The SCADA That Didn`t Cry Wolf

The SCADA That Didn’t Cry Wolf: Who’s
Really Attacking Your SCADA Devices
Kyle Wilhoit
Sr. Threat Researcher
Trend Micro
1
Glossary
HMI: Human Machine Interface
IED: Intelligent Electronic Device
SCADA: Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition RTU: Remote Terminal Unit
Historian: Data Historian
Modbus: Common ICS Protocol
DNP3: Common ICS Protocol
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Confidential | Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc.
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Typical ICS Deployment
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Modbus
•  Oldest ICS Protocol
•  Controls I/O Interfaces (MOSTLY!!!!)
•  No authentication or encryption!
(Surprise!!!)
•  No broadcast suppression
•  Vulnerabilities are published
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Security Concerns- ICS vs. IT
ICS
•  Correct commands issued
(Integrity)
•  Limit interruptions (Availability)
•  Protect the data (Confidentiality)
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Confidential | Copyright 2012 Trend Micro Inc.
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IT
•  Protect the data
(Confidentiality)
•  Correct commands issued
(Integrity)
•  Limit interruptions
(Availability)
Primary Security Concerns
•  HMI: Allows arbitrary command execution as
well as set point modifications.
•  Data Historian: Allows inbound traffic to
secure network segments. (Replication of
data)
•  RTU: Allows remote communication ability
And many more…
Incidents Exist
•  First half of 2013
•  Over 200 confirmed “incidents”
SCADA Internet Facing
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Google-fu
Shodan
ERIPP
Pastebin
Twitter
SCADA Internet Facing
Story Time!
•  All Internet facing…
•  No security measures in place
Attacks
•  Attacked several times- over a period of
months
•  Attackers gained access
•  Exfiltrated data
•  Not made public
•  This is not a story…
•  This happened…
Story Time!
In my
basement…
Enter Honeypots…
• 
• 
• 
• 
12 total honeypots
8 different countries
Running since Jan, 2013
Combination of *nix, Windows, and
Nov. 2012-March
2013
embedded
systems
Phase 1:
Physical Deployment
•  Small town in rural America
•  Water pump controlling water pressure/
availability
•  Population 18,000~
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Physical Deployment
•  Fake water pressure system Internet facing
•  Very little security measures in place
•  Could cause catastrophic water pressure
failures if compromised
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What They See
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Physical Deployment
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Attack Profile- Country of Origin
2%
2%
2%
2% 2% 2%
US
19%
6%
LAOS
UK
4%
2%
2%
12%
CHINA
NETHERLANDS
8%
JAPAN
BRAZIL
35%
POLAND
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• 
• 
• 
• 
12 total honeypots
8 different countries
Running since Jan, 2013
Combination of *nix, Windows, and
March. 2013-July
2013
embedded
systems
Phase 2:
Virtualized Environment
•  Water pump controlling water pressure/
availability
•  Population combined ~50 million
Logically…
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Architecture
Some Tools Used
Modbus.py
OpenDNP3
PiFace
Vulnerabilities Presented
“If you can ping it, you own it”
•  SNMP vulns (read/write SNMP,
packet sniffing, IP spoofing)
•  Specific ICS Vendor
vulnerabilities
•  HMI (Server) Vulnerabilities
•  Authentication limitations
•  Limits of Modbus/DNP3
authentication/encryption
•  VxWorks Vulnerability (FTP)
•  Open access for certain ICS
modifications- fan speed,
temperature, and utilization.
What’s an Attack?
•  ONLY attacks that were targeted
•  ONLY attempted modification of pump
system (FTP, Telnet, Modbus, set points,
etc.)
•  ONLY attempted modification via
Modbus/DNP3
•  DoS/DDoS will be considered attacks
Total Attacks
-74 attacks
Non-Critical Attack ProfileSource Countries
-63 non-critical attacks
Critical Attack Profile- Source
Countries
-11 critical attacks
Some Attack Stats
Data exfiltration attempt
Modification of CPU fan speed
Modbus traffic modification
HMI access
Modify pump pressure
Modify temperature output
Shutdown pump system
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Spear Phished
TO: CITYWORKS@<HOSTNAME OF OUR
CITY>.COM
“ Hello sir, I am <name of city administrator> and
would like the attached statistics filled out and
sent back to me. Kindly Send me the doc and also
advise if you have questions. Look forward you
hear from you soon
....Mr. <city administrator name> ”
Cityrequest.doc
•  Decoy doc- not much substance
Cityrequest.doc
Dropped Files
•  CityRequest.doc
•  File gh.exe dumps all local password hashes
–  <gh.exe –w>
•  File ai.exe shovels a shell back to a dump server.
–  < ai.exe –d1 (Domain) –c1 (Compare IP) –s (Service) >
•  Malware communicating to a drop/CnC server in China.
•  exploiting CVE 2012-0158
•  Malware communicating to a drop/CnC server in USA
–  70.254.245.X
–  70.254.245.X
–  Has been taken down…by the US government
Execution
•  Upon execution of CityRequest.docx, files leaving
the server in question after 5 days.
–  Fake VPN config file
–  Network statistics dump
–  SAM database dump
–  Gain persistence via process migration
•  Won’t execute on Office 2010.
Exfiltration: Days 1-4
Exfiltration: Days 5-17
APT1 Report
•  APT1 (Comment Crew) report released in Feb
2013.
•  Included many APT variants we’ve seen.
•  One of particular interest was HACKSFASE.
•  Commonly used in energy sector.
Examination
Attribution
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Attribution
•  IP
•  BeEF
•  Code Analysis
BeEF Usage
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Detect Tor
Get Registry Keys
Get_Physical_Location
Get_System_Info
Get_Internal_IP
Attacker Profile
•  Most attacks appeared to be non-targeted
•  Many attackers were “opportunists”
•  Some were targeted…
Some Takeaways
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• 
• 
• 
Red team/Blue team often
Perform specialized vulnerability assessments
Control contractors
Perform basic security controls
•  Network segmentation
•  Two-factor authentication
•  Patch your stuff!
•  Lockdown external media
•  Manage vulnerabilities
•  Classify your data/assets
•  etc.
Shout
Email: kyle_wilhoit@trendmicro.com
Non-Work: kylewilhoit@gmail.com
Twitter @lowcalspam