O X F O R D I B THE D I P L O M A C O M PA N I O N Keely Rogers Jo Thomas R O G R MO V E GLOB A L C O U R S E P A M M E TO WA R 3 Great Clarendon Oxford Street, University Oxford. It furthers the research, scholarship, Oxford is a the and © UK Oxford Oxford, Press is a OX2 University’s and 6DP, department trade mark other countries Press of by in University the objective education registered certain United of Kingdom University of Oxford in worldwide. 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Continued on back page Course Companion denition The IB Diploma designed to Programme students of an way IB an and opportunities for books and mirror Each book the IB core be used the IB are a of resources. given in each subject. expected what and IB is while aims and the encourage wider will from IB. a the help study content They in reect deep issues materials Diploma They presenting of to resource a the understanding and providing thinking. philosophy the the in of use IB a learner theory wide the curriculum range prole of conjunction and Suggestions and viewing of of and the knowledge, in terms resources, IB the Diploma extended essay, (CAS). required book are two-year particular the service can their of subject requirements, activity, of are a connections approach; students variety of making mindedness, creativity, in purpose critical whole-course Programme the approach by of international study Companions throughout Programme The a of illustrates subject Course students understanding Diploma that each course gain philosophy of Programme support with other encouraged for additional suggestions for how materials to draw and to and indeed, conclusions further extend from reading research are provided. In on addition, the honesty being the specic Course course protocol. Companions assessment They are provide advice requirements distinctive and and and on guidance academic authoritative without prescriptive. IB mission statement The International Baccalaureate knowledgable and more world To peaceful this end the organizations education These IB to and caring through works develop rigorous programmes active, with their with aims to people develop who intercultural schools, challenging inquiring, help to create understanding governments programmes of and a better and and respect. international international assessment. encourage compassionate, people, young and students lifelong differences, can across learners also be the who world to become understand that other right. iii The IB learner Prole The aim who, the of all IB programmes recognizing planet, strive to help their to is to common create a develop humanity better and internationally and more shared peaceful minded people guardianship world. IB of learners be: Inquirers necessary learning. They to conduct They sustained develop inquiry actively throughout Knowledgable and global and develop their They and enjoy their natural In research learning and They and show this love acquire the skills independence of learning in will be lives. explore signicance. curiosity. so understanding concepts, doing, across ideas, they a and acquire broad and issues that in-depth balanced have local knowledge range of disciplines. Thinkers and They creatively reasoned, exercise to ethical of modes and of fairness, and They They work with They personal the Caring of skills critically problems, and make one ideas and information language and in effectively and a variety willingly in others. act and with integrity respect They that for take They and are individuals evaluating a honesty, dignity of with the for a strong individual, their own sense of groups, actions and the them. understand histories, and the responsibility accompany other and thinking complex express communication. Open-minded from and than communities. seeking understand creatively justice, traditions applying more consequences and in approach in collaboration Principled and decisions. Communicators condently initiative recognize and open and range of appreciate to the communities. points of their own perspectives, They view, and cultures values, are are and accustomed willing to to grow experience. They and feelings and act to show of empathy, others. make a They positive compassion, have a and personal difference to the respect towards commitment lives of others to the needs service, and to the environment. Risk-takers They with and courage explore new defending Balanced emotional and others. limitations and understand They in ideas, balance They experience. unfamiliar and situations have strategies. the and uncertainty independence They are brave of and spirit to articulate in beliefs. They and Reective iv roles, their approach forethought, to the give thoughtful are to order able to importance achieve of and their intellectual, well-being consideration assess support personal to their understand learning and for own their physical, themselves learning strengths personal and and development. A note on academic honesty What constitutes misconduct? It Misconduct is result or is of vital importance appropriately when that credit all, have property work, owners it of be is used ideas rights. must acknowledge owners information After of to the To of in your (intellectual have based on an and information original ideas with the Therefore, work all oral, completed own language used or for and referred of assessment whether others must Where in or paraphrase, such is or in, an assessment plagiarism and or may unfair component. collusion. work dened the as the your sources sources another representation person as your of own. the The of are some of the ways to avoid plagiarism: written use form of fully Words and support are ideas one’s of another person arguments must be are verbatim used to acknowledged. direct must Passages that quoted must be be appropriately more Plagiarism ● quotation or results gaining piece assignments, expression. to, one that student individual ● or any includes following acknowledged. in behaviour Misconduct ideas and you advantage work. property) authentic your in, enclosed within quotation marks and acknowledged. acknowledged. ● How do I acknowledge the work of others? CD-ROMs, Internet, treated The way the ideas that of footnotes you acknowledge other and people is that through you the have use email and in the at the ● The sources of illustrations, bottom of a page) to be from (placed provided another information not is need part of to a at the when end you document, provided provide ‘body of in a of a quote or document) or another footnote for knowledge’. is, ● the You information That Works of theatre do all not need to be footnoted as they are that and based should should that you include magazines, resources, that part of include a formal list of you used all in CDs your resources, newspaper and should forms of A information your maps, data, material graphs, must be they are not your own work. art, arts, whether or be of visual music, lm, dance, a part arts, of a and where work takes the place, is dened student. as This supporting misconduct by includes: allowing work. works use one of of ● Internet- art. the presentation. You work as can bibliography is to how nd the a reader same compulsory in to be copied or submitted assessment by another student duplicating work components for and/or different diploma assessment requirements. ‘Formal’ forms of misconduct include any action several must or work The including articles, your of gives you an unfair advantage or affects the provide results full be the that accepted if acknowledged. Other means similar must for resources books, must journals. denitions ● listing the knowledge. Bibliographies the and programs, use another assumed books photographs, creative Collusion do as on media are summarize document. sites or paraphrase closely way computer acknowledged endnotes web electronic used of bibliographies. (placed other same audio-visual, Footnotes messages, any of another student. Examples include, viewer taking unauthorized room, misconduct material into an examination information. the extended during an examination, and essay. falsifying a CAS record. v Contents 2.3 Your guide for Paper 1 Italian What factors policy Case study 1: Japanese expansionism in East Asia in Italian 1.1 The on impact Japan’s of nationalism foreign policy: and the Why origins, Japan 1.2 in the in South-east foreign did Italy was crisis in of expansion Events in Manchuria, Why did Italy and after Italy the the results of the Manchurian turmoil: The descent international expansion, into “the Dark League response to of response The USA ’s Nations’ of the of response League China response to response the was to events and Europe German to events after Japanese to events USA change its the post-war 1933–1938 155 in Europe to the post-war 1938–1940 post-war 170 settlement after 1937 1932 actions the Treaty of Versailles: The liquidation 1931–37 Czechoslovakia 1937–38 policy expansion: Poland towards international the reaction of the USA to the May alignments: The Pact of 1939 attack outbreak of International war the was of fascism origins, rise the to on Italian Foreign 1870–1933 82 was power impact of it How the First World War in on was was What Fascism? did First support World for Fascism grow in Italy of was Mussolini What consolidate his to Italian by of 192 appeasement Britain affected in the the why 1930s? response by and to aggression weaknesses of the on the Nations? the impact of response US foreign to the of Soviet policy expansionist powers? after War? the did policy international 1930s League 1915–18? the pursued the responses 1935–1940 international How the Harbor? Mussolini’s the to alignments expansion, What Why Europe 1938? impact is in 1933–38 2.1 What War alignments challenges aggression, Italy, 1939? to 2.6 What April 1933–38 Case study 2: German and Italian expansion policy: in in The The World diplomatic Steel, Pearl Sudetenland 1933 Changing on Second Changing German What Albania expansion, of after invade German Beyond Japan the 1932 The did during 1938? challenges Challenging Why War 1931–36 after USA ’s Civil 60 2.5 The Spanish Japanese 1931–1941 response events role diplomatic settlements, The the 1933 Germany's Manchuria in Valley” after The foreign crisis? 2.4 The Italy’s 1931 settlements, 1.3 on 1935–39 intervene Italy’s Germany’s of impact policy, September Changing Causes Years an Asia, 29 were had 1930s? 1920s expansion 1931–1941 What 129 1936–39 What 1990 the Japanese in 14 after 1933–1940 militarism 1853–1930 Japan expansion, 1 was the impact international response to foreign the policy on expansionist power? powers? What factors inuenced Mussolini’s foreign policy? What How successful was Mussolini’s foreign policy was Italian the international invasion of response Abyssinia in to the 1935–36? 1920s? The 2.2 the in The impact of Nazism on German 2.7 policy: the origins, end of appeasement 1918–1933 did support for Nazism grow The after the What Italy international response to German 1933–1940 213 First The World Mussolini’s 110 aggression, Why of foreign Second World War: The historical debate War? factors allows Hitler to become a dictator? a clear Writing the internal assessment for IB History The plan he vi historical for took debate: achieving power in his Did Hitler foreign 1933? have policy goals on full document sources can be 232 Extra help here: www.oxfordsecondary.com/ib-history-resources found when Y O U R The years 1931 ofnationalist Europe pursue a and to and Asia. collapsed. security” world the saw militarist these foreign to world be the governments policies, the the idea the of involved in began First inadequate was F O R of both hopes the on for Pearl the War of the This which book would deals nationalism rst and cost with the the militarism, East democracies Harbor in that 1941; conict Asia to led an into and Japan’s to the event a the actions. Japanese that global response It attack transforms war. “collective and in lives growth the 1 into events European a by The second and German case study examines Italian Fascism 1941 Nazism. It looks at how the devastating expansionist conict Japan Western examines to World PA P E R expansion development regimes following Increasingly, proved of 1941 As aggressive peaceful much G U I D E of aims of these governments led to millions. of Japanese the break the European European resulting down war in collective powers in and security the among descent into a 1939. Historical concepts The content in this unit The is linked move from diplomacy aggression to to the six key IB concepts. The move and neutrality from appeasement international to confrontation national and isolation Change Historiography: Why did Pearl Harbor Japan attack How successful Nationalism in 1941? Imperialism was Militarism Mussolini’s Perspectives foreign Economic Why and did Hitler's actions lead and crises The limitations policies in security Europe? Fear Was of to collective war pressures Continuity policy? the policy Key of of communism concepts appeasement responsible causing September Why for war Japan move militaristic style to a of government? 1939? Why Significance did Japan attack Pearl Harbor? Causation Which did more in Why did with Hitler? Mussolini Why did ally events/actions/ individuals were significant in war break out in most Europe in 1939? shaping Consequence International What were factors that relations? the led What was the impact of Western What was the impact of the What were actions on Japan? significant to global Great Depression? war? the results of Japan’s actions in the1930s? What was the democracies impact on of Italian the and actions German of the Western expansionism? 1 Pa p e r 1 “The for move Paper book 1 to global of your focuses understand will also not the help war” IB only on content you to is a prescribed History helping relating develop subject examination. you to the to this skills Where This cover topic, you see this icon, go to www. oxfordsecondary.com/ib-history-resources and extra help answering full document to nd questions. but necessary to Preparing for Paper 1: Working answer the source questions. with sources The be content relevant Papers Each ● 2 of to and the prescribed topics that subject you are may also studying As for in of this the book key activities to events develop and key in each case When study your understanding of links between concepts (see timelines to discipline is based on work with of sources historians’ you are practising methodology. a Paper are the skills that historians apply 1 when issues the content previous help and of a question and attempt to draw page) develop key research conclusions. historical a Paper 1 you will: chronological ● understanding and the In ● you component they ● training — David Dixon skills content our evidence. includes: key ● historians, documentary 3. chapter analysis this demonstrate understanding of historical events sources ● a summary of relevant historiography ● ● a ● practice range of sources source for each questions along with examiner’s ● How to use this book rst each will 1 chapter question source you will on exercises give of compare and analyse information from a sources and contrast information between sources hints This interpret variety topic the to the explain IB try how Paper 1; to evaluate ● synthesize your approach there throughout opportunity to ● the will then book practise own sources for their value evidence from the detailed knowledge and limitations sources of the with topic. be which your Paper skills. Where you see answering the chapter next or this icon, question, to the you will either question at nd the extra end of help the itself. L TA Thinking skills Read the following comment on sources and then answer could marshal in a lifetime. It is vital, therefore, that the questions that follow. students of history become aware of the scope of historical sources, and the methods which historians “ The practice of history begins with evidence and with use to order them.” sources. The availability of sources is often the key determinant of what becomes most popular, because Black J and Macraild, D M. 2007. Palgrave some areas, for example nineteenth-century France, Study Skills – Studying History. benet from a greater volume of documents than 3rd edn, page 89. Macmillan. Basingstoke, UK others, such as ancient Germany. Whereas historians 1 According to Black and Macraild, what makes cer tain of early modern and medieval popular culture face historical subjects more popular than others? a constant battle to nd material ... those concerned 2 with modern political history face a veritable forest of ocial documents – more than any one person 2 What problems do contemporary historians face? T H E M O V E T O G L O B A L L TA Communication skills W A R TOK Following the catastrophe of the First World War the new Bolshevik government Following on from your discussions in Russia published all the Tsarist documents relating to the outbreak of the war. for question 3 and 4, get into small This led to other European governments publishing volumes and volumes of groups and consider what is the role of documents – in what became known as the “colour books” – but in most cases the historian? To what extent do you attempting to demonstrate how their country had not been responsible for agree that the key role of historians is to causing the war. Historians have subsequently had vast quantities of documents bring us closer to historical truth? Or do to use as more government and military sources were declassied and released. historians, selection of evidence and use However, as recent historiography has revealed, there is still no consensus of language tell us more about their own among historians as to the key causes of the First World War. eras and societies than those of the past? 3 In pairs discuss whether each generation of historian can move closer to “historical truth” and can be more objective because they are fur ther away in time from an event and have more sources to work from. 4 Listen to this discussion on the historiography of the causes of the First World War: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b03srqz9?p_f_added=urn%3Abbc%3Aradio% 3Aprogramme%3Ab03srqz9 What dierent interpretations do historians have on the causes of the First World War? What factors have aected their interpretations? What can you expect on Paper 1? attain paper Paper 1 has question a predict the on paper. this and advantage is nature practise these key format given and This the questions in style means correct and for students advance; of that four you can approach maximize for the awarded This book war. As also to can marks learn deals this ensure is you with an IB have of this book which you the bullet point each The for majority of marks on this skills. the questions you the as technically. are is the prescribed prescribed learned linked list set to all of each down topic topic in you the of content sub-topic the global will need in from syllabus: Case studies Material for detailed study Case study 1: Causes of expansion Japanese expansion in ● The impact of Japanese nationalism and militarism on foreign policy ● Japanese domestic issues: political and economic issues, and their impact on foreign East Asia (1931–41) relations ● Political instability in China Events ● Japanese Invasion of Manchuria and Nor thern China (1931) ● The Sino-Japanese War (1937–41) ● The Three Power/ Tripar tite Pact; the outbreak of war; Pearl Harbor (1941) Responses ● The League of Nations and the Lytton Repor t ● Political developments within China – the Second United Front ● International response, including US initiatives and increasing tensions between the US and Japan 3 Pa p e r 1 Case study 2: Causes of expansion German and Italian ● Impact of fascism and Nazism on the foreign policies of Italy and Germany ● Impact of domestic economic issues on the foreign policies of Italy and Germany ● Changing diplomatic alignments in Europe; the end of collective security; appeasement expansion (1933–40) Events ● German challenges to the post-war settlements (1933–1938) ● Italian expansion: Abyssinia (1935–1936); entry into the Second World War ● German expansion (1938–1939); Pact of Steel, Nazi–Soviet Pact and the outbreak of war Responses The be four a sources selection of on the both ● International response to German aggression (1933–39) ● International response to Italian aggression (1935–36) ● International response to German and Italian aggression (1940) examination primary and paper will Par t a secondary The sources. The length of each source may vary 3-mark extract but the total length of the paper should 750 words in total. One of the will be a “visual” rather than suggestions of for example statistics, graph a or photograph, asks infer you to comprehend, information. for answering this Here are question: Write: rstly …, secondly …, thirdly … to ensure text-based that source, possibly four ● sources and not some exceed question – cartoon, you make at least three separate points. table map. ● Do not repeat the same overly rely point you have already made. This a book wide global will range thus of give you different plenty sources of on practice the topic with of ● Do war. not and the How to approach the source then briey source in on quotes quote two – or make three your words point of support. Par t b questions on Paper 1 ● You should try to make two clear points for this question. Refer to the guidelines source-based below questions in when each attempting chapter of the the book. ● For of is in 2-mark 5 marks. of the the is parts. It is You knowledge the only content It – is do in a to 3-mark possible and total asks the comprehension give you a of your own response. that of of a historical need your meaning up you your not question and made giving assessing sources. detailed This two component For a own to refer specically provide and enable b you to evidence should knowledge; understanding and to parts your the for content your you to message of the topic understand of each not however and need your to sources more bring in contextual clearly should the content source. explain documents Second question As you sources 4 point, source answer. First question This each the know, as historians they research need a to use historical and era evaluate or event. T H E For the source second in question, terms of examining its question is worth the origin its origin, 4 you “value” purpose need and to evaluate “limitations” and content. one The by kinds This grid M O V E on of pages values different nd provenance For origin of and the G L O B A L 7 and and primary 8 W A R gives limitations you an idea connected of the with sources. marks. Examiner’s To T O purpose look carefully at hint: Note that value and limitations the given in the grid could be applied are general or generic points that source: to these contextual knowledge any source that you to sources. and the However, specic your provenance of Who wrote it/said it/drew it? you get in the examination will allow When did the person write it/say it/draw it? Where did the person write it/say it/draw it? and a What is the source – a speech/car toon/ source using For purpose For content much limitations document the textbook , etc.? make it precise comments the source that question. Notice also will of more always depend you that on on the evaluate the what value in value you of are for. Why did the person write it/say it/draw it? Who did the person write it/say it/draw it for? What are the values and limitations Is the language objective or does it sound associated with secondary sources? exaggerated or one-sided? What is the tone of the source? The most common will have to deal secondary with is key one historian. Again the the of source?” source from questions a that text of you book “What or is What information and examples do they origin the and “What is the select or focus on to suppor t their point? From of the the information source, document’s value and and what purpose, a on can must the particular have you you limitations researching you event infer then source or the about for period purpose?” to work out in question. historians in history. Here the Historians ● are usually professionals or exper ts in eld ● have the benet of hindsight which is not present are in contemporary sources addressed limitation of in the order source will have studied the individual in question in ● points you limitations could of consider works by regarding historians might have a broad focus to their work or might have a very specic and narrow focus ● might be an exper t in a dierent region or era from the one they are writing about ● may be inuenced by their nationality, experience, politics or context ● much detail may provide sources that have value due to and Limitations more sources will be available ● and be biographers: may oer sources based on a range of documents; the more recent the publication, the ● some value and Values Biographers value to the the Source ● the need origins explain has source’s might have become too involved with their subject and have lost objectivity ● may focus on the role of the subject of their biography at the expense of other individuals or tone, use of language and expression factors ● sometimes have the benet of hindsight ● might not have direct access to the subject and/ or other relevant sources (the place and date will be key here) ● may have limitations due to tone, use of language and expression 5 Pa p e r 1 L TA Thinking skills Consider the following provenance: analysing Japanese history in this period. (Remember to research Pyle’s credentials as a historian of Japan.) Kenneth in the Japan Pyle, a academic professor of book, Making The History, of writing Modern 2 How would a school history textbook dier in value and limitations compared to the work of (1996) a historian? 1 Using the points on the previous page, consider the value and limitations of this source for a student L TA Communication and thinking skills T ask 1 T ask 2 Find a biography of one key gure from the period of history What questions would you ask about an autobiography to that you are studying. With reference to the questions above, assess its values and limitations to your research analyse the value and limitations of the source in providing extra insight into the role and impact of this individual. L TA Thinking skills Read the following extract: source: it typies the milieu (social setting) of the young Tory Radicals of the day [of whom Disraeli was Par t of the problem for historians is dening what one] … a source is. Although primary sources are usually closest, or indeed contemporary, to the period under Black J and Macraild, D M. 2007. Palgrave Study Skills – observation, and secondary sources those works Studying History. 3rd edition, page 91. Macmillan. written subsequently, the distinction is actually quite Basingstoke, UK . blurred. Once we move away from simple cases [such Note: Disraeli was a 19th-century British Conservative as politicians’ diaries, or cabinet minutes] which are Par ty leader, and British Prime Minister from 1874–80. clearly primary, diculties do arise. Take Benjamin Disraeli’s novel of 1845, Sybil; or the Two Nations. This is rst and foremost a piece of ction … For historians … however, Sybil is something of a primary Examiner’s evaluation, to a historians hint: source just Note has that no because it for more is the or purposes less primary of intrinsic or value secondary. Question What is the problem with trying to dene sources as “primary” or “secondary”? Always source not L TA ● statements be considered invalid by examiners? to on the specic whether give this it is origins primary distinction in and or purpose secondary. your of a You do answer. A limitation of this source is that the translation could This source is limited because it doesn’t tell us what A value of this source is that it is an eyewitness account. ● be inaccurate. ● need not Communication and thinking skills Read the following statements. Why would these ● focus – This source is only an extract and we don’t know what he said next. ● This is a primary source and this is a value. ● As it is a photograph, it gives a true representation of happened before or after. ● This source is limited because it is biased. ● This textbook was written over 70 years after the event took place so it is unlikely that the author had rst- hand experience. This is a limitation. 6 what actually happened. T H E Refer back to the Examiner's Source Private letters hint on page 5 regarding this M O V E T O G L O B A L W A R table. Values Limitations These sources: These sources: ● ● can oer insight in to personal views or opinions only give individual opinion, not a general view or government (audience – the recipient) perspective ● can indicate the aects of an event or Diaries era on an individual ● may give an opinion that changes (audience – personal not due to later events or may give a view ● can suggest motives for public public at the time of writing) not held in public actions or opinions ● ● might have the motive of persuading can, through tone, use of language the audience (in the case of private and expression give insight into letters) to act in cer tain way perspective, opinion or emotions ● may have limitations because of tone, use of language and expression Memoirs to be published ● can oer insight into personal views, ● may revise opinions with the suggest motives for public actions benet of hindsight, i.e. now the and might benet from hindsight – an consequences of actions are known (audience – public) evaluation of events after the period ● ● might be written because the author might show how the individual wants wants to highlight the strengths of his or her motive or actions to be his or her actions – to improve the viewed by the public author ’s public image or legacy ● may have limitations because of tone, use of language and expression Newspapers, television or radio ● repor ts could reect publicly held views or ● popular opinion could be politically inuenced or censored by specic governments or regimes Eyewitness accounts ● ● might oer an exper t view ● may only give “overview” of a situation ● might only give a one-sided narrow can give insight into contemporary opinion perspective ● could emphasize only a minor par t of an issue ● may have limitations because of tone, use of language and expression (Note that eyewitnesses are not useful just because they are at an event; each eyewitness will notice dierent aspects and may miss key points altogether, which could be a limitation) Novels or poems ● could inform contemporary opinion ● might oer insight into emotional ● could provide a “dissenting” voice, i.e. not popular opinion responses and motives ● could exaggerate the impor tance of an event or individual ● could have political agenda ● may have limitations because of tone, use of language and expression 7 Pa p e r 1 Statistics ● can oer insight into growth and ● decline ● (e.g. political, economic) and could be deliberately distor ted might suggest correlations between indicators, e.g. unemployment and ● voting patterns ● might suggest the impact of an event ● might suggest incorrect correlations; there could be another causal factor ● make comparisons easier ● can give a sense of a specic scene not included in some sets of statistics ● or event ● might relate only to one location or time period or its results over time Photographs are gathered for dierent purposes are limited as we cannot see beyond the “lens” can oer insight into the immediate ● impact of an event on a par ticular place, or people’s immediate might distor t the “bigger ” picture because of their limited view ● might be staged ● might reect the purpose of the response ● might oer information on the photographer; what did he or she environment Car toons or paintings ● want to show? can inform public opinion as ● car toonists often respond to popularly held views ● could be censored and not reect public opinion ● can por tray the government’s line often play on stereotypes (par ticularly car toons) and when there is censorship exaggeration ● could be limited to the viewpoint and experience of the car toonist or ar tist (or the publication the car toon or painting appears in) ● may have limitations because of tone, use of language and expression Government records and ● Speeches might show the government’s ● position on an issue documents ● often do not oer insight into the results of policies and decisions can oer insight into the reasons ● for decisions made might not reveal dissent or divergent opinion Memoranda ● might reveal the motives for government policies ● ● might not show public opinion ● can be used to keep sensitive can show what the public has been told about an event or issue by the information classied for many years ● government ● may not explain the motives for a decision or political purpose might be a well-informed analysis ● may have limitations because of tone, use of language and expression L TA 8 Research skills Find primary sources of the types listed in the grid above For the sources that you have assessed, also look at for the topic that you are currently studying. Using the the content and the language being used. How does the notes in the grid above, analyse the values and limitations tone, style or content help you to assess the value and of each of these sources. limitations of the sources? T H E Third question This will sources. and ask ideas in differences total of you Your 6 two Examiner’s to aim compare is to sources, between and identify and them. It contrast similar to is also than two You themes as identify marked out of this are a one key this three question is linkage, i.e. be expected to discuss the sources for a talk your running about response. commentary. one source The At no without hint: Note attempt 6-mark points of points of must than six This comparison there you more identify question. However, two that and to W A R one points might and might make not comparison be and contrast. of linkage mean three more there points balance four of – there points or four points of comparison and two of points together of throughout G L O B A L you contrast, are a difference. marks. to is T O comparison should could The M O V E examiner time is should relating it to contrast. looking you the How to draw comparisons/show similarities other. “End-on accounts” – where you write about Both Source A and Source B … the of content the of second one source source – do followed by not well. score the content Source A suggests … ; similarly, Source B suggests … Source A suppor ts Source B … How do you approach this question? You must This is one for nd best both similarities presented comparisons are some ● You as two and and separate one for Like Source B, Source A says … differences. paragraphs contrasts. – Here In the same way that Source B argues … , Source A points out that … tips: How to draw contrasts / show dierences could highlight colour practice the and using highlighter similarities the in differences each in pens source another – in one Source A suggests … ; however, Source B says … colour. Source B disagrees with Source A regarding … ● You must make sure in you demonstrating are every that sources you sentence is mention you write. both The skill Source A claims … as opposed to Source B which asser ts … linkage. Source B goes fur ther than Source A in arguing … while ● Always be clear about which source you are A focuses on... discussing. ● Find both the differences, specic more and “obvious” then comparisons go on and similarities to identify and the more contrasts. Examiner’s of this different the ● Deal with similarities in your rst differences in your Ensure that each point this If brief support you – quote quote your you from only make is Do not the two sources, or three not full words to It is answer or attempt ● a conclusion. wastes time. Do waste not time you question not to sources to is look not do: are at the asking The similar focus or content you of why be similar or the different. use This is not explaining necessary what grids, charts or bullet points – always write paragraphs. not a each full in mentions valid one that contrast source … but played a to identify not the role, what other is (i.e. whereas simply “Source Source B to does reach might mentioned your the make point. introduce asking This what clearly A ● is – how second. in stated. it is paragraph Do ● – source. sources and hint question not mention this” is not developed linkage). and source says. ● Do not discuss why the sources are similar or different. 9 Pa p e r 1 Question content. Three The will be assessed markbands using generic markbands, as well as exam specic indicative are: Marks Level descriptor 5–6 • There is discussion of both sources. Explicit links are made between the two sources. • The response includes clear and valid points of comparison and of contrast. • There is some discussion of both sources, although the two sources may be discussed separately. 3–4 • The response includes some valid points of comparison and/or of contrast, although these points may lack clarity. 1–2 • There is supercial discussion of one or both sources. • The response consists of description of the content of the source(s), and/or general comments about the source(s), rather than valid points of comparison or of contrast. 0 • Examiners The response does not reach a standard described by the descriptors above. will apply the “best t” to responses and attempt to award changing Four th question grid This It this of is worth requires question material required the you to most to is that from marks, write an each synthesize a 9 of the mini-essay. essay is source. total The required However, material from the – of key not you your own knowledge in your a ● as is recommended you would any that you essay plan is that you will use evidence Then add events, are your be well as from your own detailed statistics When you only brief The ● a When ● your First and group which from the a brief them the plan into point suggest them 10 open, the to the such views of as grid. This dates, historians. writing, sentence as the of you will need to write introduction. sources, Source A, refer Source E to the and them so on. You can quote briey from the sources sources knowledge the essay but quoting two or three to an in based either the on the is sufcient. those essay alternative ● Use ● Include own detailed ● Write brief conclusion which title e.g. under themes “Examine the if and the sources. a for which should answer or question and question reasons knowledge those argument, the all sources you is the difference the group to arguments. make support sources knowledge knowledge and start using directly answer words support own detailed throughout as the below. sources ● here Add possible. essay. your question. alliances...”. shown should list How do you approach this question? It wherever 25. to ● with as credit the have given. be in line with the evidence T H E M O V E T O Sources that suggest X Sources that suggest other factors Source A Source B Own knowledge: events, dates, details Own knowledge: events, dates, details Source D Source C Own knowledge: historian Own knowledge: events, dates, details Source E G L O B A L W A R Source A makes more than one point, can be used to suppor t more than one argument or theme Own knowledge: events, dates, details ▲ Planning grid for the four th question – mini-essay The Fourth well as question exam specic will be assessed indicative Marks Level descriptor 0 • using content. generic The markbands, markbands as are: The response does not reach a standard described by the descriptors below. 1–3 • • The response lacks focus on the question. References to the sources are made, but at this level these references are likely to consist of descriptions of the content of the sources rather than the sources being used as evidence to suppor t the analysis. • No own knowledge is demonstrated or, where it is demonstrated, it is inaccurate or irrelevant. 4–6 • The response is generally focused on the question. • References are made to the sources, and these references are used as evidence to suppor t the analysis. • Where own knowledge is demonstrated, this lacks relevance or accuracy. There is little or no attempt to synthesize own knowledge and source material. 