council Conclusions of June 2010, Annex II,
pages 14–15).
Democratic Peoples´ Republic of Korea
The EU continues to support the Six–Party Talks process, the objective of which is the de–
nuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The EU remains ready to contribute once an appropriate
solution has been found. In the past, the EU contributed to the Korean Energy Development
Organization (KEDO) and to IAEA monitoring activities in the DPRK.
7.10.1.6
Strengthening export controls
The EU WMD Strategy highlights the importance of strengthening export control policies and
practices concerning dual–use items, which can be used for both civil and military purposes. The
control of exports of these items is governed by Council Regulation No 428/2009 setting up a
Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual–use items.
This Regulation is directly applicable in EU Member States. Items listed in the Regulation cannot
leave EU territory without an export license granted by the competent
authorities of the Member States – see the next chapter for more
details. The EU list of controlled items is based on control lists adopted
by the international export control regimes: the Australia Group (AG),
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the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR). The EU is promoting the participation of all EU Member States in all
export control regimes, given the existence of the single market and the fact that Regulation No
428/2009 is legally binding in all 27 Member States. Currently, those EU Member States which are
outside some of the regimes are not aware of denial notifications issued by non–EU participants.
This situation could create a loophole in the EU´s ability to implement controls effectively, thus
increasing the risk of unintended transfers of technology. Consultations are continuing with those
third countries which are reluctant to accept new participants.
7.10.1.7
Complying with and promoting UNSCR 1540
UN Security Council Resolution 1540/2004 (select full text from here) and subsequent resolutions
1673 and 1810 have given a strong legal basis for, and further impetus to, the EU´s efforts to
prevent proliferation by explicitly addressing illicit trafficking and procurement networks, and in
particular, the involvement of non state actors, including terrorists, in the proliferation of WMD
technology.
The EU has been active in ensuring the full implementation of UNSCR 1540 both internally (inter
alia through regular updates of the Council Regulation on dual–use export controls) and externally,
by promoting the full implementation of UNSCR 1540 in third countries (regional seminars
together with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, assistance for the submission of national
reports and for the enhancement of national capabilities, etc.).
Beyond its comprehensive programme of assistance on dual–use export control, the EU will invest
EUR 300 million in the period 2007–2013 in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN)
cooperation with third countries. The EU´s objective is to develop a strong regional approach, in
line with UNSCR 1540 requirements, through the creation of regional CBRN centers of excellence
in partnership with the countries concerned. The goal is to establish regional networks that would
mobilize national, regional and international resources to develop a good CBRN policy at national
and regional level. It would cover all aspects of CBRN policy, such as export control, border
monitoring, safety and security, illicit financing, and engagement of the scientific community.
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7.10.1.8
EU support to international security initiatives
In addition to treaties and international export control regimes, other initiatives are also supported
by the EU. The EU and its Member States have subscribed to the Principles of the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). The EU
has observer status within the GICNT, but it has not so far acquired status within the PSI. The EU
will participate actively in the follow–up process of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit of
April 2010, where the European Council President represented the EU.
7.10.1.9
EU in the G8
The EU participates in G8 activities and discussions on non–proliferation and disarmament issues.
Since the establishment of the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons and
Materials of Mass Destruction in 2002, the EU has committed nearly EUR 1 billion to its
programmes. The EU supports the extension of the Global Partnership beyond 2012 and its
geographical and thematic expansion beyond the former Soviet Union. Several EU Member States
are also donors at national level.
7.10.1.10
Chemical Weapons
The EU continues to promote the universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which
must be duly matched by the full and effective implementation by all States Parties of their
obligations under this Convention. This will enhance the capability to effectively prevent and
respond to acts of terrorism involving toxic chemicals. The EU has noted with concern that the final
extended deadline of 2012 for the total destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles will not be met.
Reinforcing the verification regime will be another crucial challenge in the coming years.
The EU is providing significant political and financial support to the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in order to meet its policy goals, particularly with regard to
universalisation and full implementation of the CWC. Since the first Joint Action in support of the
OPCW, adopted by the Council in 2004, 21 States have signed and ratified the CWC, bringing the
number of States Parties to 188.
Council Decision 2009/569/CFSP adopted in 2009 allows the continuation of intensive targeted
assistance to the OPCW, including a specific Programme for Africa.
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7.10.1.11
Biological weapons
The EU strongly supports the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the main
multilateral instrument in reducing the threat from these weapons of mass destruction. The EU has
adopted two Joint Actions in support of the BTWC. The first ran from 2006 to 2008 and
implementation of the second started in 2009.
Under the current Joint Action, the EU is carrying out a series of activities which are being
implemented
by
the
BTWC
Implementing
Support
Unit
(ISU).
They
have
four
goals:
universalisation of the Convention; national implementation of the Convention; promotion of
Confidence–Building Measures (CBM); and support for the BTWC inter–session process.
The concrete projects include awareness–raising seminars and financial grants to enable training
and visits by authorities of countries not yet party to the BTWC to EU Member States´ authorities.
The EU also provides assistance to interested States Parties in such matters as drafting legislation,
including criminal law provisions, and administrative measures. Increasing the number of CBM
declarations and providing assistance for their submission continue to play an important role in
monitoring States Parties´ compliance, in the absence of a verification mechanism. Finally,
workshops are organized on inter–session topics in order to enable the best possible preparation of
the next Review Conference in 2011.
In 2008, the Council adopted a Joint Action in support of World Health Organization (WHO)
activities in the area of laboratory bio–safety and bio–security. This Joint Action supports the
implementation of the BTWC and of the International Health Regulations, which constitute an
important framework for promoting bio–security and bio–safety. Actions include regional outreach
workshops focusing on bio–risk reduction management and strengthening the security and
laboratory management practices against biological risks in a specific country. The first country
selected is Oman.
International cooperation and assistance in the field of bio–security and bio–safety is also provided
through the Instrument for Stability. Projects to reduce the risk of biological incidents and misuse
include:
195