7–9 • • The response is focused on the question. Clear references are made to the sources, and these references are used eectively as evidence to suppor t the analysis. • Accurate and relevant own knowledge is demonstrated. There is eective synthesis of own knowledge and source material. Examiners credit will apply wherever the “best t” to responses and attempt to award possible. 11 Pa p e r 1 Here is a summary of the key points for each question Third question with the kind of language that is useful when answering This is designed to assess your cross-referencing skills. each question. When comparing two sources you could use the following First question, par t a structures: Remember you have to show your understanding of the Sources A and B agree that … source and come up with three points. Here are some Moreover, the two sources are also similar in that … useful sentence star ters: This is suppor ted by … in Source A and … in This source says that … Source B … Secondly … For a contrasting paragraph: It also suggests that … Source A diers from Source B in that Source A says … while Source B argues that … First question, par t b Always star t with your key point. Another dierence between the two documents is that … One message of this source is … Moreover, Source B goes fur ther than Source A when This is suppor ted by … here refer to specic details it suggests/says that … in the source. Four th question Another message of the source is ... This is a mini-essay and is assessing your ability to You need to make a separate point, not an elaboration synthesize sources with your own knowledge as well as of the rst point: you need two clear points about the your ability to give suppor ted arguments or points that message of the sources. address the specic essay question. Second question Use your essay writing skills and vocabulary for this This question is assessing your ability to analyse a question. source for its value and limitations by looking at its origin In addition, as you are using sources as well as your own and purpose and content. knowledge, you could use the following to help tie in the Make sure that you use the words “origin”, “purpose” sources to your own knowledge: or “content” in each of your sentences to ensure that As it says in Source C … you are focused on what the question needs, e.g. This is suppor ted by the information given in A value of the source is that its author … Source … A value of the purpose is that it … Source A suggests that … and this is suppor ted by The language of the content of this source indicates the fact that in the Soviet Union at this time … that … Historians have argued that … This viewpoint is The content also seems to focus on, or use, examples which are ... On the other hand, there are also limitations to using this source for nding out about … This is because (explain here how origin and purpose can cause problems for the historian) or A limitation of the origin is … A limitation of the purpose is … The content of this source makes it less valuable because … 12 suppor ted by the information in Source E concerning … T H E M O V E T O G L O B A L W A R How should I distribute my time in the Paper 1 examination? A key the issue efficiently time to most You you marks will allowed to this on have to through Read the hour have to managing not out p a p e r. write through run the one understanding is do fourth you sources. you the recommend read paper If could answer examination We for examination. work of time. question; complete ve minutes your time through Yo u after the must all At time in questions allow this paper. reading effectively the is the enough worth the beginning when you are of the not anything. that the of you use your questions what through you the five first. are minutes This looking questions will for and reading time give you an when you read then begin to initial the read sources. How much time should I spend on each question? Some examiners question answer could could have be suggested based receive. on The the that the time maximum following is a you number rough spend of on marks each that the guide: First question, par ts a and b 10 minutes 5 marks Second question 10 minutes 4 marks Third question 15 minutes 6 marks Four th question 25 minutes 9 marks 13 1 J A PA N E S E I N 1.1 E A S T E X PA N S I O N I S M A S I A The impact of nationalism and militarism on Japan’s foreign polic y: the origins, 1853–1930 Conceptual understanding Key concept ➔ Causation ➔ Signicance Key questions ➔ Assess the origins of Japanese nationalism and militarism. ➔ Examine the reasons for Japan following an expansionist foreign policy in the 19th century. ▲ General Tojo bowing to Emperor Hirohito, 1940 Commodore Perry arrives in Japan 1853 The Treaty of Kanagawa is signed between 1854 Japan and the USA The emperor ’s powers are restored 1867 1871 The Sino–Japanese War 1894 1902 The Russo–Japanese War The Treaty of Tientsin is signed with China The Anglo–Japanese Alliance 1904 The Russo–Japanese War ends with the 1905 Treaty of Por tsmouth Japan annexes Korea 1910 Japan seizes German possessions 1914 in Shandong The “ Twenty-One Demands” are made on 1915 China 14 C H A P T E R 1 . 1 : T H E I M P A C T O F N A T I O N A L I S M A N D M I L I T A R I S M O N J A P A N ’ S F O R E I G N P O L I C Y: T H E 1918 O R I G I N S , 18 5 3 – 19 3 0 The Siberian Expedition The Treaty of Versailles conrms Japan’s 1919 war gains 1921 The Washington Conference 1925 The Peace Preservation Law 1926 Hirohito becomes emperor What were the origins of Japanese nationalism and militarism? In order to look at to the understand started in middle the events of the 1930s in Asia, it is important Nationalism roots of Japanese nationalism and militarism, which When the people of a country strongly of the 19th century. suppor t the interests of their own nation, Several factors contributed to the growth of Japanese possibly to the detriment of the interests nationalism: of other nations. ● the determination which was linked to to transform the desire Japan for into a equality Western-style with Western power, powers Militarism ● Japan’s ● the belief in its destiny as the leader of Asia When a government or the people of a need to obtain raw materials and to secure markets in East Asia, country believe that it is necessary to and to stop other countries from doing this have a strong military in order to both ● the need ● the actions ● growing for strategic defend and to promote the interests of security their country. The impact Japan but policy as of these to Japan militarism the popular also nationalist taking of support factors link took goals. that over and powers for was other Japanese making militarism not only nationalism Nationalism because action Western Asian in to expansionism promote with an expansion also in nationalism pursuit became was within imperialist territories Japan political and linked dependent on Japan. in foreign of its with The Shogun the Since 1192, Japan had been ruled by military a feudal military dictatorship called the decisions. bakufu. Although the emperor was still Japanese nationalism began in the second half of the 19th century ocially the ruler, in practice the power when Japan had its rst contact with the West. Up until in attempt this time, it lay in the hands of the Shogun who was a had been isolated from the outside world an to shield its military dictator. Beneath the Shogun were civilization from the perceived threat posed by Christianity. This had the daimyo or feudal lords, and under the been the policy of Japan’s rulers, the shogun, who had effectively ruled daimyo were the samurai or warriors. the country since 1192. 15 1 L TA Communication skills Copy out this mind map. As you read through this chapter, identify motives and events that suppor t each of the ve factors given below. Add this evidence to your mind-map. Desire for with equality the Need West Growth of 19th in a destiny leader in the century as Need Popular the strategic Japanese nationalism Belief for security materials for for raw enthusiasm of Asia militarism and markets and expansionism However in Matthew Perry, steamships. demands He for mindful of to the resist 1853, signed The the began trade. now or all a in signicantly, areas: reforms were Japan’s military a led adapting new navy of a 1894–95, world gave ports 16 A representation of a factory in Meiji, Japan to with Japan, China and to of to USA At unity of “rich included military of the China, empire. Islands, a negotiate large a same the strong The the military”. army established results positioning Treaty and Korean indemnity, commercial Meiji patriotism; also of of War itself as Shimonoseki Liaodong independence to and took perhaps the Sino–Japanese thus The known system and, Japan the of Yoshinobu, reforms time, country, Formosa recognized pay fashion British. attempted Political feudal Major modernizing In and government the and US US 1854. became His tactics. signicant. an the in immense. who education, help had series a to Ships”, with were up sign democracy. cry “Black Tokugawa the several open which to dismantling defeated Pescadores Peninsula obliged the were Japan power the reforms with modernization China with to Shogun, national the German to emperor. military. with Perry’s emperor, industry, promoted Japan forced Commodore Japan by the form the ofcer, of get Japan Japan, limited most and to to on “enlightened” place government ruling naval shores been Kanagawa treaty modernizing establishing ▲ of had the returned Meiji the happened and this on Intimidated treaties, of American determined had West Treaty effects power as the was what humiliating an arrived open treaty. and additional C H A P T E R 1 . 1 : T H E I M P A C T O F N A T I O N A L I S M A N D M I L I T A R I S M O N J A P A N ’ S F O R E I G N P O L I C Y: T H E O R I G I N S , 18 5 3 – 19 3 0 Source skills Source A An by extract from Ubukata who was a memoir, Toshiro, a teenager Sino–Japanese ... a written in put 1931, police journalist-novelist, at the start of it the War. Everybody agreed that it would be upon to held capture huge Pyongyang, British since cannons. August, the After China all, Japanese with so army little effort and disappointing – and the enraptured. My home a to system the back police that it people town no the had News it, thanks to a of post ofce and telegraph police beyond thirty check of the imagination. population times was as over big as 200 compared to our leader 30 in million. Li It had Hongzhang… this was a our rst country war with British. the supported a foreign Everyone women – – moreover adults, talked children, about war by the and victories line else, station. All been as day and happy as night … when we no one ever learned of between the the to newspaper had received ran excitement the almost Japanese then. before its competent nothing came was children The of overpowered aged, telephone was front the the were we day. in However, country, was board very and Pyongyang a people such in and times Japanese million, city message station, several Japan, difcult the news fall of Pyongyang... was Source B A Japanese artist depicts Chinese ofcials surrendering First question, par t a – 3 marks According excited to Source about the A, why victory were over naval ofcers in 1895. Second question – 4 marks the China to Japanese in 1895? so With reference assess for the to values historians its origin, and purpose limitations studying the of impact and content, Source of A the First question, par t b – 2 marks Sino–Japanese What is the message of Source War of 1895. B? 17 1 The eects of the First Sino–Japanese War on nationalism TOK and militarism In pairs consider the skills you have used to answer these source based questions: Germany, interpreting the message of each source; and extrapolating information and evaluating Peninsula the provenance and content of a source. Japan’s Discuss how these are similar to the Germany methods used by historians to gain Britain knowledge. various its this Russia impact in in as took the with forced the the over of to the concerned whole, known control and seen a then advantage pretexts be as was Russia secured took France, Asia what fury, can and on Triple weakened sources their to growing give up Intervention. Liaodong Shandong expand Japan’s Japan Peninsula Province. China spheres to of the Much for to itself, France seize power Liaodong and port inuence. while Great cities The on impact of below. Source skills Source C An Source D extract ofcial from Hayashi, following the Japanese written Triple government in June John 1895 Hunter American of must continue Western considered build is methods if inadequate now; if must be to study … necessary them; need the we be, If we and new must start entire use warships must, organisation our make at of any our are was cost, it will, from Japan ke e p ca lm an d so as to of her and her; lull s us p i cio ns during national we must thi s pow e r watch in m us t the a nd the be wai t O r i e nt and emulate one day. decide her Whe n ow n thi s fa te; not only to p ut i nto the the who seek to will even to be ab l e , medd l e for d ay a nd down amount enough.” to to Japan was a that thing had It had played by the victim, they if learned the rules. were of rules, but they were moment victory, imperialism. Now, the it it in of found that was Japan’s reviled yellow-peril pl ace this in the and imperialist denied club. equal Japanese, J a pa n w il l he r sloganeering s u re l y a rr i ve s s he in the ir fair the w il l the i r s hould in came you weren’t of rules those who had been most enthusiastic be Western models, became convinced, as the Jensen writes, that international law and affai r s; modernization alone would never be bring necessary, it didn’t we West. institutional she because and what conso li da te d; that me dd le “Say standpoint particularly Marius powers strong life. journalist Intervention psychologically this What justice established about able of countrymen, Triple found a t ion s even will him rest enough. his the happened membership come The nurtur ed ti me by opportunity Japan: si t not against had weren’t From tight, the of that transform sincerity you mus t it strong system changed. present to many wrote dominate army rectifying military for Tokutomi to At Modern (1993). Intervention. Speaking We Boyle. Nexus full respect and equality from the West. affa i r s. Third question – 6 marks Compare and contrast Source and Source C Japanese The military also the encouraged reinforced successful powers 18 as a the that world and to kept a of a and and drawn military up to and defend from presence at expressed the the gaining to a militarism against military the upper heart of land the other the of of and power, Japan. Japan to It be Western expansion ranks of in for representatives the of Western necessary itself in views countries. land also was Japanese ministerial only War, some military Russians. 1905, be give nationalism strong power the to views regarding Western Sino–Japanese having growth idea now This of at against 1895 were forces. the the and between navy success frustration towards the D increased the the army armed government. and C H A P T E R There 1 . 1 : T H E was a production iron and huge I M P A C T steel. the Japanese N A T I O N A L I S M determination soared as The amounts society, O F of River expansion on was were to J A P A N ’ S Japan to on was O N become told spent Society, the M I L I T A R I S M strengthen sought population money Amur to Japan A N D in less all army established on through and to P O L I C Y: respects. reliant “endure the F O R E I G N T H E A promote 18 5 3 – 19 3 0 Industrial imports of hardship” navy. O R I G I N S , as patriotic the idea of mainland. Japan after 1900 How did international events contribute to the growth L TA of nationalism and militarism? Japan’s position was further strengthened by the signing of an Thinking skills alliance The Russo–Japanese War with Britain, the Anglo–Japanese Alliance, in 1902. This not only ended An ex tract from Kenneth B. Japan’s diplomatic isolation but was also the Western and a rst time a military alliance Pyle, 199 6. The Making of had been signed between a non-Western nation. Modern Japan, page 191. When Japan and Russia clashed over their interests in Korea and against the The [Russo–Japanese] war Manchuria, Japan went to war, with a surprise attack required an unprecedented Russians in 1904. It was successful in its land battles, although with great mobilization of the nation’s loss of life; however, it was the war at sea that was decisive. The Russian resources. The government eet sailed halfway round the world from its base in the Baltic Sea to mobilised one-fth of the Vladivostok. When it arrived in the Tsushima Strait, it was destroyed by male working population for Admiral Togo and the new Japanese eet. some form of war service and sent 1 million men to the MANCHURIA Vladivostok front. Casualties amounted to Mukden Liaoyang more than 100,000 and the lf u G f o g n o d o ia L nancial cost was immense. Port Its cost was ten times that of Arthur the Sino-Japanese War and stretched the economy to the Inchon N limit. To sustain so heroic an KOREA A eor t, the war was justied as P a great popular under taking. Tokyo A Shimonoseki J Nothing in the nation’s history Sasebo (Naval Battle B u R ▲ s s ia a ic lt t e le F Japanese naval Japanese land had so heightened political attacks base) of awareness as this war. oensives Tsushima The Battle of Yalu River, 1904 n Questions The Russo–Japanese War, 1904–05 1 According to this source, what eects did the Russo– Japanese War have on Why was Manchuria so impor tant to Japan? Japan? Manchuria Japanese it Manchuria the the islands, provided growing was it also from of was impor tant China closest agriculturally oppor tunities offered Japanese threat area the for possibility population and, to rich the of Japan. with Four mineral supply of providing strategically, times it larger resources. resources living could space act as to This the meant Japan. for a than the rapidly buffer 2 Discuss how Pyle has used language to present his argument. against Russia. 19 1 L TA The Russians were forced to accept the Treaty of Portsmouth. Many Thinking skills Japanese were disappointed An ex tract from Kenneth B. led Pyle, 199 6. The Making of much of South Modern Japan, page 19 6. rights in Manchuria to expect much more. with the However, Manchuria, along terms Japan including with the Port of this gained treaty control Arthur. southern half as It also of they of had Korea gained Sakhalin been and railway Island. Japanese imperialism The war earned Japan not only the respect of the West but also the was driven by continuing admiration of other Asian countries, who saw the Japanese as a role preoccupation with strategic model for how they, too, might take on the West and win. It also advantage and a peculiar afrmed Japan’s own belief in its destiny as leader of Asia. combination of nationalist Some Japanese were worried about the impact that such imperialism pride and insecurity … This was having on Japanese society. The cost of the wars had an impact on pursuit of empire and status its economy, and the need to defend its new territories brought with it as a great power coloured the demand for a stronger for a less army and eet. However, the voices of those all other aspects of Japan’s who argued ambitious foreign policy were overwhelmed by national development … those who wanted to improve Japan’s position in Asia. If the drive for industry and empire was to be sustained, national loyalties would have How did Japan benet from the First World War? to be continuously reinforced The First World War gave Japan the opportunity to expand its inuence and every eor t made to in Asia further. Japan demanded German colonial territory in China and overcome the forces of when this demand was ignored, Japan declared war on Germany, seizing disintegration. Germany’s in 1914. military bases Meanwhile, its on the navy Shandong occupied Peninsula Germany’s in the South north Pacic of China possessions. Question What are the implications of Pyle’s assessment of Japan by 1906? With One to the Allies the Japanese commercial more sharp Japanese from supplying markets Japan that also goods the became the in war, the Russian Japanese originally also in had Civil on forces after and mistrust Japan of the of that had Bolsheviks on War 70,000 in government prestige and independently the of to an also to by to not also such it agree lease a within only to modied. First World orders exports developed caused those stood were the any political, actions Thus, to demands angered of “Twenty- extra to accept These supplying full. as also Japan demands the end of withdraw USA because to War Asian ourished. industries to 1922. cost control government war of to the the and The though men. whole home, The the were which The they British, defeated there in had expedition. the in had Japanese venture intervention the with Whites Bolsheviks. after they the even 7,500 army, during Bolshevik withdrawal support of At the Brest–Litovsk Whites, only Britain. the to however, in and of civil with Russian of Army the send the the force Red support Ultimately, came Treaty invading would failure was advantage expand the they the was that Following signed to to grant the China imported. against the the and unable men left. had Allies take to and the with required Japan. USA, result, to 1917. sent and believed a Japan Russia agreed stayed French for China self-sufcient after it As were previously Allies sent who and from the China these powers, sent and able the more opportunity Germans, 20 to Another the other Allies goods from to advisers was issued of Shandong Manchuria. reputation. produce Revolution in Britain Japan then in government Japan’s Japan important remaining military Economically, by most territory and reaction damage The privileges coastal nancial the distracted, Demands”. US by and the encouraged were attacks Russia, largely the loss acted C H A P T E R 1 . 1 : T H E I M P A C T O F N A T I O N A L I S M A N D M I L I T A R I S M O N J A P A N ’ S F O R E I G N P O L I C Y: T H E O R I G I N S , 18 5 3 – 19 3 0 The results of the First World War for Japan Japanese immigration At the Versailles Conference that followed the First World War, Japan to the USA secured the former German Pacic islands as a mandate and Germany’s The ow of Japanese former economic privileges on the Shandong Peninsula of China. These immigrants to the USA gains rmly established Japan as an important economic power on the increased substantially after Asian mainland and as the main naval power in the Western Pacic. 1900. They worked mainly However, Japan “Western Club” the Charter Britain of and Japanese was by the the reminded its failure League USA immigration to of were that get of their was racial Nations. afraid into it not equality This the fully was a clauses because implications countries member (see for the included leaders this right of discrimination in all areas. in would more in unskilled jobs and faced in A growing fear of “the yellow have for details). peril”, perpetuated by the US press, drove various anti- Japanese laws; the Japanese L TA Social skills were not allowed to become US citizens and in states such Look back at the six factors, listed on page 15, that contributed to the growth as California were prevented of Japan’s nationalism after 1853. In pairs or small groups, copy out the spider from owning land. The 1924 diagram and work together to add evidence from pages 15–21 to suppor t Immigration Act discriminated these factors. against Japan by making it the only country not to be allowed Japan in the 1920s any quota of immigrants into the USA. How peaceful was Japan in the 1920s? Inuenced in 1921 to a to develop by and foreign relations seek policy economic Thus Japan the the to a be China, of the this treaty should the in Italy, respect integrity Meanwhile, the ratio. massive These that of Wa sh i ng t on J a pa n 1 920 s. wi t h in cha n g ed T hi s k ee pi ng a nd a im e d g ood c on t i n ui n g th e and together Japan Japan, or Treaty, to fr a m e wo rk of be the was by Japan Treaty setting France and the agreed First ratio Italy opposed by to to the the as signed the the 1922. ▲ and Shidehara Kijuro and German War. for in Britain, be abandon Treaty as February territorial each international four well competition Navy that Four- France of return 5:5:3 would Washington committed to a integrity, the World of Navy in and and by Treaty, Portugal restricted a and any concluded the Imperial deeply of independence during Naval USA Nine-Power and insisted replaced possessions A agreements. Americans independence China”. formed was the should Pacic. Japan’s was international Netherlands the carriers required 1902 seized respectively. treaty treaties the m e a ns : bu t to 1 929 –3 1, pa r t n er, 1921, Chinese Five-Power aircraft expansion indicated the and Japan This the “sovereignty, Shandong of of Four-Power to several rights the in and a m ba ss a dor a nd dur in g China , Britain, the concessions USA wa s peac e fu l tra di n g in to Alliance administrative battleships vi a k ey Conference threatened undertook respect a signatory Belgium, signatories This in confer countries who 19 24– 27 agree me nt. Anglo–Japanese Treaty; to e co nomy adv a nce me nt was agreed in i nte r na ti ona l is m US A, Washington Power by the Kij ur o, mi ni ste r of Japan’s with international At Shi d e ha r a foreign the allowed a its for plans General System 1.75 a Staff. and cooperation in 1920s. 21 1 The Washington Treaty System Four-Power Treaty: Five-Power Naval Treaty: Nine-Power Treaty: This ended the Anglo–Japanese This limited the tonnage of the US, Japan, the USA, Britain, France, Italy, Alliance. The USA, Britain, France and British, Japanese, French and Italian China, Por tugal, Belgium and the Japan were to confer if there was a navies. Netherlands were to respect China’s crisis in the Pacic. integrity and independence and abide by “open door ” principles. This change supported liberal and referred for the a a Taisho’s prime was signicant 1925, and all of and the Minister Hara’s and it leading of that The term Taisho to be their that the to the those the Diet now electorate vote. it the than was Society a was more years of became leader in to democracy” latter gaining rather affairs point “Taisho to the experience given foreign democracy, given the in seemed during controlled meant of of common one 1920s. of political because extended became the This power they were until, more in open inuential. government economic government the that were Hara’s of part Meanwhile, more social membership world’s elite. males approach instituted position because media introduced As parties because adult mass Prime so Japan. reforms reign. political members of minister’s main doing international developments democratic series two were more internal more to Emperor to by led Council lasted reforms. Japan into showed from The the that 1918 League it to military was of 1921 was and contained Nations, accepted as where one of its the powers. What problems did Japan face in the 1920s? Despite 1920s, the society, The came democratic law links of together system the in no addition, and problems in the in 1930s extension Party, laws, right one had the engage internationalism Japanese to lead in the government Japan towards and a fear This was open ruling the also of also down for country’s saw on aimed franchise scandals the political big business the public’s as to radicalism. the and parties. in the cities suspicions. 1920. and the who at The much a year via opposed the of limiting dilemma political that the saw Peace Japan’s Communist passing other indicated how The government, anyone particularly in discussion, circles Financial deepened left-wing established the fragile. support respect. franchise been in a clamping extending government’s either inspired was structure. which to of with public countryside longer Law, remained eroded party the there Preservation political reforms violations each landlords The 22 democracy dictatorship. election In towards underlying A fragile democracy Japan’s or were which military 1. moves there these the in two public’s the freedom Meiji to allow. C H A P T E R 2. 1 . 1 : T H E I M P A C T O F N A T I O N A L I S M A N D M I L I T A R I S M O N J A P A N ’ S F O R E I G N P O L I C Y: T H E O R I G I N S , 18 5 3 – 19 3 0 Opposition to Shidehara’s internationalism and the growing inuence of the military on foreign policy Many Conservative questioned it as for betrayal example, from an a The expanding of the 150,000 of the along in Washington 226). and to see ‘iron-ring’ They with Treaty destiny army, seeing System, preventing continued Japan’s the relations, to as Japan advocate being the the the a of bill Shidehara’s limiting specically page 21). protest other Tai s ho a This was the slap in opponents di e d, r e v i v al revi v a l excluding from provocation of of policies by the the was immigration “Asiatics” very of face”. to countries the the who played Shidehara’s the (see Japanese called into policies, to quota it the a hands who saw the West. com in g ide a press It all from offensive Japanese the conrmed from of na ti ona l is m of the and n ew E m pe ro r empe ro r the id e a as of a Hir oh i t o l ivin g J a pa n ’s wa s go d, s pe ci al wo r l d . A growing economic crisis The economic 1921, boom when of Europe the and strike Japan’s cities paralysed and caused by workers the rural tried police. crushed the zaibatsu (big crisis, left Indeed, foreign the by and the repression end the the than a imported to be in 1920s, the the of following government the in a middle markets. 1921, a bitter price were rice and suppressed political The the of farmers associated global a between falling they landlords. USA in When with intimately the the lost divide rice. politically, and and, large from until back developed was outbreak Crash only take dissatisfaction seemed the and suffered cheap companies) Japanese rather There themselves with lasted revive unrest increased Street of years farmers and that came Wall crises, and organize again business however, following docks. harvests to This to industrial areas, good war began Unemployment of 2001: “deliberate as with with on and bill Emperor destiny of and and military celebrated The Anglo-Saxon China dislike strong insult” When (Bix, in passed box immigration 3. interests. as along international Asia. provoked “grave government, to “ an abroad” year, information the seen policy USA a in approach Japan’s conservatives’ when and of was aggressive leadership groups Shidehara’s system with real by that the economic depression 1929. series would of come domestic and down the on side democracy. What was the role of political instability in China in encouraging Japanese nationalism before the 1930s? China’s political competition Korea and on instability its was mainland key and in encouraging preventing imperial Japanese expansion into Manchuria. 23 1 During the century, Sea competed of course as of the European to gain 19th powers colonies, Okhotsk had been forcibly S China a RUSSIA opened up for trade by the k Russia a h to il 1858 n West. MANCHURIA Although this had MONGOLIA 1900–05 autonomous to After 1912 Russian, 1905 also Japanese been the case for Japan, Russia Vladivostok 1864 Sea of Beijing following Perry’s arrival, managed to this turn it had situation Japan to its advantage, borrowing JAPAN Tokyo Yellow Western Yokohama CHINA ideas to become a Sea TIBET strong Nanjing country after 1868. autonomous East 1912 China PACIFIC N E However, N P China went on Sea A OCEAN L BHUTAN Pescadores Islands W to E TAIWAN country . to Japan semi-colonial Following China’s 1895 BURMA Bay a s Guangzhou INDIA become Colonial Spheres of possessions influence defeat Opium British of by the British Wars in the (1839–42 and Philippine French Bengal SIAM Sea 1856–60), European powers German PHILIPPINES Japanese to South gained extraordinary economic, U.S. Russian 1898 China Qing Empire, 1850 military and legal Chinese soil, privileges on Sea 0 300 600 Miles especially along BRUNEI INDIAN the BRITISH SARAWAK OCEAN NORTH SINGAPORE 0 300 600 coast Ofcially , was ▲ in the treaty ports. Kilometers BORNEO still the an Chinese Empire independent power, A map depicting how colonial powers car ved up China, 1850–1910 but in mercy reality of it was other at the powers and Source skills their A French from political cartoon treaties, power. In which addition, were backed Christian up by “gunboat missionaries diplomacy” ooded into the or armed country 1898. As we West have which, ambition for East of they Japan (see a quick dynasty. China; 18) defeat. A However, prevented the they it by 1920s, Nationalist Party at the the of who as the “a in in political which, would and powers that of dagger Japan’s other in remained fought at the weak of the lose out having heart” depended of on Sino–Japanese Korea, and and was toppled among out would Japan 1911 markets powers The in drive help Strategically, security inuence Meiji the also the thrust areas. The sharing they modernized China had this the encourage mainland. such over national (GMD) on with colonies. to materials possibility country main raw newly revolution the Naturally, that fought to helped concerned (seen equality acquiring European inuence was kind the the the believed warlords any meant claims Korea achieve country” were stake compared dominated see alarmed in to mainland. benets: dominant page also could and also and weakness By the also control having War not wished “rst-class on China was Japan) course, a Japan did political its of be Japan economic Asia. spoils it to expansion provide if seen, China’s evident the divided. themselves in Manchu It was and unity. force after in China 1925, was was led the by Guomindang General Jiang First question, par t b – 2 marks Jieshi. What is the message of this car toon with up regard to China in the 19th century? cause in will 24 However, 1921. The further read in the Communist rivalry instability the next between in China chapter. Party these in of China two the (CCP) political late 1920s had groups and been was 1930s, set to as you C H A P T E R 1 . 1 : T H E I M P A C T O F N A T I O N A L I S M A N D M I L I T A R I S M O N J A P A N ’ S F O R E I G N P O L I C Y: T H E O R I G I N S , L TA Research and thinking skills 1 18 5 3 – 19 3 0 TOK Add more evidence to your spider diagram (see page 16) on factors that had After you have discussed the review contributed to the growth of Japanese nationalism by the end of the 1920s. questions consider the following: Which of these factors do you consider to be the most impor tant? Did your class agree on which events were most signicant? How might your 2 Identify the factors that encouraged the inuence of the military to grow in choice of events impact the conclusions Japan during this period. you draw about historical events? 3 In pairs, discuss the role of China in encouraging Japanese expansionism in Now discuss more generally who decides this period. Be ready to feed back your discussion to the class. which events are historically signicant and how this impacts our understanding of the past. to Source help and hints our 30 leader You need to nd three clear points to answer part Question 1 on the document paper. When idea rst Li war the source it is a good to these points before writing them and competent a foreign this country, was a our country moreover children, the by the aged, British. the Everyone women – – talked out. no First question, par t a – 3 marks war one and ever learned page a or about (See such reading underline adults, highlight had Hongzhang… with supported through It a rst of in million. of nothing had the been fall of else, as day happy, and as night when … we Pyongyang. 17.) Cited in Modern Japan, A History of Documents. According to Source A, why were the Japanese so J.L . Human, OUP , 2004 excited about the victory over China in 1895? Once you have found write your three clear points, it is an easy Source A process An extract from a memoir, written in to 1931, Example by Ubukata Toshiro, a was a teenager at the start of according about agreed that it would be city in to held capture huge August, the Pyongyang, British cannons. Japanese army since with so disappointing little – and Pyongyang little had thought enraptured. the Japanese that it much to system received the it, the post put upon My home back police it town then. and and times a people China before to a had News was population we day. was thirty was the station. board in children The of times over line as 200 was achieved despite the very fact easily, that it would be “very difcult”. they Secondly, were bigger excited than because Japan and China had a was good this made the Finally, victory they seem were even excited more because no had been successful in their rst war with a victories All front ran between news of to excitement beyond effort”, country. newspaper telegraph police message station, Japanese its thanks ofce several all, police the the people foreign came were because almost Japanese they telephone Japanese China However, remarkable. were the overpowered effort the of so leader; was A, over the so Pyongyang Source victory very “with difcult the War. capture Everybody to the excited Sino–Japanese answer journalist-novelist, Firstly, who answer: was the check of the imagination. After big and as Japan, million, Examiner’s likely clear to achieve points. though Make comment: you sure three Note do the not that marks brief need you This do to not answer because quotes quote to the repeat would there are be three support points, sources directly. the same point. compared 25 1 Note First question, par t b – 2 marks that example (See page Standing upright, than phrases Example is rst apart message and a Western-style Fists clenched sts are that they also giving are Traditional uniform the fact is in are in your painting the Japanese shown are the bold in the answer clear is the as being to the that and fact the thus that uniforms, traditional This tall and with feet the subservient Second, message Western standing position bowing. by that Chinese. Conversely , Westernized the by the artist Japanese is have modernized. the Japanese whereas the are Chinese dress. dress Examiner’s is the message of Source you you have pick a out visual the annotations message support of the your source, key annotate the source to points. should source help and can you be work used out as the clearly stated and The message this answer with of would details painting and gain marks. Two clear event was remembered full so supported the source points be are from expected the to made. overall evidence to points. how Second question – 4 marks this Japan. page comment: B? is It also has value as an by some example of in what 17.) was With this to clenched. shown wearing (See that making commanding Chinese This of superior by in successfully Your to answer are shown upright, help words Bowing Chinese Japanese When or key examiner. The What are 17.) the taller the answer reference to its origin, purpose and being published about such events in the content 1930s. assess the values and limitations of Source A However, for historians studying the impact of to Sino–Japanese War of its origin key to this question is to look at the 35 the source. This will give you the origin of the thus clues as to its purpose. The years important has point up here is that this is a memoir written some the First Sino–Japanese War. Also note that it by a Japanese events journalist who is recalling as of his power. being source who is was have written a key by a event Japanese of his victory of experienced 26 had on that it a is the of Japanese the this origin event eye-witness small a it is possible that some aspects, or that taken on writing greater in 1931 importance, when are written with Japan the is a purpose and some so it aspects is to possible make that his he is memoir interesting. “no over town. memoir at the rst that Chinese it the hand account The and is of purpose gives an This one limitation had ever can been so be seen in the happy”. journalist comment: This has and limitations, answer purpose and the and refers deals to the with origin, content. author and the values in the value an written event, childhood: both us is Memoirs Examiner’s recalling give the forgotten published language, answer This A memoir, childhood. Example 1895. a an more the after he exaggerating event relating is was of written limitations it years great after As to especially pick some source some and has purpose. introduction Ubukata to source and 1895. some The the the so he impact value insight can it in into Note that useful, as expressions you may such not as “it is know for sure. possible that” are C H A P T E R 1 . 1 : T H E I M P A C T O F N A T I O N A L I S M A N D M I L I T A R I S M O N J A P A N ’ S F O R E I G N Orient Third question – 6 marks (See page P O L I C Y: that and contrast Source and Source towards arrives Japan and she will able the D views expressed regarding the come will one day. decide When her own Western compare and be not only to put into fate; their in views of the powers who seek to meddle in her the she will even be able, should meddle in their affairs. this be countries. necessary, for surely day affairs; Again, will 18 5 3 – 19 3 0 this place Japanese O R I G I N S , 18.) Compare C T H E contrast questions, to annotate Source D the sources when you read them to help you pick out the John comparisons and contrasts. You can do this in Hunter The colours. This will make it easier to write your as an example, two of the comparisons are in blue and green; one contrast is shown in for rest of happened from Japanese Hayashi, written in June the Triple of must continue Western build is if the inadequate now; if must be to study … necessary them; need we be, If we and new must, our start entire use warships organisation must make it at any of our cost, not army rectifying military From it from system so must to suspicions lull during this the power watch time must Example and keep calm and the nurtured foundations be wait of the of yellow-peril those of using and opportunity that it had enough. was that to a sincerity thing Japan had of played the rules, by victim, but if you learned the they it it found that and imperialist had been in was the Japan’s reviled denied club. most were were Now, to rules. they imperialism. sloganeering the had equal Japanese, enthusiastic models, writes, became that convinced, international as law modernization alone would and never we in full respect and equality from the West. the The difference that both Western sources refer methods. to Source Western methods and on “Japan had learned to in the plan to sources remedy is that the SourceA situation, the Source emulate a involves continuing to copy the West, C must continue to study and make use of D Western says of who Jensen “we talks will, strong Contrasts is of in Western which use fair victory, ● similarity you her answer Japanese was dominate against consolidated; for It moment focuses One and sit Comparisons ● West. rules bring must to amount standpoint institutional national what weren’t enough.” particularly Marius her; “Say we down didn’t membership Japan as life. strong the about tight, journalist Intervention psychologically established by changed. present this came emulate are even At countrymen, Triple Intervention. methods considered him because justice weren’t We his the 1895 and following of that government What ofcial many wrote transform the Source C extract Japan: (1993). purple. to An Nexus. picked Tokutomi out Modern American answer . Speaking Below, Boyle. different methods … keep calm and sit tight the …”. Conversely, Source B focuses on the fact West”. ● that Both sources are also, however, critical West’s intervention. Source C Western accuses belief of interfering in Japanese affairs, D says that Japan had found by the West or “the imperialist sources by the focus on Japanese the bitterness ● The tone in felt of the by very the the language West, while accuses the and is emphasize similar. “meddle” Source West the and West, they would never equality”. to this positive is the about sense that Source the future and C for Japan to believes an “opportunity” own fate” will denitely “decide come, whereas the Source D is much future, implying more negative about the this. sources as and however Triple Source C of B with quotes not the playing regard to the achieve it will be very difcult to equality. the journalist by that uses ever such that, humiliation following war copied respect Connected her Intervention they “full that faced worked club”. is Both haven’t Japanese itself ● “reviled” the while get Source among the much West methods of the the who rules. 27 1 Examiner’s six points you in three of the comment: similarity answer). similarities. between and This could However , similarities and You should difference be there three is not differences; attempt (indicated to the nd here for question. and point contrasts and and always balance a there a two comparisons and four contrasts, could or every clear student that the has good “linkage” here, vice which has compared the sources student the is China It is a For as is very Queen The in the common of cartoon annotations John has to this cartoon get used to well-known so this you with regard in but cartoon, cartoons. is interpreting caricatures should revolutionary Victoria, caricature you countries, with of also has points JH. been know France rosette or Pyle, K. 1996. annotated you write USA Toshiro, 1931. U. Japanese OUP 28 York, The Lexington, War”. on sources. source end. It Each should be both. good, Review short the quotes to markbands for Third Question. Does this answer best t the top marks? countries competing to the slice of China China shown as a being cut largest unable Western get portrayal to stop powers; of indicating the racist China, weakness to is symbols these shown her here shown cartoons. what on Britain sometimes Modern New both each the as is as hat; shown the Bull. help 1993. Jovanovich. some made. here an for answer you. to Use the the question. up into pie slices References Boyle, to at century? use example, woman this that often represent are. 19th important Cartoonists to message the about China 24.) the in talk throughout Western What refer commentary First question, par t b – 2 marks page not comparison means boundary (See do the versa. the student key: do should running support The is then be The only This separately Japan: The Making of Modern “Promulgation Modern American Nexus . Harcourt Brace USA Japan, A of Japan . the History DC Heath constitution of Documents, and and J.L. Company. the Sino– Huffman, 2004. Japan on watching sidelines with interest 1.2 Japanese expansion in S outh-east A sia, 1931–1941 Conceptual understanding Key concepts ➔ Causation ➔ Change ➔ Perspective Key questions ➔ Assess the impact of nationalism and militarism on Japan’s foreign policy in the 1930s. ➔ Examine the impact of economic factors on Japan’s foreign policy. ➔ Discuss the impact of the political instability within China on Japan’s actions in Manchuria and mainland China. ▲ Japanese forces in Manchuria, 1931 Japan bombs Chinese districts The Manchurian crisis 1931 of Shanghai 1932 Army ocer revolt Prime Minister Inukai is assassinated Manchukuo is created 1933 The repeal of the naval treaties Japan signs the Anti-Commintern Pact with 1934 of Washington and London by the Germany Japanese navy 1936 Election results in the Minseito Par ty in government An attempted coup takes place in Japan, The Marco Polo Bridge Incident 1937 The beginning of Sino–Japanese War in favour of Kodo-ha The National Mobilization Bill The star t of Tosei domination of government 1938 A proposal for the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is announced The Imperial Rule Assistance Association 1939 is formed Japan sets up Wang Ching Wei as the All political par ties are banned in Japan puppet ruler of Manchukuo 1940 Japan signs the Tripar tite Pact with Japan signs the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany and Italy the Soviet Union 1941 July: Japan invades the rest of Indo-China Japan demands access to bases in Vietnam from the French December: Japan attacks Pearl Harbor 29 1 Between by the that 1931 growth you read deteriorating and of about on Pearl There are different USA ● It a and could ● be the could only be to Japan of could from the through used be for was willing to achieve it addition, actions of and the the could Britain to of to the led of to to be in China, the global the dened military intervention ultimately, what be 1930s , Asia. war; as its that a Japanese war. war had as that be between in in planned the the region region international possible. Japan be was contain to because negotiation. for If However, if war. forced for plan was avoided. prepared aims did This through to Japan to an inevitable. legitimate determined war although was had aims delay objectives powers argued to not to Japan Japan’s therefore, long was needed Japan were war major Japan USA. continued power development early argued Asia, In led and, negotiations in failed, the dominating also with This West regarding empire war policy growing Pacic: expansion negotiation USA and its possible, ● 1941 that Japan their it 1.1. the the aim the with achieved inevitable. However, in argued with expand Chapter in foreign and perspectives Japan response in Harbor war was Japan’s relationship attack the 1941, nationalism into the war region. by the The Japan. Causes of expansion RUSSIAN (USSR) By EMPIRE the 1930s, Japan had fully 1922 modernized towards MANCHURIA West. and gone achieving The forces a long equality of way with nationalism the and SAKHALIN (1931) OUTER militarism had taken hold and were (1905) MONGOLIA MANCHUKUO popular with the Japanese people; (1932) . JEHOL I INNER these forces had been given a boost by S E I (1933) L ) R MONGOLIA in wars against China and 5 U 7 K 8 1 ( Mukden successes Russia, which had established Japan’s Beijing Sea LIAODONG KOREA PENINSULA Por t (1905) Ar thur position of Japan in Japanese, mainland by the China. 1930s, Most saw Japan’s (1910) E position I as essential, not R. Japan 1898–1914 because E 1914–1923) and strategic only reasons, they believed it was but Japan’s Nor th E Yellow S Pacic Nanjing Sea JA Hankou economic M (Germany for P Qingdao Ho Asia R CHINA Hw an g in A P N destiny to be the leader of the region. Ocean . R Shanghai Throughout the 1930s, the impact of e t z East g militarist s I n a y Japan k nationalist continued to be thinking important in in u Sea and u China y R Pescadores encouraging (1895) an expansionist foreign 1895 OKINAWA policy. (1874) Canton Furthermore, crises at home in 1910 the government and in the economy forces to have TAIWAN Treaty HONG (FORMOSA) KONG (1895) of 1905 allowed Manchuria upper ”Manchukuo“ (BR.) South PHILIPPINE China ( TO USA encouraged Growth of Japan’s Empire 30 Another key the factor Manchukuo an expansionist that foreign 1933 1898) policy ▲ hand. 1932 IS. To Sea these 1931, was instability the that continuing existed in political China. C H A P T E R 1 . 2 : J A P A N E S E E X P A N S I O N I N S O U T H - E A S T A S I A , 19 31 – 19 4 1 Political instability in China By the late 1920s, a new situation, combined economic crisis Encouraged China, the Chinese end forced By unequal China 1921, a to This China. the It was military this and the Manchurian crisis concerning the behaviour foreigners grown. by Jiang included treaties in of the had led emerged strength precipitated outrage (GMD), had growing that nationalism unication. the the Japan, public Guomindang national to by in situation with that The Nationalist Jieshi, began anti-foreigner the great a of Party rhetoric powers, in campaign and including of 1931. in China, of demands Japan, had sign. new political party, the Communist Party, had been set up The warlords in China. Jiang Initially, Jieshi “Northern wrest and to 1927, form Communists, the Expedition” power the the from the Communists directed Communists the United to Front. warlords. were to than the Mao central in an focus of Zedong, United However, clash and by The consolidate energies rather led Front joined launched government ultimately, all-out Jiang civil The warlords were local or a control the war towards with regional military leaders that and had their own armies. They Nationalists which, defeating would rule areas of China as from their own territories. Rivalries the and competition between Japanese. warlords meant that at times This changing situation in China was to have an impact on the actions of they were at war with each other. the Japanese government and military. Japanese domestic issues before 1932: Political crises and the growing inuence of the military The Northern with the the Japanese Manchuria, and for Expedition, Communists, government. Zhang attempted Jiang. interests If in which was to Zuolin. expand Jiang The been with Japanese However, into defeated had regarded had Zhang Northern Zhang, launched some this backed had China, could by degree Jiang of the become which impede Jieshi concern warlord very made Japan’s by in powerful him a target special Manchuria. The Kwantung Army The Japanese Kwantung government Army, to Manchuria before GMD China have However, be some treated they so forced assassinated believed was while the Zhang Japan and leaders to 1928. fallout from this conquer Japan’s Prime enforce discipline on to Some act to interests that halt would Manchuria, retreat policy They Kwantung provide the let to Jiang’s Manchuria. should Jinan. the back to themselves. at the was in Zhang action of in him The its take Expedition army force thought June to to its Jiang. focused 4 wanted on use by decided Northern to and defeated Kwantung leniently Zhang that disarm he Jiang’s planned Manchurian railway had been guarded by the Kwantung garrison, which in 1919 not First, then assassins excuse Since 1906, the southern they developed into the Kwantung Army. The Kwantung Army became a stronghold of the radical Kodo-ha or “Imperial Way” faction, with many of Manchuria. its leaders advocating the Minister Tanaka was instructed by the emperor to violent over throw of the civilian in the army. However, despite Tanaka’s anger at this government to bring about interference by the Kwantung Army in government policy, the General a military dictatorship (see Staff were unwilling to punish of the the perpetrators as they claimed it would page 39). They also advocated weaken the prestige army. In July 1929, Tanaka was forced to a more aggressive and resign as he was unable to implement the emperor’s wishes. Therefore, expansionist foreign policy. as early as the summer of 1929, it was clear that the army could ignore 31 1 the government democracy The in leader of minister but majority in his the Great did Minseito had for election won good relations However, the both with agreed the his started funds the this decisions to limit particularly in military head forced when him to to civil made with the at naval was undermined April and so sectors. In by as (see he liberal The have the on end of to the Hamaguchi government were Hamaguchi Disarmament of the 1930, right-wing in an impact military Criticism died a public and the when Naval prime below). cut outraged he not from November a and did faltered economy growth. 1931 he became disarmament London grew. shot as soon then the Yuko, majority China, industry were circles, in 1930 military but Japan’s resign in sound affect help and Hamaguchi to a government move, Conference a fundamentally Hamaguchi an unhappy to Party, He have salaries This call of to Depression not impunity. parliament. manifesto corruption. with Japan. government, things radical. His came to injuries August. Japanese domestic issues: Economic crisis The global Street economic USA economic Crash and in the order. other crisis USA This, which called in turn, democratic started into cast in 1929 question doubts nations, and the on on following whole the the Wall international trustworthiness Japan’s own of the parliamentary government. Japan was countries Hawley Tariff brought on dependent put in worst hit had fallen to hit than particularly production. The trade protect into by as law was badly result the silk of since was by its own as in US industry. over fell drastically The Herbert Hoover peacetime as Smoot– in industry. 1930, Duties 200%. what desperate exports industries. President tariffs much one-fth and their protective rose industry less world to signed highest goods The on tariffs Act, the Japanese were up it half By had of 1932, been them poverty as the in price 1923. relied on of silk Farmers silk unemployment rose to 3million. The of responsibility the liberal internationalism, to In become this dire important had in the rights, and Manchuria Japan. In Matsuoko “our only If could fact, very of Port it gain also a means of to a possibly wa s have in li vi ng read as the by M i nis t e r the shoulders Taisho anyway, Boyle, of 1.1, railway Russo–Japanese (coal, the it iron fo r th e in about and Japan and War timber) deprivations would an were 1993 more Chapter manufactured sp ace on even in control suffering de pi c ted Fo re i gn — became Manchuria its and doomed depression. resources for squarely democracy well Japan market s ur viv al ”. as of over pr ov ide b e ca m e you Russia wealth took placed Manchuria As defeated enticing and world Arthur, Ma nchuri a (who the was Taisho robust of situation, Japan also plight 1920s. interests. when increasingly the victims Manchuria’s depression. resources 32 Japan’s control Japan’s of never more economic 1904–05. were two to gained mineral for reforms control of these goods. ove r-p opu l at ed d ipl om a t 194 0) as a Yo su k e “ li fe li n e ” a nd C H A P T E R Security: buffer 1 . 2 : J A P A N E S E E X P A N S I O N I N S O U T H - E A S T to Raw Russia The attraction to help of coal, timber of lifeline” withstand Living impact 19 31 – 19 4 1 materials: iron, Manchuria, “a Markets, A S I A , space for global Four times Japan’s larger population depression than Japan Source skills rural Source A areas. service A graph showing Japanese exports For was 1934–36 = rural escape youths, from military poverty and 1926–38. degradation. Yen-denominated; many their 100 such as the Military Imperial leaders and Reservists’ organizations Association 210 promoted the idea that the “soldiers were the Textiles 190 arms 170 and legs of than civilians. men struggling It the empire stated to that survive …” and young better peasant “consider it to be the 150 greatest honour attainable, once they enter 130 the Commodity army to become a private superior class.” exports 110 total Source C 90 Herbert Bix, an American historian who 70 1926 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 specialises academic in Japanese book history, Hirohito and the in an Making of I. Yamazawa and Y. Yamamoto. 1978. Estimates of Modern Japan (2000). Long-term Economic Statistics of Japan since 1868. 14: Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments. Thus ideas justify advanced their actions by in Japan’s leaders Manchuria to gained Source B reinforcement Contemporary observation, 1929. capitalism, blocs, In this climate of economic despair and decline, the military emerged as shining and pure example of spirit of the nation. Aided in of indoctrination, the part most fervent support in the domestic and of global trade military ideology. In a systems lecture of delivered before Hirohito and his entourage at on January, 1932, former army minister by Minami emphasized national security, found raw its contending and General decades monetary the 28 true emergent breakdown a court seemingly the and politics political from materials, and the need for territory to down-trodden explain the army’s creation of an independent 33 1 Manchurian state. management”, he “Japan-Manchuria told the emperor, joint First question, par t a – 3 marks would According enable Japan to “withstand an a blockade from “indenitely of Manchuria solve the decade a in great its Japanese providing people, abroad” as space whose were for and entirety The would “population Japan’s expected by to particular Source appeal B, for why the did the military Japanese have peasants? continue power”. numbers to economic also problem” rapidly the reach According to important for Source C, why was Manchuria by Japan? increasing end 70 First question, par t a – 3 marks acquisition of First question, par t b – 2 marks the million. What is the message of Source A? Second question – 4 marks With reference assess the historians Despite Japan’s aims the The of Kwantung destabilize fullled, who the as aimed to difcult Thus, a of hope that it the was succeeded Jiang. peaceful China, for taking in to the over would clear ght to his the While principles militants of became by of of son, given Zhang the was not Xueliang, Nationalists rallied government maintain Japan’s Kwantung Army would for would control Japanese Manchuria C Manchuria. Zhang Chinese the content, crisis. that, for seize and Source Manchurian Japan Indeed, propaganda. purpose limitations assassination warlord with origin, the China allow objective to Manchuria, and himself position were in still the concerned become more achieve. group Manchuria L TA Prime Army’s follow their studying Expedition, anti-Japanese North-East that for its and situation the allied behind plans Northern to values of once Minister Kwantung Army and against for all, Wakatsuki was ofcers the warned hatched policies of the of a plot their plan by to seize own government. Japanese consul Social skills ofcials In pairs or groups, use the in Manchuria. minister of war, Minami responded He General informed Minami, to the emperor, restrain the who ordered Kwantung the Army. sources and the information in by writing an urgent letter to the commander of this section to assess the impact the Kwantung Army, but this letter was intentionally held back by the of the economic crisis on general ● the political situation in Japan ● the position of the military ● the overall foreign policy plan tasked before against the Hirohito would with delivering receiving Chinese. and his top the As The emperor’s the palace it. … therefore command historian advisers plotters Herbert never seize the initiative, completely overturn undermine the emperor’s authority ” (Bix, to P . cancel Bix imagined the executed any writes: that Minseito the their action “ [Emperor] Kwantung cabinet’s army policies, and of Japan. 2000). Events in Manchuria, 1931 The impact of nationalism and militarism on Japan’s foreign policy On the evening explosion on Immediately railway that 34 the had a of 18 September section of afterwards, been blown perpetrators the were near Mukden, Japanese-owned ofcers up 1931, by of the the Chinese. members of South Kwantung the there was an Manchurian Army However, Kwantung claimed there is Army. Railway. that the evidence C H A P T E R The Kwantung forced the Kwantung Army Wakatsuki’s policy of had to began its to entered declared victories that Kwantung the Manchurian from of did not would ignored the Within to to the but the hours, The back to S O U T H - E A S T the Japanese following control the day, orders the coming the railway and and A S I A , 19 31 – 19 4 1 had the declared Kwantung 24September, government I N north. regain heed On fall E X P A N S I O N Mukden. hostilities”, territory. army Army “excuse”. attempted and more J A P A N E S E Changchun government seize its retreat “non-expansion relishing It Army Chinese 1 . 2 : Army from Tokyo. government zone, pushed a was but further again into the the countryside. Source skills The Source A army troops An extract from Kenneth B. from Making of Modern Japan , page 189 weakness of the Korea government, gone general both of decision-making confusion the an uncertainty and foreign opportunity for fact is that turmoil – the Kwantung conquer all of resolute Army. It pushed Manchuria and 29] troops puppet and state, was Manchukuo. replaced by a headed by Inukai party government in am Tsuyoshi. pre-war It was from Korea you without authorization?” the He Tanaka said, cabinet “Well, the [1927– were I dispatched gathered he without had not imperial foreseen all … under these any circumstances quite can powerless his to majesty’s restrain military the act military. without sanction? be What talking to can you I do? like Maybe this, but I should can you do the … I am in serious trouble. Japan. page Wakatsuki’s soldiers Wakatsuki Source B Minister have can Seiyukai Cited Prime of during at anything? last may “How a not cabinet him: ahead establish his resigned rebuked action How Japanese I all I to they in attending problem by indeed, send the sanction.” created “We’ll the power, and domestic in.” dispatch government diffuseness … me, (1996). allow The told Pyle, already The minister appeal in Hirohito 236, by and the Herbert P . Making of Modern Japan , Bix to First question, par t a – 3 marks the secretary Kinmochi I am not Foreign I have forces more by in respected being kept or warned two only informed by Ministry haven’t you are so and ten “What … Chief The Mongolia thousand thousand. are you challenge anticipated either through Kawasaki hundred your you Army them some minister, chance, Saionji the Manchuria than Prince According to Source Army to seize A, why was the Kwantung 1931. Secretary have army the Ministry just Cabinet we in of – outnumbered According the do if, something something you to can’t Manchuria? Wakatsuki to Source face in B, what problems responding to did events in Manchuria? while asked going causes of First question, par t a – 3 marks of number [sic] control the … Chinese I able that given Third question – 6 marks Compare and Source regarding B government contrast during the the the views in weakness Source of Manchurian the A and Japanese Crisis. stop?” L TA Thinking skills In pairs, identify the factors in Japan and China, which led to the Mukden Incident in Manchuria. 35 1 What were the results of the Manchurian crisis? The results for Japan’s international relations To the outside seemed The world, deceitful, breakdown of fully appreciated. Thus there relations on the as o t h e r. army control followed, between J a p a n ’s its in over the Japan Although, proclamations continued on as the 1930s, the you to of peaceful expand Kwantung a one will marked hand read Source skills the Army the the troops marching into a Chinese town, We s t ’s September–October USA crisis cautious, force leave the for sees as the a to have Japan, by by the resolutions were Triple First question, par t b – 2 marks Uchida of in no seen as way as conicts holding upholding allowing the 1930s, Germany contrast, and a in the on own Nine-Power legitimate from this, and was a which had also the new the threat as degree Soviet Japanese region. law imperialist there territorial 1930s, the the international their Following with back to only the walked Japan, viewed the it go military out of the with its Soviets concerned suited and not but also Manchurian to of the 1895 (see Minister “ Recognition Manchukuo] the racist West was reasons, themselves and unchallenged. more League was their the for of law League’s that 1895, Japan of in key power Japan both interests as by the [of and System. League Foreign state within regime Treaty compared gained admiration communist Increasingly when to abandoned The on in to now attacked claimed As of led it military and new Treaty ”. needs actions of the as Intervention page18) photograph? point” it the were politicians. crisis Nations. international West for to cooperation Washington only of Indeed, seemed the Japan Japan Kenneth isolation Nations, 36 was Manchurian Japan’s Within of “turning Japan. the this the 1931 nevertheless, League international of to in caused historian crisis message Britain c h a p t e r, condemnation Pyle the in and response using The is been 1931. its What not Manchuria, rather circa had next Manchurian Japanese intent Manchuria. deterioration and in in for Nations. an in Nazi In ideological Manchuria. potential relationship By the opponent between C H A P T E R China and the Comintern 1936. Italy with However, and leading or Soviet Pact the cabinet World it is Germany, 1 . 2 : Union, Nazi J A P A N E S E Japan important government to never nor governments, signed Germany Japan did even in a the that S O U T H - E A S T A S I A , 19 31 – 19 4 1 Anti- unlike Fascist abandon during I N November note had it E X P A N S I O N the Party elections Second War. The results for Manchuria and China By the under beginning the control Manchuria set the puppet rule and called In the January between The city was bombing of Chinese Pu Yi (the state and bombed had by the Chinese over the densely were outrage against Japan. landed to and assist the The Japanese emperor of the in under China) as a of casualties world in and intensied opinion Japanese stationed widespread intense residential of result, turn out Shanghai. with The populated thousands helped in Japanese divisions navy broken forces districts. created Four wholly government also Chinese the that last was “Manchukuo”. ghting with forces. independent of Chapei, refugees of Manchuria Japanese an new 1932, 1932 of up Japanese devastation area of troops Shanghai. After ▲ six weeks, Chinese forces were forced to Smoke rises from buildings in Shanghai’s native business withdraw. district, where Japanese troops launch an attack against defending Chinese, 1932. L TA Thinking skills Ex tract from Herber t P. Bix , Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, page 251 (20 0 0). Neither army nor navy drew any conclusions from the heavy losses they incurred in this rst large battle with a modern Chinese army. They continued as before – utterly contemptuous of the Chinese military and people, whom they saw as a rabble of ignorant, hungry peasants, lacking racial or national consciousness, that could easily be vanquished by one really hard blow. Quesion What point is Bix making regarding the attitude of the Japanese military in China? The results for the Nationalist Par ty in China China’s of response Nations. focused on involved in Jiang to the Jieshi, defeating another Manchurian the the leader Chinese conict. He of crisis the was to Communists knew call Nationalist that he and was on the Party, did League was not unlikely now want to to get receive 37 1 L TA Thinking skills the kind of support nevertheless that he he needed could from gain the time to Western powers, organize his but hoped defences. He also did I. Hsü, The Rise of Modern not directly negotiate with the Japanese government. This combination China, page 550. Published of “non-resistance”, no-compromise and non-direct negotiation was in 1995 by O xford Uni versity unlikely to benet the Chinese position (see historian Immanuel Hsü’s Press, O xford, UK view to the left). In retrospect, one cannot help Although Jiang was reluctant to confront Japan directly, the Chinese feeling that such a negative people responded with fury at Japan’s actions. There was a boycott of approach could hardly Japanese products, which had an impact on Japan as it reduced sales of achieve positive results. its goods in China by two-thirds. This did little to stop Japan’s actions, If the government had however, or to change Jiang’s priorities in dealing with the Communists authorised the Northeastern rst before dealing with the Japanese. Thus, following the bombing army to resist the invader, of Shanghai and Japan’s continued expansion in the north, China the glamour of aggression continued to cede territory. Japanese control of Manchuria was accepted might have been dimmed, in May 1933 of parts in the Treaty of Tanggu. Jiang further agreed to the seizure thus providing a chance for of inner Mongolia and, in June 1935, agreed to remove all the more moderate civilian troops from Hebei province. Jiang’s strategy against Japan derived from government in Tokyo to his belief that, given the size of China, Japan would exhaust itself in have had a greater voice in the process of trying to occupy it. He believed that the Japanese “were the China aair. Moreover, a disease of the skin while the communists were a disease of the heart”; if Nanking [Nanjing] had thus, he considered “selling space to buy time”, a viable strategy. pursued an active policy of negotiations with Tokyo, The results for the Japanese government it might have reaped Japan beneted economically from the occupation of Manchuria. more positive results. However, the mainland to cost of maintaining a sizeable army on the Chinese Unfortunately, it followed some extent negated the benets and there was an increase neither course. Instead it in taxation back home in Japan. Indeed, by going it alone internationally placed its reliance on protests and also the “Asia declaring its responsibility for maintaining peace in Asia through to Tokyo and on appeals to Monroe Doctrine”, Japan was potentially overstretching itself. the League of Nations. It needed navy, to According to Hsü, how could US events have been dierent if Manchuria China had been more active in of solving the Manchurian issue nationalist be and able also and to to protect make Northern decision-making by sentiment the army had against Chinese China. the that itself This Soviet government precarious rather been the than the growing in Army accept situation and its position was government the the and in result of the Japan. itself? Following would was the regain further actions in Manchurian the upper undermined China. There crisis, hand. by was there Indeed, public a was the support celebration little hope Japanese for of the the that the government government’s Kwantung “heroes” of position Army’s Manchuria; The Monroe Doctrine was a the embarrassed Japanese government had to go along with the wave of 19th-century US policy, which popular opinion and accept the conquests rather than demonstrate the loss set out to prevent the European of control it had over the army. Foreign criticism and condemnation also powers expanding their colonial galvanized Japanese nationalist sentiments. interests in Nor th or South America. Japan’s version of L TA the Monroe Doctrine would Communication skills be a policy limiting European Go to the link www.youtube.com/watch?v=OExOfMNK-R4, or search “Evidence of inuence in Asia. Japanese accusation at WW2 #1”, to watch Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka at the League of Nations , February 1933, defending Japan’s China Policy 38 C H A P T E R 1 . 2 : J A P A N E S E E X P A N S I O N I N S O U T H - E A S T A S I A , 19 31 – 19 4 1 Source skills Saburo Ienaga, academic 1931–45, a book page Japanese The 129 The Imperial was presented Pacic historian, War an started, Senso) quest in (Taiheiyo a for war escalates elusive uncontrollably in the victory. (1968). Army’s as an march act of into Manchuria self-defence How could That was China an be brought intractable to its knees? problem. to First question, par t a – 3 marks guard “Japan’s acquired the at lifeline”, great cost Sino-Japanese Next, North in and China which blood had and been treasure wars. Inner had and Mongolia What in Russo-Japanese points impact of are made Japan’s by Ienaga takeover of regarding the Manchuria? to Second question – 4 marks be controlled to guard Manchuria. Protecting With these areas required further advances reference assess the heartland of China. This pattern of the values a truism military about operations international its and origin, purpose limitations of and this content, source for ever- historians expanding to into studying the Manchurian crisis. conrmed conict: once Years of turmoil: The descent into “the Dark Valley” After 1932, there the politicians the political call of a “the division within situation establishment Japanese was but at the the military Dark not only military time and between itself. would government and This the military further ultimately the lead descent and destabilized to into the what the Valley”. Japanese domestic issues Military after 1932 RADICAL MODERATE Political crises and the growing inuence of the military Although some to the generals did not want Koda-ha replace government with Way military junta, momentum there behind groups that did. groups that wanted for military: the was the There Imperial faction ha or were were two key inuence Koda-ha Way faction, and Control faction. Both imperialist expansion. was generally two. The and or the the more Koda-ha the Tosei- dictatorship groups wanted However, Legal with emperor means military in government of the believed in a = enemy USSR that get Japanese radical faction dictatorship to inuence Koda-ha USSR military or faction growing Military Imperial Tosei-ha Control militarist more the or a would = good deliver relations state socialism. viewed main the enemy. Soviet Union conquest of Its Soviet leading Union They as saw war inevitable Manchuria ofcers as as Japan’s with and the the the rst Spiritual step towards national this. “spirit” They over emphasized material of training army Modernization of army force. 39 1 The Tosei-ha were against government. They wanted and inuence Soviet Union over as Soviets. the modernization As the Their whole part of this One army and trial actions of of Therefore, the a the power struggle However, Saito and, a ha leader to a as it the L TA was found guilty May did force foster not see to war good in which China, as well remove military maintain a the rm banks, took over as with the relations would the the power with require mobilization sympathy in the of ruling of its against 1934) the discovered, of police killed. for their parties. enhanced democratic Saito army and Admiral played out its factions. seemed into to high Kodo-ha’s he and support the leaders and the political Tosei-ha 1932–July and known, the 1932 number Admiral which the major shot widespread during July 1934. promoting a young the During the Kodo-ha ofcers, General for was became and a ofcers undermined three was when Inukai governments stance When Tosei-ha, it three between favour radical promoted a the positions. factions member of war. publication his as further (May Japan, party with Koda-ha him of in 1932, Minister appointed against of in governments, economy. There of to government Incident”, and subsequent minister control of 15th took Okada the keeping to demonstrated government plot produced control use industry disillusionment between faction, Tosei-ha They power the Prime army interim Saito’s Admiral the The for attacked Tokyo. “May of were the the means conquest and place conspirators Okada after army took general government. Kodo-ha was contest ofcers in the inuence Admiral and legal wanted destabilized these navy and the internal plots headquarters The and objective of use nation. assassination 1936. to government. inevitable the of the terrorism a idea his leadership, that the army minister was Kodo-ha ofcer sacked the Kodo- should for not assassinated the Nagata. assassin, Aizawa, at his trial but he was Communication and executed. In response, a group of young Kodo-ha skills ofcers Go to: www.youtube.com/ watch?v=yDv8NxGv9Yg, or search for “ The Road to War – attempted marched ofce, police brutally coup into a and many around the to seize took headquarters murdered went revolt Tokyo power over and the ofcials. the in February parliament prime News minister’s of their 1936. 1,500 buildings, the residence. attempted soldiers war They and bloody world. Japan”. Watch the Pathé News clip, star ting 22.30 minutes into the video. Make notes on how the coup was repor ted. Fifteen ha of the faction faction meant were that Admiral became and Okada prime had programme support with 40 the Hitler resigned In to to May in on, developing now take attempted the start, he military, including 1936, agreed army, he which Hirota Manchuria. November, 1936. agreed also When coup the later and weak shot. the of the National a for this Koki to a make strong the army seven-point control expand and had pursue to Kodo- country. Hirota and The Tosei-ha the ministers agreed signed the to handed to of planning, agreeing that He and control was basically He army rmer the ofcers. secret members after military. in in tried then From serving the the army in the be from government would minister. were From important army with policy. navy conspirators discredited. most the compromises foreign key was arms of the production and Anti-Comintern Pact Diet alarm declared its C H A P T E R at the direction the 1 . 