Strengthening bio–safety and bio–security capabilities in Russia and in Central Asian
countries through training of personnel;
The establishment of a network for the control of health, security threats and other bio–
security risks in countries in the Mediterranean basin. This project, called EpiSouth, seeks to
strengthen preparedness at national and regional levels;
Support for the Ukrainian Anti–Plague Station (UAPS) in Simferopol to secure the existing
facility and to build a new one to improve safety and security practices.
7.10.1.12
Ballistic missiles
The EU strongly supports the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) against Ballistic Missile Proliferation,
the only multilateral instrument on confidence–building and transparency in the field of ballistic
missiles. In order to make EU support more tangible, a Council Decision in support of the HCOC
was adopted in 2008. The activities are aimed at supporting the universality of the Code,
implementation of the Code and enhancement and improved functioning of the Code.
7.10.1.13
Non–proliferation actions within the EU
The fundamental security issue of WMD proliferation was given a new dimension by the Council in
2008 with the adoption of the action plan, ‗New lines for action by the European Union in
combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems‘.
Here you can read ‗New lines for action by the European Union in combating the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems‘ (December
2008)
– Click on the icon
The main objective is to make non–proliferation a cross–cutting priority in EU and Member States´
policies, to identify best practices and to encourage better coordination.
In November 2009, the Council adopted an EU CBRN Action Plan in order to enhance preventive,
detection and response measures against CBRN threats and risks. The implementation of key
actions started in 2010.
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7.11 CHAPTER 4 - The European export control regime
This chapter aims at enabling the course participant to describe and
differentiate between the international and EU structures related to export
controls and identifying the principles that govern an export control regime.
It also enables the participant to distinguish some of the most visible
improvements observed in the European export control regime as
progressively set up by the successive legal acts.
7.11.1.1
Introduction
Although the principle of a restriction–free international trade is set as a worldwide economical and
political objective, the development of different peaceful nuclear, biological and chemical
applications, such as power generation or pharmaceutical and chemical industries, is constrained
by the potential risk of diversion to military applications. Therefore, in order to reinforce the non–
proliferation mechanisms, trade in weapons and dual–use items is not subject to the restriction–
free principle which applies to ordinary goods and services. Specific security–motivated exceptions
have been set at international level, such as Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade adopted in 1948.
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which organizes the common commercial
policy of the European Union (Article 207), and indirectly implements Article XXI, has included
similar exceptions allowing Member States to restrain trade exchanges between Member States
(Article 36) and towards third States (Article 346).
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(As set by the Lisbon Treaty)
Article 36
(ex Article 30 TEC)
The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on
imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public
197
security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national
treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and
commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(As set by the Lisbon Treaty)
Article 346
(ex Article 296 TEC)
1. The provisions of the Treaties shall not preclude the application of the following rules:
(a) no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers
contrary
to
the
essential
interests
of
its
security;
(b) any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the
essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms,
munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition
in the internal market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes.
2. The Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, make changes
to the list, which it drew up on 15 April 1958, of the products to which the provisions of paragraph
1(b) apply.
Article 207
(ex Article 133 TEC)
1. The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly with
regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in
goods and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment,
the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalization, export policy and measures to protect
trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies. The common commercial
policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union´s external
action.
2. The European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance
with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt the measures defining the framework for
198
implementing the common commercial policy.
These internationally–agreed exceptions not only concern products that are specifically designed to
be integrated into the structure of a weapon, which are sometimes designated by the term
―defense material‖, but also those which, even though they are primarily designed for civilian use,
can be diverted to a military purpose and contribute to the elaboration of WMDs. These products
are usually known as ―dual–use‖ items. The similarly important risk they represent for the
proliferation of these WMD has therefore to be kept in mind by all exporters.
7.11.1.2
Export control regimes – general characteristics
Generally, export control rules consist in politically binding guidelines and procedures, also known
as ―soft law‖ (adopted by a group of States which are usually the main suppliers) and various
legally binding Treaties and other instruments adopted at international level or at EU level.
The basis for the nuclear export control regime is the Nuclear Non–Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
which requires States Parties to apply export controls (Article III (2)). Similarly, the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) include
provisions on export controls.
Numerous export control regimes, notably the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers
Group in the nuclear field, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms
and Dual–Use Goods and Technologies, and the Australia Group in the chemical and biological
fields, have established common control lists, principles and parameters for the purpose of
governing international transfers of proliferation–sensitive items. Controls on some of the potential
means of delivery of these weapons are dealt with in the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR).
The Zangger Committee was formed in 1971. It is an informal group and has 38 members (as of
199
November 2011), all of which are party to the Nuclear Non–Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and
members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The ZC was formed out of a desire for major
nuclear suppliers to reach a common understanding on how to implement Article III, paragraph 2,
of the Nuclear Non–Proliferation Treaty: “Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to
provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially
designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any
non–nuclear–weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material
shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.” (IAEA safeguards as described in Article
III).
Set up in 1992 (and derived from the London Club created in 1985), the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) is a group of 46 nuclear supplier countries (as of November 2011) that seek to limit
nuclear proliferation through the implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear exports and
nuclear–related exports. The first set of Guidelines (Trigger List) governs the export of items that
are especially designed or prepared for nuclear use. The second set of Guidelines (Dual–Use List)
governs the export of nuclear–related dual–use items and technologies that can make a major
contribution to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity, but which have
non–nuclear uses as well.
The Wassenaar Arrangement was established in 1994 and replaced the Western COCOM export
control regime. As of November 2011, it has 40 participants who seek to promote transparency
and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual–use goods and technologies.
It establishes lists, called “control lists”, of those items that may contribute to the preparation of
weapons of mass destruction.
The Australia Group (AG) is an informal forum, created in 1985, of 41 participants (as of
November 2011) which, through the harmonization of export control lists and guidelines, seeks to
ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons.
Coordination of national export control measures allows Australia Group participants to fulfill their
obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention to the fullest extent possible.
Created in 1987 by the G7, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a voluntary
association of 34 countries as of November 2011, which share the goals of non–proliferation of
unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and which seek to
200
coordinate national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing their proliferation. The MTCR rests
on adherence to common export policy guidelines (the MTCR Guidelines) applied to an integral
common list of controlled items (the MTCR Equipment, Software and Technology Annex). All MTCR
decisions are taken by consensus.
(Click header for the MTCR website)
All of these regimes aim to counter the risk of proliferation by addressing the roots of proliferation
through the transfer of sensitive products; in other words, they set an export authorization
requirement. In order to do so, they all contain, as common elements, definitions of the targeted
items, of the conditions and of the criteria for authorizing exports.
Their approach to defining the items to which particular attention should be paid is to establish
lists of sensitive items that are regularly reviewed in order to adapt them to the evolution of
technologies and products. The Nuclear Supplier Group for example, which brings together the 46
main exporting States, has drawn up two different lists: a list relating to the nuclear material, also
called ―a trigger list‖, and another list relating to dual–use items. It must be pointed out that, since
international trade in these products originates from a limited number of exporting States, the
various regimes usually have similar membership.
7.11.1.3
Implementing export control regimes
The various regimes set a certain number of conditions and criteria to be implemented by the
participating States´ authorities when examining the request for an export authorization. The
conditions are objective and contextual elements that can be verified. For example, for nuclear
exports, the NSG requires, as a general condition for supply, that the importing State have a
Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement in force with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The
European Union, as stated in the Strategy, proposes to make transfers subject to ratification of an
Additional Protocol, in order to improve the efficiency of the verifications by the Agency. The
criteria for dual use exports are more subjective than the conditions and must be considered on a
case–by–case basis by the national authorities taking the decision, for example the commitment of
the importing State in combating the proliferation of WMDs.
With UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), which aims to prevent proliferation by States
and non-State actors, the implementation of export control mechanisms became a universal legal
obligation for all States, including those not party to the NPT. The EU attaches great importance to
201
the full implementation of UNSCR 1540 as it would amount to effective implementation of the key
principle of multilateralism set out in the Strategy. In 2008, the Council adopted Joint Action
2008/368/CFSP, with a budget of EUR 475 000, to enhance the capacity of officials responsible for
managing export controls in third countries. Workshops were organized for border, customs and
regulatory officials in six geographical regions (Africa, Central America, Mercosur, the Middle East
and Gulf Regions, the Pacific Islands and South–East Asia) to discuss the national and international
legal framework, regulatory controls (including licensing provisions, end–user verification and
awareness–raising programmes) and enforcement (including commodity identification, risk–
assessment and detection methods). The Commission, acting in the framework of the EU´s
external relations, has also been very active in the promotion of export controls. Under the
Instrument for Stability launched in 2007, in which the proliferation of WMDs was identified as a
major threat, the EU set up a cooperation programme for third countries on export controls.
Programmes on dual–use items are implemented by the German Licensing Office BAFA, as
mandated by the Commission. For more details, see: www.eu–outreach.info.
Regarding the European Union more specifically, it should be noted that all Member States
participate in the NSG and the Australia Group, but some Member States remain outside other
export control regimes because of opposition by third countries. The EU is working towards the
early accession of all Member States to the MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement to ensure the
proper functioning of the single market. The European Commission participates in two regimes:
the Australia Group and the NSG. Owing to the large number of EU parties, the action of the Union
is fundamental for these regimes.
7.11.1.4
European control regimes
The international requirements prescribed by the various regimes, however, are implemented in
Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 27 August 2009 setting up a Community regime for the
control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual–use items and by the Joint Action of 22
June 2000 (2000/0401/CFSP) concerning the control of technical assistance related to certain
military end–uses. The controlled items are based on control lists adopted by above–mentioned
international regimes.
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Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 is directly applicable in the Member States
– click
on the icon to read the text. The Member States´ competent authorities are responsible for the
practical implementation of this Regulation.
Despite its title, the Regulation covers not only dual–use items but also all goods which can be
used both for non–explosive uses and to assist in any way in the manufacture of weapons of mass
destruction or other nuclear explosive devices. Inserting this provision appeared to be necessary
insofar as for nuclear equipment and technology, the definition of dual–use is slightly different and
distinguishes between ―items especially designed for nuclear use‖ and ―items not especially
designed for nuclear use‖.
The Regulation establishes a certain number of principles. In the first place, it distinguishes
between ―export‖ from a Member State to a third country and ―transfer‖ between two EU Member
States. Owing to the common market within the EU, the transfer of a sensitive item is, in principle,
exempted from an authorization, unless the transferring Member State´s national security
interests are threatened by, notably, the possibility that the item may be re–exported to a third
country, or the item is included in a list of very sensitive dual–use items. However, this latest
exemption to the common market principle is in practice limited by the possibilities given to the
Member States to issue general licenses authorizing the transfer of some of these sensitive items.
The various authorizations defining the European export control regime
Name of the authorization
Individual export
authorization
Definition in Regulation (EC) No 428/2009
An authorization granted to one specific exporter for one end user
or consignee in a third country and covering one or more dual–
use items.
The authorization must be requested in the Member State in
which the exporter is established.
Community General Export
Authorization (CGEA)
An export authorization for exports to certain countries of
destination available to all exporters who respect the conditions
of use as listed in Annex II [of Regulation (EC) No 428/2009].
Annex II: Parts 1 & 2 define the list of items for which the CGEA
is issued. Part 3 defines the list of countries for which the CGEA is
issued.
No complementary authorization is required from the Member
States´ authorities.
Global export authorization
An authorization granted to one specific exporter in respect of a
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category of dual–use item which may be valid for exports to one
or more specified end users and/or in one or more specified third
countries.
The authorization must be requested in the Member State in
which the exporter is established.
National general export
authorization
An export authorization granted in accordance with Article 9(2)
and defined by national legislation in conformity with Article 9
and Annex III c [of Regulation (EC) No 428/2009].
The authorization must be requested in the Member State in
which the exporter is established.
Annex III c: the authorization must be published in the national
official journal and notified to the European Commission.
The regime is currently under review and the revision, which will enter into force in 2012, creates
six European Union General Export Authorizations (EUGEA) replacing the Community General
Export Authorization (CGEA). These EUGEAs will cover dedicated items, specific destinations and
specific operations.
The Regulation covers not only exporting and transferring activity but also tangible and intangible
exports or transfers, such as the transmission of information and technologies. In addition, the
Regulation defines the transit of items and brokering, as an intermediary activity, and imposes
controls on them.
7.11.1.5
European industrial actors
Nevertheless, as in the previous Regulation (1334/2000) and in different international regimes
such as the NSG, the European Union has set up mechanisms to apply controls to items not listed
and scenarios outside the prescribed criteria. These mechanisms are called ―catch–all‖ clauses and
allow the national authorities to impose a prior authorization requirement on exports of items not
listed if they have reason to suspect that they may be diverted for a use incompatible with the
objective of non–proliferation or the protection of human rights. They also require an industrial
operator to ask for an authorization if it itself suspects that the item it intends to export may be
diverted.
The European Union export control regime is therefore characterized by an increase in the political
responsibility of industrial actors for non–proliferation of WMDs. This dynamic may even trigger
developments in the structure of the exporting industries because they will in the future be
increasingly encouraged to set internal compliance programmes, even if Regulation (EC) No
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428/2009 has already made the implementation of internal compliance programmes a criterion
when exporters apply for a global export authorization. These programmes are intended to prompt
exporters themselves to evaluate the threat that their activity may subsequently represent for
non–proliferation; they are, therefore, in line with the spirit that presided over the introduction of
catch–all clauses.
7.11.1.6
News & Updates
Up–to–date information on non–proliferation of WMD and related issues
Centre

d´Étude
de
Armements
Internationale
et
de
Maîtrise
– Click on the icon – EN
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
– Click on the icon
– EN

FAS Security Strategy Blog

Global Security Newswire
des
– Click on the icon for the monthly bulletin – FR
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
The Nonproliferation Review



Sécurité
– Click on the icon – EN
– Click on the icon – EN
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8
AKU 9 – THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
8.1.1.1 General description
AKU9 introduces the most important aspects of the security implications of climate change,
including elements of climate science, physical impacts of climate change and its ‗threat multiplier‘
consequences in global security, as well as possible approaches to European and national security
planning from a climate security perspective.
8.1.1.2 Learning Content
AKU9 will touch upon the following aspects of the current climate change debate:



Climate Science and Physical Impact. The chapter represents a summary of climate
science and the physical impacts of climate change. After the study of this chapter (incl. the
study of the recommended reading files), the reader should be able to recognize the evidence of
climate change and describe what the impacts will be.
Climate change as a „threat multiplier‟ of existing tensions and its contribution to
instability. The chapter discusses the various ‗threat multiplier‘ effects of climate change,
which in turn generate new risks in a globalised world. After the study of this chapter (incl. the
study of the recommended reading files), the reader should be able to enumerate the existing
tensions and weaknesses in regions of instability on which climate change is a ‗threat multiplier‘,
and explain how this could impact on broader global security.
Climate Security in the Context of Security Planning. The chapter reviews how the
security risks related to climate change are considered in the security and defense awareness at
European and some national levels, outlining also some alternative approaches in this direction.
After the study of this chapter (incl. the study of the recommended reading files), the reader
should be able to identify climate change linked risks to European security and summarize EU
and national possible approaches and actions.
8.2 CHAPTER 1 - Climate Science and Physical Impact
The chapter represents a summary of climate science and the physical
impacts of climate change. After the study of this chapter (incl. the study of
the recommended reading files), the reader should be able to recognize the
evidence of climate change and describe what the impacts will be.
8.2.1.1 Carbon Dioxide Heat Trapping
Carbon dioxide is a heat–trapping gas. More carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere will
inevitably warm the planet. Globally, the 10 warmest years on record have come after 1996. The
206
last decade (2000–2009) was the warmest in the whole temperature record, since 1850. Natural
variation cannot explain the increase in global temperature over the past 50 years.
8.2.1.2 Burning Fossil Fuels
Burning fossil fuels is a major contributor to CO2. CO2 levels in the
atmosphere have gone up 38% since pre–industrial times, to 387 parts
per million (ppm). Rising levels of greenhouse gases are directly linked
to human activity like burning fossil fuels and clearing forests. Data from
ice cores verifies this. CO2 concentrations are now at their highest level
for at least 800,000 years. There is international consensus, informed by
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), that to avoid
the worst impacts of climate change, global average temperature rise
must not exceed 2°C compared to pre–industrial times. Based on historical emissions, the global
temperature average has risen by 0.7°C. Beyond the 2°C threshold, the risks to our global security
and prosperity are too great because our capacity to adapt sufficiently is too uncertain. A 2°C
temperature rise is equivalent to ~450 ppm of CO2.
Even if we stopped releasing carbon dioxide into the atmosphere tomorrow, the planet
would continue to warm for several decades because of the time it takes the Earth´s climate
system to remove the CO2 from the atmosphere and the slow response of the oceans. We are
already committed to 1.4°C degrees of warming above pre–industrial times. Reducing long term
global emissions now will help avoid the risks of the worst climate impacts in the future.
Higher concentrations of CO2 in the oceans increase the acidity of seawater, threatening
marine ecosystems. The world´s oceans are a major source of protein for millions of people in
the world.
8.2.1.3 Impact of Global Temperatures Rise
Higher global temperatures will:


Affect crop yields in all regions of the world. An
average global temperature rise above 3°C will very likely
decrease total food production.
Exacerbate the availability of freshwater in
some already water stressed regions in the context of
higher total world population. By 2080, under a moderate
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
population growth projection, close to 3 billion people could be living in water–stressed areas.
The Middle East, Central Asia and Mediterranean basin would be particularly badly affected.
Make more regions of the world at risk from infectious diseases such as dengue
and malaria. Warmer temperatures and higher humidity provide hospitable environments for
some disease vectors such as the Asian Tiger Mosquito, whose population has expanded into
Italy, southern France and the US, bringing West Nile disease as far North as the Canadian
border.
Affect coastal regions and low lying areas. As the global temperature rises, the warming
oceans will continue to expand. Water stored in polar ice sheets and glaciers will also melt into the
oceans. The combination of these two processes results in rising average global sea levels. Low
lying, densely populated regions such as the Brahmaputra and Mekong deltas are most at risk. The
impacts of storm surges are more likely to be catastrophic in these regions as a result of higher
sea levels.
8.2.1.4 For details, see also the following recommended readings...
International Panel for Climate Change, Geneva, Switzerland,
“Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report – Summary for Policymakers”
(Clic
k on
the
logo)
Met Office, Exeter, UK Climate Science Explained”
© British Crown copyright 2010, the Met Office (Click on the
logo)
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, UK “The Impact of a Global Temperature Rise of 4°C” – Google
Earth layer
(Click on the logo)
8.3 CHAPTER 2 - Climate change as a „threat multiplier‟ of
existing tensions and its contribution to instability
The chapter discusses the various „threat multiplier‟ effects of climate
change, which in turn generate new risks in a globalised world. After the
study of this chapter (incl. the study of the recommended reading files), the
reader should be able to enumerate the existing tensions and weaknesses
208
in regions of instability on which climate change is a „threat multiplier‟, and
explain how this could impact on broader global security.
We live in an era of globalization based in, but extending far beyond the economic sphere, to
encompass ideas, migration, asymmetric security threats and access to key strategic resources,
including water, food and energy. Increasing globalization provides greater opportunity and
efficiency. But because the system is closely woven, it also creates the risk that local shocks will
have global, systemic impacts. The recent financial crisis is a foretaste. Our national and European
security is built on the stability and continuance of this global system.
8.3.1.1 The International System and Climate Change
The stability of the global economic system depends on the reliable supply and access to key
resources, such as energy, food, water, and raw materials. These ‗pillars of security‘ are already
under stress in our tightly–wound globalised world; demographic trends alone suggest that there
will be around 3 billion more mouths to feed by 2050, with concurrent pressures on these pillars.
However, climate change multiplies the stresses, threatening the reliability of access to each and
therefore global stability:



Food: Global demand for food is expected to increase by up to 70% by 2050. Already, as
a reaction to fears about rising food insecurity, we are seeing so–called ‗land grabs‘ by countries
and multinational companies, who are buying or leasing land to secure food and, indirectly
water. These moves may exacerbate the global food security problem through bypassing the
global market, potentially pushing up prices and triggering instability in the ‗grower‘ country. In
2008/09 civil anger over such ‗land grabs‘ contributed to the overthrow of three Governments,
such as the deal between a Korean company and the Madagascan government which was seen
as a key driver for the coup in 2009.
Water: Severe droughts are predicted to become more prevalent and are already now
twice as common as they were in 1970. The Middle–East and South–Asia, already two of the
most water–stressed regions in the world are likely to experience even greater pressure due to
growing populations and reduced water availability.
Energy: Energy security is based on a reliable and stable supply of energy; it is already
becoming more technically difficult and expensive to extract oil but the global economy is
dependent on cheap and reliable access to fossil–fuel energy. Rising temperatures could melt
the permafrost on which oil and gas pipelines that cross Canada and Siberia are built, an
increase in ferocity of tropical storms in big oil producing regions like the Gulf of Mexico and Bay
of Bengal could disrupt supply and rising sea levels present new risks to coastal based refining
and distribution capacity. Underinvestment in production and infrastructure is already a big risk
to our energy security and climate change will place an additional strain on this.
209
In addition, the just–in–time nature of the global trade system means any number of factors can
disrupt the regular supply of goods around the world. Climate change poses potential threats to
the viability of key maritime choke points, through which flow goods and commodities vital to our
economies, by exacerbating underlying sources of tension and instability in the surrounding
countries. Likely places where this could happen include the Straits of Hormuz, Suez Canal, Straits
of Malacca and Panama Canal (see adjacent illustration).
8.3.1.2 Climate Change – disproportionate impact on the most vulnerable
areas
The impact of climate change on access to food, water and energy in the most vulnerable states
risks increasing the fragility of these states. Set against a background of population increases in
developing countries which would already stretch capacity to provide basics such as sanitation,
healthcare and education, this increases the risks of state failure in a number of regions, including
strategically significant regions such as the Middle East and Central Asia, which in turn would
increase risk of migration, civil unrest and conflict.
8.3.1.3 The Threat of Mercantilism
The threats to the bases of stability, set against the background of a more difficult security
environment, would challenge the open, rule–based international system. The threat to access of
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key resources may drive the world away from a collaborative rules–based system for managing
international
affairs
towards
a
more
narrowly
competitive,
mercantilist
approach.
Moreover, if left unchecked, given the highly interconnected and complex nature of our global
systems, the consequences will be felt far beyond the origin of instability. The impacts will thus be
unpredictable in timing and scope. And whilst climate change will cause hard security risks, there
are no hard security responses to solve climate change.
8.3.1.4 Risk and International Security
Whilst the climate is changing, it is impossible to predict the exact rate and timing of key changes.
The non–linear nature of these changes complicates efforts to quantify the impact of climate
change and, this uncertainty, reduces our ability to manage greater risk in the global system, and
therefore exposes the global system to greater risk. Given the unpredictable nature of the impacts
to which we may have to respond, a strategy based on adaptation to the security risks, rather
than avoid the impacts through mitigation of our carbon emissions, would be highly inefficient and
unlikely to succeed. The combination of gradual changes, such as decline in crop yields at lower
latitudes, and shock events such as flooding, demand even higher levels of resilience from states.
8.3.1.5 For details please see the following recommended readings...
Center for Naval Analyses,
“National Security and the Threat of Climate Change”, 2007
(Click on the logo)
Defense Concepts and Doctrine Centre,
“Strategic Trends Programme: Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040”, 4th edition,
2010
Ministry of Defense UK,
pp. 20–26 and pp. 104–106
(Click on the logo)
German Advisory Council on Global Change,
“Climate Change as a Security Risk”, 2008, Earthscan, pp. 1–6
(Click on the logo)
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Geoff D. Dabelko,
“Planning for climate change: the security community�s precautionary principle”,
2009, Climate Change, Volume 96, Numbers 1–2, pp. 13–21
(Click on the logo)
8.4 CHAPTER 3 - Climate Security in the Context of Security
Planning
The chapter reviews how the security risks related to climate change are
considered in the security and defense awareness at European and some
national levels, outlining also some alternative approaches in this direction.
After the study of this chapter (incl. the study of the recommended reading
files), the reader should be able to identify climate change linked risks to
European security and summarize EU and national possible approaches and
actions.
8.4.1.1 Evolution of climate change in European and national security
strategies
European level
The European Security Strategy (ESS), first published in 2003, recognized the challenge posed by
climate change to European security through the lens of the consequences for global development
and conflict. The ESS acknowledged that Europe´s economic and security interests are dependent
on wider global economic and security. ―Security is a precondition for development‖ it noted, going
on to say ―Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also
encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible.‖ Given
Europe´s level of interdependency with other parts of the world, through trade and movement of
people, it identified climate change as a potential driver of migration out of the most vulnerable
regions and create further instability in those places hardest hit.
As the security implications of climate change became more widely acknowledged, the EU High
Representative, Javier Solana called for a further report on Climate Change and International
Security (CCIS) (Commission and the Secretary general/High Representative to European Council,
―Climate change and international security‖, 3 March 2008, ref: 7249/08) to investigate the issues
and consider the consequences of climate change on international security for Europe´s own
security. This noted (Secretary General/High Representative to PSC, ―Climate Change and
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Security: Recommendations on follow–up to the High Representative and Commission report on
Climate Change and International Security‖, 8 December 2008, ref: 16994/08):
―Climate change is best viewed as a threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends,
tensions and instability. The core challenge is that climate change threatens to
overburden states and regions which are already fragile and conflict prone. It is
important to recognize that the risks are not just of a humanitarian nature; they also
include political and security risks that directly affect European interests.‖ [7249/08,
p2.]
The CCIS report drew out specific examples of how the impacts of climate change could
likely exacerbate existing instability and act as an obstacle to further peaceful
development: ―The attainment of Millennium Development Goals would be at
considerable risk because climate change, if unmitigated, may well wipe out years of
development efforts.‖
Climate change is viewed as a threat to European security because of the risks arising from:







Conflict over resources
Economic damage and risk to coastal cities and critical infrastructure
Loss of territory and border disputes
Environmentally induced migration
Situations of fragility and radicalization
Tension over energy supply
Pressure on international governance
Given their vulnerability to a large number of overlapping climate consequences (drought,
flooding, sea level rise and increases in extreme tropical storms) and low degree of adaptive
capacity, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean and
the Arctic were identified as the most climate sensitive countries.
In response to these threats, the report identified possible actions the EU could undertake
including: Enhancing capacities at the EU level around research, analysis and monitoring, EU
multilateral leadership to promote global climate security and cooperation with third
countries involving integrating climate resilience and adaptation into EU regional strategies.
A further follow up paper (published December 2008) from the High Representative to the Political
and Security Committee looked in greater depth at the possible vulnerabilities of geographical
regions and proposed: an intensified dialogue with third countries and organizations; more
detailed analysis of the security implications at regional level; and the integration of these
213
analyses into EU early warning mechanisms, which were subsequently approved by the
European Council in December 2009. The agenda has been taken forward at a working level by
Council Secretariat, DG RELEX, and interested member states comprising of UK, Sweden,
Denmark, and Germany. Council Conclusions adopted in December 2009 recommended that the
issue moves past narrative and discussion to concrete policies.
8.4.1.2 An example of climate change incorporated at the national security
level
In April 2007, the UK sponsored a debate in the UN Security Council on the security implications of
climate change. In March 2008, the first UK National Security Strategy (NSS) of the UK included
climate change as one of a series of substantial drivers of instability globally, that would have
consequences for the UK. The NSS stated: ―Climate change is potentially the greatest challenge to
global stability and security, and therefore to national security.‖
Cabinet Office, National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, 2008, pp. 18–19 &
50–51
(Click on the logo)
8.4.1.3 Defense approaches to addressing climate change and environmental
issues
The need for greater fuel efficiency of defense installations and equipment is becoming
increasingly recognized amongst European countries and allied partners. More efficient use of
energy means: lower financial costs, greater operational capabilities, less risk to human life,
reduced environmental impact including lower CO2 emissions.
8.4.1.4 UK MOD climate change strategy
The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) produced its own Climate Change Strategy in 2009, updated in
2010, recognizing that climate change would have strategic and operational consequences for its
own Defense objectives. The UK MoD´s Climate Change Strategy looks at the climate change and
energy challenges through both mitigation of its own carbon emissions and adaptation to the
threats it is likely to face as a result of climate change impacts.
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UK Ministry of Defense ―Climate Change Strategy 2010‖
(Click on the logo)
8.4.1.5 US Quadrennial Defense Review
The US Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), published in January 2010 stated that ―[climate
change] may act as an accelerant of instability or conflict placing a burden to respond on civilian
institutions and militaries around the world.‖ Like the UK MoD´s Climate Change Strategy, the
QDR looks at both mitigation of carbon emissions and its own adaptation to the challenges climate
change will pose to its operational capacity. The QDR discusses the impacts on the type of
operations including increased need for humanitarian and disaster response as well as the benefits
of energy efficiency for operations, bio–fuels, electric vehicles, a green carrier strike group by
2016 and an innovation fund for new tech.
―US Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010‖, pp. iv, xv, 7, 84–88
(Click on the logo)
8.4.1.6 French MOD environment action plan
As part of the Grenelle environment process, the MOD created an environment office in 2008 to
oversee the ministry´s environment action plan. The plan features 40 measures related to
infrastructure (energy usage in buildings), waste and dangerous substance management, water
management, transport and procurement. The environment office is responsible for the
development, implementation and co–ordination of environmental protection for the MOD. It
produces an annual environmental audit (emissions, water usage, and volume of waste).
Key features of the environmental action plan include:




Greening defense equipment by investing €9 million in environmental research for defense
equipment; and running 31 ―eco design‖ arms programmes;
€118 million for arms dismantlement;
Work with national parks to protect the biodiversity on military land;
19 real estate projects within the High Environmental Quality framework, 7 projects for
low energy renovations, two low energy building projects and two positive energy projects;
215
Renewable energy projects on military sites.