2 : military J A P A N E S E was taking, E X P A N S I O N the I N government S O U T H - E A S T was A S I A , 19 31 – 19 4 1 brought down. The government and June of General Hayashi was in power between February Class discussion 1937. attempted divided. and the it was would be the was the military’s Prince that, Tojo with his only instrument power. Konoye However, Fumimaro long took political of its power left politicians over as prime experience, he that were Discuss possible reasons for minister could Japan’s decision to sign the unite Anti-Comintern Pact with Nazi in six the Germany in November, 1936. restrain to; the China Hideki, Within ordered to able expansion 1937. Diet politically. wanted not General had limit June, hoped nation Konoye and to In The the was their became weeks army, Tosei-ha of invasion of it was was objective. Chief Konoe but faction of Staff taking China. A to apparent leading the power, Konoe soon dominant was in that the Tosei-ha Kwantung Japan’s powerless to general, Army army he government in July commanders halt it. Year Prime Minister Features of the period 1931 Wakatsuki Par ty Cabinet; undermined by the Kwantung Army taking over Manchuria 1931–32 Inukai Par ty Cabinet; assassinated in 1932 1932–34 Admiral Saito Moderate 1934–36 Admiral Okada which admirals; resulted military in control power the over struggle supremacy between of the Tosei-ha Tosei-ha and and paved the factions, way for more government 1936–37 Hirota Koki 1937 General Hayashi 1937–39 Prince Konoe 1939 Baron Hiranuma 1939–40 General Abbe Japanese expansion in China and South-East Asia 1940 Admiral Yonai Tripar tite Pact 1940–41 Prince Konoe Diplomatic activity with the USA ; fails to control militarists 1941 General Tojo Attack on Pearl Harbor ▲ Kodo-ha Growing militarism; concessions to the army Unable to control the military; war with China star ts Summary of the political changes, 1931–41 Source skills ideals Source A Watch a 1936 cartoon, Evil Japanese Mickey of the nation principles are 1. must … The described fundamental below: anti-American attacks Japan : Japan aggressive strive to policies eradicate of the the great powers, www.youtube.com/watch?v=icVu-acHlpU and Source B based and Hirota share Koki’s government adopted on principles of national must become the stabilising East to contribute Asia mankind both and to at in name and in the peace and welfare the same time the principle co-prosperity. This is joy of the which is co-existence spirit of the Way … Japan must complete her national defence force and in true Asia policy: 2. Japan the East the Imperial following with fact so armament to protect her national as security and position of development. In this way, the of manifest the Empire as the stabilizing the 41 1 force in name 3. The East and policy Asia in can be secured both For in fact. toward the continent must rather of 1933 of a kind on the following factors: in Manchukuo’s healthy order to stabilise Soviet to the Japan-Manchukuo threat Union, promote from must our be the no abatement must the United prepare against States collaboration and China. In the must relations 4. Japan pay with Great Britain about Japan, execution plans to due other development especially in the her in there of Japanese political, in the interference, affairs And at a Tokyo press of Northern conference Ministry spokesman in 1934 enunciated what appeared to “Monroe Doctrine”, be, despite disclaimers, warning a Japanese foreign powers their of off to China. First question, par t a – 3 marks this are the to key points made in Source B policy, Japanese policy in Asia? friendly First question, par t b – 2 marks racial the outerlying hands Manchukuo, attention economic peace But and close powers. promote spring order regarding Japan Japan. the was the in What and and from there development, bring between and Foreign keep we China years, 1937, national north, eliminated; economic of development a defense, four to China. and than summer between economic promote the be was based more to South South What and Seas, Seas is Source the overall message of the cartoon in A? area. Second question – 6 marks “Fundamental Principles of National Policy”, With reference to its origin, purpose and content, 11 August 1936 in Lu, David J., 1997. Japan: assess the values and limitations of Source C for A Documentary History, pages 418–20. historians the Source C Richard Storry, academic book a professor Japan and of the history, Decline in of an the Asia 1894–1943, page 149 the Second World War in Pacic. Third question – 4 marks West Compare in studying and contrast the views given in (1979). Sources actions B and C during regarding this Japanese aims and period. The Sino–Japanese War of 1937 At the Marco Japanese Mukden in into Tokyo. deployed set from Kor e a conta i n is on Ko re a of wa r a nd the B eij i ng , 7 l imi te d Jap anes e mini s te r from to by nea r fo rce s the r e up China The attempted B r i d g e, Chine s e Incident, deliberately forces Polo and Ju ly g h t in g 193 7. evi de nc e fo rce s, wi thout a rmy, t h at a l t h ou gh br oke t h at and t h is the a rmy d ra wn go v e r n m e n t we re P ri n c e we re the wa s ha d fo rc e s a lt h ou g h b e t we e n to cla s h the m or e r e info rc e m en t s ou t co n t ra s t c on su l t in g d ema n de d Ma nchuri a , In sent. Kon o ye This le d to Class discussion the full-scale war wi th Chi na . Why was the Japanese By the end of July, Japanese forces had taken Beijing, and the government unable to prevent following month there was ghting in Shanghai. Japan was engaged a full-scale war developing with both in the north and in and around Shanghai, and was thus ghting a China in 1937? war on two Although fronts. the of that earlier have 42 Marco event concluded that Polo Bridge Incident has often been described as a repetition which led to the Manchurian Incident, reliable postwar studies the 1937 incident was not the result of prearranged planning C H A P T E R by If Japanese historians Bridge affair , created could authorities have by they its have actions escalate – excused into a an 1 . 2 : J A P A N E S E either those Japan not in from climate of eight-year Tokyo the exonerated E X P A N S I O N it or charge from animosity in those of the on I N S O U T H - E A S T the scene premeditating more China in serious which 19 31 – 19 4 1 … the Marco charge a A S I A , that triing Polo it incident war . JH. Boyle. 1983. “Sino-Japanese War of 1937–45” in Kodansha ncyclopaedia of Japan, Vol. VII, page 199 The Japanese was brutal, devastating forces the ed drove to that this largest more raids. inland river Some suggested amounted human along refugees interior. have Their and Chinese the historians in air Yangtze terrorized attack with to the exodus history. The The Rape of Chinese Nanjing nationalist government had its Nanjing, capital to abandoned the this Japanese Nanjing fell Japanese during the that followed, and to atrocities. As Akira Iriye December, days Chinese civilians subjected the historian writes, of Nanking’ make it all to but still were appalling ‘rape Japan but as the 13 and soldiers also advanced. to on moved “The would impossible be accepted for as Infamous photograph of South Station in Shanghai, China, 28 August 1937 ▲ a respectable member international (Iriye, the community” 1987). There followed among the Japanese the defeated storm victims, of much of of 30,000; city who in of and died on that after fugitive 12,000. of terror modern entered cruelty the at period rst troops and a history whom civilians the the Chinese violence at murdered Nanjing in troops, many observers in worst the a of the the city on helpless has few repeated soldiers Robbery, and destruction warfare. For December Chinese parallels. assaults, killed were wanton that almost 13, were rape estimated destruction at and on population female estimated rank weeks unleashed civilian The must seven by foreign 30,000; arson left ruins. Spence, J. 1990. The Search for Modern China. 43 1 Source skills Source A Source C Japanese Chinese soldiers vendors, purchasing Nanjing, items from Corpses China. on Nanjing, the shore China, of the December Yangtze River, 1937. Source B Japanese Nanjing, troops China, rounding 16 up December Chinese, 1937. L TA Research skills 3 Refer back to the photograph on the previous page showing the baby on the railway tracks in Shanghai. Research the controversy surrounding this photograph. L TA Thinking skills 4 With reference to Sources A–C, discuss the challenges facing historians using photographs as 1 In pairs 2 What discuss the message of Source A. evidence. is the message of Source B? What were the results of the Sino-Japanese War for Japan? As the the army the historian Japanese rather than escalated, the 44 Staff army the has as had as a you campaign to written, wanted ” been Chinese. (partly Japanese, all-out Pyle General war p. of read for once Jiang with 198). preparing However, result will a (Pyle, a the Jieshi’s China, Indeed, major Marco new in the next “annihilate” the nationalist “ was not a until this war with the Polo Konoe regime. Soviets to called that time, incident commitment chapter) war up had resist for an C H A P T E R The hope was that China Japanese leadership extent Chinese the of Rape of 1 . 2 : in a J A P A N E S E would new quickly Asian nationalism and E X P A N S I O N capitulate order. the This outrage I N and view S O U T H - E A S T would by 19 31 – 19 4 1 accept underestimated caused A S I A , such the events as Nanjing. Source skills A cartoon the UK The by David newspaper cartoon labelled Low the depicts “Jap Evening the industry” “Further deeper” Standard, Japanese and and “Jap 19 military politics”, published January leading into in 1938. two men, China. First question, par t b – 2 marks What on is Low’s Japan Thus, in despite message regarding this cartoon? their defeats, the lack the of impact effective of the invasion weapons and of China industrial TOK support, Japan This the had led to to becoming Chinese ght supply more another under the to push agree the becoming to Zedong intensively terms Chinese one in for peace. further overstretched Chinese developed, Mao most and vulnerable resistance of on lines Chinese one refused guerrilla under Jiang north-west bombed cities and into the Jieshi the meant the T wo at that centres Chongqing thus far. Look at the historians’ for views and the primary accounts and would World have looked at in this chapter forces Chongqing Second In pairs review the sources you interior. Japanese attacks. China. of This become and photographs. When historians work on developing War. their accounts of historical In November 1938 the Japanese government declared the creation of a events how do they select new political, cultural and economic union between Japan, Manchukuo their sources? How do they and China – a New Order in East Asia. Prince Konoe had publicly select what events and actions declared Japan’s aim of creating this union, which would mean a new are signicant? Discuss the level of political, economic and cultural “cooperation” between Japan, dierence between selection China and Manchukuo. Jiang rejected this idea for a new union, and and bias continued The in key its the problem favour. terms, war. for Japan over It pursued a decisive military victory the number of and next few years strategies the setting was including up of an how to end the compromised alternative war peace Chinese 45 1 regime that would Bix concludes and [would] II, and agree that end Japan’s war, only after ultimate terms “set with the stage having defeat” them. for given (Bix, the seed None of triumph to these of Japanese methods Communism involvement worked. in in China, World War 2000). L TA Thinking skills An ex tract from Max Hastings. 20 07 . Retribution: The among subject peoples of the European empires. battle for Japan 1944–45, pages 5–6. Published by This vanished, however, in the face of the occupiers’ Alfred A K nopf. New York , US A behaviour in China and elsewhere. Japanese pogroms of Chinese in South East Asia were designed par tly to Inaugurating its “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity win favour with indigenous peoples, but these in turn Sphere”, Japan perceived itself merely as a latecomer soon found themselves suering appallingly. The new to the contest for empire in which other great nations rulers were inhibited from treating their conquests had engaged for centuries. It saw only hypocrisy and humanely, even had they wished to do so, by the fact racism in the objections of Western imperial powers that the purpose of seizure was to strip them of food to its bid to match their own generous interpretations and raw materials for the benet of Japan’s people. of what constituted legitimate overseas interests. Such a view was not completely baseless. Japan’s What are the key points made by the historian Hastings pre-war economic diculties and pretensions to a regarding Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere policy of “Asia for Asians” inspired some sympathy in this source? Why did the conict deepen after 1938? The militarists take control Prince in he Konoye December created which was control unity joined the Indeed, Rule a returned 1938. prime minister aimed to party by multi-party in Konoe as still called most the limit in Imperial political July the parties. 1940 power Rule of having the Assistance However, he resigned military and Association again failed to militarists. Assistance were He total politics was Association control resigned and when was suspended replaced in all October, replaced by in 1940 political 1941, General when parties. Prime the The Imperial military Minister Prince Tojo. The impact of the war in Europe With Hitler’s were drawn 1940, have Japan troops conquest swift to areas pressured and of victories new Europe conquest occupied airelds South in of East in in – France the into Indo-China. Asia. Similar summer Europe’s of permitting This would attempts to 1940, colonies. be In the Japan’s the pressurize military November forces rst stage the Dutch to of its failed. Events 1940–41 The Three Power/Tripar tite Pact and the Neutrality Pact In September Yosuke, Italy the would Axis colonies pact powers in with clashed 46 the the Asia twice could defeat be was Soviet with Axis Europe could Japan the Japanese, Tripartite dominate Furthermore, a 1940, signed the and the easily able Union. Soviet under Pact leave by secure During Union over to that Matsuoka Germany dominate democracies in East and Asia. Europe If their Japan. its the Minister agreed Japan Western seized to Foreign which northern war with border border China, disputes after signing Japan – rst had in 1938 C H A P T E R and again, Nazi April This 1941 was forces in Indeed, for for Soviet a more Pact of mutually Europe the Japan the victories of take over Netherlands and, on Dutch From East Indies. immediately with Japan region In and 1941, Japan has froze to a part South been The all East without a engaged in attacked Western this could to assets that plan of war, with for to to no colonies in end its China brought (see Greater it. to in into November its and the southern Japanese foreign Indo- and the move, trade defences in the 1.3). victories Asia in Europe, Co-Prosperity this. the Indeed, the early East in Soviets. south. Malaya their Chapter impressive entered into this 19 31 – 19 4 1 opportunities France (Thailand), this the further A S I A , The concentrate great at 1939. with forces moved alarmed included end could strengthened the be Japan how in of However, Pact Britain, Siam S O U T H - E A S T Japan. created forces and they Hitler’s was move of I N summer for Union Europe Britain, Jiang ambitions Asia could threaten and by Soviet in the Neutrality colonies addition, aid in a Japanese Japanese suggested clear July, fostered its Nazis E X P A N S I O N set-back into the Asian USA In increased in the they halt. expanded Sphere; It there as a Japanese the 24 period, been entered benecial to China. had also and J A P A N E S E protracted 1939 Matsuoka 1 . 2 : war Japan conict in with was sight, China still fully when it 1941. L TA Social skills ARTICLE 3 The Tripar tite Pact Japan, Germany and Italy agree to co- operate in their eor ts on aforesaid lines. The Government of Japan, Germany and Italy They fur ther under take to assist one another consider it the prerequisite of a lasting peace that with all political, economic, and military every nation in the world shall receive the space to means if one of the three Contracting which it is entitled. They have, therefore, decided Powers is attacked by a Power at present to stand by and cooperate with one another in their not involved in the European War or in the eor ts in the regions of Europe and Greater East Asia Japanese-Chinese conict. respectively. In doing this it is their prime purpose ARTICLE 4 to establish and maintain a new order of things, With the view to implementing the present calculated to promote the mutual prosperity and pact, joint technical commissions, to be welfare of the peoples concerned. appointed by the respective Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy, will meet It is, fur thermore, the d es ire of the three without delay. Governments in other direct for spheres their the world to extend of effor ts purpose of th e co- operation w orld along w ho lines realis ing are similar their to natio ns inclined to their u ltima te to ARTICLE 5 Japan, Germany and Italy arm that the above agreement aects in no way the own political status existing at present between object , each of the three Contracting Par ties and peace. Soviet Russia. Accordingly, the Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy have agreed as follows: ARTICLE 6 The present pact shall become valid immediately upon signature and shall ARTICLE 1 Japan recognises and respects the remain in force ten years from the date on leadership of Germany and Italy in the which it becomes eective. establishment of a new order in Europe. Lu, David J. 1997. Japan: A Documentary History, ARTICLE 2 Germany and Italy recognise and respect the pages 424-25. M.E. Sharpe Armonk , NY, USA leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater Asia. 47 1 In pairs or small groups discuss and agree a response to the 2. following questions. Present your answers to the class. 1. How might the Western powers perceive this agreement? How might the terms of this treaty facilitate Japanese 3. foreign policy ambitions? How signicant is this agreement in demonstrating Japanese intentions in the region? Source skills Source A A cartoon UK ▲ . by Mars, Sidney “the “George” God of War”, Strube has published masks in labelled, the Daily China, Express, Spain 15 July, 1937. London, Abyssinia. “So is he going back to that old mask - again” prepared Source B to Kenneth B. Pyle. The Making of Modern avoid for 2nd edition, In the war summer with General most time of that to it 1937 It the was total would and structure war. and To them it concentrate was on a critical fully Japan . effort to develop Japan’s economy (1996). wanted. develop industrial 198 of China. Staff able aware page all-out hostilities coordinated 48 and Japan not The war a war truth that is an Japan army even were considerably integrate into the that planners require before blundered acutely more effective would the be … In June by Saionji Konoe old to was noble succeed the 1937 weak in and widely He prime the spoke domestic Fumimaro might, was and achieving affairs, ineffectual gure it country of was minister. respected who uniting military. justice” become a family, in Konoe but leader. he chosen Prince from an thought, restraining “social proved a C H A P T E R 1 . 2 : J A P A N E S E E X P A N S I O N I N Source C From No and Kawakami. Aims one against can Japan in China: Her According (1938). doubt China … Japanese that Japan During the has last a grave ten country veritable to reverberated hymns destroy case of hate, Japanese with war in Chinese Japanese Japanese of go security. handle the part of out the who had the China spontaneous by for friendly or social murdered. hatred of combustion, the Nationalist with of … is Using a relations but a was during life the like for 1930s? of the cartoonist in Source A? the sources extent do and you your agree own with knowledge, the to following “In into the summer war with of 1937 Japan China.” sense Examiner’s on paper, or with whole – message blundered not conagration Government hint: need to writing. clear paragraphs in country you start that blackmailed, Japan the statement: not reprisal Japan This what for organizations. to C, China the would fear in Four th question – 9 marks troops safe could homes intimidated, with longer merchants anti-Japanese even aame no longer their goods were were assaulted, ignited of business Japanese was were No Chinese Japanese Chinese who cities residents. Source songs, exhorting interests to people First question, par t b – 2 marks what Most 19 31 – 19 4 1 years What the A S I A , First question, par t a – 3 marks K.K. Motive S O U T H - E A S T is the what Plan the sources that than three to page 79 for a it as and the out support you will manage sample in fourth your you two question to Remember For plan would sides question answer to an the requires. on before essay, with argument Use the your own knowledge. four sources plan examination. for a fourth if evidence have the the you rather (See question.) itself. Pearl Harbor and the outbreak of war 0 1500 km CHINA 7 December 1941: Without Captured warning 25 December US Pearl Harbor aircraft Invaded 1942; 2 15 carriers. JAPAN January killed, Captured May Naval base of 1941 4 1942 US from Over 4 others attacked Japanese 2300 Americans battleships damaged aircraft by carriers sunk, but all are at the sea Invaded and 3 January escape 1942 11 Invaded December 1941 MIDWAY captured ISLANDS 8 December 1941 by Japanese Pearl Captured HONG WAKE KONG Harbor 23 INDIA Captured December British 1941 ISLAND HAWAIIAN BURMA 10 December 6 May 1942 ISLANDS 1941 battleship PHILIPPINES Prince and of Wales battle cruiser Repulse sunk GUAM MARSHALL by ISLANDS MALAYA Japanese bombers NEW BORNEO Invaded SINGAPORE GUINEA 7 March 1942 SUMATRA Key 15 February 1942 Major Singapore surrenders Japanese; to DARWIN soldiers taken greatest military ▲ British by Japanese Japanese extent of conquests defeat 20 in Maximum prisoner; Bombed “the battle JAVA 130,000 history” February 1942 AUSTRALIA Japanese expansion, December 1941–May 1942 49 1 Why did Japan attack Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941? Again, Japan’s policy the in 1941–42 was domestic issues; increasing the military blockade on of its long the and ensure only of resources option. from the no ambitions. retreat Negotiations 1941. and to under of its the Some and did the control. wanted continued to view and the Japan to agree an its “open not August to despite to by trade these the their to to gain be the question its Others danger throughout the territorial peaceful policy in means the conditions efforts the sustain if the in The withdraw real respect policies fatal not lifted. continued door” agree a result Indo- Japan. on could as a China divided USA as seemed embargo US into conquest colonies Japan the be for in the embargo could of the economic concerns would war war was that get pursue could into Japan argued Japan maintain Japan in USA neighbours, to European thus not a that of Prince areas and the Konoe negotiate. While negotiations alternative Japanese 4 its continue deadlock to between Therefore, opinion and Wa s h i n g t o n integrity plans. cabinet September, Our attain demands decide to – the USA Japanese and after will [1] for preparations measures to with The continued, navy some the presented debate, the military its plan in for following Japan war was to made the agreed on 1941: Empire complete vis-a-vis our the met commence by the for [3] the purpose war, USA objectives. being Netherlands. 50 w a r. to off. from Indo-China wanted their cut H o w e v e r, expanding forces were by case on from Japan term Japanese supplies the expansion China of Japan. economic on had and arising placed this control now Economic war in concerns The year determined the government key foreign crucial [2] and In hostilities Great the rst of self Britain event ten defence concurrently days against that of the and take and there October United self-preservation all possible thereby is no … prospect we States, diplomatic endeavour will of our immediately Britain and the C H A P T E R 1 . 2 : J A P A N E S E E X P A N S I O N I N S O U T H - E A S T A S I A , 19 31 – 19 4 1 L TA Thinking skills Saburo Ienaga. 1968. The Pacic War (Taiheiyo Senso) Japanese troops be withdrawn from China. Tojo Hideki, 1931–45, page 133. Iwanami Shoten, Japan (translation army minister in the third Konoe cabinet, spoke for Random House, New York, USA) the military: “ The army’s position is that there can be no compromise on the stationing of troops in China. It The United States and Japan were inexorably moving aects military morale … Troop withdrawals are the toward a bloody collision in the Pacic. Several hear t of the matter. If we just acquiesce to the American individuals and groups tried to stop the drift toward war demand, everything we have achieved in China will and stimulate productive Japan-US talks. Through the be lost …”. Tojo found these compelling reasons not eor ts of Bishop James E Walsh, a Catholic Maryknoll to budge on China. Premier Konoe, however, “thought priest, and others who had close contacts with it manifestly unwise for Japan to plunge into an Japanese leaders anxious to aver t war, negotiations unpredictable war at a time when the China incident is began in Washington between Ambassador Nomura still unresolved”. He resigned on October 16, 1941. Kichisaburo and Secretary of State Cordell Hull. By this time in 1941, however, Japan had only two grim According to this source, what was the key issue over which alternatives: reach a compromise with the US or take the Japanese military were not prepared to compromise? the gamble of going to war. The American government was in no mood to compromise and insisted that Even and then, the Washington time, force prepared USA When a base On November, Council to made is in President up as with the with negotiations mission Americans. sent to However, was at the attack fail. nal for an naval political nal of from our hand we we let continue. present the and to of On the If have to American dictation. recognize it all the the other present we opportunity will our accept demands. cannot situation Privy summed present situation American the Hara self-preservation, war, a follows: impossible, standpoint the continued Japanese task stalled, Conference, matter It nal terms negotiations American A Hawaii. Imperial the naval were the government USA. agree secretly should on the to negotiations in 2 try huge preparations attack with to same the Japanese diplomacy miss to go submit to to Therefore, I ▲ that is inevitable US Navy le photo showing a small boat rescuing a USS West Virginia crew member from the that water after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 7 December 1941 we must against I will in the decide the put difculties start United my early to trust part as the of a war States. in what the war I war; have and progresses, been that told, namely although there is some we that will prospect things will experience of go well increasing success. President Hara quoted in Jansen, MB. 2002. The Making of Modern Japan, page 630. 51 1 On 7 December installations eet. If to resist consolidate The its on 90% badly its of for would Japanese Pea r l the carrier manoeuvres this in in bombers an have to rendered expansion. South attacked attempt East the Japan Asia US destroy ships the USA could before Pacic temporarily then the and US conquer USA had and time to capability. damaged. aircraft Japanese Harbor control naval attack with 1941, Pearl successful helpless rebuild at Ha r bo r Ho we v e r, cap a b i l i ty. and di d mi d - P acic were incur a ir the a nd hi t. ha d s e ver a l T his l os se s p ower Jap a n es e I nde e d, no t hu g e se a f or n ot la t e r US A , d e str oye d d e str oye d c a rr ie r s w o ul d the e i t h er had th e be e n pr ove a ou t fa t a l or US on m i st a ke Japan. The US government was outraged by the attack on Pearl Harbor Class discussion which was described Look back at the newspaper duplicitous headline on page 50 from the simultaneously New York Herald Tribune. Why as might the details in this primary and source be inaccurate? declaration entirely nature of the Pearl conducting and US war attack President sending 1,178 However, on of deceiful injured by an attack eet across The personnel “dastardly”. in the brutal and the USA Pacic air was assault civilians The while as seen killed before 2,403 any made. Japanese Harbor as negotiations treacherous. military was Roosevelt historian was not Michiko in line Hasegawa with Japan’s argues that long-term the planning Hull’s last Note (see source and was caused by the oil embargo which forced Japan into war. below) Revisionist This was America’s nal proposal provoked historians Japan into go as far making as an to argue that Roosevelt deliberately attack. before the attack on Pearl As they attacked Pearl H a r b o r, Japan simultaneously Japanese forces then attacked Hong Harbour. It was delivered to the Kong and Singapore. went on to attack the Japanese ambassador by the US Dutch East Indies, the Philippines and Malaya on 8 D e c e m b e r. By Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. the end of D e c e m b e r, Japan had seized control of Guam, Hong Kong One of its conditions demanded and Wa k e Island. They also had sunk two important British warships the complete withdrawal of all – the Prince of Wa l e s and the Repulse. Japan had taken Indo-China, Japanese troops from French Siam, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, Singapore and the Philippines Indochina and China. by mid-1942. Source skills Richard West in Storry. Asia Japan 1894–1943 and the Decline of the the and When the blow was struck at Pearl 7 December the reaction in Prince Japan it was the Empire hostile the of astonishment, general, was powers, if relief irrational, encircled that by Hull’s a last ring and belief the box] noose. justied as The an tremendous the 52 Pearl had been resort act of to of Note further war, of the Wales – airelds, then sinking of the Repulse no less appeared to underline than the inevitability plunge into the Second World of War. so it seemed, was on her side. that grimly First question, par t a – 3 marks [see tightening then, self-defence. successes Harbour a Philippine joy. According glossary the was Heaven, For on Malaya, rectitude Japan’s compounded in Harbour the on Boeings landings (1979). seemed the rst few days strike, the destruction the reaction of the – of source above, home-front on Harbor? fully Moreover, of to what was the of the Pearl in Japan to the attack C H A P T E R 1 . 2 : J A P A N E S E E X P A N S I O N I N S O U T H - E A S T A S I A , 19 31 – 19 4 1 L TA Social skills Write some notes outlining your response to the question on page 52. Now swap your response with a par tner. Mark each other ’s response out of 3 marks. Give each other feedback. war Perspectives in the Ienaga Pacic. was also The Japanese critical of historian Japan’s role in Saburo causing Historiography the Left-wing of the Japanese war in Manchurian hold the the historians Pacic Incident. “militarist as date 1931 The left capitalist – in the beginning with Japan clique” war and militarism a “15-year war”. The Japanese were tend The indoctrinated right-wing December East Asia Japan 1941 in was as the Many freeing without the movements Japan the had oil Japan, the have in for Rape no region the in into idea at was a of on the that the they these “Great was time, The Japanese that Japan The the right (Hayashi) ction. have period. the even Other called that West following was in fact a 100-year 1941. actions up at USA China in that the Asia that in as the addition, Roosevelt’s arrival of the the War orthodox began incident. in causing Crimes of 1937 Japan expansion. the after waged This war was the Pearl aggression Convention. a Japan in the struggle of on one was in USA the with Polo Japan’s was key breach wholly the asserts the for the war oil was US historians, or of it generally the historian even did in the US of the eet” as states warnings as to Japan had of in actions. identify Japan knew ensure (Boyle, Some Japanese that: that aimed resist Boyle Roosevelt so to provoking Boyle Hawaii act Americans suppressed attack corruption. not such in argued primarily encouraged key as were Western Harbor; commanders on as Vietnam, into about broken the their “[Roosevelt] military a successful surprise 1993). role in and actions at in for the that no he historians that he Seagrove, to stop Japanese been of the to wanted submit writing pre-war disputed. emperor’s book The emperor expansionists war to the after Hirohito aggressive. his the not expansionism. the L TA Research skills that was in that Japanese but often suggest argues had choice Revisionists, but Tokyo Geneva responsible had 1989, evidence the in also role 1853. Pacic the has the and role emperor “Holy Bridge aggression presented Harbor and the of historians war Americans Marco war perspective Tribunal. Japan’s historians Hasegawa because in 1941 revisionists role attack The war USA 1930s, Pearl ignored to from Japanese argue For point US the bombing codes. by right argue purging Traditionalist the war Revisionist Japan’s policies War” Michiko to starting the The on went during In that territories extreme Tanaka, i.e. independence with the historian only writing suggest of argue post-war war and 1968). had exploitation the a Masaaki Nanjing for successful Historians example of from invasion forced embargo. the propaganda been the been point (Ienaga, education. identify Furthermore, Japanese would Japan support Asia colonialism. in factors imperialism responsible public pre-war starting Japanese Western there their historians War”. presented by key Japanese to December, been that the embargo. for argues was The but was Hirohito’s not a force but he in passive Sterling Dynasty, supporting have did death simply historian could had militarists. Yamamoto He he not intervened want to. TOK In pairs research other historians’ perspectives on Japan’s foreign policy In small groups investigate fur ther into in the 1930s. Try to nd historians from dierent regions and historians the background and work of the historians writing in languages other than English. named in the perspective box above and those that you nd in your research. You should spend two hours on this activity. Discuss with your teacher Discuss how the context within which how to reference your sources and provide a brief list of works cited. historians live (time, place and culture) may impact their knowledge, understanding and views of historical events. 53 1 Conclusions The historian Japan Kenneth paid a Abandoning Japanese nearly 3 The million left of traditional expansion the Japanese the history – of the and of the realism nation its the bold that entire the Communism an war in leaders conict empire, irony. by War ideology in Japan’s its buildings, Asia, and 1941. cost lives of destruction it of houses. Generations in to Japan vehemently that for the wanted rst had preserve to social-democratic – the trauma. sought that in the sentiment and a and and actions: characterized that the that order, brought China, enemy a scarred political inuence Instead, of of traditionally into overseas historic Japanese Bolshevik by had equipment, with impact gamble entered ultranationalist of occupation up psychologically heavy an Empire. rise for machines, values the home, its by price Japanese, was impelled sums cautious physically outcome been the diplomacy, one-quarter were terrible Pyle the opposed establish revolution time in at Japan’s force. Pyle, KB. 1996. The Making of Modern Japan, page 204 Full document question: The USA’s actions with regard to Japan, 1930–41 The Source A July 1941 imposed A cartoon by David Low. “Dogs of by in the Evening Standard, 31 October on and Japan asset – freeze Roosevelt’s diplomatic action in the months London. before UK. embargo U.S. War” clumsiest published oil the Pearl Harbor – was partly designed to 1941 deter Tokyo from Barbarossa. Yosuke states Japan’s Matsuoka, because attack his … … Japan The provides best of rejected war reason either partners, ambitions. The pursued rooted in an assumption Italy in June decided difculties properties in . . that that 1940, the Europe . sake conduct. interest 1941 Japanese own nation’s obvious Japan unrelated in sought powers their to was victory. December colonial exposed of planning German Japan old in two manifestation Japanese of to fascist pleas shared Like alike and its month urgings rejecting only was his were for minister, same for however, The the German making Operation foreign in Germany common the mitigation bellicose and to Hitler’s resigned government commitment Axis joining remoter seize access to Source B vital Max Hastings. 1944–45 Retribution: The Battle for Japan for oil and mass raw materials, migration from together the home with space islands. (2007). Source C A Japanese assault on the Soviet Union in Kenneth 1941–42, taking the Russians in the rear B. Pyle. The Making of Modern Japan. as (1996). they have struggled yielded Stalin was to stem Hitler’s important terried of invasion, rewards such an for the might Axis. eventuality. The dilemma struggled Incident 54 that with now Japanese ever since became diplomacy the still had Manchurian more difcult, for as C H A P T E R the China the less conict prepared 1 . 2 : J A P A N E S E expanded, to deal the with E X P A N S I O N nation the was Soviet I N S O U T H - E A S T the Manchurian border and the Source D Japanese in the skirmishes Pacic. with vulnerability of A the the succession Red Army of Hirohito, Army; at Japan was illness … a time the resolute U.S. Navy program was of now building like in the Pacic. By the Japanese navy General of America’s crash program had its there An would life … gaining 1942, naval supremacy the oil cope of that the Dutch of with 1940 Pact and must in East Indies power … [Matsuoko] signed the with Germany attacked pledged by a European and to power war Italy, aid not or in one in In from a serious without a danger of a an gradual operation, still while offer it might some be hope Army General Staff was of in saving favour putting hope but … in in diplomatic the case of negotiations failure, a to the decisive Pacic access order the would have to be performed. to to Quoted autumn page in Richard Overy. 2009. The Road to War, 342 Tripartite in which another currently the alone result the have American signatories the Japan was would the operation by suffering left concluded nish, in be 1940 of that he embarked spring Staff patient additional his the a Should dangerous, strength the the decline. on to 1941 the operation, same Nagano September border revealed Kwantung Admiral American Emperor eet 19 31 – 19 4 1 army The on A S I A , First question, par t a – 3 marks the if involved ghting in in According to Source at of 1941? the end D, why did Japan take action China. First question, par t b – 2 marks Matsouka States thus thereby and hoped dissuade opening the it to from way for isolate conict Japan to the United with seize Japan, What message is conveyed in Source A? the Second question – 4 marks European resources off colonies it Chinese in needed supply Southeast for Asia, grasp self-sufciency lines. and the cut With reference assess the to values historians its and studying origin, purpose limitations the causes of of and content, Source war in D the for Pacic. Third question – 6 marks Compare and contrast Source and Source B the C views expressed regarding Japanese in polices. Four th question – 9 marks Using the analyse Pearl sources the and reasons Harbor in your for the December own knowledge Japanese attack on 1941. 55 1 Review task L TA Communication and research skills In small groups use the sources in this chapter, and/or other 3 Using the sources and your own knowledge examine sources you research online to draft your own version of a the validity of the claim that “in creating the Greater Paper 1 examination. You could use the questions in the box East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Japan perceived itself here to help you rene the “theme” of your paper. merely as a latecomer to the contest for empire”. 4 Remember: Using the sources and your own knowledge, to what extent do you agree that Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor ● You will need four sources. ● One source will need to be a non-text source, for was the result of its expansionist foreign policy? 5 Using the sources and your own knowledge examine example a car toon, photograph or some statistics. the role of the failure of Japan’s policies in its decision ● You need to ensure that the total word count of your to attack the USA in 1941. sources does not exceed 750 words. 6 “Japan’s failure to bring about a victory in the war with Here are some ideas for your four th question. China ultimately led to the Second World War in the 1 2 Using the sources and your own knowledge analyse Pacic.” Using the sources and your own knowledge the reasons for the Manchurian crisis in 1931. assess to what extent you agree with this statement. Using the sources and your own knowledge analyse Using the sources and your own knowledge assess the extent to which Japan was acting defensively when it scale war between Japan and China in 1937. attacked Western interests. Using policy the of Overall, information each Nationalism Militarism Political situation in Japan Economic situation in Japan Situation in China Actions of the West (You will need to ll this in after you have read the next chapter.) Conclusions of which inuencing 56 7 why the Marco Polo Bridge incident escalated into a full- the factor Japan’s in this factors or chapter, on the factors foreign review left-hand do you the impact side of the consider to be on Japan’s following most foreign table. important in policy? Causes of the Mukden Causes of the Causes of Japan’s attack incident 1928–32 Sino-Japanese War 1933–37 on Pearl Harbor 1938–41 C H A P T E R 1 . 2 : J A P A N E S E E X P A N S I O N I N S O U T H - E A S T A S I A , Yen-denominated; Source help and hints 19 31 – 19 4 1 1934–36 = 100 210 Textiles First question, par t b – 2 marks 190 (See 170 page What is 33.) the message of Source 150 A? 130 To answer this question, you need to work out what you Commodity can learn from the graph. Read the details carefully. In exports 110 total this case, ● The you can nd out the following. 90 total number of exports fell dramatically 70 27 1926 after 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 1929. I. Yamazawa and Y. Yamamoto. 1978. Estimates of ● Exports began to rise again from 1932. Long-term Economic Statistics of Japan since 1868. 14: ● Textiles had been a major part of Japan’s Foreign trade and balance of payments. exports. Second question – 4 marks (See page 33.) ● It has ● It is the benet written Hirohito’s With reference to origin, purpose and the value and limitations of Source C to studying the Manchurian question is asking you to evaluate have the It is book, important at the date that of you look publication interesting politics the understanding and insights on so is the of Japan at this time. The style of the content suggests an objective historian’s approach work. of Japan crisis. ● This purpose modern for internal historians the in hindsight. content, likely assess for role of carefully at the title and any information you as in use of language of the title and analysis. of Limitations on the historian as these will guide to the value of ● the source for the particular purpose being asked The focus Hirohito Here are some points you could the The a ● It source was so it book social was professional written may written in this in 2000 provide and the political the content elites, and is on therefore consider. Values ● and about. by an academic who may and not fully economic address non-personal factors. is eld. which good access is fairly to recent recent scholarship. ● First question, par t a – 3 marks There was a lack of clear a general a sense decision-making power. (See page 35.) ● According to Source A, why were the There in army able to seize should be able control of to nd the atmosphere of confusion Japan. Manchuria? ● You was Kwantung following There was of domestic and foreign points: turmoil. ● The Japanese government was weak. 57 1 First question, par t b – 2 marks (See page What is 36.) the message of this photograph? ● The Japanese are ● The Japanese forces ● There appears in to be control. are well little ordered. support for Japanese forces. As with the picture carefully at people the could in dress, draw in Chapter expressions photograph. the following 1.1, and From you need to demeanour this look of the photograph, ● There you seems for depth. The perspective page reference content, Source the to assess A for the the a origin, values historian Manchurian purpose, and that the page of The crisis. may many of the points are similar to the 57 date, have – but possible the date here is key for allowing you the of the benet of It the is that writing hindsight. and researched. analyses source historian, academic may is years focused 1931–45, is the 1968, Also, therefore also it in the work who more 1968, focus are purpose be objective on the which other The from key points Japanese points are as Japanese powers as replace them made policy available as more once wartime documents classied era the depth of were its released, interpretation. on the Pacic to War include may the mean impact the of this event regions. allow ● To in protect Manchukuo, wanted to the Japanese eliminate in Source the Soviet the threat an build to inuence with up Union. B Japan wanted to prepare against Britain and Asia? remove the USA to promote its own economy. Japan planned a in South East “co-prosperity government believed its armaments. to promote its racial and great Asia sphere”. that development in South East Asia. and Examiner’s get from hint: this There source Japan three 58 least follows: aimed Japanese must at actions. well can The its limitation the limit economic ● in and ● ● Japanese is the key a seen, a and region may of ● The is 42.) the regarding a become neglects from What defensive is government page indicate that has First question, par t a – 3 marks (See may conict to in value the limitations. Values Japanese content on could source A Japanese answer The identify to Limitations of impact which on resistance and limitations studying as documents Notice no 39.) initially, With be conclusions: Second question – 4 marks (See to forces. to gain 3 marks. – are but several you only points need that to you explain C H A P T E R 1 . 2 : J A P A N E S E E X P A N S I O N I N S O U T H - E A S T A S I A , 19 31 – 19 4 1 References Bix, HP . New 2000. York, Boyle, JH. 1983. Encyclopedia Boyle, JH. of Knopf. Hsü, I. Japan Iriye, S. A. Boston 2007. The 1968. 1987. MB. MA, London, Modern Japan . Harper Perennial. War of 1937–45” Kodansha. Japan: The Tokyo, American in Kodansha Japan. Nexus . Harcourt Brace USA The Battle for Japan 1944–45 . Alfred A of Modern China, page 550. Oxford University Press, The Pacic War Random Origins 2002. (Taiheiyo House. of the Senso) New Second York, World 1931 –45. Iwanami Shoten. USA) War in Asia and the Pacic . UK The Making of Modern Japan . Harvard University Press, USA KK. J., 1938. 1997. Armonk, Overy, R. Japan 2009. 1996. Japan: NY , USA The Road The in China: Her Lexington, Spence, 1990. J. York, R. A Documentary to War. Making Company. Storry, of motives and aims . John Murray. UK David New VII. Retribution: Rise The Sharpe K. Making USA London, Kawakami, Pyle, the UK Routledge, Lu, York, (translation Jansen, Vol. Modern York, 1995. Ienaga, Japan, New M. New Oxford, and “Sino-Japanese 1993. Jovanovich. Hastings, Hirohito USA The of MA, History , Vintage Modern pages Books. Japan . 2nd 418–20. London, edn. DC M.E. UK Heath and USA Search for Modern China . WW Norton and Company. USA 1979. Macmillan. Japan London, and the Decline of the West in Asia, 1894–1943 . UK 59 1.3 The international response to Japanese aggression, 1931–1941 Conceptual understanding ➔ Consequence ➔ Signicance ▲ Franklin D Roosevelt, US president from 1933 The League of Nations decides to set 1931 up a Commission under Lord Lytton to The USA issues Stimson Non-Recognition investigate the Mukden incident Doctrine 1932 The Lytton Commission publishes its repor t 1933 Japan leaves the League of Nations Second United Front established 1936 between the GMD and the CCP in China China appeals to the League of Nations after the Marco Polo incident 1937 USS Panay is sunk by the Japanese 1938 The USA gives loans to the GMD The USA starts an embargo on Japan 1939 July–September: the Burma Road and the trade deal is cancelled is closed 1940 In September Churchill reopens the Japan occupies southern Indo-China. Burma Road following the Tripar tite Pact. The USA freezes Japanese assets. A total 1941 July trade embargo is imposed by ABD powers A total oil is embargo imposed on 1941 November Japan by the USA Japan attacks Pearl Harbor 60 1941 December C H A P T E R 1 . 3 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E TO J A PA N E S E A G G R E S S I O N , 19 31 – 19 4 1 The League of Nations’ response to events in Kellogg-Briand Pact Manchuria 1931–36 This pact was signed in 1928 and the signatory states promised Japan’s action in the Mukden Incident was the rst signicant not to use war to resolve challenge by a major power to the new international system that had “disputes or conicts of whatever been set up in Europe after the First World War. This international nature or of whatever origin they system centred around the concept of collective security – that states may be, which may arise among would take action, the joint action to deal with aggression. To facilitate such them”. Instead, it called for the League of Nations, a body where all states could be peaceful settlement of disputes. represented, was established in 1919. In addition, various treaties, such Japan signed this pact in 1928 as the Washington Conference System, the Nine-Power Treaty (see along with 14 other nations. page 22) and the Kellogg-Briand Pact reinforced the idea of peaceful Ultimately, the pact was signed international cooperation. by 62 nations. Source skills Source A Extract Second Source B from World Akira War Iriya. in Asia The and Origins the of the Pacic A in cartoon published in Outlook, a US magazine, 1931. (1987). The term system”, short, nor “the or was was it Washington “the not in current subsequently well-dened legal immediately after the much “the spirit talk of conference”, Asia Conference Washington and use of the country’s be it furthered or undermined it expressed the stability the gradual It was in opposed relations, such increasing an to of as a the as rapid Asian order that in of in whether spirit. … to maintaining China’s modern state. wholesale international advocated Chinese and was behaviour and being process there assisting a a less, Washington terms International of 1920s, willingness and Washington peace, in another was number evolutionary ensure one region Communist Rather, powers’ transformation transformation the judged for as the conference to with the None tended co-operate in recognized concept. a system” and by an nationalists. powers of by would change so stress as to stability. First question, par t a – 3 marks What, the according Washington to Source A, were the aims of System? First question, par t b – 2 marks What is Japan’s the message actions in of Source B concerning Manchuria? 61 1 The organization and aims of the League of Nations The League Council of all of action The out consisted League. The assembly states; met yearly consisted four most Nations the member council plus of of other the a Covenant how the cooperation the major members key against of it of the League and in of to was and by Assembly the of maintaining it its was was aims international the of the The the of vote. Italy to that document and the The Japan made could take war. promoting peace and council body and representatives one France, resorted League the had assembly. who Nations of up state Britain, League achieve made each particular the League was the powers elected decisions; member of which set international security. L TA Social skills Read these ar ticles of the Covenant of the League which this Ar ticle the award of the arbitrators or set out how the League should solve international the judicial decision shall be made within a disputes and so prevent war. reasonable time, and the repor t of the Council shall be made within six months In pairs discuss the following questions. Listen carefully to after the submission of the dispute. each other ’s ideas and agree a joint response. Ar ticle 13 1 The Members of the League agree What actions could the League take against aggressor that whenever any dispute shall arise states? between them which they recognise to be 2 Which of these actions do you think would be most suitable for submission to arbitration or eective in solving disputes? judicial settlement and which cannot be 3 Can you identify ways in which these methods might satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they not be eective? will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration or judicial settlement … Ar ticle 10 The Members of the League under take to respect and preserve as against external For the consideration of any such dispute, the aggression the territorial integrity and existing cour t to which the case is referred shall be the political independence of all Members of the Permanent Cour t of International Justice … League. In case of any such aggression or in The Members of the League agree that they case of any threat or danger of such aggression will carry out in full good faith any award or the Council shall advise upon the means by decision that may be rendered, and that they which this obligation shall be fullled. will not resor t to war against a Member of the Ar ticle 11 Any war or threat of war, whether League which complies therewith. In the event immediately aecting any of the Members of any failure to carry out such an award or of the League or not , is hereby declared a decision, the Council shall propose what steps matter of concern to the whole League, and should be taken to give eect thereto. the League shall take any action that may be Ar ticle 15 If there should arise between Members of deemed wise and eectual to safeguard the the League any dispute likely to lead to a peace of nations … rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration Ar ticle 12 62 The Members of the League agree that if or judicial settlement in accordance with there should arise between them any dispute Ar ticle 13, the Members of the League likely to lead to a rupture they will submit agree that they will submit the matter to the matter either to arbitration or judicial the Council. Any par ty to the dispute may settlement or to enquiry by the Council, eect such submission by giving notice of and they agree in no case to resor t to war the existence of the dispute to the Secretary until three months after the award by the General, who will make all necessary arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the arrangements for a full investigation and repor t by the Council. In any case under consideration thereof … C H A P T E R Ar ticle 16 1 . 3 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E TO J A PA N E S E A G G R E S S I O N , 19 31 – 19 4 1 Should any Member of the League resor t to between the nationals of the covenant- war in disregard of its covenants under Ar ticles breaking State and the nationals of any other 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed State, whether a Member of the League or not. to have committed an act of war against all It shall be the duty of the Council in other Members of the League, which hereby such case to recommend to the several under take immediately to subject it to the Governments what effective military, naval severance of all trade or nancial relations, or air force the Members of the League the prohibition of all intercourse between their shall severally contribute to the armed nationals and the nationals of the covenantforces to be used to protect the covenants breaking State, and the prevention of all of the League. nancial, commercial or personal intercourse What actions did the League take in response to the Mukden incident? Following the Mukden incident, Source skills China of of appealed Nations. one the This member another; taken and Article 16 However, meetings should were to be (who, member invited to the on of to next Japanese on the While the to the to The Manchuria from railway zone. League Lytton to then time, last were now Daily in the the government the – a Yi of of to Japanese send the state ruler. Chinese to army March troops message role in took of the this cartoon Manchurian was under able months its to control Japanese report was of claimed led to on continue Manchuria the withdraw commission several complete 1932, The should fact-nding months Kwantung In a commission several its is Nations’ concerning the League crisis? a that This as What over puppet from First question, par t b – 2 marks with continued League then Pu free the Japan?”. position Manchuria. emperor, to was decided During Manchukuo up crisis. deance the and of newspaper stand a out army Manchuria this UK source sets Manchuria. throughout the league action and inuence in request out cooperating the its in the meetings not League, Japanese League, “Will representatives page be published 1931, Japanese government’s expand The the Manchurian seemed Low acted China council). the David November invoke set what although the by 17 action as These by send on several discuss in to cartoon Mail attacking League held attended A example Covenant. taken. government USA the It an get Japan the League collective thus of cautiously. was hoped of against the state China principle security to to by that Lord arrive the in situation. expanding declared Japan the with the the state China’s Manchurians domination. 63 1 Source skills Japanese 24 Government September placed statement, act For some years in jeopardy. imminent 1931. past… unpleasant disaster swiftly… The taken place in the regions of Mongolia, in special in which Japan is degree… Amidst the anxiety to a detachment the tracks of of the be viewed Chinese superuous South attacked 18 in the our vicinity railway September. A of Mukden, guards, clash at troops then thousands of Japanese place… Japanese ● attacks in to no other repeat that light… the It may Japanese harbours no territorial designs and reference the to value the and origin, purpose limitations of and this content source for were year after the published. Japan force did by It in the Mukden stated fact army, and ● Japan give ● Manchukuo should was as Manchuria should the Manchurian Lytton Incident. Commission’s Report following: special and the its interests takeover of in Manchuria the whole of but the use Manchuria, of was unjustied. up not recognized studying incident, the have unacceptable ● [South wanton Manchuria. historians was SMR against Hundreds residents One the Second question – 4 marks on assess and to Japanese and midnight between took the troops With Chinese of an had Manchuria on Railway guard Railway] government destroyed endeavours army atmosphere be of forestall interested should a to Japanese Manchuria Manchurian and order incidents Government have In the the an territory and independent withdraw state and its forces. could not be such. become independent but the of under Chinese sovereignty. The Commission stressed that problem Manchuria could only TOK be Look at the sources on pages 64–66. Make a note of the following: solved by a general recommended railway and a zone, trade a the choice of language b the selection of events and and suppor ting details. members Such that, the improvement following two China; Sino-Japanese withdrawal should negotiate of a relations. troops It back to non-aggression the pact agreement. not prepared were after Japan’s countries recommendations was in ignored to hypocritical all, had not the fact compromise. in the their British that Japan attitude and Japan wanted declared towards French that Manchuria the Japanese established League’s actions their in enclaves Discuss in small groups in there by force? Japan did not accept the report and withdrew from the what ways the sources contain League in protest in March 1933. The US Ambassador to Japan, Joseph bias. Do some sources seem C Grew, reported that: to be more objective? Which sources seem the most biased? The military themselves, and the public through military propaganda are Feedback to the class. In pairs fully prepared to ght rather than surrender to moral or other pressure from attempt to write a brief account the West. The moral obloquy [condemnation] of the rest of the world serves of the Manchurian Crisis that only to strengthen not modify their determination. is without “bias” - attempt to be as objective as possible. Why did the League not take stronger action against Japan? Discuss as a class the extent to No further action was taken against Japan. Why? France, as one of the which it is possible to describe key members of the League, felt that it had no real reason to fall out historical events without bias or with Japan. As the colonial power subjectivity. gain 64 from a weakened China. in Indo-China, it also had much to C H A P T E R Britain the was ruling security were In should not at Great either in also I N T E R N AT I O N A L cautious be both In any its it or countries military meant Russia in was the them Japan to act from there Moreover, the viewed as its means to A G G R E S S I O N , were principle when the hesitant was J A PA N E S E the military suffering actions. Far that unwilling lacked TO Although believed made that the it were which R E S P O N S E response. who case countries Depression communist in Party upheld, stake. economic both T H E Conservative addition, the 1 . 3 : some of spend fear an of ally interests resist economic in collective own to 19 31 – 19 4 1 Japan. effects resources of on communism in containing East. Source skills On Source A of Extract from Alan Farmer. Britain the one Soviet 1919–39 action was to be taken, US support was that support was not forthcoming. British although interests immediate in a the danger. northern potential Far East, Indeed threat was risk of of China could Japanese areas Ronald War an (for be seen expansion example, sanctions The as enforce Royal a other, more Southeast in Asia). were unlikely to Navy trade biggest would was not strong embargo, and not trading support partner, any the policy from Cameron, Akira War with to therefore seemed to it takeover the are of Japanese Manchuria threat did to and not rule. and the The and Origins China, it so the of the Pacic the (1987). international strongly turned for help, identied was itself through a major of the crisis world of another depression. sort; Those clear action. be Asia for it beginning that had constructed and preserved The international system – advanced industrial accept to – were in the midst of a severe hope crisis. that which Appeasement Iriya. in which which economics Japan’s of Communist USA, made League under enough the best provinces (1991) World powers it of achieve the Japan’s chaos reducing going to menace Source C and much. the expansion system Economic ve tortured Unfortunately sensitive, dark to not Japanese in to Second the four being Extract in the other Japanese Road imperialism, see the vital, Cited but On (1996). now If they Foreign China, Affairs, side Russia. Between 1929 and 1931 industrial develop. production, prices, employment, purchasing power commodity – all such indices Source B of Winston Churchill speaking in the House economic 17 February is I must very word for of her something sympathy policy, national of say unfashionable. but for for difculties. Nations would I be plummeted, with incomes cut to nearly one-half in 1933. the Now had of national Commons, health, I am to Japan, her do you going not which to The a and think well-advised the to States, situation interactions, necessarily position not say United whole … her words, League when Germany, severely and thus affected the international had the already and their world economic economy co-operation, begun Manchurian elsewhere. to break Incident in as a other down broke out. quarrel First question, par t a – 3 marks with in Japan. Europe Japan Swiss Sea … than and … I The League there there is no would Czechoslovak hope we in has great more be in use to shall to do affronting ordering navies England work the try the Yellow What, why according Britain against to failed Source to take A, any were the further reasons action Japan? to Four th question – 9 marks understand a little the position of Japan, Using an ancient State, with the highest sense the examine national honour and patriotism, and with population and a remarkable why the and your League own of knowledge, Nations did not take a stronger teeming sources of action to deal with the Manchurian crisis. energy. 65 1 What was the impact of the League’s failure to take action over Manchuria? The failure that Japan of the was contributed to League able to to respond continue Mussolini’s to with decision the its to Manchurian expansion; invade it incident may Abyssinia in also meant have 1935. Source skills Source A Extract from World War In 1933 R.J. Overy. Origins of the other Second of (2008). powers inuence Chinese Japan left the League and the Far East from the 1934, in system There security. In violation agreements to preserve an policy in China, the on Japanese the Amau Doctrine, a is no at doubt home to go otherwise Japan’s with of technical aid that Japanese leaders, by the further military, after 1932 cartoon Standard, by 19 David Low, January “The warning have done because than of from the major Doormat”, published to in the UK powers. newspaper 1933. L TA according Source A, was the result of Communication skills the By examining the language he Manchurian crisis for Japan’s future actions in China? uses, can you identify Overy’s First question, par t b – 2 marks opinion in Source A on the results of this crisis? What 66 is the message of Source B? they the to First question, par t a – 3 marks What, to were Source B A sphere the government response announced provision as trade “open might door” China abandon of encouraged international the to of spurred collective and regard effectively them. removed to and the Evening weak C H A P T E R 1 . 3 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E TO J A PA N E S E A G G R E S S I O N , 19 31 – 19 4 1 The response of the League and Europe to events after 1932 China again Bridge Japan appealed incident for breaking now impotent case, Britain Britain but In to last that the League bombing of Nine-Power could France repeatedly no to the the and and of Nations Shanghai. Treaty of after The 1922 take little practical were now preoccupied asked the USA for joint the Marco League but action to by in reality help events diplomatic Polo condemned it was China. in In any Europe. pressure on Tokyo avail. November the and time 1937, in hostilities Japanese the Nine-Power Brussels. be It Treaty condemned suspended but it Conference the actions produced no of convened Japan measures and to for urged stop aggression. The response of China to events after 1932 The establishment of the Second United Front Jiang’s insistence Japanese he had lost to at his demonstrations of which middle of a troops acting charge of the commanders, not the Enlai, ew Japanese. his Second was United be a up The over of to did Front was Party; “war of the Japanese. in of be of Japanese the not sign a a civil rst between war was involved against agreement, and in and the Zhou the he changed Japanese. Nationalist suspended placed northern Japanese the the the been communist, before the had the alliance formal in kidnapped other became joint was were most while Xue-liang, like on 1933 were the 1936, prominent Communists national policy, In who There Zhang but, CCP the Fujian Zhang Zuolin. the party. Jiang focusing negotiate at December General and formed the troops campaign leaders Jiang his his than own the Zhang should release rather his Communists, orders (Sian) to Then, the son Jiang attacking Communist to the and Jiang’s Xi’an of against that Although priority the felt over to 1935. within among stand Beijing Communists from anti-communist Communists. negotiations to in under warlord the even uprising in was campaign Manchurian in an failure serious by ghting support suppress protesting also on him Party instead A and there resistance”. China’s actions following the Marco Polo Bridge incident Following incident, and that guilty was of “If we unpardonable held to to By of “total apparent of the 1938, Japan one included policy Jiang’s Chinese. allow which a establishment fallen full-scale announced an declared Despite Japan’s Jiang inch both new of of the of our against after by territory our the approach race.” to the Marco had be had we Bridge reached” shall be conference Nationalists. Japanese the lost, national the Polo been Mao nation”. war Ghangzhou government to A and whole Front, Shanghai, the endurance Communists United GMD China limits more resistance Second the “the crime Beijing, and invasion that to following went and badly Nanjing withdraw the for the had their all capital Chongqing. 67 1 Republic of Nevertheless, USSR China Japan occupies 1931, creating Manchukuo in Japanese of Empire and Jehol a puppet Province in state of the war escalation caused by the Manchuko, 1934. Chinese British the September Irkutsk United Front drew India the French Indo-China British Colonies PEOPLES’S July the 1937, Marco that Japanese Troops Polo Bridge and for they did which conict not they want did and not have cross invade the China a MONGOLIA Harbin 7 into REPUBLIC MANCHUKUO OF Japanese resources. By 1940, Japan proper. Vladivostok had committed over 750,000 Mukden JEHOL ground troops to the struggle. Beijing And Port CHINA despite the lack of any Seoul Tokyo Tianjin Ningbo international Arthur Japanese Nanjing Zhengzhou 19 win falls December the opposition, could war. not They the quickly were forced 1937. Suzhou to try to consolidate their Nanjing Brahmaputra Shanghai July Chongqing 1937 Shanghai Japan but lands fails to Ningbo up until late position by adopting of off a policy in link 1938. living the land with the INDIA help Imphal of puppet governments. Wenzhou Burma Kunming Okinawa The most was led important was a and rival, that China of these Fuzhou Zhangzhou road BURMA YUNNAN by Wang Jingwei who Guangdong PROVINCE Manadalay former GMD colleague, Shantou Nanning Hanoi October Hong 1938, Japan seizes Kong Guangdong Haiphong Chinese Hainan aid to and Ports in of Jiang. Believing major order Nationalist to stop could never win forces. Island against Rangoon the Japanese, Wang FRENCH THAILAND agreed INDO-CHINA in 1940 to become the PHILIPPINE Bangkok Manila head ISLANDS of 0 Miles of “the China”. New This Government regime was 600 recognized by Manchukuo Saigon and ▲ the three Axis powers but Map showing Japan’s advance not by any of the Western powers. Thus, by 1938, China was divided into into China, 1931–1938 three based main in areas: Shaanxi Nationalist and China based Japanese-occupied in Chongqing, China in the Communist east and China north. L TA Thinking and social skills nature that jeopardise the peace and welfare The puppet government of Wang JingWei in of their countries. central and nor thern China signed a treaty The Governments of the two countries with Japan on 30 November, 1940 shall, in order to accomplish the purpose Identify the key terms of this treaty, and highlight mentioned in the preceding paragraph, which points would be par ticularly resented by Chinese eliminate communistic elements and nationalists. In pairs or small groups compare and organisations in their respective territories, same time co-operate closely contrast your responses. Oer feedback where your and at the par tner or a member of your group has missed a point. concerning with Basic Relations Treaty information reference communistic ARTICLE 2 to the and propaganda defence activities against … The Governments of the two countries shall closely co-operate for cultural harmony, creation and development. ARTICLE 5 The Government of the Republic of China shall recognise that Japan may, in accordance with previous practises or in ARTICLE 3 The Governments of the two countries order to preser ve common interests of the agree to engage in joint defence against two countries, station for a required duration all destructive operations of communistic its naval units and vessels in specied areas 68 C H A P T E R 1 . 3 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E TO J A PA N E S E A G G R E S S I O N , 19 31 – 19 4 1 within the territory of the Republic of China, the Yangzi River and the rationalisation of the in accordance with the terms to be agreed demand and supply of goods between Japan upon separately between the two countries. on the one hand and Nor th China and the Mongolian Federation on the other. ARTICLE 6 The Government of the two countries shall eect close economic co-operation between The Government of Japan shall, with respect the two countries in conformance with the spirit to the rehabilitation and development of of complementing each other and ministering industries, nance, transpor tation and to each other ’s needs, as well as in accordance communication in China, extend necessary with the principles of equality and reciprocity. assistance and co-operation to China through consultation between the two countries. With reference to special resources in North China and Mongolian Federation, especially ARTICLE 7 … the Government of China shall open mineral resources required for national defence, its territory for domicile and business of the Government of the Republic of China shall Japanese subjects. under take that they shall be developed The terms of the Treaty were added to in an Annexed through close co-operation of the two Protocol, 1940. countries. With reference to the development ARTICLE 3 When general peace is restored between the of specic resources in other areas which are two countries and the state of war ceases to required for national defence, the Government exist, the Japanese forces shall commence of the Republic of China shall aord necessary evacuation with the exception of those which facilities to Japan and Japanese subjects. are stationed in accordance with the Treaty The Government of the two countries shall Concerning Basic Relations between Japan take all the necessary measures to promote and China signed today and the existing trade in general and to facilitate and rationalise agreements between the two countries and the demand and supply of goods between shall complete it within two years with the the two countries. The Governments of the rm establishment of peace and order. two countries shall extend specially close Treaty concerning basic relations between Japan and co-operation with respect to the promotion China, 1940, in Lu, David J. 1997. of trade and commerce in the lower basin of Japan: A Documentary History, pages 420–22. Despite the tensions United between Front, Source skills the Chinese Nationalists and civilians bombing Communists high and 1941 near shelter Chongqing, China, in a cave circa during a was of when First question, a relations par t b – 2 marks Jiang What attacked the on Pearl with USA that ultimately What a of against realized the Harbour declaration had the and the against message this photograph? the the Jiang Japan would defeated. been Second by Japan, be became the attack and war essentially Sino-Japanese now is Communists. of However, Japanese 1939. remained there deterioration in seeking the conict part of World global War struggle aggression and totalitarianism. 69 1 The USA’s response to Japanese actions 1931–37 The of USA ’s main “isolationism”. did not affect crisis own want them. only the USA had action. in the with to it did of many 1929 United plants to sell and of the – as we re US A w a nt ti e s mean kind ha d to of in othe r tr a de “ the i n cr ea se d of USA did out words, felt not ensuing 17 9 ) . that they directly economic in an be a re a Ma n c hu ri a ” US the on its Nel s on a nd o t he r Chie f K ser ved T of the t he (Boyle, the US A t he more in No to credible naval back any up force threats Fa r fa r the US Ja p a ne se g o o ds The reasons for the USA’s isolationism non- doctrine t ha t w i ll D ivi si on com m e n t e d w e re issue Secretary a of ke p t ha d i nv o l v e d no tr ul y non-recognition State Great Henry depression need to focus in v it a l interests not affected doctrine Stimson) – on issues security directly Stimson e n vo y 17 9 ) . and recognition m ore i nd ust r ia l isolationism Japan t a ke J a pa n C hi n es e Eas t e rn S ta te s to in u nd er fur t h e r J a p a ne se was naval limits. la rg e r area domestic quarrels took naval US A had were door” threatened i nt e r e st s Am er ic an U n it ed to Treaty m a nuf a ctu re d of 1993: was bring mu c h this fo r Hoover credible J o hn s on , Hor n be c k if whe re after the the a to for in ve st m e nt wit h which “open administration funds i n de ed the directly lacked London development government not se l f- in t e r es t s and The Doctrine of USA and actions of President were refused than Sta nl ey be s t also US 70 stay other concentration Japan’s US, opp ort un it y m a chi ne r y Stimson US ▲ to First no involvement with in the the and focus the Treaty Ja pa n tha t an might the had Amba s sa do r 1993: strugg l e the case, je op ar di ze ; w i th Depar tme nt, as any Washington addit i o n, response called In Congress the r e not such the the interests indecisive by and (Boyle, State “ US by integrity incident the the concerned advocated crisis. commente d needed ” was security The may be interests Trade was which States’ and trade In China, enterprise (also the 1930s interests; disputes interests Britain, account. Republic. The Crash the own War, into territorial been Pacic up important an World again in its US economic that concern pursue First Street Chinese Manchurian to to reinforce the which European to the into the Wall on As the of which strength – The policy and dragged by force of get although minimal Impact After to served violation policy World War crises issues. Thus, a foreign international C H A P T E R on 7 1 . 