8.4.1.7 European Defense Agency
Taken from European Defense Agency´s ―Sustainable Energy Work Strand‖:
―The EDA has recognized that there is an urgent need to follow the EU green initiatives in
implementation in order to minimize the environmental impact of Crisis Management Operations
(CMOs). Increasing the overall energy efficiency of systems will decrease fossil fuel consumption,
reducing the logistical footprint while at the same time lessening the system life–cycle costs.
Adopting a systems approach to increasing energy efficiency for the short and medium/long term,
it is the combination of both conventional and alternative, new and old technologies, which
together with new conscious ways of consumption that will make the difference. The goal is to
reduce the environmental impact whilst retaining reliable energy supply for the safety of personnel
and security of operations.
In accordance with the EU Renewable Energy Associations initiatives the EDA has already started
to investigate how these sorts of power conversion technologies can fit into future crisis
management operation. Furthermore, EDA has recently addressed overall energy efficiency on
naval platforms and power sources from a component/sub–system perspective which, combined
with past initiatives in the WEAG on electrified platforms and their components, constitutes a solid
body of work.‖
1
Further information on the Grennelle environment process can be found here: http://www.legrenelle–
environnement.fr/spip.php?article1
8.4.1.8 For details, please see also the following recommended readings...
Commission and the Secretary general/High Representative to European Council, ―Climate change
and international security‖, 3 March 2008, ref: 7249/08.
Secretary General/High Representative to PSC, ―Climate Change and Security: Recommendations
on follow–up to the High Representative and Commission report on Climate Change and
International Security‖, 8 December 2008, ref: 16994/08.
UK Ministry of Defense ―Sustainable Procurement Strategy‖
(Click on the logo)
216
9
AKU 10 – EU MEDIATION AND DIALOGUE CAPACITIES
9.1.1.1 General Description
This Autonomous Knowledge Unit gives an overview of the different styles and activities of
mediation and dialogue, the EU´s engagement in such activities, either as mediator or is support
for mediation and dialogue led by others. This AKU also provides an overview of the EU´s concept
on strengthening EU mediation and dialogue capabilities and provides an overview of other
organizations engaged in peace mediation.
9.2 CHAPTER 1 - Introduction
9.2.1.1 DEFINITIONS
Mediation and dialogue are tools that aim to support communication between two or more parties
to a conflict. They are often used together in support of peace processes –– before, during and
after a formal peace agreement has been signed.
Dialogue is when disputants (and possibly others) talk together directly, with the objective of
improving their understanding of the issues and each other, without necessarily resolving the
issues that divide them. Dialogue can also be facilitated by a third party.
The definition of dialogue that the EU uses in its 2009 Concept for Strengthening Mediation and
Dialogue Capacities (henceforth the EU Concept) is:
―An
open–ended
process
which
aims
primarily
at
creating
a
culture
of
communication and search for common ground, leading to confidence building and
improved interpersonal understanding among representatives of opposing parties,
which, in turn, can help to prevent conflict and be a means in reconciliation and
peace building processes.‖ Click on the icon to the right to open the document
(Required reading).
217
In mediation a third party assists the disputants to discuss the issues, with their consent, with a
view to finding a solution that both parties agree to. Mediation is differentiated from other forms of
third–party intervention primarily because it is not premised on force and because the parties
maintain a certain degree of ownership over the outcome of the process. The EU Concept also
notes that mediation is usually based on a formal mandate from the parties to a conflict.
Since dialogue and mediation are so closely associated in practice, many definitions of mediation
include dialogue. This is the case with the EU since its Concept ‗uses mediation in a broad sense
which is meant to include also dialogue and facilitation‘.
9.2.1.2 Styles of Mediation
There are different ways that mediators can use their third–party role
to find a solution to a problem that divides the parties. These are often
categorized into three different ‗styles‘ or ‗models‘ of mediation. For
more details, you can consult the document ‗Engaging the EU in
mediation and dialogue: Reflections and recommendations‘ by A.
Herrberg, with C. Gündüz and L. Davis (2009) by clicking on the icon.
1. Power–based, deal–brokering mediation
This is when mediators bring power to bear on the parties, including the promise or threat of
positive or negative incentives. The style of mediation is directive with mediators engaging both in
matters of process and substance. This is typically associated with high–level peace negotiations
and with EU political (CFSP) engagement in them. Indeed, the EU Concept notes that ‗through its
political and economic weight and its comprehensive approach ... the EU is in an excellent position
to provide incentives to the conflict parties‘.
2. Interest–based, problem solving mediation
Interest–based mediators focus on facilitating a process that generates options for an agreement
that satisfy the underlying interests of all parties. The mediator acts as a guardian of the process
and sometimes also makes contributions on substance. This kind of mediation is often associated
with informal dispute resolution at lower–levels. The EU has a history of engaging in this kind of
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dispute resolution directly through its political representatives (EU Special Representatives Heads
of Delegation, and, in some cases, Heads of CSDP missions). It also supports this kind of
mediation led by others, with financial assistance and political and technical support.
3. Transformative, long–term mediation and dialogue
Third parties can also mediate or facilitate processes that aim to improve understanding, build
relationships and trust and generate new solutions. This kind of intervention can lay the ground–
work for formal peace talks, can run parallel to them, or can be the key to ensuring that an
agreement is implemented. The EU has supported this form of mediation and dialogue through its
support for community dispute resolution efforts, peace processes and reconciliation and social
cohesion interventions in conflict–affected contexts.
9.2.1.3 Levels of Mediation and Multi–Track Approaches
It is common in conflict–affected contexts for there to be multiple forms of mediation and dialogue
in play at one time, using styles that are adapted to the levels or ‗tracks‘ of engagement. For
example, Track 1 refers to official talks at the highest political level. Track 1.5 involves influential
leaders from government and society that are not directly involved in the formal high–level talks
but have the ability to influence them. These can, for example, include business, religious, military
and political party leaders and are often informal and confidential. Track 2 mediation efforts
typically refer to public processes involving talks between non–governmental leaders and track 3
to more local civil–society or ‗grassroots‘ actors.
In theory, multi–track mediation and dialogue processes should be mutually reinforcing with track
1.5, 2 and 3 processes serving to build confidence, strengthen relationships and generate ideas or
support for official Track 1 talks between political leaders [Add references and links to academic
work including Diamond]. This is borne out by studies that show that peace agreements reached
through multi–track processes tend to be more sustainable [Academic reference: Wanis–St.John,
A., and D. Kew. 2006. ―The Missing Link? Civil Society, Peace Negotiations: Contributions to
Sustained Peace‖ Paper for the forty–seventh annual convention of the International Studies
Association, San Diego].
The EU engages in and supports mediation and dialogue at different levels:
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Mediation activities
There are a large number of activities associated with mediation. Some of the most common
include:
Analyzing the conflict, diagnosing its causes and identifying the parties´ positions and
interests.
Designing and convening mediation processes and preparing agendas in consultation with
the parties.
Facilitating dialogue, negotiations and co–operative problem–solving by the parties.
Pursuing shuttle diplomacy when the adversaries refuse to talk directly to each other.
Employing methods to build the parties´ confidence in negotiations.
Identifying common ground between the parties and generating options for overcoming
deadlocks.
Providing technical advice to inform generation of options in specific substantive areas e.g.
on resource management, power sharing, DDR, SSR, land reform, constitutional reform.
Helping the parties to forge agreements.
Creating opportunities for civil society to contribute to peace talks.
Coordinating external actors that have an interest in the conflict but are not participants in
the negotiations (e.g. international bodies, donors and neighboring states).
Providing information about the peace process to relevant actors, the public at large and
communities in the country in conflict.
9.3 CHAPTER 2 – EU engagement in high–level mediation and
dialogue
For the EU, mediation and dialogue is seen as a policy tool that can be used both as a tool of first
response to emerging on on–going crisis situations and as a tool that can be integrated into other
conflict prevention, crisis management and peace building activities.
The EU has a range of institutional actors engaged in diplomatic, security and development
activities linked to peace processes. All of them have at times been directly engaged in mediation
and dialogue activities. Examples of how various actors have been engaged in mediation–relevant
activities are given below.
9.3.1.1 EU Political and Development Actors
A range of EU institutional actors have been directly involved in formal mediation at the highest
political level. These include the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy (HR/VP), the President of the European Council, the European Commission (EC), the
European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) and the EU
Delegations.
220
More often than not, there is more than one formal mediator and the EU serves as a co–mediator
in high–level mediation teams. This was, for instance, the case with the joint US/EU mediation
team of Solana (former EU SG/HR) Léotard (FR) and Pardew (US) in reaching the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) Ohrid Agreement in 2001 and the joint Solana and Kwasniewski
(PL) mediation team in the Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2004.
An example of high–level mediation by the EU Presidency is the lead role played by Sarkhozy and
Kouchner (EU Presidency and FR) in the mediation of the cease–fire agreement in the 2008
Georgian–Russian conflict. The EU has often been represented in formal, longer–term peace talks
by its EUSRs. For example, EUSRs represent(ed) the EU in status talks for Kosovo from 2006–
2008, the Middle East Quartet and the Geneva talks between the parties to the conflict between
Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
In addition to directly engaging in formal peace talks, the mandates of EUSRs often include a
range of tasks linked to mediation and dialogue support. These include, for example, confidence–
building measures contributing to the settlement of conflicts and/or to the implementation of cease
fire or peace agreements and tasks linked to promoting dialogue and facilitating and maintaining
close contact with all the parties. For more information on the roles that EUSRs have played in
supporting peace processes see ‗Pioneering Foreign Policy: The EU Special Representatives‘ by
Giovanni Grevi, EU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot paper No. 106, October 2007].
The European External Action Service (EEAS) and the EU Delegations have also played a direct
role in peace mediation in some cases. For example, the, at that time, Commission Head of
Delegation mediated the Accord Politique Globale in Togo in 2006. More commonly, however, the
European Commission supports a range of mediation and dialogue processes led by others in
conflict–affected areas (see chapter 3).
9.3.1.2 EU Security Actors
Formal high–level engagement in peace talks is rarely part of a CSDP mission´s mandate.
Nevertheless, mission leadership has on occasion been called upon to play a formal mediation role.
For example, the Head of the Aceh Monitoring Mission was given a mandate to mediate and, if
necessary, arbitrate between the parties in relation to the implementation of the disarmament
221
aspects of the peace agreement. Similarly, the leadership of EU Police Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina is often engaged in informal, high–level dispute resolution.
Some CSDP missions also support formal dispute–resolution mechanisms that relate to security
issues, such as the Incidence Prevention and Response Mechanism supported by the EU Monitoring
Mission in Georgia. In short, although CSDP missions are not typically called upon to mediate in
formal peace talks they can engage in mediation between the parties at the highest levels in order
to keep the implementation of a peace agreement or a peace process on track.
More commonly, CSDP missions play a supportive role. The majority of CSDP missions engage in
dialogue and sometimes dispute resolution at the working level (track 1.5 or 2) in order to build
confidence and create an environment that is conducive to achieving progress in high–level talks
led by others. Indeed, the EU Concept calls for more mediation training of CSDP personnel at the
field level to ensure that their interaction with local actors is conflict sensitive and can help
manage or de–escalate local tensions. For more information on how CSDP missions integrate
mediation and dialogue in their work click on the icon.
9.4 CHAPTER 3 – EU support for mediation and dialogue led by
others
Although the EU is an actor in mediation in its own right and EU representatives serve as a
mediators or co–mediators, the EU also often plays a supportive role to mediation and dialogue
processes led by others. The EU Concept notes that its supportive role is equally as important as
its direct mediation role. Types of EU mediation support include:
9.4.1.1 Promoting Mediation
EU statements and positions consistently promote mediation and dialogue as a non–coercive
response to tensions and conflict. The EU Concept notes that this is based on its own experience
as a peace project and its underlying values of human rights and the rule of law. The EU and its
member states promote mediation both in relation to particular conflicts but also to build national
and organizational capacity to support mediation and dialogue processes. The EU is, for example, a
core group member of the ‗Friends of Mediation‘ initiative.
222
The core group is comprised of 25 states and seven regional organizations that are committed to
promoting a culture of mediation in their national policies as well as regionally and internationally
(1). Core group members were active, for example, in promoting support in the UN General
Assembly for strengthening the UN mediation capacities and, more recently, for the adoption in
2011 of a UN General Assembly consensus resolution on ‗Strengthening the role of mediation in
the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution‘.
(1)
The core group was initiated by Finland and Turkey and includes: Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil,
Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco,
Norway, the Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Tanzania and Uganda. The organizations are: the African Union, the Organization of American
States, the League of Arab States, ASEAN, the EU, the OSCE, the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation, the UN (Department of Political Affairs and its Mediation Support Unit).
9.4.1.2 Providing Technical Support
In mediation processes led by others the EU can facilitate the process by providing technical
support for capacity building and training, logistical support and the provision of substantive
expertise to the mediators and the conflict parties. Mediation support has typically been
outsourced to specialist consultants, but the EU is in the process of strengthening its in–house
capacity in this area. As the EU Concept notes, this will involve strengthening its capacity to
provide operational support to ongoing mediation and dialogue initiatives, identifying lessons
learned and best practice guidance as well as mediation training capacity (also see chapter 3 on
the EU Concept).
9.4.1.3 Providing Financial Support
The EU often contributes to the funding of formal high–level peace processes. For example, it
provided financial support for:
AU high–level implementation Panel for Sudan.
ECOWAS–led Accra Peace Conference that reached the 2003 peace agreement in Liberia.
OAU–led talks that led to the Arusha Peace agreement in Burundi.
UN/AU joint mediation support team in Darfur.
UN Good Offices in Columbia.
In addition to providing financial support for formal high–level talks, the EU also supports informal,
often confidential, talks (track 1.5) designed to influence and support the formal peace processes.
For example, it has provided support for parallel informal talks that aim to support the
constitution–making process in Nepal. It has also supported informal talks that ended up with a
223
formal peace agreement. This was, for example, the case with its financial support for the talks
mediated by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari with the NGO Crisis Management Initiative
that led in 2005 to the Aceh peace agreement. In addition, the EU has also supported mediation
and alternative dispute resolution efforts at the community level. These are often implemented by
NGOs that specialize in building capacity for community mediation and facilitating dialogue. For
example, the EU–funded Confidence Building Early Response Mechanism, established in 2010,
financed and opened the door for the implementation of some 68 small scale dialogue and
development projects between communities in both Georgia and Abkhazia.
The two most relevant EU financial instruments that currently support mediation activities are the
Instrument for Stability (IfS) and the African Peace Facility (APF).
The IfS contains the Policy and Advice Facility that enables the funding, at short notice, of a
specific dialogue or mediation initiatives. For example, this facility was used to support dialogue
between the Laos government and the Hmong diaspora, facilitated by an NGO. The IfS can also be
used to support larger or longer–term initiatives under other IfS headings. For example, it has
been used to support the UN/AU joint mediation support team in Darfur and, under the long–term
component, to provide support to strengthen the UN stand–by team of mediation experts in the
UN Mediation Support Unit. Just as the IfS is used to support capacity building of the UN, the APF
provides support to mediation activities and capacity–building in the AU and in African sub–
regional organizations. (For more on how the EU supports the mediation capacity of the UN and
African organizations see chapter 5.)
9.4.1.4 Exerting Leverage on the Parties
In line with a power–based approach to mediation, the EU has sought to leverage its political and
economic weight to pressure the parties to reach a negotiated solution. To maximize its leverage,
the EU is also often aligned with other influential actors, in some cases represented in ‗groups of
friends‘. This is especially the case in Africa.
An example of where the EU used leverage in negotiations in which it acted as co–mediator is the
US/EU mediated negotiations between Albanians and Macedonians that led to the 2001 Ohrid
Agreement. In this case the EU exerted pressure through its alliances with influential external
actors. These included the Ukraine – the principal source of weapons for the Macedonians – as well
224
as the US and NATO. For instance, joint statements made it clear that NATO deployment was
conditional on progress in the talks.
9.4.1.5 Creating an environment that is conducive to a settlement
A large number of EU interventions in conflict–affected areas are justified in terms of their
potential to create the conditions that are more conducive to a political settlement. For example,
the EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) is predicated on the assumption
that building an effective Palestinian state apparatus and police service is a necessary prerequisite
for building confidence in the peace process and a two–state solution to the conflict. Similarly, in
many post–conflict situations, the majority of EU development and security interventions will be
designed to support the peace process by providing peace dividends (jobs), promoting security
and justice sector reform and implementing specific aspects of a peace agreement. For example,
the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM BiH), the EU Police Missions in the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL PROXIMA/EUPAT in FYROM) and the EU´s monitoring
missions in Aceh (AMM) and Georgia (EUMM) were all intended to help implement security aspects
of a peace agreement.
9.5 CHAPTER 4 – The EU Concept´s guiding principles and
recommendations for strengthening mediation and dialogue
capacities
In 2009 the Council adopted the Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities.
The concept builds on the Secretary General/High Representative´s Report on the Implementation
of the European Security Strategy that called for the EU to ‗expand [its] dialogue and mediation
capacities‘.
In addition to summarizing how the EU engages in mediation and dialogue, the EU Concept
provides guiding principles and proposes a number of ways that EU mediation and dialogue
capacities can be strengthened. These are summarized here
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9.5.1.1 PRINCIPLES
Coherence
Mediation initiatives need to be undertaken in line with broader EU policy objectives.
Comprehensiveness
Mediation is part of the EU tool box in the area of conflict prevention and crisis
management. The EU should seek to link up the various EU instruments, including multi–
level mediation initiatives, so as to increase their overall impact.
Risk Assessment
Mediation initiatives – and their potential failure2 – carry reputational risks for the EU.
These need to be carefully considered and weighed against the alternatives, including
support for mediation initiatives led by other actors.
Transitional Justice and Human Rights
There is often a tension between the fight against impunity and reaching peace
settlements that are acceptable to the conflict parties. EU mediation efforts should
nevertheless be in line with the principles of human rights and humanitarian law.
Promoting the participation of women
The EU should contribute to promoting women´s equal and full participation in peace
negotiations, peace building, peacekeeping and post–conflict reconstruction.
2
This is a significant risk since most mediation initiatives fail. For a statistical analysis of high–
level mediation efforts that result in peace agreements see [add link to CHD report].
9.5.1.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
The 2009 EU Concept includes a number of recommendations for how the EU should strengthen its
mediation and dialogue capacities in the following five areas. These are summarized below along
with initiatives undertaken to implement them.
1. Strategic and horizontal aspects
While all EU actors should support timely EU mediation of mediation initiatives of others, this
should constitute an explicit part of the mandate of EUSRs and mediation–related tasks should be
included in the mandates of CSDP missions.
2. Operational support
The EU will strive to improve access to mediation expertise to EU–appointed and EU–backed
mediators. To this end, the EU has established a Mediation Support Group within EEAS. The EU will
also explore the feasibility of establishing a roster of experts in mediation process and related
thematic areas. This work is being supported by a pilot programme authorized by the European
Parliament and by a complementary project supported by the Belgian Foreign Ministry
[http://www.themediateur.eu/index.php/projects]. The focal point for this work within the EEAS is
the Peace building, Conflict Prevention and Mediation Division.
226
3. Training
Building on existing training practices, training, capacity building and coaching for mediators and
their staff need to be further strengthened. Basic mediation skills training should be offered to all
staff in CSDP missions/operations or EU delegations, while more in–depth, specialized training
should be offered to those directly involved in mediation or mediation support.
This AKU is one step in this direction. In addition, since 2009 the Commission has supported a
number of in–house trainings for Commission and EEAS staff in mediation and dialogue skills.
Mediation coaching is also offered to new Heads of Delegation. Some CSDP missions, such as
EUPM BiH, have also initiated an interactive ‗essentials of mediation‘ training programme for some
of their staff. A few EU national training institutions, notably Zentrum für Internationale Frieden in
Germany and Folke Bernadotte Academy in Sweden
http://folkebernadotteacademy.se/en/Training/ also offer mediation and dialogue trainings for
national and international (including EU) staff.
4. Knowledge management
The EU aims to strengthen its knowledge management in this area in cooperation with other
partners. This will involve gathering best practices and developing guidelines more systematically,
including possibly though regular exchanges between mediators. One example of collaboration in
this area is the EU´s collaboration with UNDP in developing guidelines on issues of process and
substance.
5. Outreach and co–operation
Recognizing the wealth of mediation expertise that exists in other international and regional
organizations, in states and in specialist non–governmental organizations, the EU will seek to
strengthen its own capacities through operational partnerships. The next chapter provides some
examples of such collaboration.
9.6 CHAPTER 5 – Other organizations engaged in peace mediation
There are a range of national, international and private or non–governmental organizations
engaged in peace mediation. This section briefly introduces some of those that the EU works most
closely with.
9.6.1.1 Countries or States
Historically, representatives of
national states have mediated most conflicts at the track 1 level.
Some states, such as the US and Norway, have been particularly active. The EU has supported a
number of initiatives led by states. For example, it provided financial support to mediation efforts
led by Norway in Sri–Lanka.
9.6.1.2 The United Nations (UN)
The UN is the international organization with the most experience in peace mediation. UN
mediation is commonly associated with the Good Offices of the Secretary–General or UN Special
227
Envoys that have a mandate to support high–level peace talks. A number of UN regional offices
also play a mediation and mediation–support role. These efforts and actors are, in turn, supported
by the
UN Department for Political Affairs (UN DPA). Since 2008, UN DPA also hosts the Mediation
Unit. This works closely with the Department´s regional divisions to plan and support mediation
efforts in the field. It provides advisory, financial and logistical support to peace processes and
works to strengthen the mediation capacity of regional and sub–regional organizations.
UN DPA also manages the United Nations Standby Team of Mediation Experts – an ‗on call‘ group
of experts established in 2008 that can be deployed individually or as a group to assist mediators
from the UN or other organizations in the field. The EU has provided financial support for the UN
Mediation Unit. It funds two members of its permanent stand–by team.
As part of its role in mediation knowledge management, UN DPA maintains the
UN Peacemaker
Databank, an online support tool for international peacemaking professionals. The databank
includes more than 800 documents on peacemaking and mediation including over 300 peace
agreements and a growing number of operational guidance notes for mediators.
A number of other UN institutional actors also perform mediation or mediation–relevant functions.
These include resident political missions that have a peace process support function and
peacekeeping operations. And, in the majority of countries that do not host UN peace operations,
UN country teams headed by UN Special Representatives (UNSRs) provide mediation and
mediation–support functions. These are, in turn, supported by a joint UN Development Programme
(UNDP) –
UN DPA programme for strengthening national capacities for conflict prevention. The
programme provides for political and technical support, notably through the deployment of Peace
and Development Advisors, to bolster the preventive diplomacy role of UNSRs and to support the
development of local mediative capacity. The EU is in close contact with this programme and has
drawn upon their lessons learned when it comes to engaging in dialogue processes.
For an overview of the UN´s institutional actors and instruments for
preventive mediation see the 2011 Secretary–General Report to the Security
Council on preventive diplomacy.
And for more information on UN plans to strengthen its mediation–related
activities see the 2009 report of the Secretary–General to the Security
Council.
228
9.6.1.3 Other Regional Organizations
Regional organizations are taking on an increasingly active role in mediation and mediation
support. The African Union is a case in point. Mediation is one of the functions of the African
Union´s Peace and Security Architecture and the AU is increasingly active in leading a range of
early warning and mediation efforts. For a reflection on the AU´s role in mediation and efforts to
enhance its capacities in this area (see ‗Towards enhancing the Capacity of the African Union in
Mediation‘ by Laurie Nathan).
Both the UN and the EU are engaged in efforts to strengthen AU´s mediation capacities. For
example, strengthening AU mediation capacity forms one element of the UN´s AU capacity
building programme and much of the work of the UN Mediation Support Unit is dedicated to
supporting AU–led mediation efforts. Similarly, under the EU African Peace Facility (APF), an Early
Response Mechanism has recently been established to support mediation efforts of the AU and
other African sub–regional organizations. The EU APF also provides for the mobilization of a range
of mediation expertise through agencies that manage short–term consultancies.
Other regional and sub–regional organizations are also active in mediation and a number are
engaged in processes to strengthen their mediative capacity. This is, for example, the case with
the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Organization of American States
(OAS), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).
9.6.1.4 NGOs/Private Diplomacy Organizations
An increasing number of non–governmental organizations specialize in conducting mediation or
providing mediation support to others. Well known examples of peace talks prepared and
facilitated by international NGOs include the 1992 Mozambique peace accord mediated by the
Community of Sant´Egidio3 and the 2005 Aceh Memorandum of Understanding mediated by the
Crisis Management Initiative.
The EU´s collaboration with private diplomacy organizations takes different forms. In some cases
it they serve as discrete operational partners, in other cases the EU works with consortia of
229
organizations to distil lessons learned and to generate knowledge products and practical guidance.
This is, for example, the case with EU support – through the Instrument for Stability – for an
‗Initiative for Peace building‘ programme that has a cluster of activity to harness research and
lessons learned in mediation practice.
A far larger number of non–governmental organizations engage in community level mediation,
which is also sometimes called ‗alternative dispute resolution‘. These include community based
NGOs working on development and reconciliation. For one example, see the Community Mediation
programme supported by the Asia Foundation in Nepal.
Similarly, it should be stressed that many if not most peace mediation efforts are prepared and/or
conducted by so–called ´insider‘ mediators. These are local individuals who are not necessarily
impartial but are acceptable to the parties. While some are associated with NGOs, many work in
their individual capacity. Such insider mediators are increasingly organized in professional
networks or platforms at both national and regional level. One example is the Insider Mediators
Platform – Africa initiative.
3
This is a Catholic public lay association and is also recognized as an international NGO
for its
development and peace work.
230
10 AKU 11 – AN INTRODUCTION TO GENDER-SENSITIVE OPERATIONS
10.1.1.1
General description
AKU 11 is dedicated to the importance of women´s equal and full participation as active agents in
the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace building, peacekeeping,
humanitarian response and post–conflict reconstruction and to the EU´s commitment to support
this. It consists of an introductory part, of 2 chapters focusing on the implementation of UN
Security Council Resolution 1325 and its importance for the success of missions and operations.
10.1.1.2
Learning Content
AKU11 will touch upon the following aspects gender related operations:


Chapter 1 „Introduction to UN Security Council Resolution 1325‟ – Short overview of
the main elements of the UN SCR 1325, the implementation and the international
commitments related to it.
Chapter 2 „Gender in Operations‟ – Some practical measures related to the
implementation of the UN SCR 1325.
Before the start of the first chapter we strongly suggest that you read UN Security Council
Resolutions 1325 and 1820 (click on the icons to open)
UNSCR 1325
10.1.1.3
UNSCR 1820
Some useful links
Several internet sources where consulted during the preparation of AKU11. Should you wish to
deepen your understanding of aspects covered in the AKU11, the following links might be useful:
231








Report on the activities of the CSDP missions on celebrating the 10 th anniversary of the
UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.
Recommendations from the conference ―Implementing UNSCR 1325 and 1820 in EU
missions: Improving immediate and long–term security for women‖ French EU Presidency and
UNIFEM in cooperation with European Commission.
Indicators for the Comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the UN Security
Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security.
Comprehensive approach to EU implementation of UN Security Resolutions 1325 and 1820
on women, peace and security.
Handbook on ―Mainstreaming gender and human rights into ESDP – compilation of
relevant documents‖.
Gender Equality and Women Empowerment in Development Cooperation Communication
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council COM (2007).
A comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the United Nations Security
Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security.
McKay Susan, Women, Human Security, and Peace-building.
For a broader documentation on CSDP related subjects, whenever necessary, you are invited to
visit the CSDP Knowledge–base at http://esdc.mil–-edu.be
10.2 CHAPTER 1 - Introduction to UN Security Council Resolution
1325
10.2.1.1
1325, what do these four digits mean?
Resolution 1325 (2000) was the first United Nations Security Council resolution to specifically
address the impact of armed conflict on women, and women´s contributions to conflict resolution
and sustainable peace. UNSCR 1325 stresses the importance of women´s equal and full
participation as active agents in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace
negotiations, peace building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and post–conflict
reconstruction. It calls on member states to ensure women´s equal participation and full
involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security. It urges all
actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender perspectives in all United
Nations peace and security efforts, including demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR)
and security sector reform (SSR).
UNSC Resolution 1325 is non–binding as it falls under Chapter VI ―Pacific Settlements of Disputes‖
of the UN Charter. It does not have any enforcing mechanisms to enforce the resolution, as
opposed to Chapter VII ―Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and
Acts of Aggression‖. However, the UN Security Council can make decisions under Chapter VII and
include resolution 1325, as is the case in several mandates of UN Peacekeeping missions. In such
occasions it does obtain a legally binding character.
232
The Resolution is furthermore based on binding international law, which means that those who
commit crimes against human rights can be brought to court. Since the year 2000 there have been
decisions from war tribunals and international courts determining systematic rape during armed
conflict constitutes a crime against humanity.
With 18 operational paragraphs, UN SC resolution 1325 can be summarized under five key
provisions:





Increased participation and representation of women at all levels of decision–making.
Attention to specific protection needs of women and girls in conflict.
Gender perspective in post–conflict processes.
Gender perspective in UN programming, reporting and in Security Council missions.
Gender perspective and training in UN peace support operations.
Since the adoption of resolution 1325 in 2000, four supporting resolutions have been adopted by
the Security Council: 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009) and 1960 (2010). The five
resolutions focus on three key goals:
Strengthening women´s participation in decision–
making — Resolution 1325 calls for strengthening
women´s agency as peacemakers and peace builders,
including their participation in conflict prevention and
peace processes, early recovery, governance and in peace
operations. Resolution 1889 complements 1325 by calling
for the establishment of global indicators to measure
progress on its implementation.