3 : January, T H E 1932 I N T E R N AT I O N A L in which the R E S P O N S E TO J A PA N E S E A G G R E S S I O N , 19 31 – 19 4 1 USA Source skills declared any that that policy This or that the also but economic When uphold to continued outside took in to David Low, the “Silence”, Evening published Standard , in London on 11 November 1938. ▲ The tex t reads, “League of Nations; Foundation stone of a New Order, laid 1918; allowed committing to of was inaugurated the 1933, same he limited Japan. His attention solving the economic his “New the most of Meanwhile, export by newspaper Pact. doctrine March with on through door UK international avoid Roosevelt focused open cartoon the sanctions. president response A China’s integrity Kellogg-Briand non-recognition law recognize violated against the to not administrative went or Hoover as would agreement territorial or it Deal” USA, the the strategic throughout the ambassador in policies Hitler’s USA ’s USA was crisis and, policies attention. continued materials 1930s. to The to Japan British Peace hath her sacrices” Washington [Roosevelt’s] nothing [the] the to be question avoid is done Japanese ultimate to view that at reported: there present government can only inability anything of be to stop What and that Doctrine? solved Japan that First question, par t b – 2 marks is to would by is the message of the cartoonist regarding the Stimson the stand tend the to strain relieve any that longer. His policy would be strain. Source skills Richard West in But Storry. Asia the Japan and 1894–1943 Hoover the Decline of the the (1979). far any from Administration kind, economic contemplating in was not muscle China, and to use Japan. sanctions by the America’s Moral the only “non-recognition” weapon; and if one exacerbated of advanced no practical America’s nationalist help own to interests can no way at all. First question, par t a – 3 marks force, according to Storry, was the impact of policy, the was it was of What, exemplied that Japan, Washington, military prepared against remains in in so fact feeling USA ’s “moral force” response to Japanese scarcely, aggression? in fairness, especially blame in the Stimson year of for making presidential use of it, elections, Class discussion The USA’s response to events 1937–38 The the a hesitant fact threat that to launched In the in addition, following and the approach Japan’s USA. 1936, the their whole of the military Japan’s upset the economic military concept Americans and ambitious balance of of penetration invasion the continued economic naval into door” after 1937 were now building power in north threatened “open actions US the and programme, western central interests policy. despite becoming in Pacic. China, those regions Review question Refer back to Source A on page 65. What are the similarities between the motives for the USA’s lack of action and the motives for Britain’s lack of action over the Manchurian incident? 71 1 Roosevelt had some sympathy with China’s position, as did the US Neutrality Acts media. 1935 – If there was a war then the USA would not supply arms to either side. 1936 – No loans could be made to belligerents. aid. Roosevelt, However, between for none and participation conict in July any the and case USA ’s along to of with this other translated November in a joint make limited a 1937, offer show by isolationist prominent several stance of of into the laws by political USA in strength. called the US ten nancial Indeed, British appeals Sino-Japanese Roosevelt’s Neutrality preventing gave intervention. rejected mediation naval Americans, Acts actions which involvement in were enforced conicts 1937 – Warring countries could that did not specically involve the USA. only purchase arms from the USA if they were paid for and A taken away by the purchaser. could potential gunboat, the L TA Communication skills crisis have led the Yangtze December offered had which to Panay, river, 1937. was actually direct which US was bombed However, compensation, been did more escorting and when many involve US intervention sunk the three by a were small oil Japanese Japanese Americans interests and developed quickly relieved so when a tankers aircraft US on on apologized that a 12 and conict avoided. Watch the bombing of USS Panay at: Public 7 out opinion of 10 in 1937 Americans was in overwhelmingly favour of a in favour withdrawal of of US isolation citizens with from http://www.criticalpast.com/ China in order to avoid the possibility of a confrontation with Japan. video/65675061828_USSThe USA sent representatives to the Brussels conference in 1937 (see Panay_Japanese-dive-bombers_ page 67) but showed itself unwilling to go beyond verbal condemnation manning-machine-guns_motoragainst Japan. In one speech in 1937, Roosevelt seemed to promise sampan, or go to more than this when he called for a “quarantine” on aggressors to put www.criticalpast.com and a stop to the “world of disorder”. This “quarantine speech”, seemed to search “Japanese bombers indicate a willingness this his to impose sanctions against Japan. However, if attack was intention, Roosevelt had to quickly back down in the face USS Panay”. of public In fact, with not only Japan against a outcry 40% of did until China. major from the 1939 The supplier Japan’s isolationists. USA of oil, total USA not played a bought scrap needs impose key large iron for economic role in quantities and metals, sanctions, supporting of automobile cotton and its Japan’s Japanese silk parts. It wood pulp. trade war also effort and met was nearly Why did the USA change its policy towards Japan after 1938? During 1938, towards isolationists and victim alike. not active support change The to to $25 lot the the did in to carry not Neutrality 1938, using Neutrality Minister a the Acts to aggressive sentiments which China starting HH more with Kung of treated presidential Acts nationalists, Finance out share an aggressor powers, and to oil correctly policy the Roosevelt give loan saw more of $25 this as can be a policy: expected her began the Thus apply C h i n a ’s of USA Roosevelt regarding chose million. 72 the Japan. million … and this was is cannot a only the political beginning, loan w i t h d r a w. … further America large has sums definitely thrown in C H A P T E R Why did 1 . 3 : T H E America I N T E R N AT I O N A L now start to R E S P O N S E TO J A PA N E S E A G G R E S S I O N , 19 31 – 19 4 1 resist Source skills Japanese Japan in that East page expansion? it wished Asia” 45). concern In in was US overtures from in this order”. invincible factor the USA did the Soviets the their also The not to in victories US in end join An order American policy (see the thus China. in the put US entered European Italy. This power favour was The and for to of if Jiang, support increasing opinion Roosevelt’s laws. key for German summer Japanese 1959). two Axis into then fear In in of of 1940 their First question, par t b – 2 marks “missing September that that the if the is the war Pact Germany or European aid the victim and impose of this source sanctions on concerning any Japan? with the Europe to and in in message 1940, Germany Japan, would the Tripartite powers engaged powers Americans a fascist stated not no-sanctions in attempt the a them Japan that public neutrality spring the aid their further context policies (Hayashi, Japan supporting Japan. respond with What bus” poster against growing possibility enough attitudes. encouraged expansionist new might would increase swing international changing had the give might to to “a point was Jiang This Nationalists, campaign there Japan was inuence began create by position. Another for announcement turning that to an to the addition, the “new The of Italy War the the was or attack. war attacked the in China This Asia by any War, the convinced were the third other many same war. L TA Communication and thinking skills If Great Britain goes down, the Axis powers will control the “Fireside chat”; a radio broadcast to the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia and the high people of the US A by Franklin D Roosevelt on seas – and they will be in a position to bring enormous 29 December 1940 military and naval resources against this hemisphere. It … Never before since Jamestown and Plymouth Rock is no exaggeration to say that all of us, in all the Americas, has our American civilisation been in such danger as now. would be living at the point of a gun – a gun loaded with explosive bullets, economic as well as military. For, on September 27, 1940, by an agreement signed in Berlin, three powerful nations, two in Europe and one in … We must be the great arsenal of democracy. For Asia, joined themselves together in the threat that if the this is an emergency as serious as war itself. We must United States of America interfered with or blocked the apply ourselves to our task with the same resolution, expansion program of these three nations – a program the same urgency, the same spirit of patriotism and aimed at world control – they would unite in ultimate sacrice as we would show were we at war … actions against the United States. 1 … Does anyone seriously believe that we need to What message is Roosevelt attempting to convey to the American people in this radio broadcast? fear attack anywhere in the Americas while a free 2 With reference to the origin, purpose and content of Britain remains our most powerful naval neighbour in Roosevelt’s “reside chat”, assess the values and the Atlantic? Does anyone seriously believe, on the limitations of this source for examining American other hand, that we could rest easy if the Axis powers attitudes towards the international situation. were our neighbours there? 73 1 Sea of Japanese SOVIET Empire in 1870 Okhotsk UNION Kuril Is. Acquisitions until 1932 (1875) Additional occupation by 1937 Additional occupation by 1938 Additional occupation by 1939 Additional occupation by 1940 Additional occupation by 1942 Southern Sakhalin (1905) MANCHURIA (1905, 1932 puppet state) Harbin MONGOLIA Vladivostok JEHOL Sea of JAPAN Japan INNER 1933 KOREA MONGOLIA (1905 Beijing protectorate, 1910 Shandong SHANXI Pen. (1915–1917) Yellow annexed) Seoul Tsushima Sea Stark Shikoku KIANGSU CHINA Hankary Ningbo (1937) INDIA RYUKYU Is. BURMA Nanchang (1872–1879) Daito Road East China Is. Sea (1876) Taiwan TONGKING BURMA Macao Hong Kong (1895) Hanoi Guangdong PACIFIC (1937) OCEAN Rangoon THAILAND Hainan (1942) (allied (1939) 1941) Philippine Sea FRENCH Andaman Manila INDOSea South China (1942) Sea PHILIPPINES CHINA Phnom Gulf Penh of Saigon Thailand The advance to war: US pressure on Japan American reaction to the Tripartite Pact was … unexpectedly – In January parts of 1939 sales, the and same suspended. fuel and year A “a in moral embargo” February a year 1939 long-standing later high-grade a partial melting was credit trade trade scrap placed to on Japan embargo was put in planes was agreement strong Pyle, with on and stopped. Japan aviation 1996: 201 aviation In July was and motor place. The Burma Road Throughout 1940 The Burma Road is a road of aid linking Burma with the Road southwest of China. The road is to 717 miles (1,154 kilometres) were long and runs through the dollars of supply China route and, sent USA to and to by 1941, China. to the China put in summer replenish also as Japan Following the October of 1941, depleted economic advanced, the 1941, a on the air USA gave closure USA hundred Chinese pressure the temporary P-40 force. of agreed US millions the Burma more ghter loans planes Simultaneously, Japan. mountainous country. Par ts of In July 1941, when Japan moved south rather than moving north to attack it were built by approximately the Soviets, the USA responded by freezing all Japanese assets. It then 200,000 Burmese and Chinese imposed a trade embargo in November which included oil. Britain and labourers between 1937 the Netherlands also imposed a total trade embargo. USA, this As Japan was totally and 1938. The British used dependent on imported oil from the who now believed created a crisis for the the Burma Road to transpor t Japanese government that the Western powers were materials to China before 1941. attempting 74 to encircle Japan and destroy its “rightful place” in the world. C H A P T E R If its oil 1 . 3 : reserves T H E ran I N T E R N AT I O N A L out, Japan R E S P O N S E would be TO unable J A PA N E S E to A G G R E S S I O N , 19 31 – 19 4 1 continue TOK the war There USA. in followed agreed be that to a agree Japan removing that a to get war the of to and forces conquest they was this happening. diplomatic over the China. southern military resources a risk from from its the not stalled withdraw withdrawal to could agreement unacceptable order Japan negotiations However, insisted not China. from and that Japan China needed as this Japanese the (see In small groups investigate current inter-state the tensions. How has the global community USA responded? Which nation seems to be the have but aggressor? Explore if the UN has responded, could has there been a crisis or issue referred to at the would people. Japanese page to the may Indo-China, the necessary mission fact Security Council and was there a UN resolution? In Feedback your ndings to the class. Consider decided the international response to Japan’s action up 49). to 1941. As a class, debate the extent to which we learn from history. Source skills Source A The in US Source B Ambassador 1939, offering reaction to his to Japan, Joseph assessment of Grew, Max Japan’s for Hastings. Japan treatyless exasperate anything which The now in plus Japanese could Japanese a are mood retaliation, which counter-retaliation. to weigh that our counsel every the ultimate dignity particularly interests, from and reasonable a of in turn Japan our that almost power … in forbearance had are Indies. sanctions, to lead not I was themselves the the battle use point, of however, war the without to In interests, assault commercial and and approach own cultural this constructive declare on United in American subsequent problem whether have conciliation German with into It 1941; occupying the and by absence the U.S. Indochina Tokyo Congress national East wished enter the remains allowed British Dutch have deciding powers. would of our in its excluded December imposed sentiment … been certainly advance factor western to events and aggression embargo Japan’s in along would how U.S. had itself Japanese oil tipping the the plans Burma, Roosevelt the ght war conned and following stop think and – if dependency confront war speculation, evolved Japanese Tokyo Malaya certainly would would have means should realistic temper from for and fascinating principle our we constituted a Philippines incidents call is might people might consequences moderation, sacrice so would where serious which would to point American and intimidating, a embargo even the and an to happen, iname such from bring the endurance war. far situation could beyond The (2007). sanctions. It A Retribution: 1944–45 the of a a and public president direct interests declaration to moot of or war the on the States. standpoint. First question, par t a – 3 marks First question, par t a – 3 marks What, why according sanctions to Source against A, Japan were were What the a reasons bad US key policy points are towards Japan. 8 on Pearl Congress December Churchill with who only B regarding December 1941? Some historians have suggested that Harbor agreed Source to Class discussion on Pearl Harbor? attack in up idea? What was the reaction of the USA to the attack The made Japan to united the Roosevelt’s one dissenting condently remarked: American request vote. people for This a for a war Declaration was wonderful of against War news on for Churchill and Jiang had both gambled on the USA entering the war in Europe and the Pacic. Both leaders aimed to hold out until US military and economic force would win the Hitler’s fate was sealed. Mussolini’s fate was sealed. As for the Japanese, global war. From the evidence in this they would be ground to powder. All the rest was merely the application of Chapter, how far do you agree that overwhelming force. this was Jiang’s position? 75 1 L TA Thinking and social skills President Roosevelt’s speech to the United yesterday speak for themselves. The people of the United States have already formed their opinions and States Congress on 8 December, 1941 well understand the implications to the very life and Yesterday, December 7, 1941 – a date which will safety of our nation. live in infamy – the United States of America was As commander in chief of the Army and Navy, I have suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air directed that all measures be taken for our defense. forces of the Empire of Japan. Always will we remember the character of the The United States was at peace with that nation and, onslaught against us. at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with the government and its emperor looking toward No matter how long it may take us to overcome this the maintenance of peace in the Pacic. premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory. Indeed, one hour after Japanese air squadrons had commenced bombing in Oahu, the Japanese I believe I interpret the will of the Congress and of ambassador to the United States and his colleagues the people when I asser t that we will not only defend delivered to the Secretary of State a formal reply to a ourselves to the uttermost, but will make very cer tain recent American message. While this reply stated that that this form of treachery shall never endanger us it seemed useless to continue the existing diplomatic again. negotiations, it contained no threat or hint of war or Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that armed attack . our people, our territory and our interests are in grave It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan danger. makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned With condence in our armed forces – with the many days or even weeks ago. During the intervening unbounding determination of our people – we will time, the Japanese government has deliberately sought gain the inevitable triumph – so help us God. to deceive the United States by false statements and I ask that the Congress declare that since the expressions of hope for continued peace. unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian islands has Sunday, December 7, a state of war has existed caused severe damage to American naval and military between the United States and the Japanese Empire. forces. Very many American lives have been lost. http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/franklin-delanoIn addition, American ships have been repor ted roosevelt/pearl-harbor-speech-december-8-1941.php torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco and Honolulu. Question Yesterday, the Japanese government also launched an attack against Malaya. Last night, Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong. Last night, Japanese forces attacked Guam. Last night, Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands. In pairs examine the key points made by President Roosevelt in his response to the bombing of Pearl Harbor. You can also watch Roosevelt’s speech here: http://www. youtube.com/watch?v=lK8gYGg0dkE See an annotated draft of par t of the speech at http://www. archives.gov/education/lessons/day-of-infamy/images/ infamy-address-1.gif Last night, the Japanese attacked Wake Island. Listen to the radio address here: http://www.archives.gov/ This morning, the Japanese attacked Midway Island. education/lessons/day-of-infamy/images/infamy-radio- Japan has, therefore, under taken a surprise oensive extending throughout the Pacic area. The facts of 76 address.wav C H A P T E R 1 . 3 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E TO J A PA N E S E A G G R E S S I O N , 19 31 – 19 4 1 Full document question: USA’s actions with regard to Japan, 1930–41 Source A Source C Memorandum Henry in handed Stimson Washington to the on 22 by Secretary Japanese of State Stimson ambassador September response situation [in morally, legally number of matter into of and nations. concern question provisions Power Manchuria] at of politically It to is not Japan once the Treaty of of to a such February 6, Japan’s that considerable authoritative China. as a It of certain Nine- and we world. brings the 1922, happened concern, exclusively and meaning agreements, Kellogg-Briand is to pact lacked We that American might the only. of is use We the condent has not been the intention of the to create or to be a creation the applicability of a situation party treaty which The not hasty or wish in to taking be a American in position. thus feels that formulating very exists, which no its the Japanese responsibility with regard largely for to upon It is conclusions embarrassing would determining the ending Japan of it, the Berryman Roman from the this seem course that (Laocoon statue on refers which catch should but duty to meant the second you do him? If half with we an had easily that have answer found escaped the us catch the criminal and for it such war. Our offence was thus that who passed by on the other side. Source D of situation an P . Bix, an academic Modern American historian to a is Hirohito and writing the Making the sinking (2000). events rests The of massacres the USS [of Panay nor United … press the classical rare front-page based). momentarily raised stimulating wave Kennedy sinking Chinese Since had late tended eld to for the President of Panay of the The never Asian projection goodness as of their in foreign sanctions against vulnerable economy came Japanese to boycott to criticism the sale abated. as a a proper idealism refusal under pro- Americans only also Roosevelt’s movement news entirely not but in tensions, century, China or massacres anti-Japanese, that the China received international exploited essential in depression-racked reports attention. view quickly either the nineteenth to be – In the sentiment the market and a of and neither forgiven States States, Nanjing] were and Clifford this book Japan forgotten, by will who the … 1938 we man United cartoon reach those condemnation to Source B US a choice the A moral We unfortunate doubt Government. end. American of the not what you Kellogg-Briand must a the international condemned was was does in situation – the war we it the One enforce into Government However, a with did when answer, Herbert Government and But of War to brings provisions of consideration. it it. World courage to a of Manchuria. Japanese implied the in America’s that right Government after decision question reached it about action the agreed renounced Pact. Government 1947 aggressive aggressor The in 1931: What This speaking relations. impose Japanese from of a new imported goods. First question, par t a – 3 marks According should the to Stimson USA Manchurian not in Source directly A, why intervene in the crisis? 77 1 First question, par t b – 2 marks What the is the USA ’s message of isolationist Source B Third question – 6 marks with regard to position? Compare and contrast Source and Source A response to the the C view expressed regarding Manchurian the in USA ’s crisis? Second question – 4 marks With reference assess the to values historians origin, and studying isolationist position purpose limitations the in reasons the and of for Four th question – 9 marks content Source the C for USA ’s Using the examine 1930s. attitude sources the and reasons towards your for Japan own the knowledge USA ’s between change 1931 and of 1941. L TA Thinking skills Here are wider question in questions the this source sources in par tner, set ting that paper. chapter, you could Using discuss the each get for a four th information question with 2 and determining Japan’s actions between 1931 and 1941. a 3 out your arguments for and against . you use to Examine the impor tance of the actions of the West in To what extent did events in China contribute to Japan’s expansionist policy between 1931 and 1941? What sources in this chapter could help you 4 answer each Discuss the reasons for the changes in US policy question? towards Japan between 1931 and 1941. 1 “The League of Nation’s failure to take stronger action over the Manchurian crisis encouraged the Japanese to go fur ther in its expansionist policy.” To what extent do you agree with this statement? Source help and hints A a cartoon US published Magazine, in in Outlook, First question, par t b – 2 marks (See page 61.) 1931. What is Japan’s the message actions Examiner’s used in the hint: cartoon – Manchuria into China, the you it “open Kellogg-Briand B concerning symbolism use interpret is also not your a only suggests door” pact. the always to violating Source Note gateway to help of Manchuria? knowledge going 78 in being contextual source. Here showing that principle as Japan well the Japan is as the C H A P T E R 1 . 3 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E TO J A PA N E S E A G G R E S S I O N , Second question – 4 marks Limitations (See ● page 64.) This is only the government With reference to origin, purpose and the value historians and studying limitations the of this Manchurian source of to consider include the of not what view the from military , the so was going on it at the is only one time. for ● incident. The date of 1931 investigation Points point and content, perspective assess 19 31 – 19 4 1 is before could have a thorough been carried out. following. ● As this is a speech given to the League of Values Nations, ● It is an value ofcial for position government showing at the the time statement, Japanese of the so it has government’s incident It was presented international Japanese think at the forum, so government was League this of Nations, shows wanted the of the to evidence innocence what Linked an the world to damning the to happening. of out Four th question – 9 marks … and the the sources League to and your own knowledge, deal of Nations with Examiner’s did not take the for a hint: Manchurian Structure standard introduction question. the essay. and Your question is addition, your This clear opening and make Integrate evidence the answer means as parts you writing of paragraphs linked of for essay question sentences should to is the the the it clear sources the so purpose that they the points structure shown of League the that Japan had taken that you are Chinese the with quote your from own Source A knowledge that you in it could Commission of Nations ndings, use to give not A and Source B of of US Source isolationism A B and quote … (explain the relevant …) 2 and were more France, members pressure in on as of self-interested two the Japan. Vietnam, also China. had As growing its a spread of of the League, France, much Source concerns greater relevant As the up League the and try to reasons most not as to the put too colonial to C gain from highlights, a about the there Soviets threat part of several reasons result (here Source you was could seen to and quote be the C). of 3 the the economic crisis facing Europe demanded withdraw Japan why … which ndings a territory force communism that its following the to it did Wall European powers Street Crash meant that the it were more focused on their forces. do internal concerns, rather than dealing with this international are Source answer reported on incident. Manchuria did strength). below. Mukden should military making. own not problems. (Develop with your own take knowledge stronger of Therefore the of Lytton Commission’s there tracks”. for “atmosphere provide Finally, and it issue there Britain Paragraph regarding However, detachment the quite make link Introduction back unavoidable, incidents”, is to a the 1932, seem language intends to were In “a the clearly relevant of Source weakened this refer objective. a both relevance power kind not crisis. much The and not lack important paragraph. extra may stronger for to it world aggression. point, and actions develop Secondly, the above destroyed Paragraph brief so the assess the would convince Japan, Japanese China (include then highlight action to 65.) In why of is “unpleasant anxiety” regarding Using the Japanese content page of of example troops (See purpose (1931). ● ● its and Source D.) action. Conclusion Paragraph 1 In Firstly, Europe did not have the means to conclusion question Japan into withdrawing. As Source A … (make sure you answer the force clearly). points 79 1 ● First question, par t a – 3 marks demonstrated would (See page the according USA ’s to “moral Storry, force” was the response impact USA ’s to “moral force” ● increased ● did response: ● failed not to 73.) The president’s opinion reference Roosevelt’s US to the origin, “reside limitations of government’s this purpose chat”, assess source attitude in and the indicating towards ● events the in The of date The remarks President and come directly therefore actions from American the origin the Chief has value as are from Executive of policy at the broadcast in December Europe had and position 1940 when at Roosevelt been taken therefore the the USA; is talking the he over gives the examples the the by the insight reect the government. means that it lacks the “chat” is to of the position get Axis and Americans powers Roosevelt is to will see that affect trying to the lead so could than he be making thinks the it the US situation actually American is – he is people. This last point is backed Roosevelt is up trying by the style of the to make clear the faces, using rhetorical Axis into the of to in the the that the world US the aggression in of shows shape the public the to on public the setting focus on be and powers is he no out what intervention thinks example living at appealing and opinion. Axis that for Europe how speech of people public events support source used American getting impact attempts emphasize to of needs therefore President 80 not region. could happen if time. purpose understand The may the the most there ● of “shock” questions, and origin neutral and to dangers powers the the worse “chat”; with in in time. ● ● comments Therefore trying of interests the seem comments was of their opinion It US everyone purpose shift USA. ● Japan in Values the in 1940. the These feeling hindsight. to ● USA resist content values ● Europe the to China support ● page nationalist help Limitations and that sanctions Japanese (See of Japanese actions Second question – 4 marks With the economic of aggression? The to use 71.) their What, not US using metaphors public will of us in Americas point of a “all a to the and gun Americans’ sacrice”. the …”. “spirit understand, He of is would also patriotism C H A P T E R 1 . 3 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S P O N S E TO J A PA N E S E A G G R E S S I O N , 19 31 – 19 4 1 References Boyle, JH. 1993. Jovanovich. Cameron, R. Kilmarnock, Farmer, A. Hastings, Knopf. Iriye, Lu, M. A. Storry, The American Nexus . Harcourt Brace Appeasement and the Road to War . Pulse Publications. Britain 2007. York, Foreign Retribution: Affairs. The Hodder. Battle for London, Japan UK 1944–45 . Alfred A USA The Origins of the Second World War in Asia . Longman. UK David J. 1997. NY , R. Harlow, Japan: USA UK 1987. Armonk, Overy, York, 1991. 2006. New London, Modern New Japan: A Documentary History, pages 424–25. M.E. Sharpe USA 2008. Origins of the Second World War. 2nd edn. Pearson Education. Asia, 1894 –1943. UK R. 1979. Macmillan. Japan London, and the Decline of the West in UK 81 2 G E R M A N A N D I TA L I A N E X PA N S I O N 2.1 The impact of fascism on Italian foreign policy: the origins, 1870–1933 Conceptual understanding Key concepts ➔ Causation ➔ Signicance Key questions ➔ Examine the reasons for the growth of suppor t for Fascism and Mussolini in Italy after the First World War ➔ ▲ To what extent did Fascism inuence Italian foreign policy in the 1920s? Benito Mussolini Mussolini once said of Fascism: “action and mood, not doctrine”. Giovanni Giolitti is prime minister 1903–14 1910 Red week . There is widespread unrest Mussolini joins the Socialist Par ty 1914 The First World War begins Mussolini is expelled from the Socialist 1914 August Italy remains neutral Par ty for his stance on the war Mussolini sets up the newspaper Il Popolo d’Italia 82 November CHAPTER 2 .1 : THE IM PA C T OF FA S C I S M ON I TA LI A N FOREIGN P O L I C Y: THE ORIGINS , 18 7 0 – 19 3 3 Italy is promised major gains by the 1915 April Entente. Treaty of London Italy enters the war against Germany and May Austria-Hungary 1917 October Italy is defeated in the Battle of Caporetto Italy wins the Battle of Vittorio Veneto 1918 October 1919 March Mussolini founds a Fascist par ty The Versailles Settlement does not give June Italy major gains The Italian nationalist d’Annunzio seizes September the por t of Fiume Italian elections are held and the Socialist Par ty and Catholic Par ty gain the majority November of votes but fail to form a government 1919–20 There is widespread socialist unrest There is widespread Fascist violence 1920–22 against opposition groups The Fascist Par ty is established under the November control of Mussolini The king appoints Mussolini prime minister 1922 October 1923 August Italy gains the Fiume 1924 January 1925 October Albania becomes an Italian protectorate Italy bombards Corfu Italy signs the Locarno Treaties 1926 Mussolini encourages Croatian separatists 1927 who want to break away from the newly created state of Yugoslavia Mussolini encourages Arab nationalists who 1928 challenge the British and French Empires Mussolini encourages Macedonian 1929 separatists in Yugoslavia 83 2 Italy Italy in had only become a unied state in 1861. 1815 Before this it had consisted of a number SWITZ. of independent combined Milan of the states. diplomatic prime It was and minister of through military the actions Piedmont Sardinia, VENEZIA LOMBARDY Turin Trieste Cavour, and Italian patriot Giuseppe Fiume Venice PIEDMONT FRANCE Garibaldi, PARMA that Italy could be unied in M O D E N A Genoa 1861, San with Rome and the Papal States nally Marino joining the new Italian Kingdom in 1870. P A P Florence unication, Italian society after L A Despite 1870 remained divided across geographical, Sea religious and weakened social Italian lines. These governments divisions and, along Rome with the discontent and unrest caused by Bari Italy’s KINGDOM OF SARDINIA involvement in the First World War, THE helped Naples facilitate the rise to power of Mussolini TWO and SICILIES his Once Fascist in foreign Party power, policy number of in 1922. Mussolini that factors. was pursued inuenced These an by Italian a included: Palmero ● Italy’s geographical economic AFRICA 200 ▲ position and ● the ● nationalist Versailles Settlement views on the destiny L TA ● earlier ● the ● Fascist foreign policy humiliations changing international context As you read through the next ideology. section consider how each of the (Fascist ideology will be explored in detail later – see page 89.) a role in helping to formulate Mussolini’s foreign policy. Add evidence to a copy of the spider diagram below. Fascist ideology resources Nationalist Factors views inuencing Mussolini’s foreign policy Versailles settlement Earlier International 84 of Italy to become a great power and to have an empire Thinking skills Economic limited miles Map showing Italy before it was unied factors identied here played its resources situation humiliations CHAPTER 2 .1 : THE IM PA C T OF FA S C I S M ON I TA LI A N FOREIGN P O L I C Y: THE ORIGINS , 18 7 0 – 19 3 3 Mussolini’s rise to power What were the long-term weaknesses of Liberal Italy? The the period between inherent 1870 weaknesses and that 1923 is an era undermined known Italy as during Liberal this Italy period and would Liberal democracy ultimately facilitate the development of a Fascist dictatorship. Nevertheless, it This describes a government was not inevitable that the style of government to replace liberal democracy which is based on both the ideas would be Fascist rather than socialist or an authoritarian monarchy. of democracy and of liberalism. Lack of national identity Thus, people of the country can choose the government in Despite the recent unication an Italian identity. of the Italian state, Italy lacked a coherent open and free elections, and the sense of Piedmont had been the dominant state, and its individual rights of the people laws and political systems were imposed on the other states. Regionalism are protected by law. remained towns and limited strong cities, support divisions the a force, with particularly in this area. between the north south living in abject many in the There and Italians south. were the poverty feeling The whilst with the to their capital in Rome new economic south, loyalty as well the as had political majority industrialized home of peasants north in prospered. The Catholic Church The breakdown begun was during in exacerbated Indeed, up relations unication by until the 1914, between also anti-clerical the Church continued Vatican to policies had and State divide of urged which Italy. the This liberal Catholics had division governments. not to vote. as the Working-class protest The middle franchise all men and (the over existed 30 before representing upper vote) were the the growing peasant strike 1914. 19th in century, Most PSI. and One prime work He also in the undermined Turkish war them of nationalists was appalled the idea of the largest Italiano or the 1892, time gain in and in upper to respond unions the and and socialists to rapprochement to in in of offer Party only. in the parties pre-war masses electoral with the a from was that and led into growing 1911–14, the This Italy (PSI) the when corruption fermented banning politics support for grown Socialist 1930, governments classes which had system, until liberal reputation and 1906–09 were initially economic Giolitti was such with an able the issues the PSI successful, were pursued to seize imperialist continued were a elites many unrest, Italian political to general the late founded. unrest such as period, with the as was Giovanni and was and willing welfare Church by reform. allowing schools. and working had wanted win a The Italian trade dominated to the wealthy movements the down policies at liberals parties middle 1911–12. PSI from of moderate Giolitti’s vote. War 1903–05, education the working-class the to to World wanted attempted Although Italian at who Giolitti religious in closing man with and the Working-class minister Giolitti. to by needs dominated limited given First and, politicians force, classes was liberal after and this under from and the First Catholic on War, Party by the Italian– from However, the parties. World recession pressure Turkey. many parliamentary the serious compounded war Libya war a left The move when ( Partito the rejected the away two Popolare PPI). 85 2 S S Nationalist opposition R C U The Italian had been Nationalist Association FRANCE Black Sea founded in 1910. A poet, y SPAIN Filippo Marinetti, also established TURKEY the aisinuT Gibraltar Futurist movement Malta Movement. gloried This war and Alexandria criticized the weakness governments Suez for of failing liberal to Canal ALGERIA become LIBYA, a “Great Power”, which 1912 EGYPT Marinetti have believed been Italy’s unication. The also believed was unnished should destiny after nationalists that unication SUDAN Adowa SOM. regions Wal of and Trieste under Austrian rule possessions a naval base Italian naval base 0 500 despite i l a t I British 1000 of miles containing Italian large speakers. numbers These were KENYA known ▲ Trentino Wal remained Italian the d BR. ABYSSINIA because Italy’s empire in 1914 as the terre “unredeemed In addition, nationalists also wanted an empire to irredente or lands”. compete with Britain, L TA Thinking and France and the new Germany. However, Libya apart, the Italians had communication skills made 1 What factors undermined liberal rule before the First World War? 2 only minor Somaliland Abyssinia the (in in gains 1889). 