Ending sexual violence and impunity — Resolution 1820 calls for an end to widespread
conflict–related sexual violence and for accountability in order to end impunity. Resolution 1888
focuses on strengthening leadership, expertise and other institutional capacities within the
United Nations and in member states to help put an end to conflict–related sexual violence.
233
Awareness training of the FARDC on the fight against sexual violence in Camp KOKOLO (RDC)
© The Council of the European Union

Provide an accountability system — Resolution 1960 mandates the Secretary–General
to list those parties credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of sexual
violence in situations on the Council´s agenda. Relevant sanctions committees will be briefed by
the Special Representative of the Secretary–General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, and may
take action against listed parties. SCR 1960 also calls for the establishment of monitoring,
analysis, and reporting arrangements specific to conflict–related sexual violence.
Together, these resolutions provide a powerful framework and mandate for implementing and
measuring change in the lives of women in conflict–affected countries.
10.2.1.2
Facts and figures
Source: UN Women, DCAF
In most countries around the world, the different security and justice needs of men, women, boys
and girls are not adequately being met. In addition, women and certain groups of men remain
excluded from formal peace processes, security decision–making and from participation in
oversight processes.
Though war has always impacted men and women in different ways, possibly never more so than
in contemporary conflicts. In contemporary conflicts, as much as 90 percent of casualties are
among civilians, most of whom are women and children. While women remain a minority of
combatants and perpetrators of war, they increasingly suffer the greatest harm.









Civilians account for the vast majority of victims in contemporary wars; those least
empowered suffer most.
Women´s participation in peace negotiations average less than 8 % of the 11 peace
processes for which such information is available. Fewer than 3 % of signatories to peace
agreements are women.
No women have been appointed Chief or Lead peace mediators in UN–sponsored peace
talks.
Sexual violence exacerbates conflict and perpetuates insecurity in the wake of war. It
holds entire communities hostage, and has an economic, social, cultural and inter–generational
impact: women cannot access water–points and markets; children cannot safely get to school;
‗war babies‘ are ostracized.
250,000-500,000 women and girls were raped during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.
20,000-50,000 women and girls were raped during the war in Bosnia–Herzegovina in the
early 1990s.
50,000-64,000 internally displaced women in Sierra Leone were sexually attacked by
combatants.
An average of 40 women and girls are being raped every day in South Kivu, DRC. It is
estimated that more than 200,000 women and children have been raped over more than a
decade of the country´s conflict.
Women and girls are targeted as a tactic of war to humiliate, dominate, instill fear in,
punish, disperse and/or forcibly relocate members of a community/ethnic group.
234




Out of 300 peace agreements for 45 conflict situations in the 20 years since the end of the
Cold War, 18 have addressed sexual violence in 10 conflict situations (Burundi, Aceh, DRC,
Sudan/Nuba Mountains, Sudan/Darfur, Philippines, Nepal, Uganda, Guatemala, and Chiapas).
Women have a legal right to be protected from sexual violence, even in the midst of war,
and victims have a right to reparations. Amnesty to sexual violence as an international crime
(Art. 7 CEDAW; Rome Statute 8(2) (b) (xxii)) is counter to international law.
Peace will not be sustained if the deal is considered unjust or if the accord does not take
measures to rebuild the foundations of society.
With regard to trials of sexual violence as a war crime, crime against humanity, crime
associated with genocide, and use in torture, sexual violence has been the ―least condemned
war crime‖.
10.2.1.3
International Commitments
Source: Clingendael, Dutch-Spanish Seminar 2010
There is a growing consensus internationally on the need to apply a comprehensive approach
to crisis management and peace–building. The same goes for the need to take into account
the evident links between security, development and human rights. It also applies to over–
arching topics such as the role of women in peace and security.
European Union High Representative Ashton
If women are not active participants in peace building and reconciliation, the views, needs
and interests of half of the population in a conflict area are not properly represented. That is
simply wrong. It can also undermine the peace.
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen
All that is needed now to move from policy to action is determined leadership. We all know
that women count for peace. But for them to count for peace, they need all of us.
UN Under–Secretary General for UN Women Michelle Bachelet
I am often asked why on earth do I believe that women and girls are a national security issue.
Well, I believe it because I know that where girls and women are oppressed, where their
rights are ignored or violated, we are likely to see societies that are not only unstable, but
hostile to our own interests.
United States of America Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
Why is ‗gender‘ amongst the priorities of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and NATO Secretary
General Rasmussen? The answer is simple; it is a result of increasing insight that it is a
235
strategic, effective and a sound investment in a country's stability and economy.
However, more than a decade of high–level commitments — as seen in the quotes above — on
UNSCR 1325 calling for focused activities that encourage the participation of women on every level
of peace missions, as well as in political peace and reconstruction processes, has shown one thing:
there are many challenges linked to the Resolution´s full and consistent implementation.
One of these challenges involves the meeting point of gender concerns and the changing nature of
peacekeeping operations: The tendency of peacekeeping personnel to increasingly engage with
local non–state stakeholders has made cultural awareness and gender sensitivity critical
peacekeeping capacities.
The efforts being made by the military and civil component of the peacekeeping apparatus into
these matters are the key for making UNSCR 1325 operative at the field level, and to the success
of the series of UN resolutions.
The
fairly
recent
development
of
guidelines
for
implementing
a
gender–perspective
in
peacekeeping missions confirms the international commitment from the European Union, United
Nations and NATO. While these directives differ in their target audience and level of detail, as well
as their practical implications they all aim to increase the mission´s effectiveness.
10.2.1.4
International Commitments
Four leading guidelines for implementing a gender perspective in operations
1.
Council of the European Union, Implementation of UNSCR 1325 as
reinforced by UNSCR 1820 in the context of ESDP, 15782/3/08 Rev 3,
December 2008.
Aim: Gender mainstreaming in the area of CSDP [the document refers to ESDP, which is
the predecessor of CSDP] is not a goal in itself; the ultimate objective is to increase the
EU´s crisis management efficiency. This document seeks to ensure gender
mainstreaming and implementation of UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 1820 from the early
planning to the conduct of CSDP operations, including their follow–up. The document
should be used by all actors involved in planning and conducting CSDP
236
missions/operations. It should serve as a reminder and provide concrete examples of
what can be done during the different stages of planning, conducting and drawing
lessons from CSDP missions/operations.
2.
NATO, Advancing Women´s Perspectives in NATO Military Organizations,
Gender Mainstreaming, and Measures to Protect Women and Girls in
Situations of Armed Conflict, Bi–SC Directive XX–X, 2009 /
NATO, Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspectives in the NATO
3.
Command Structure Including Measures for Protection during Armed
Conflict, Bi–SC Directive 40–1, September 2009.
Aim: Provided to the military organizations and forces in the NATO Command Structure
to implement UNSCR1325 to afford the Alliance and NATO led missions and operations
the advantage of including female perspectives NATO, encouraging a policy of gender
mainstreaming and protecting women and girls during armed conflict.
4.
Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support,
Integrating a Gender Perspective in the Work of the United Nations
Military in Peacekeeping Operations, March 2010.
Aim: To enhance the operational effectiveness of military peacekeeping tasks by serving
as a tool to guide practical translation of existing mandates on women, peace and
security in the performance of these tasks. They are intended to support military
personnel working at the strategic, operational and tactical levels to ensure that the
security priorities and concerns of all sectors of the local population – women, men, boys
and girls — inform the planning process as well as the operational activities of the
military in its areas of operation.
237
10.3 CHAPTER 2 - Gender–sensitive peacekeeping = Effective
Peacekeeping
10.3.1.1
Multiple Approaches
Gender does not mean ―women‖, gender means ―business‖. Particularly in these financially
uncertain times, we need to include everyone. Because it is the right thing to do for women? Yes.
Because they deserve equal rights as men? Yes. But, first and foremost, because our societies
need active and participating citizens, both men and women. It is not a loss for men, neither a
victory for women. Advancing equality is not just relevant for increasing effectiveness in
peace keeping, it is also an investment in conflict prevention. Societies where men and
women, boys and girls, have equal rights to education, health and economic opportunities are
more stable societies. Equality is a global public good. Equality is good business.
Without a doubt, the successive UN Resolutions on ―Women, Peace and Security‖ have had a huge
impact on international thinking on peacekeeping. Contrary to ten years ago, it is now widely
recognized that peacekeeping is not a gender–neutral affair: gender matters for both the internal
dynamics of the peacekeeping apparatus itself, as well as for the form and shape of the conflict
that is to be resolved.
―Gender–sensitive
peacekeeping‖
can
refer
to
the
objective
to
achieve
a
proportional
representation of men and women in peacekeeping forces and in its counterpart: the national
security forces (also referred to as a gender balance). It may also indicate the aim to take local
gender roles and norms as one of the fundamental parameters in the design and implementation
of a peacekeeping operation (gender mainstreaming). Finally, it can be framed as a protection
issue that deals with the particular vulnerability of different gender groups in armed conflict.
Inclusive Peacekeeping — men and women on a mission
Full and equal participation of men and women is the basis
of a stable society, of economically and politically thriving
societies. That is why multinational corporations and banks
are investing in attracting women to the top. Simply because
238
it means profit. Because diversity at the top, diverse perspectives from both men and women,
leads to better decisions. Decisions based on diverse perspectives may prevent new financial
crises. This is why the equal participation of men and women in the security forces and in
international operations is encouraged. Nevertheless, the figures so far show a different picture:
Women´s representation in the military segment of UN peacekeeping operations has
slightly increased to 3% in 2010; it is still a giant leap away from the 50% target that
was set by UN Resolution 1325.
Three ways in which women´s participation can be of added value to
peacekeeping operations:
1)
Sensitize the army to operate with a broader, more human–centered definition of
security;
2)
Serve as role–models for the local population;
3)
Have better access to certain segments of the local population.
Inclusive analysis of the local security situation
During conflict, men and women´s roles change. For women, this often means stepping out of
traditional (domestic) roles and into the labor market, into the military or rebel forces, become
activists, or face the challenges at home as sole head of the household. Lives change during
conflict, societies change during conflict. Because of these changes, after the conflict, it is simply
impossible to turn back to the situation prior to the conflict. Similarly, men´s and women´s roles
cannot turn back to the pre–conflict status quo. A process has started to find a new status quo,
one that can potentially be beneficial to the whole population. This is a responsibility of the
national authorities, but it is just as much the responsibility of all actors involved to truly engage
everyone in rebuilding the country and its institutions,
including
(peacekeeping)
Understanding
themselves
what
and
for
men
and
their
operations.
women
children,
want
as
for
well
understanding what they fear most, helps to gear
operations to local needs. Moreover, women expect the
239
international community to support them in their efforts to maintain or obtain economically and
politically active roles, they expect the international community to address barriers that refrain
them
from
participating.
Grasping renewed opportunities for women´s participation in rebuilding is inevitable for building a
stable society. This implies reaching out to civil society, and in particular to open a dialogue with
women, women´s organizations and with men. A dialogue, not just by gender advisers, but
certainly also by heads of missions — be it peacekeeping, military or diplomatic missions. An
inclusive dialogue on all issues relevant in reconstruction, relevant to all citizens. Investing in the
diverse interests of all citizens means investing in the interest of society and stability.
Protection of civilians
In 2010, millions of men, women, and children were killed, raped, displaced, injured, or recruited
by force in armed conflicts throughout the world. Whether caught in the crossfire or deliberately
targeted,
civilians
too
often
suffer
disproportionately
as
a
result
of
conflict.
What used to be hidden and silent, conflict–related rape and sexual violence, has become front–
page news. We all know countries where rape is rampant, such as in Sudan, the Ivory Coast and
of course the Democratic Republic of Congo. Sexual violence is often used in conflicts as a
cheap
and
effective
weapon
with
the
intention
to
demoralize
and
destabilize.
Increasingly, UN Peacekeeping mandates now include protection of civilians in their mandates, and
reflect UN SC Resolutions 1820 and 1888 on conflict–related sexual violence, hereby responding to
the
respective
protection
needs
of
men
and
women
in
conflict
situations.
The primary obligation to protect civilians affected by conflict lies with national
governments and parties to conflict. However, when these actors are unable or unwilling
to fulfill this obligation, the international community, in particular the UN Security
Council (UNSC) has a responsibility to recognize the plight of civilians caught up in
conflict
and
to
take
action
to
protect
them.
More and more, peacekeeping operations are being tasked to protect civilian populations affected
and traumatized by armed conflict, in particular women and children. In this context, the
240
prevention of sexual violence, sexual exploitation and abuses remain one of the greatest
challenges.
Empirical evidence suggests that a gender–sensitive approach of personnel serving in crisis
management missions and operations, coupled up with adequately gender–balanced staff mix,
helps to bring better results when it comes to civilian protection. For cultural and religious reasons,
having female personnel serving in posts requiring interaction with local women facilitates contacts
and allows to carry the tasks in an uncontroversial manner (ex. house and body searches,
interviewing victims of sexual trauma, children etc.).
Nevertheless, there is increased attention and support for integrating the women, peace and
security agenda within the protection of civilians debates. For example, during the Open Debate in
the Security Council in May 2011 on Protection of Civilians, 33 out of the 51 statements addressed
the gender dimension of the protection of civilians, in particular on protecting women from sexual
violence in conflict in armed conflicts including the DRC, Côte d´Ivoire, Libya, and Yemen.
Protection of Civilians can take many forms:

Humanitarian assistance aimed at saving lives, providing basic
services, and keeping people safe;

Diplomatic initiatives to prevent or resolve conflicts;

Military action when peaceful means fail;

Challenging violations of human rights and ending poverty, disease,
and environmental degradation;

Control of the arms trade and reducing the danger posed by guns and
explosive weapons.
OXFAM 2011
10.3.1.2
The Policy Cycle
Source: Clingendael, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Actively engaging men and women, on equal grounds, creating equal opportunities for both men
and women, within our own missions and institutions as well as in rebuilding post–conflict
societies, is a matter of operational effectiveness.
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Peacekeeping and peace building efforts will be more sustainable and lead to more stable societies
when men and women have equal opportunities, have their voices heard, and when both are
actively engaged in conflict resolution and post conflict reconstruction.
Gender cannot be something done on a voluntary basis on the side, but should be integrated into
the planning, execution and evaluation of a mission.
It starts with a situation analysis. An analysis based on the views and needs of only men, does not
properly prepare an operations, as only half the population´s security needs are reflected.
Particular attention should be paid to the preparatory phase of programming and planning:
gender, as an analytical concept, is indispensible when determining criteria for
intervention and preparing troop deployment. Yet, this cheap and effective tool is often
overlooked in mission planning.
Inside
Internal
aspects
External
aspects
10.3.1.3
Outside
Number of (wo)men, Code of
Conduct (internal)
Guidelines, policies, consultation
with men and women on the ground,
Protection of Civilians
Code of Conduct (towards
outside)
Interpretation of mandate,
Innovative + flexible thinking
Roles and Responsibilities
Source: Clingendael, Conflict Resolution Unit Dutch Spanish seminar 2010
A system–wide gender mainstreaming effort requires that roles and responsibilities be clearly
defined from the earliest stage of the policy cycle onwards.
The final responsibility (and accountability) for integrating gender into peacekeeping
operations lies with the senior managers and commanders. They should develop operational
guidance in terms of commitment, guiding policies and (human) resources.
Gender advisors and focal points should be understood as facilitators, catalysts and advisors, not
as ultimately accountable for implementing the guidelines in their mission.
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As regards the position of gender advisors, specific attention should be paid to: gender balance
(i.e. female and male advisors), hierarchy, and tasks and competences.
Gender Advisors in the chain of command
In the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations Gender Advisors are placed parallel
to the chain of command and at every level. DPKO distinguishes between the strategic,
operational and tactical competencies and organizes its gender expertise accordingly.
Here, they work under the leadership of both the higher–ranking mission gender advisor
and the relevant military commander. The leadership of the military component of the
UN peacekeeping missions holds final responsibility for ensuring compliance with the
guidelines, whereas the Military Gender Advisor is designated by DPKO with
responsibility for coordinating and guiding the implementation process.
NATO requires its gender advisors to support the work of and report to the commander.
It is also the most elaborate of the three about the tasks and competences that gender
advisors are endowed with.
The EU CSDP directives state that gender advisors are directed by ‗the chain of
command‘. They assign critical tasks to them: Advise during the planning process; take
action on sexual and gender–based violence. Gender advisors are enabled to
communicate directly with appropriate EU–structures.
10.3.1.4
Pre-deployment training
The need for adequate pre–deployment gender training can hardly be overestimated, especially for
operations where sexual and gender–based violence (SGBV) might be an issue. Peacekeepers
should be well–prepared for their demanding duties in the field and should be sensitive towards
local perceptions and concerns. (Peacekeeping) Operations should build on a profound knowledge
of local culture, and act with respect for diversity. Troops should be sensitized to the valuable and
constructive role women and men can play. This contributes to a more comprehensive
understanding of the situation, and often times means bridging gaps between international
standards and local perceptions.
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Peacekeepers can form the tie between theories and policies on the one hand, and the
local population on the other.
Nevertheless, an operational mandate is only as strong as the will of the leaders on the ground to
implement it. Nonetheless, well–trained troops certainly contribute to the ability of those leaders
to perform their mandated tasks as diligently as possible.
In November 2009, the Council of the EU agreed the document ―Implementation of UNSCR 1325
and UNSCR 1820 in the context of training for the ESDP missions and operations —
recommendations on the way forward‖, aiming at improving the coherence and quality of pre–
deployment training for staff deployed in (E/) CSDP missions/operations. It also foresaw to
increase the availability and access to gender training, inter alia, through the development of
standard elements for a training curriculum on the implementation of the relevant UNSCRs in the
(E/)CSDP. (The conclusions were based on an inventory of the EU Member States´ gender training
practices and an expert seminar organized in Brussels in July 2009.)
The Council Secretariat organized a first ESDP Gender Advisors and Focal Points meeting in
November 2009, allowing for extensive exchange of experiences and networking. A Human Rights
and Gender Advisors/Focal Points meeting in July 2010 was part of the Council Secretariat´s
efforts to facilitate networking among the human rights and gender advisers and focal points, and
to identify lessons from CSDP missions/operations to inform the first thematic lessons report in the
autumn of 2010 ‗Lessons and best practices of mainstreaming human rights and gender into CSDP
military operations and civilian missions‘.
One clear conclusion from the lessons report was the need for basic training on relevant human
rights and gender aspects for CSDP personnel. Basic EU/CSDP standard training elements were
also further developed in 2010, in a ―Package of three draft concepts containing minimum
standard training elements on Human Rights, Gender and Child Protection in the context of CSDP‖,
also envisaging the development of fully–fledged CSDP training modules.
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10.3.1.5
Accountability
Source: Clingendael, Conflict Resolution Unit
Proper mechanisms are necessary to ensure that both civilian and military peacekeeping
personnel can be held accountable for their conduct. This accountability is two–fold and
relates to the performance of the (peacekeeping) operation on gender–oriented goals (for
example, the proportional representation of men and women), as well as the behavior of personnel
toward men and women in the host country.
Performance–based accountability has an internal and an external component. Internally, it must
be clear at all levels of the chain of command who is being held accountable for the (lack of)
performance on the respective gender–related responsibilities. Naturally, senior managers and
commanders are ultimately responsible for integrating gender throughout a peacekeeping
operation, and their accountability should be incorporated in existing performance–based
accountability mechanisms. Externally, the local men and women of the host country should be
consulted during monitoring and evaluation processes, and enabled to request clarifications.
Finally, easily accessible complaint mechanisms are vital to ensuring allegations of gender related
violence committed by peacekeepers will be taken seriously and subsequently dealt with.
Accountability mechanisms are integrated at different levels by the EU, NATO and the UN. DPKO
incorporates performance on gender–related goals into the existing accountability
structures; it requires all parts of the chain of command to report on their progress. The NATO
and ESDP directives however, do not establish provisions to ensure that senior management or
gender advisors can be held accountable for (a lack of) progress made on their gender–related
responsibilities.
EU, UN and the NATO all have strict accountability provisions in place regarding allegations
concerning gender–based violence committed by mission personnel, the so–called zero tolerance
policy.
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11 APPENDIX
11.1 Summary of Acronyms
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247
248
249
11.2 Summary of Definitions
250
251
252
253
254