1896; Abyssinians in Africa, They indeed, at the also the with Eritea failed in Italians infamous their were Battle (in of 1885) attempt and to part of conquer humiliatingly defeated by Adowa. Work in pairs to create a mind map to show the What was the impact of the First World War on diculties faced by the Italy, 1915–18? liberal governments after 1870. Italy’s reasons for joining the Entente Alliance In 1914, the Europe Triple Germany were First and deeply World right-wing block the of War Treaty ofLondon Futurists. hoped the and destroy rivoluzionaria crisis, Italy or of the PSI a since if Italy of the and support who opposing the III, as was on an this the his left; they groups” were during October The signed back PSI di up was the arguing it others would azione by a Treaty and against but that fasci set the the was war”, believed The gain 1915. to the the alliance would Empire. and after However, Nationalists Mussolini opinion by (the they April “imperialist’s Benito but action both politicians neutral. persuaded by and with developed 1907), in Entente Alliance Italy’s that Entente in revolution. action war. war, the Russia because foster changed the and division could crisis remained supported conict Triple Triple Austro–Hungarian favoured intervention the the however, joined France was Italy of established Emmanuel the 1882; rst Salandra, caused alliances, member intervention at “revolutionary to two Russia Britain, Victor viewing initially that, intervention interventionists member with supported Liberal and territories Intervention left into been the and Antonio king, intervention, on out, France Italian-speaking Italian during broke liberals Britain, London, had Austria–Hungary minister, of divided Italy divided prime The 86 was Alliance. left-wing leading intervention in favour CHAPTER of 2 .1 : intervention. editorship of Giolitti and war, did to THE as gain a liberals, Catholic entering fellow FA S C I S M was newspaper, many the OF Mussolini its from against IM PA C T the I TA LI A N expelled from FOREIGN the PSI, P O L I C Y: and THE from ORIGINS , 18 7 0 – 19 3 3 his Avanti! including Church. Catholic ON war, state, most The while of the liberals the Chamber, saw Church that did opposed Italy not had relish the little a war Austria. Austria-Hungary B a ra n ya Zagreb S Trieste la SUBOTICA Bačka v o n ia Banat REKA Istria a t i a Sava o r C Bosnia Don av a B ZADAR D rz e g o v in a i Split r e g H l b a a a t i u a l m a Italy Sofia Montenegro Cetinje V a r d a r state M border division line to Italy to Serbia between ainablA country split ▲ border Serbia and a a Montenegro Land oered to Italy, Serbia and Montenegro in London, 1915 Source skills The Treaty France, of Italy London, and ARTICLE signed Russia on by 26 Britain, April 1915 maintenance in the of a partition the future receive the Southern treaty district Tyrol up of peace, Italy of Trentino; to its the natural is of which is the Bremner in the district to balance her a of rights, share, power in case equal to of Trieste; the Gradisca; the entire of the Mediterranean. entire ARTICLE 11 geographical Pass; the is to get a Country of share in the war indemnity city to the magnitude of her Gorizia sacrices and and Turkey, basin corresponding and political to Italy frontier, the 4 theirs, By of Mediterranean, and efforts. Istria. First question, par t a – 3 marks ARTICLE 9 What, France, Great Britain and Russia admit expect principle that fact of Italy’s interest in according to the Treaty of London, did Italy in to gain by entering the First World War? the 87 2 Far thest advance of the Allies SWITZERLAND Central AUSTRIA-HUNGARY Central Powers into Italy Powers International Far thest Allied advance into in boundar y 1914 Major battle Austria-Hungary Trentino Trentino Oensive Tar visio Caporetto May 1915 Piave R. Oct Trento 1917 Isonzo Vittorio Veneto R Eleven October of Asiago Lake Piave Oensive Garda May Battles 1918 the Isonzo June 1915– Sept 1917 River 1918 1916 Venice Verona Trieste 3rd seized on November 1918 ITALY Adige Po Istria 0 0 ▲ R. River 50 50 miles Adriatic Sea kilometers Map of the Italian front during the First World War The impact of war The Italians and the Germans Northern the Italy. Western Belgium, most the of war Battle the Italians end of Italy at Battle the of Austrians. cost of more and the the than of in on and and huge for engagement at October the 1917, losses back Germans, by who 100kilometres. war, in October achieved Vittorio a victory Veneto However, war in case However, than nally front France pushed and more 1918, the ▲ were a the years static. Austrians the in suffered they Austrians developed Caporetto advanced At was Front three was the across As trenches the of when the fought the against human had been horrendous: 600,000 men were hundreds of thousands dead wounded. Italian troops killed in an Austrian chlorine gas attack The war that served for their war in that The the increased increasingly 88 Italy its more army politically were mismanagement stance. meant an made of workforce number of membership militant by the was war. the trade end of Many resenting Many mobilized industrial of divided. politicized, to also the war. a grew. and the the 5 million liberal resented ght workers unions of the the “total” In PSI, and PSI’s war, turn, men government anti- which this both led to were CHAPTER 2 .1 : THE IM PA C T OF FA S C I S M ON I TA LI A N FOREIGN P O L I C Y: THE ORIGINS , 18 7 0 – 19 3 3 L TA Research skills Go to https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GpZi84oVUrY, or go to criticalpast.com and search “Austro-Hungarian troops advancing...”. Watch Austro-Hungarian troops advancing after the Battle of Caporetto. L TA Research and social skills In pairs or small groups, research in more depth the Italian front in the First World War. You should allow two hours for this task. You might want to focus on: specic battles or campaigns; the use of technology; the role of military leaders; conditions on the front lines; propaganda. You need to review how to reference your sources and provide a list of works cited. As a pair or in your group, give a 10-minute presentation on your research to the class. What is Fascism? Fascism itself did not differently nationalism, empire easier against and in and was clear Fascism’s War. called fascio or In dictator, Fascism anti-communist was and against and general, one-party it could by it manifested Fascism be argued considering against the multi-party promoted government, class liberal that what it it is stood struggle, democracy pacism. growth World doctrine, Nevertheless, what internationalism, against founding countries. leader war. understand it a different strong building to against: a have in Europe Mussolini di set was up his fostered rst by Fascist the impact units in of the March First 1919, combattimento . Nationalism • View its a of the culture nation and unifying Militarism state, history, • as force Promotion of political violence and war method of as a Key revitalizing features of • Desire to foreign society remove influences • Violence seen as Fascism necessary • Own nation seen in order to as progress superior to other • nations Development of paramilitary organizations Class discussion Social Social unity Authoritarianism Look at the characteristics Darwinism • • The belief that Opposes class-based divisions in evolved to has the influence or state of Fascism. In pairs or small control groups, discuss what kind of collective over all aspects of as national superior and Totalitarian; races promotes have society • other society foreign policy you would expect society races to see from a state following • • “Survival of the The people fittest” subservient • Mussolini: not ▲ are to the state this ideology. “ obedience discussion ” Fascist symbol 89 2 Fascio means sticks or Mussolini ties “group” fasces which probably between his and would Roman intended men in the become magistrates the associated used symbolism militia as to a with the symbol suggest bound of ofce. strong bonds or units. Why did support for Fascism grow in Italy after the First World War? Following the war, Italy entered into German-speaking New Brenner Brenner a AUSTRIA period of political crisis. The liberal frontier Pass governments lose SOUTH control. of 1918–22 began As the franchise extended, the liberals to had TYROL SWITZERLAND Tarvisio (ALTO been ADIGE) badly in the elections of fared 1919 and Croat-speaking gained TRENTINO fewer chamber. than half the Subsequently, seats none in of the the Settled political Italian-speaking by Pact of Rome. parties coherent were coalition able to form government. a The Trieste 1924 result Lake was short-term governments Garda Fiume and this undermined the credibility of ISTRIA ITAL Y the democratic Moreover, Adriatic parliamentary support for the system. government Sea Key declined North-east boundary of Italy in in further liberal Prime it became Minister clear Vittorio 1919 Emmanuelle ▲ when 1914 that Boundary Orlando had not obtained Italy’s territorial gains the the defeated primarily the for Istrian also got a However, also Austro–Hungarian territorial peninsular, port in, and although expected to gain, empire. received, port the protectorate clearly the port of Trieste stated of Italy, as the not gain territory in had having promised, and over, Fiume Italy the and the claimed joined the the from war province Dodecanese of Tyrol, islands. It Albania. Treaty of London, Italy had Dalmatia. Territory claimed by Territory promised at the Italy Treaty of London, May Territory Italy received in the Treaty of 1915 St Germain in 1919 South Tyrol * * Trentino * * Istria * * Fiume ▲ Dalmatia * Colonies * Italy and the peace settlement Prime Minister conservative willing 90 to Orlando foreign renounce was accompanied minister, Italian Sydney claims to to Versailles Sonnino. Dalmatia by Orlando in return his had for been the port of CHAPTER Fiume, were 2 .1 : but THE his foreign exploited by either territory. There was rate for As men Britain. The a not of Fascist based groups strict law World In the a Italy was actually forces were of at the end the their Italians outcome Italian higher poet, of casualties thousands than casualties and the and P O L I C Y: THE ORIGINS , 18 7 0 – 19 3 3 differences were not given resign. earlier, hundreds nationalist beneted clear across and in noted to In FOREIGN injured. the Versailles The casualty compared Gabriele the were to more than casualty rate for 35.8% for D’Annunzio, deemed the order and it from doctrine class after gave or the divide. the its post-war theories Italians violence members situation. could appeal embraced on the it the its streets As to fascism a wide demands following opportunity to for the regain was range a First sense of pride. 1921 Catholic (newly its powers forced disgust I TA LI A N disagreed. great was ON victory”. Party on War, national of Italian “mutilated The minister and forces 39.1% FA S C I S M other been killed Italian OF Orlando has Britain: it the widespread Settlement. 600,000 IM PA C T elections, Party and founded 35 138 in seats seats 1921). went to the Italian to the Fascists Socialists politics and was (PNF), the 108 to the Communists polarizing. What was the impact of D’Annunzio and the Fiume aair on Fascism? In September Fiume by to hand to remove in December Italian 1919, force the in port Gabriele protest over to D’Annunzio 1920. democratic the Yugoslavia. until The D’Annunzio against Giolitti whole affair led Italian 2,000 ex-soldiers government’s The government was returned undermined as the to occupy agreement proved prime too feeble minister credibility of the system. Source skills The Source A war left included Video clip of D’Annunzio and his a major legacies. for justice (“land and transformed They for the forces peasants”) in other thirst a economy. The Fiume: war also produced tens of thousands of new http://www.britishpathe.com/video/dannunzio-at-umeofcers, drunk with patriotism and greedy to aka-italian-army-review-at/query/AMERICAN+TROOPS+INS command. They had won the war, and did not PECTION+ON+MARCH intend Source B M. Clark. to Modern Italy 1871–1982 (1985). Denis Italians had been divided by November divided than “shirkers”, against forget it. Mack 1919 ever: government against No could were “combatants” peasants defeatists. they them a Italian British history, historian in an who academic all. Modern Italy – A political history (1997). more against workers, conceivable suit Smith, in before, book. but anyone Source C specialises The let patriots form of Support of for Fiume) who had signature for such “the this was escapade obtained no intention at Versailles, people Yugoslavs when are (the from of honouring and in occupation many Orlando’s D’Annunzio November excited patriots by a he savage spoke stated: spirit 91 2 of domination quarrel or with shock when troops been war had were talk of a A cloak godsend to them, place it for … of in such and a affair, dress circles people shouted coup détat … eja, people the Fiume to war in use be the was solidify the The under would was there … the the arditi were the alala.” sketch of copied without the for to be future Here, an … seen fascist too, “corporate was fascism in cry seen All by as “A the this acknowledgement black Fiume war was state”. inspiration The noi rst was later Mussolini. First question, par t a – 3 marks What, encouraged possible eja, example a obvious favour of its rehearsal such of the and arditi shirts opinion to ridiculous perpetual dangerous patriotism and public Fiume avoid black-shirted especially and government annexing The continuation respectable the cannot military accustomed force. by we demobilized, had of and them”… the of according First World to Source War on B, was the impact of Italy? international First question, par t b – 2 marks repercussions [A] were completely member of the D’Annunzio in Fiume Nitti] boasted of royal family … giving disregarded [The … paid Prime government … visits to Minister money What is News in the message Source of the images from Pathé A? to Second question – 4 marks help it keep meant the articial nothing indiscipline was to revolt him or alive the unpunished … king and apparently that even With military reference analyse rewarded. the historians D’Annunzio’s for over a “Regency year. of Although Carnaro” it was a to its values origin, and studying purpose limitations Italy in the and of content, Source C for 1920s. lasted petty and L TA Social skills Share your response to the second question (above) with a par tner. Peer assess each other ’s response to this question and award a mark out of 4. Discuss how and why you gave the marks awarded, and suggest how your par tner might improve his or her response. What was the impact of economic factors on the rise of Fascism? The post-war ination with savings. situation the In southern to and to the a of the the and that There restrain the not of the had industrialists opposition Communists was Blackshirts immigration to in Russia, across in During this on that the landowners, but were the their also Indeed, use police excesses. Fascists as the prepared the the and the to the the Fascists gained support offered confront to army, the Party conservatives Fascists as attempted however, Fascists to had 1919 known socialists passed meant poverty. 1917, 1921; This that Between Communist support Fascism. 1919. their became January and of October the Italian and and escape in time 21 and Mussolini to Europe. Italy The peaked physically. from America end of classes the formed from rise middle on manipulate complicity the by revolution. was in the million unrest already could 2 and restrictions revolution Rosso). factor workers to US emigrate Communists. they important soared new extensive Italiano ) left an communism (Biennio ideological Socialists believed fear was wealthy only ends. could by Russian-style opposed from also xed-wage Bolshevik Comunista strength not poor Years” catalyse was the exacerbated there Red (Partito who both widespread 1920 “Two hit Unemployment was addition, led 92 economy High initially their who own did not CHAPTER Fascism 2 .1 : was signicant saw the Fascists 1922, that had unable stable also IM PA C T as force a therefore, to to in by the Italy. of ON I TA LI A N Catholic Pope Pius improving FOREIGN Church XI the P O L I C Y: which backed position THE was the 18 7 0 – 19 3 3 a Mussolini of ORIGINS , as he Church and relations. there bring contain post-war FA S C I S M means church–state failed OF supported political cementing By THE was about violence a a on loss of faith “victors” the in Italian peace streets and state institutions settlement, had failed to seemed establish a economy. Source skills at Source A running that An extract from Mussolini’s speech to the the of the Milan fascio in March, interests have in a the Italy crisis failed. now sensed today impression has the we It exists. that is During inadequacy know that the clear of our present to the the to the virtues of that war us the intelligence and all must future not nature determined. regime ready is to the take are piazzas the of was Italian ability of the its be act of its will cry who now If this organs be out, “The pushed that the to defend conference. Italy should receive not They only 1915, (southern of Dalmatia), of Fiume agreed Tyrol, but with the Entente Trentino, should also be in Istria and given the parts city the the us, over the to be must we rush the border States Fiume, on of of Istria. When America the Britain refused grounds to country into new it addition, denied that, there, sacrices and and To them, had won Liberalism apparent in not so Italy the vital to despite had a to state, that few share Africa, only was was weakness. because would colonies it Yugoslav Liberal became Dalmatia German outraged. we the in of the population, of blamed lived are Italian economy Nationalists be be into because large the creativity right to is reason, to on United not present we of ready belongs peace leaders. system fast. For as the due people, superseded, place. succession ones political fasci that and hearted, must to the agitation political faint We going establishing and be that territories its We at those hand to convinced fail government; victory the now would regime everyone and solely were 1919. demanded I war rst Italian meeting the government in the When, Italy would Italians the division nationalists been were cheated. “mutilated Her victory”, culprit! war First question, par t a – 3 marks and led it to victory!” What, Cited in C.F . Delzell (ed). 1971. the Fascism, 1919–45: Selected according to Source A, is the problem with Mediterranean documents , page existing Italian government? 10 First question, par t a – 3 marks Source B Why, Mark Robson. Italy: Liberalism and that 1870–45 according to Source B, did Italians believe Fascism they had been cheated after the war? (2004). Second question – 4 marks It was not only over the issue of the supposed With “socialist threat” that the right reference assess the government. Nationalists who had the Liberals weak its origin, purpose and content, the and values and limitations of Source A for always historians considered to condemned studying Italy in the post war period. incompetent L TA Thinking, communication and social skills In pairs or small groups, consider the following statement: One student (or half your group) should prepare to argue for the assertion, the other (or other half of your group) against. “Italians were justied in viewing the Versailles Settlement Review the evidence presented on each side and together as a mutilated victory.” draw a conclusion based on the weight of your arguments. 93 2 How impor tant was the March on Rome, October 1922? Source skills A photograph the March on of Mussolini Rome, with black-shirted Fascists before 1922. Go to www.britishpathe. com/video/march-on-rome Watch Mussolini’s March on Rome. First question, par t b – 2 marks What By is the 1922, the vulnerable; they were liberal the of ready to should government, Ivanoe Bonomi, a conservative In August and the could 1922, middle restore September with and on means, had some Socialists now had willingness he to how rst led by was time The and that question was not take socialist This Facta and come would 1922. Luigi weak had key they Italian February and to that support expelled was that power. prime The minister, followed was seize called a by unable general Mussolini it and his clear he in a that wanted increasing and to councils there also in as in to Fascists in negotiations prime several would be explore pressure strike, his speech engaged appointment Socialist rumours under only made monarchy, to from a towns Fascist legal his own power. continued would offer Communists Mussolini was Ras, that Italy. the widespread talks in Mussolini the However, the their but believed order. backed though 1922, in that violence. squads government by politicians been bosses, October led coalition and he Rome. even regional new law Fascist there march In the conservative minister. Italy collapsed classes that control lead increasing government believed take coalition the photograph? democratic they weak this Fascists whether control 94 message with include Fascists regard Fascists. cabinet to the formation Although posts, there Mussolini of a was would not CHAPTER accept 2 .1 : anything with leading seize power. On 24 less a (“to three Fascists squads attempted central Italy. Rome. not He taken asked the Fascist and On 29 king to urgent. proceed Mussolini, prime the and rst with III, of so he in panicked the of the Rome. army Fascist north and reports Facta, was then to planned October, 1922, that but 27 on the Minister before imitation march of met right chanted buildings sent Prime was 18 7 0 – 19 3 3 back who asked could had to stay. crush changed his mind a telegram Mussolini, Rome as he Milan. wishes from H.M. to the confer the king: King with asks you you — to King Victor 1922 leader had who agreed, received priority, to law to 10,000 night In shirts ORIGINS , Mussolini time Naples. Black THE Mussolini. Mussolini Top the Fascists king the intention but martial the in Rome, ofcials, the October, government resigned, declare At On of 16 P O L I C Y: of only a party 35 that members had of regularly parliament, participated in was the offered post of minister. On 30th him October, Prime march given on to than all in Rome with the to legions been subsequently His squads had asked let them arrival to books. form and the Denis a the not But arrive the was civil soon and this in armoured in launched and their Smith, of the until in of In up of to cars: of the there whom they men. to hours power government had on no fewer arms troops policemen Rome. after had picture These a satisfaction. Pugliese waiting he reached amused General 400 so of were had garrison indeed, winning myth Mussolini the before 3,000 appointed something ‘ultimatum’ reality with were the an twenty-four after fascism loss place long private only develop many stand trains Rome and to Emmanuel with invented Rubicon. unable to enforce march, photographers war took Mack to fascist admitted needed was the Victor satised to ready government myth after martyrs” — a through. insurrection “fascist did up He and not legend across quite Rome was fascists a machine-guns Mussolini fascist armed eventually hold in leader appointment. militiamen have their sufcient arrived fascist 300,000 and fascist would The royal by leading and proved a King, 30,000 at as Rome the horseback Mussolini Minister. unspectacular to local held their FOREIGN that 40,000 outside control On agreed was assemble. against immediately Emmanuel violence to side October, Very to seize I TA LI A N role. and declared miles terried revolt. decided 20 action major ON Garibaldi, government rm the a congress and to FA S C I S M Milan leader, began This The in each 50,000 to than Rome”) places, OF Fascist unication Roma At IM PA C T Fascists October, Italian A THE by orders their an 3,000 sponsored he armed ctitious history 1983. L TA Self-management and social skills In pairs or small groups, use the information in this chapter and in the source above to identify the key factors that led to Mussolini’s appointment as prime minister in 1922. Which of these factors do you consider were the most impor tant? 95 2 How did Mussolini consolidate his power? At rst, the Mussolini 4 out on of the move ● In Fascists was 12 the ministers part of both towards was to administration ● In February ● In July party be given ● In April from to May On 3 the 11 local ● days in OVRA. permitted include in was an to the passed, election Fascists, after a to increase series a vote reform Fascist which would parliament campaign their Giacomo deputies later the of was only actions able to of condence the Party. stated that the automatically to make of strong intimidation representation by as 1925, in and parliament death, powers and action the Most Law on The 1926 and speech revulsion took members in He in the was Italy responsibility of Mussolini by and a of the of powers. press for parliament now was now January secret were the Head of Political appointed new arrest scope against of Powers executive of wave a violence. Fascists. Mussolini However, replaced repression a gave Fascist moved to Duce the banned. were ex-squadristi following Il Matteotti condemning Fascists. November The a parties. which Mussolini won powers joined in signicant were increased Law votes opposition. ofcials Between parties, government seats 1925, of December unions through in system. liberal of himself Mussolini new Matteotti’s violence establish In the January withdrew political cabinet 66%. 1924, concerning other the able chamber murdered ● the were In other However, Nationalists of with coalition emergency Acerbo most and a dictatorship: in the of possible. 1924, 7% a tax two-thirds violence, Italian ● the power Fascists. the vote and won government ● up 1923, 1923, that share minister Mussolini 1922, able to were setting November and had prime Government parties strictly controlled. government 1927 and the Fascist Party was founded: increased, trial without penalty was Elected ofcials. police death gave trade the jury expanded was to authorities. Did Mussolini create a totalitarian state? A totalitarian over all social. and or Under comply criticism Employees 96 state aspects of one and the this the in which citizen’s Mussolini, with of is a Italians state’s was State life: had laws. enforced had to the government political, to There by swear conform could the an has economic, be secret oath to of total Fascist no control cultural overt police and loyalty to and expectations opposition militia. the regime and CHAPTER the 2 .1 : young cult THE were developed totalitarian with IM PA C T mobilized around nature powerful Mussolini Church retained gained landowning totalitarian in 1938 limited World of total and them. Mussolini Fascist control of of was He Hitler turn hardly never a regime. as the the The by in laws in This the were Italy became after Hitler Steiner systematic the while urged to of the it and the the was and in the Fascism with Also, involved had form 18 7 0 – 19 3 3 compromised Church contrasts implemented ORIGINS , King. addition, 1930s. only Zara had the the A limitations monarch In where THE movement. and the P O L I C Y: were Fascists Italy. power. Germany youth Vatican south their FOREIGN there until then developed Fascist However, dismissed racial Jews even I TA LI A N inuence over Hitler’s Historian, Kampf. be ON the such still anti-semitic – join maintained persecution impose the could nature War to Mussolini. considerable elites that FA S C I S M non-Fascists, Indeed, never OF there the more only was Second Mussolini to writes: thinker . singular He and wrote no equivalent all-embracing to Mein ideology that Source skills allowed First question, par t a – nor the to did his same There could his programme impact always not fearsome on of that or racial and doctrines claims totally expansionism regeneration Hitler’s competing abolish, of “domestic Italians remained ignore, doctrine and destroy. radical made loyalties — into on in Steiner, political reality, revisionism” the Italy German that make people. 3 marks According Mussolini was 2005 to Steiner, Mussolini’s different to that how ideology of Hitler? What factors inuenced Mussolini’s foreign policy? To make Unlike policy Italy Hitler, goals great, respected Mussolini already in action did and not place. which feared. take included ● increase national ● consolidate ● revise ● dominate the Balkans ● dominate the Mediterranean ● build with after the a 1925, Mussolini clear set of Mussolini following foreign developed a aims: L TA of Benito power However, programme — pride Self-management and thinking skills domestic support for the regime Review the factors identied on the post-war settlement of 1919–20 pages 84 that had an impact on Mussolini’s foreign policy. Add to your spider diagram any evidence from pages 84 ● Empire territories in foster spread These the an the aims wanted more to ideology, to was this Roman vision of Italy Fascism product as of was national force with in its Mussolini’s Empire. of a increase Fascist vitale or “living space”); expand its in other various factors. and helps pride and make international expansionist of heir that the of countries. key belief Control “the onwards to suppor t the impact of these factors. Settlement signicant spazio Africa were Versailles (gain The to disappointment explain Italy (and why over Mussolini himself) a much politics. aims, Fascist was Italy Mediterranean also could important. be Empire the was Linked second key to his Rome”. 97 2 Domestic considerations consolidate the support economic controlling space for needs the the for of were his important, regime Italy. and These Mediterranean too. he Mussolini also needed factors inuenced setting up and an needed to his empire to address goals with of living Italians. What impact did economic issues have on Italian foreign policy? In a speech I in consider me, foreign economy. consolidate make an Italy the had a In order far was farm near Rome a also but in a high on in term socialism. which the but the to of war fate, the as Fascist militarist had than on … not To live, even to for … our not system, only but autarky”) state. limited the strengthening aimed “achieving a to reliant raw in other weaknesses of Italy, to also and These north. people all and helped to idea of nor their conict to to aims materials The have were and Italians also industrialized the the have cost intent of promoted to increase consumer development the of in the be cease. forces and their lose. this In be of sum, goods area, idea from the was alternative system it envisaged would based work on would all of causing system a serve the would Corporate political has system and interests the to neither capitalism regulated, The This an They economy would advantages would exploited in would disadvantages. State”. economy, that system the would the “Corporate workers This at Mussolini the classes. believed divergent was fund involved economy keep to was the described favoured organizing good. would labour merely working people the class was Fascists national without and been be State problems, called an three key fraud”. achieve initiatives: and were Italy that taxation the employers practice help new interest, “elaborate To be corporations, probably as economic industry burden and for protected as he helps with the harvesting on a the vague Heavy capitalist national Mussolini carries an armful of grain a way socialism state submitting therefore and compared big of policies industrialized Mussolini’s society ambitions supporting to together permanent materials. (known supposed a not control However, the a however, rate address was capitalism ▲ of less literacy to there in … policy to said: nations. productivity. which be raw political “productivism”, and in Mussolini tenacity economic achieve, low nation risk, capable was European 1925, self-sufcient to south His his economy difcult Italian struggle, deciency Mussolini’s the the means so-called December the economic Battle “Mussolini for greatness, Grain Law” in in Mussolini 1925; 1928, the which also Battle set out a launched for the Lira programme in 1926; of land reclamation. These an policies increase in improvement olives. 98 The had little grain in area output that success. production came saw the The and at the most Battle for imports cost of negative Grain fell by other did key impact lead 75%, but crops, was the to this such as south, where CHAPTER the soil 2 .1 : was THE not IM PA C T OF suitable for challenge the Mussolini increased British pound, consumers The big as exports they government to cut also an Overall, pursuit the fell had continued of to value also was the the and pay the more in the lira was for FOREIGN The state poverty from not 154 a by also in lira P O L I C Y: the to 10%. goods In THE failed 90 lira due general ORIGINS , When to the benet to 18 7 0 – 19 3 3 to south. corresponding imported 1927 to tariffs. the land failure. assertive of wheat. there expensive weakness I TA LI A N redress of wages an ON growing landowners reclamation by FA S C I S M fascist foreign Mussolini’s policy was hampered economy. Source skills Source A Antonio writer, central Source B Cippico, in his Italian book problem of of the politician lectures, and Italy: Mediterranean Robert The Second Mallet. World 1920 industrial During strikes 1923, industrial In there and the strikes December, unemployed; took in 189 rst in of the reduced there October Italy 1,881 agricultural year were 1921, place were 1924, 200 ... to régime, The of to new anarchy citizens Fascist government order reigned; security governments, sometimes A really of in where of for of the giving life Mussolini’s … Despite is been rare this so a the had a task Sea the industrial impediment towards the supremacy. conclusion Great and serious drive Red dictator’s that Britain allowed in Rome foreign capital, and, permitted greater spending Italy to of a war-debt 1926, greater an access as a consequence, in power, has in the never history before of a and What, which years like coal armaments, on imported and petroleum ... according Mussolini’s to Source foreign B, are the key issues policy? Source C that it Meakin. “Mussolini’s Fascism: accomplished. civilized occurred has materials on reliant First question, par t a – 3 marks for almost raw heavily the … half remained staple property undertaking and the maddest parliaments, two government short nancial further and agreement in extent achieved Italian Fascism represented nations, that of triumph so of style over substance”. History Italy, Review, that of had a has the weak a projected with What and as agreement Thomas It Origins 541,000 back and magistrates immense Fascism, has the 117,000… restoring of acted Mediterranean to fallen unenviable position strikes Fascist to and (1983). (1926) Italy’s During Mussolini War much number 59 (2007). in In time. an the effort needs to of adapt a the future Italian war, the economy Fascist to Party First question, par t a – 3 marks attempted What, of according Mussolini’s to Source economic A, are the achievements policies? on in to imports. 1925, foreign reduce The Battle imposed cereal Italian high goods, for dependence Grain, tariffs whilst on launched imported government Second question – 4 marks subsidies With reference content, analyse Source A Italy the in to for its the origin, value historians purpose and and limitations studying the of Mussolini’s 1920s. Examiner’s the by 75 Refer to page 107 for ideas to answer this of available machinery from cent, and achieved cereals. 1925 by wheat 1940 complete However, to and these the assist in fertilisers. imports fell country self-sufciency economic gains on came how decade per almost hint: made purchasing In in were at a great price, as exports fell and the question.. importation of fertilisers failed to keep pace. 99 2 The the by propaganda Battle a and for decline a and Grain in further the agricultural were soon quality reduction poorer of in especially in the The third of Muss o l i ni ’s was the benets malaria,” of outweighed the Italian standards of diet, 1938, In reality, mixed living, Battle the demonstrate 1923. The Huge uninhabitable areas such of as and the d es ig ne d a g r icultur a l d ynami s m, of was ma l ar ia l ne w ly a nd and In to ma r sh the te xtbo ok of the s che me 8 0 , 000 one - s i x th st a t e ” . ha d o n ly hecta r e s the a r ea of were I t al y, as i ns i s te d . economic into in Fascist resulted propaganda dire unwise, la n d Ma rs he s S a ba udi a Fa s ci st duty the Onl y not a ne w howeve r, government total, the pr ovid e introd uc ed cre a te d the success. economy la n d, pr ev io usl y P o nti ne th e Latina of s che me swa ths whilst Aprilla, Ma r shes , is ba t t l es intervention in some victories situation unplanned, economics did from not brought and in gains… the However, reect about disorganised 1925 the by forays onwards. w e re L TA drained, the Fasc i s t employment. in of e co nomi c availa b i l i ty “it reclaimed, south. the increase proclaim e d in citi es won Thinking skills the In pairs discuss the points made in Source C regarding regime internatio na l p r a is e . “F as cis t l a nd Mussolini’s economic policies. reclamation is no t o nl y d efe nce a g ai ns t Class discussion Which aspects of Mussolini’s economic policies aected his foreign policy aims? Following on from your class discussion, add more information to your spider diagram (page. 84) on the factors inuencing foreign policy. How successful was Mussolini’s foreign policy in the 1920s? Many the had in of aims to the of work place foreign previous with after he was foreign policy Italy, and the in character. European other Mussolini powers to ministers the 1930s at to on page the to one peace; bureaucrats minister. policy have a hand, on 97 Indeed, consolidate foreign appeared On and prime 1920s Italy’s promote attempts outlined administrations. appointed in cooperation. undermine aims Italian many used by policy the were who had However, his become contradictory seemed other hand, to he to initially remained Mussolini domestic would he similar Mussolini control more approach work acted, with at in Fascist to the times, to cooperation. Ambitions in the Balkans The aspiration Africa was invaded the the Greek action an 100 held Greek with to use its the did of 50 “Corfu in the Italian Corfu Albania. navy the many of that payment Although inuence by island demanded demanded Greeks. gaining border and threatened also of aim after The an Italian League Italians million of Mediterranean agree lire was of In to 1923, ofcial Nations withdraw. Mussolini Affair” Eastern nationalists. Only was as when withdraw, a killed condemned compensation seen and great in Mussolini on this Britain but he from success the in CHAPTER 2 .1 : THE Italy, Mussolini bully smaller IM PA C T had OF FA S C I S M learned that ON he I TA LI A N could FOREIGN P O L I C Y: THE ORIGINS , 18 7 0 – 19 3 3 only Source skills powerful went on states; states to he such develop could as a not Britain. good intimidate In fact, more Mussolini relationship with Source A the A British Foreign Minister Austen cartoon UK The following foreign the policy disputed commander the to he undermine destabilize Also in took power train treaty of 1926, Italian over it. and success he In an in the the in in Albanian friendship through Zog’s there. such He Low published in the This the Albania to two in August 1923. of to and to groups Croats. Ahmed and led Star, him tried leader, The Rome, led the newspaper, military ceded ethnic as regime between which of was Yugoslavia’s army. a Yugoslavs funding on David a control sent Balkans the Italian-backed Albania, had Pact port the inuence by gained having intimidate country invested the when Mussolini independence, 1924, Mussolini 1924, Fiume, in could the wanted in rule gave French who to of Mussolini’s believe in victory port Yugoslavs Italy. to year, by Chamberlain. Zog, border. helped an ofcial states became an protectorate. Relations with Western European powers Mussolini’s actions undermined backed the Romania in France’s Little and Yugoslavia position, Entente clearly as France alliance Czechoslovakia. of had Yugoslavia, Indeed, Mussolini First question, par t b – 2 marks was hostile to France for several reasons: What ● Italy had Corsica, ● claims Nice Mussolini ● Mussolini territory and was opposition aimed around although still seven and Germany, normalize border to Although in the future Belgium and with borders France failed ushered as to he get had in the a The the the force met he the message of the cartoonist in Source A? in the for in the leaders of part with the This The settlement left was its also and eastern signed Belgium. Austria included meetings. cooperation Spirit”. in from conrmed but Pact in the Switzerland. France border and Balkans, post-war Belgium, key Morocco moderation agreements and supported and Balkans with Locarno Germany, a the Rhineland period “Locarno in secure Italian played new a The France between as at to Germany. and Tunisia aggressive Mussolini aimed with in inuence been negotiation. conict known is of Africa control himself 1925, resulted Treaties, Treaties peace, had present October that Mussolini Locarno Locarno actions to North French his future future territories French replace relations for French to Adriatic. western open prevent to In agreements Germany’s of the wanted Europe. French Sardinia jealous Mussolini Britain, the movements However, Western over and culminated The hope in for the 101 2 Kellogg–Briand Pact of 1928, which denounced the use of war as a Class discussion means to resolve Discuss the extent to which to Italian foreign policy in the State 1920s was consistent with Mussolini fascist ideology and Mussolini’s “so the disputes. declaration, Frank has sublime which Kellogg been that it and Italy had the quoted should be was been more up Foreign saying called of drawn French as one that by than US signatories Secretary Minister the 60 Aristide Kellogg–Briand of Briand. Pact was transcendental ”. stated aims. Nevertheless, only funded German In pilots addition, Africa. He French in brutally TOK Reect on the role of Mussolini of also direct in Mussolini continued crushed had signed a of groups a pursued to the in Treaty of Germany violent revolt force treaty a Versailles, but in of in he expand also Mussolini secretly and executions. not trained conquest with empire highlighted In was In Italy’s movements were 1922–28. war, “friendship” of to methods Libya mass aims independence full-scale and ambitions his support His become massive long-term breach Italy. Morocco. campaign use in right-wing a 1928, only cynical Abyssinia in when the put in against the he “pacication” down move, 1928, with the Mussolini despite his there. as leader of Italy in the 1920s. By the end of the 1920s, Mussolini was becoming frustrated with the Discuss in small groups the failure of traditional efforts of the armed forces. diplomacy, but had due to to support the disarmament extent to which his role was League of Nations the weaknesses of the Italian signicant in shaping Italian In 1927, he ominously informed the Italian Parliament foreign policy and events in that he would expand the Italian air force until it could “blot out Europe in the 1920s. Does the sun”. your study of Mussolini in In the 1930s, once the failing of his corporate state had become apparent, this chapter suppor t the view and after Hitler had come to power in Germany, Mussolini’s foreign policy that the role of individuals are became more assertive. He looked for opportunities to demonstrate that signicant in history? Italy was virile a major states British and such power. as French He then Germany and argued not that with the the future old, lay liberal with and new decadent empires. Relations with the Soviet Union Italy had Union along a broken when with pragmatic going to Soviet over Union Union European 1921, when it to could powers. Italy. seized power powers, was relations it Italy “recognized” negotiated develop be a The the two that trade useful tool and October in 1917. regime However, adopted was government agreements Mussolini with and, saw diplomatic interested Bolshevik Soviet government new gaining also the arrangements Union. were with Lenin’s the commercial Soviets Germany clear Soviet in Mussolini’s once recognized with diplomatic Bolsheviks wanted other relations 102 In formally Soviet formal approach fall. Mussolini Italy the other off Russia in not in in that 1924, the leverage fostering had the Moscow. signed better the CHAPTER Rapallo to the Mussolini the the and the at which Italy into when the Soviets the did Soviet ON they First I TA LI A N FOREIGN renounced World Rapallo post-war communist Even murdered, in FA S C I S M the with Italy 1922, OF following draw 1920s. IM PA C T in claims dissatised Fascist THE Treaty nancial wanted 2 .1 : War all and alignment. P O L I C Y: THE territorial the After Soviet all, ORIGINS , 18 7 0 – 19 3 3 and Union Italy was also settlement. Russia Italian not remained socialist cancel the on good leader dinner terms Matteotti they were throughout was holding for embassy. L TA Communication skills Patricia 82. K nigh t. Routledge. 20 03. Mussolini London, and Fascism, page but UK also Italian desirable, people “tendency … Mussolini’s style and methods were Italy’s from those economic impulsive, of and his predecessors. military inconsistent and He he satisfied more than unless anything was leading role. making grandiloquent to He he was live one day as a lamb”, and declaring to in else the and lion than that war a was such as thousand was not of the fighting”. diplomacy With through a the of a newspaper editor ”, he aimed at spectacular gestures without resulting in a much foreign thought policy that for consequences, has a fond In of “bet ter years only “by turn ambivalent , futile and been described malignant”. never playing increasingly statements European by valued limelight become character was as prestige “the moulded Ignoring weaknesses, erratic. view be quite eyes different to adding must as pairs, policy a discuss Mussolini’s in chapter the to the style descriptions and 1920s. suppor t methods Can the you in with find asser tions this source regard to examples made in of his from this foreign this source? inevitable L TA Thinking and self-management skills 1. Look back at Mussolini’s broad foreign policy aims on page 97. Discuss the extent to which he had achieved these aims by 1929. 2. Put the following events under the appropriate heading, either “Cooperation” or “Aggression”: Locarno, 1925 The Kellogg-Briand Pact, 1928 Corfu, 1923 The crushing of the Libyan revolt, 1922–28 Fiume ,1924 The Treaty of Friendship with Abyssinia, 1928 Albania, 1926 3. How far do you agree with Mack Smith in Source B on the next page that in foreign policy in the 1920s Mussolini “was concerned less to reduce international animosities than to foster them”? 4. What long-term view of fascism does Mussolini express in Source A on the next page? 103 2 Source A Benito Rise Source B Mussolini and Fall I am I always with of read I know the its purity times My Denis whe re fo ll ower s . e x ce s se s r e v e a le d. I am a nd i nte r e sts. the virtue of the soundne s s . and of are a p ut and false pr obe it vi c e down . the his fascism was abroad, in by id e al is m its T he at so - for openly of to of talk light, strength vibrate in The loftiest civic this which It is I living feel thought. self the my the I its vigor I, energy, sky national its goal, great long have interest: to in and innite and people animates and (1983). 1925 new existed p l a nt e d my I the most today people am in and black Hyderabad. an away he the was international the began “Protestant By April parties countries, Already up their spoke fascist shirts as fascism Europe. that different of used extend northern estimated forty forming Soon well setting propagandists sweeping of which to his as instance set message and sent as a far possibility movement was Mussolini’s style being anti-communist discussed. Italy! of springtime. work annihilated like this mission consignment as embassies for the shine vision new labors. of of Italian that Mussolini spreading propaganda. his was in on companies about it pretence export, channels, civilization” of for store “everywhere” o t h er th e not trade prots away and leads Mussolini outward using unofcial and di ve st e d id ea l is m its to bea t s . a ppe ar a n c e a nd Despite of and Smith. considerable realities. Air Mack bogus cre a te d fa l l a cio us w i th I i ts ght the m des tr o y e d Fascism to r ace . wi ll ins ti tuti ons ” because phrases will I a nd ne ar aspiratio n and of fa ithful l is te n “Liberal forces on are mos t a nd protection their autobiography masse s degeneracy called my intervene intemperance I his (1998). strict heart in too forty-ve and devoted bully he more my myself the rmly than believed advantageous foreign all abroad, rather policy international he that to was as at the be home, in politics feared than less to that and it than concerned animosities was negotiator here was liked. to foster In reduce them… of First question, par t a – 3 marks citizens, beat of my people. I feel place I upon heart, service proclaim that all myself to myself Italians and on the their every Italian servant. understand and What, according export fascism? to Source B, did Mussolini do to love Second question – 4 marks me; I know that only he is loved who leads With without weakness, without deviation, reference content, with disinterestedness and full done of I the Italian historical is destined Capo volume 104 to race, has make century Press. New Curtis Mussolini, B. what Fascism, an I have being met and and so, a already creation will meet unconquerable, indelible impression on history. York, incorporating Autobiography and over that necessities, twentieth Da going know USA (combined Mussolini, Publishing, 1948.) assess the the origins, value and purpose and limitations of Source faith. A Therefore, to and B. 1928. New My York, USA; for historians studying Italy under Mussolini. CHAPTER 2 .1 : THE IM PA C T OF FA S C I S M ON I TA LI A N FOREIGN P O L I C Y: THE ORIGINS , 18 7 0 – 19 3 3 Source A Source help and hints (See page 94) Source C A photograph of Mussolini with (See page 92.) black-shirted Second question – 4 marks With reference assess the historians make publication you to its and studying Examiner’s work, to values in When you look the of of reviewing the title the out the possible and Rome, before the march 1922. content, Source C for 1920s. carefully and work purpose limitations Italy hint: sure origin, on Fascists work values a at historian’s the as date these and of will help limitations. Values ● A a value of the professional origin is that Mack Smith historian and an expert publication and access is on Mussolini. ● The date of to recent First question, par t b – 2 marks sources holds value as the author had the What benet ● The of title focuses would of on the the offer fascism is in book suggests political insight that history into the of the A value an message Italy political Examiner’s work pose and context of out the look Italy. and of the academic content analysis is of that the it seems situation to in hint: position message also details ● the of Source A? hindsight. of at the the Look in of this the carefully photo are photograph. people at to to to him. Refer your points. support his working Remember surrounding photograph Mussolini: key to the be the Example answer 1920s. The Limitations ● As a may British not overall Mussolini historian, have perspective of a full it is possible insight into that the who he Italian events There may also be a limitation in that the this by the fact that a broad study that considers the of the whole modern era the be a lack of focus on him condent he everyone that he in Italy. is in the looking for photograph is leading leadership. and deant middle at him. of is that these We pose, the men, can and photo has a lot of Another supporters, and message that many these Mussolini’s supporters are war heroes as they are There wearing may to this and political of history his of control book is is in looking see with ● are message is Italy medals. in 1920s. 105 2 Work in pairs on the following questions. These sources relate to Mussolini’s foreign policy in the 1920s. Source A Martin Blinkhorn. Mussolini and Fascist Italy *Austen from (1984). Chamberlain 1924–29. Chamberlain, A combination of boldness and negotiation in [Mussolini] Italy; the to… terms of achieve Fiume’s Mussolini’s Yugoslavia consigned hinterland and Fiume to isolation but Italian was patriots Mussolini’s Greek island especially Having more of ecstatic… impetuous Corfu, British learned powerful were economic pressure that he with from than Less forced himself, him not yet in decade Italy’s with trod more position Britain alliance warily, through while system in to maintaining working to this strategy according of Italy’s In pairs, to the and evacuate. those his for Chamberlain*, one of undermine France’s Europe. Source with A, were Britain up the to key features 1926? rst read through question, part examiner’s tips How marks many below. Source a. A Check Do would you you and your have have draft a response response three been with clear to the points? awarded? hint: ● British out of pressure many forced Mussolini to pull Corfu. Crucial relationship the to relations Britain was more powerful than Italy, so with Mussolini Austen Great almost relations friendly of strengthen good south-eastern was minister First question, par t a – 3 marks ● to prime Minister Neville its the defy Mussolini seeking became of 1937 Examiner’s a Foreign successful of international could British half-brother stagnation, occupation which who the the incorporation agreement What, consequent was was enabled Britain him He had to comply with Britain’s European wishes. conservatives who admired the Duce’s anti- ● Bolshevism and Chamberlain’s acquiescence protectorate imposition benevolence in the over of internal ensured establishment Albania in 1926 of “order”. British an and the cession to Italy of two wanted with Britain alliance Italian small pieces maintain good Mussolini’s special relationship Chamberlain was key. territory. cartoon on 106 29 by David November Low 1927. the system. Source B A relations undermining of Austen African to while made ● possible Italy published in the UK newspaper, the Evening Standard, with French CHAPTER 2 .1 : THE IM PA C T OF FA S C I S M ON I TA LI A N FOREIGN P O L I C Y: THE ORIGINS , 18 7 0 – 19 3 3 First question, par t b – 2 marks Examiner’s What is the message of the cartoonist in Source ● Look at Source question, part B b. and draft Check a your response response to the with Mussolini rst tips on the right. Do you have (or How many marks would you was out of control or the two Italy does not have take participation at clear conferences points? Italy) misbehaving. ● examiner’s hint: B? seriously; childish behaviour is been shown. awarded? Are there points that you had not noticed? ● France is appears ● The turning away concerned USA is by ignoring from its Italy and behaviour. Italy’s behaviour. Source C Examiner’s Antonio writer, central Cippico, in his Italian book problem of of the politician lectures, and Italy: Mediterranean and The also second (1926). Check have This enormous been work accomplished Mussolini’s foreign of in internal only policy two is no renovation and less a half Italian In proof of Government its has signed to eight the your Review examples Draft response points on Chapter a with the given response the tips value of 1 of to of this how this answer question. below– the to book do origin, you purpose has and content you have of the source? How many marks would years. worthy attachment at questions. clear been awarded? Are there points in the of mark mention. look hint: peace scheme that you had not noticed? the commercial Example answer treaties and arbitration amongst out of other with the the a exemplary agreements large number of European Powers, has seventeen conventions based states. She, signed on alone, twelve submitted by Values ● A value Italian International Labor Bureau of Geneva. (She is of the European nation that desired that both legally sanction the obligation of the and day.). By the episode of the It was bombardment she her will her great treaties of her gave to be with high less than respected In Fascist the in all proof, parts During Yugoslavia will. the the world moderation. good Nations the her she the has in which of the long given relations government consideration beside with of to ● therefore written change of year ago, she announcing gave at the me the the League Institute for at the established at auspices the Geneva the unication Rome at offer Italy’s of of founding private expense law, to the historians 1926 which into a means view it from the time rule. role suggests in Italian be Italian his at that Geneva; knowledge policies the foreign and author policy as therefore and played a a value understanding conditions in the 1920s. A value of the of the issues purpose in the is that it is an Mediterranean at assessment under may put events into a broader the time context. Limitations the Source C was written in 1926, which means League. reference assess in an be Second question – 4 marks With experienced Assembly ● of have hand. honourable General of may when, and of rst insight content key would display it, an representative of ● a Italy Mussolini’s The a proof League holds was of tedious ample the wished she that world, and author of of Corfu the eight- provides hour that houses ● should is the Mussolini’s only origin the to values its and studying origin, purpose limitations Italy in the of and that the author was written rule over at lacks an hindsight early stage of on events. It Mussolini’s Italy. content, Source C for 1920s. 107 2 ● Mussolini’s over time, perspective particularly may have when his changed Contrasts policies ● shifted ● The in the content positive terms seems view of its Source of use focused on Mussolini’s of language presenting regime, and a both in ● The selection of the author’s previous role suggests that Source C a over government is too at Geneva one-sided in may favour bully Italy representing of Italy’s peace actions SourceD upset the community. suggests that may be justifying the or compliance with Corfu, showed Source the Italy was whereas behaving moderation Source over D like suggests Corfu. C claims highest that Italy regard and held the League supported its author’s work support pursued the in or Italy whereas mean ● source regime, that League, evidence. Mussolini’s the claims through international ● supporting C 1930s. while Source D suggests that Italy was it. sabotaging its work. Source D Four th question – 9 marks Denis Mack Smith. Mussolini (1983). Work The League someone of bent Sometimes he Nations on could upsetting condemned not the it much world as “a appeal to community. holy and the on style the plutocratic nations” against smaller countries such as Italy. Later, of a those smaller countries expressed Read response fourth the through to the question). sources when extent all four following You have sources again question 25 (in minutes. do and you your agree own with knowledge, the to statement: many “Mussolini of own. full and what poorer a alliance Using of your write outrage at pursued an aggressive foreign policy in the his 1920s”? bullying over Corfu, he used the almost opposite Here argument that barbarian nations” whereas not interfere Though do they all he in too with representative on at learn their power small claimed should went his many Geneva voice their civilized foreigners support was the it, ● and work, because would voice and he Italy realized otherwise being remained be that a he points to help you without A: also This some compromise would worked his to suggests degree with the over use of force, negotiation British. undermine aggressively the of the Fiume French and and Mussolini and acted Corfu. sabotaging member international resolved some Source but neighbours. League, actively in place ● its are “semi- equal keep more telling to an to and Source B: Mussolini’s actions were chaotic and only out of line with His policies the actions of other powers. conicts an were causing alarm to the French. Italian heard. ● Source the C: Mussolini international acted in the community interests and of worked Third question – 6 marks Compare and regarding contrast Italian the foreign views policy expressed in Sources C and with the over issues League. such He as had shown moderation Corfu. D. ● Example answer Source the D: Mussolini League policies of that used Nations showed and and he manipulated pursued was intent aggressive on Comparisons sabotaging ● Both Sources discuss Italy’s relationship These the League of the League’s work. with are some points you could bring in from your own Nations. knowledge ● Both Sources discuss ● Both Sources suggest Italy’s actions in Corfu. ● that Italy openly Mussolini had community its support for at Locarno with in the international 1925, and had Geneva. signed up to renounced ● However, port 108 worked stated of the war Kellogg–Briand as a tool Mussolini Fiume from had of Pact, diplomacy used force Yugoslavia in to which in 1928. gain 1924, the and CHAPTER he 2 .1 : had when THE IM PA C T previously met with occupation of OF FA S C I S M demanded British Corfu ON FOREIGN P O L I C Y: compensation opposition in I TA LI A N over Mussolini had promoting ORIGINS , Morocco his and 18 7 0 – 19 3 3 destabilizing its alliance partner, Yugoslavia. 1923. ● ● THE provoked the independence French Mussolini’s by movements in aggression actions in Africa, Libyan revolt up in to was the most brutal marked crushing in of his the 1928. References Carocci, G. 1974. Cippico,A. University Clark, M. Delzell, 1926. Press. 1985. C. (ed). Macmillan. Knight, P . Italian Italy: New The 1971. 2003. Italy CT, Mediterranean and D. 1983. Mussolini. Mack Smith, D. 1997. Modern Press. New R. 1983. CT, Meakin, T. 2007. represented Oxford, in Mussolini, B. 1998. volume Robson, His M. Stoughton. Steiner, Z. Own 2004. 2005. of Yale UK Selected Documents . – A Books. Political London, London, History . UK UK Yale University the My Fascism: over History Rise and York, Italy: of the Second Review, Da and Straus Liberalism extent St number Capo Mussolini, USA; Farrar, What substance”. Fall. incorporating Story. Origins World War, 1933– 40 . UK style with New Oxford, London, 1919–45: Routledge. Paladin Italy “Mussolini’s triumph Publishing. Mussolini: and London, association (combined Curtis a Mediterranean . USA Mussolini Macmillan. the Longman. Fascism, Fascism. Smith, Palgrave of UK USA 1871–1982. Mack Mallet, Problem Harmondsworth, UK Mussolini Haven, Penguin. Central Haven, Modern London, Fascism. Giroux. and Fascism Failed. Oxford New 1928. Mussolini, and Fascism College, 59 Press. B. Italian Hugh’s B. My York, 1948. New 1870–45 . USA Autobiography. The York, Fall of USA Hodder and UK The Lights that University Press. Oxford,UK 109 2.2 The impact of Nazism on German foreign policy: the origins, 1918–1933 Conceptual understanding Key concepts ➔ Causation ➔ Perspectives ➔ Continuity Key questions ➔ Examine the reasons for the growth in suppor t for Nazism after the First World War. ➔ To what extent did Hitler have clear foreign policy objectives before he came to power? ▲ Car toon by Daniel Fitzpatrick, St. Louis Post- dispatch, October 19th, 1930 Germany signs armistice to end World Kaiser Wilhelm abdicates; Eber t takes over 1918 November War One as president of the new Weimar Republic 1919 January Spar tacist uprising The Treaty of Versailles is signed by June Germany September Hitler joins the German Workers’ Par ty The German Workers’ Par ty is renamed the 1920 February National Socialist German Workers’ Par ty (or NSDAP). March French troops occupy the Ruhr 1923 January 1923 Beer Hall Putsch The Dawes Plan is implemented 1925 October 1926 110 Germany faces hyperination November September The Locarno Treaty The Kapp Putsch Germany joins the League of Nations C H A P T E R 2 . 2 : T H E I M PA C T O F N A Z I S M O N G E R M A N F O R E I G N P O L I C Y: T H E O R I G I N S , 19 18 – 19 3 3 1928 Germany signs the Kellogg–Briand Pact The Young Plan 1929 The Wall Street Crash in the USA 1929 October The death of Stresemann The Nazi Par ty gains 18.3% of the vote in 1930 September the Reichstag elections 1931 Unemployment reaches 4.9 million The Nazi par ty gains 37.4% of the vote in 1932 July the Reichstag Hitler is appointed Chancellor of Germany Nazism took rise to roots the refers power, power in the the and the policies Adolf and indeed that was of Hitler his circumstances Armistice Versailles to with signed However, ensuing Great Depression German politics. Germany and enough Once thus of in it into on in his the was to a take policy had Treaty of that Hitler’s their World War, of 1929 attain become able foreign the to Party 1933. policy Crash Hitler to in First and Street vote Hitler in 1918 allowed German action foreign defeat Wall Socialist Germany German the which the National November was Chancellor, put or leader, Germany’s 1919. achieve 1933 January Nazi its views of of thus the as elections and popularity force total in control of aims. What was the impact of the First World War and defeat on Germany? Kaiser Wilhelm expecting German swift it to Germany trenches over ended facing bloody However, Eastern had in Plan, up the the 1917, had to then been near sued for up The of At with from same German on on the seemed In the gains had the it in of Front) population for On expected 1914 achieve a expectation. Front, in in an Germany. the the On Revolution Litovsk, managing which in the Front. Brest by of to this involved Russian (supported Eastern Western Russia. was ended was War failure intended sight the World the Eastern Treaty from who First Russia, time, following offensive the Germany Russia nally the However, attrition the peace. an into attacking Ludendorff, launched freed war territorial General Paris. a which before victory substantial effort, in Germany victorious. Bolsheviks, secured German by Allies. conict October the and France 1917, Front, taken short Schlieffen victory equally II be Germany Western the victory. Front, German German pushed the of the Even war troops that Alllies back when this ▲ Kaiser Wilhelm II 111 2 hope was crushed as the Allies pushed back, German defeat was not Kaiser Wilhelm II certain. Germany was ruled by Kaiser In Wilhelm II. The political system fact, areas By at of November this point, Eastern 1918, the Germany Europe (see Allies still the had not controlled map invaded most of German Belgium territory. and large below). was authoritarian, with power Nevertheless, Germany had lost its best troops this was not in the 1918 offensive; morale held by the Kaiser and his was low as they retreated, and helped by an outbreak of the chancellor. The power of deadly Spanish Inuenza. Ludendorff was convinced that the German the German parliament, the army could not carry on ghting and that Germany would be defeated in Reichstag, was limited. Germany the spring of 1919. He also hoped that Germany would receive less severe had only become unied in terms if the government asked US President Woodrow Wilson for a cease 1871, the work of the German re based on Wilson’s 14-point programme (see next page). Asking for Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, an armistice before Germany was invaded would also preserve the army’s who fought a war against Austria reputation. and a war against France (1870) to achieve this. In the war of Believing 1914–18, Germany fought with Ludendorff Austria–Hungary against the Baden. Allies: Britain, France and Russia. with France hoped to gain revenge for armistice that better handed Negotiations Wilson terms over over demanding could be could power the the be to a gained armistice Kaiser from government be then a lasted removed civilian led by for from government, Prince several power Max of weeks, before an signed. its defeat in the war of 1870–71. 0 500 Miles NORWAY SWEDEN 0 Moscow 500 Kilometers North Sea S DEN. Jutland a 31 l t i e a c B May– GREAT 1 June Masurian Lakes 6–16 1914 RUSSIA 1918 BRITAIN Sept. IRELAND EASTERN Berlin NETH. Lusitania 7 MAY sunk FRONT London Caspian GERMANY 1915 Sea Lomborg 1 Sept–Oct Treaty 1914 March of Brest–Litovsk 1918 LUX. Vienna AUSTRIA-HUNGARY ATLANTIC SWITZ. OCEAN FRANCE Black Caporetto 24 I Oct. T Sarajev A PERSIA o SERBIA Y BULGARIA A L SPAIN Sea ROMANIA 1914 d r Constantinople i a t ic S Rome e NETH. a OTTOMAN Brussels 1915– 11 9 Jan. BELGIUM MES G ly 19 4 1 9 1 Ju 16 March 7 1 9 1 Sept Paris Central Powers Allied offensives British Major battles German war Feb–Dec 1918 Farthest Neutral of Central Powers Powers Stabilized front FRANCE 1914–1917 112 blockade submarine The ex tent of German territory in 1918 zone advances Central Stabilized ▲ naval nations y a M 1914 Powers Verdun Marne 6–9 Allied g u A 1918 March offensives front 1917 1916 RE 19 14 April E GREEC AM 1 9 1 7 A ug Baghdad 25 YN D e c . EMPIRE Gallipoli ALBANIA Armistice line OPO TA NIA C H A P T E R At 2 . 2 : this T H E point political German the the in a who never lost developed, of the Germany new had severe Kaiser This G E R M A N sailors drastic government fact socialists the shock. O N faced from causing Germans was theory when also Germany, many had back” in N A Z I S M mutiny was socialist armistice army a which imminent O F Germany unrest, blockade For I M PA C T the to to on the The Thus, on 11 terms of the were to agreeing of to winning 19 18 – 19 3 3 the Allied civil war a new armistice. the that an war, the or by the German “stab defeat the O R I G I N S , November, idea Germany’s of with winning the T H E strikes, impact Dolchstosslegende for point the and, rise explained government been they P O L I C Y: problems: and shortages. the give war. which Kiel, abdicated thought was domestic at food agreed F O R E I G N in the blaming armistice just war. L TA Thinking skills Study the source below showing Wilson’s 14 points. 1 What do you consider to have been Wilson’s overriding aims for a European peace settlement? 2 Based on these points, what kind of agreement do you think Germany was hoping to obtain? Wilson’s 14 9 points All Italians borders 1 No more secret agreements (“open arrived Free be allowed “along to clearly live in Italy. Italy’s recognisable lines nationality” at”) 10 2 to be covenants of openly to navigation of all Self-determination for all those living in seas Austria–Hungary 3 Removal of economic barriers between 11 Self-determination and guarantees of countries independence 4 Reduction in armaments, consistent with domestic “to the lowest points Balkan Colonial to 6 the The problems interests German of to be settled colonial army to be Evacuation 8 France of with The reference the peoples evacuated Turkish Turkish Turkish from Russia 13 recover for the of should an have should be govern independent access to governed Non-Turks the in by the old themselves Poland, which sea Belgium be fully liberated and Establishment of a League of Nations allowed to to people government. Empire Creation 14 should allowed states should 7 be safety” 12 5 should guarantee the political and territorial Alsace–Lorraine independence of all states What was the impact of the Treaty of Versailles? The armistice was drawn work of Lloyd The three George aims was up of at men: of and aimed up to be set held a in up Palace Prime Britain, these Clemenceau could followed the of Minister and lasting place were As you and by an a peace just treaty, outside have of Woodrow very different, seen system of international signed Paris Clemenceau President statesmen Wilson. with Versailles from and France, Wilson his 14 the 1919. from USA. aims of Wilson relations of the Minister the the points, League This mainly Prime particularly international body, in was that Nations. 113 2 L TA However, Clemenceau it had caused France, In pairs, study Source A and sufciently Source B below. Discuss the anxious to following questions. empire. Lloyd but to 1 had to and prevent preserve on from Britain’s George take it also to make to ensure Germany was board threatening naval more the that pay for Germany the France supremacy inclined to anti-German again. and damage in weakened Britain hoped leniency feeling was than to was enlarge the Clemenceau Britain. Which aspects of the Treaty of Versailles were most Given likely to anger Germans? 2 wished Thinking and social skills these different peacemakers not On what evidence do you surprising Versailles] think Steiner bases her that argument that Germany … makers” it a was to as solve great a aims, and that, failed remained defeat “remained a great power ”? faced the the of along with speed at historian problem power bundle (Steiner, the despite the which Zara of both the four compromises multiplicity it was Steiner writes, punishing years that fully of of drawn and “ [the it is and none its of the perhaps Treaty conciliating ghting satised problems up, a of country military the three peace 2011). Source skills Source A Key articles of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919. Ar ticle number 1–26 42 Description The Covenant of the League of Nations was established; Germany was not allowed to join. The Rhineland was demilitarized; the German army was not allowed to go there. The Allies were to keep an army of occupation in the Rhineland for 15 years. 45 The Saar, with its rich coalelds, was given to France for 15 years. 51 Alsace–Lorraine was returned to France. 80 Germany was forbidden to unite with Austria. 87 Lands in eastern Germany, the rich farmlands of Posen and the Polish Corridor between Germany and East Prussia, were given to Poland. 100 Danzig was made a Free City under League of Nations control. 119 All Germany’s colonies were taken and given to France and Britain as “mandates”. 160 The German army was restricted to 100,000 men. 181 The German navy was restricted to six battleships and no submarines. 198 Germany was not allowed to have an air force (though the military inspectorate that oversaw the military clauses was withdrawn in 1927). 231 Germany was responsible for causing all the loss and damage caused by the war. This was known as the War Guilt Clause. 232 Germany would have to pay reparations, to be decided later. It was eventually set at 132 billion gold marks in 1921. (However, in reality, only a trivial amount of this sum was actually paid.) 114 C H A P T E R 2 . 2 : T H E I M PA C T O F N A Z I S M O N G E R M A N F O R E I G N P O L I C Y: T H E O R I G I N S , 19 18 – 19 3 3 Source B Map showing Germany the after territorial World War losses of economic One of its left Territorial losses of Germany amounted to intact, of approximately Geran ls 13% Nr of the Slesi with capacity However, a and about Germany population which 10% was was still almost the double loss production population. the population of France. country’s ien MEMEL all er lnies Denar Dani e a Free Leae Ci rn Nains EAST PRUSSIA WEST Een ien an Male Beli G E R M A N Y Plan Berlin HOLLAND e as ien Bali Sea a “rrir ” in POSEN Eas Prssia r Geran Deiliarie ne BELGIUM Psen ien ri arlan Plan Weiar alels SILESIA Saar ien Frane r ears Paris P C Z Versallies E C H O ALSACE Gien Frane i S L O V a A K I is lan Geran L A N D A LORRAINE ls O in Geran F R A N C as rien E nie i Asria Key Terrir ls Geran er Terrir ls Geran Leae nries A U S T R I A Source skills Ruth War, Henig. pages The 4–5, Origins of the Second preventing World glorious (1985). Social Here was the rst major post-war had lost the First World War, but important sections of Democratic post-war responsibility Germany which tried accept which that defeat followed it as and the fair or a German government agree allied in the peace nal treaty 1920s demands could as a of Poland, result without public “war included hostility. guilt lie”, These were in back” the and strikes “the Enduring and alleged by in shame “the to fermenting grasp. The shouldered signing advocate the peace some diktat measure with its terms, lost electoral of support … It is signicant Czechoslovakia that and the new Romania states were to to in die Germany within a as Saisonsstaaten single season: – states annuals nationalist than perennials like Germany or France. the criminals”. “stabbed of to readily Versailles”, November have German of the incurring rather themes which its No born widespread Party, winning within settlement outcome. referred to from nearly did compliance not so large and and army problem: the Germany her victory First question, par t a – 3 marks Germany What, according of the German of Versailles? to this source, was the attitude demonstrations industrial areas, population towards the Treaty thus 115 2 What was the impact of the First World War on Hitler ’s foreign policy? The defeat followed Hitler’s fought the in of the foreign in the German the war, So it all death of fully groups the “the of two could the the in authorities L TA German Anton of In Party and they the ideas all at the by War. an Versailles that development by He birth he of and had the news heard injury sacrices. hearts for a this, In vain did so diktat, and socialists First our had that a the of received hours duty. gang had of he that the War. was been it In of in vain wretched his to on Germany been Weimar decision Working sent of conservative had new founded suspected and imposed inuence World agent, was we nationalist was helped which which from our died held the the of the Austrian World consultation, – in fatherland? Versailles intelligence Worker’s vain treaty after First Treaty key writing: on no the the the was recovering Had criminals” an Drexler, the of were Hitler clutching hands with politics as vain. fear Treaty with impact 1919 in while millions. lay war disgust involved army in mortal November Hitler’s Thinking and been in horried, embraced that end was the war objectives. German with and the policy and criminals Hitler of surrender had which, the Germany end for signed Republic. to the plotting January become army investigate in at by the 1919 left-wing by revolution. communication skills In Study the source below. Make bullet point notes answering the following questions: it was an extreme working-class soon becoming the a 1 fact, over National new its leading Socialist symbol. nationalist support. The Hitler member. German party He had Workers’ Sturmabteilung which accepted or attempting invitation the renamed Party (SA), was Drexler’s party and gave it the “Stormtroopers”, to to to win join, become swastika as (see On what grounds did Hitler page 120) was established as a paramilitary group led by Ernst condemn the Treaty of Röhm, who recruited thousands of ex-soldiers into its ranks. The Versailles? party 2 was based on similar extreme ideas as Mussolini’s Fascist Party, What other foreign policy with the same strands of nationalism, militarism, Social Darwinism, aims can be seen in authoritarianism, and unions. some a hatred of communism, socialism and trade Hitler ’s speech that are However, historians, such as Klaus Hildebrand, would unrelated to the Treaty of argue that it was so dominated by Hitler’s personal ideas that it cannot Versailles? be tted into the overall category of European Fascism. Source skills A speech by Versailles, Adolf 17 April Hitler on the Treaty moment of because 1923. eyes With the armistice of Germany. its foundation Germans, Republic on appealed to stand that you ght who are now foes but of the together! to the your last enemies of Republicans. Republic because this Up Republic not the the and resist then they because was it So of is the of Republic Today Republic day must Germany discredited turn a foe! you millions would are the Republic founded at long as this resurrection country: expects breath, the so was the regretfully humiliated, new ag toward that the old men’s ag. humiliation the Fatherland, fanatical the had The be 116 If begins when it the reform made their But it of in any those formulated the to and who At Treaty kind order deaths aside. of its stands German is possible! bring to 20 ruin made the our be no no social Treaty was Germans German Treaty demands: can The million the foundation three there people; to nation. cannot set Movement C H A P T E R 2 . 2 : T H E I M PA C T 1 Setting 2 Unication 3 Land our O F aside and N A Z I S M of of the all soil O N Peace G E R M A N F O R E I G N P O L I C Y: An Treaty. are today, and beaten until out of anvil more hammer, [Grund There task the his is of could since caused Republic, it it was the did thus this und Boden] formulate not War, not one it sign thing once Fatherland everything It has the it more shall else. our we anvil will fashion be to a a German once sword! feed not made Peace is to National, stand for to to the cartoon chapter on page 110. at cartoon concerning What the is start the of this message him rst With make refe rence content, using above our Treaty of of this Versailles? Second question – 4 marks that teach the the Treaty. the desires desires back these Movement which Movement: German the that First question, par t b – 2 marks movement which anvil 19 18 – 19 3 3 Germans. nation. demands, O R I G I N S , we Refer Our T H E this policy to assess i ts the source o r i gi n, v a l ue as p urp os e a nd e v i de nce an d l imi tation s of Hi tl er ’s of for e ig n aims. people Third question – 6 marks to understand saying: bean He afresh who will the not truth be a of the old hammer must anvil. Compare and page regarding 115 made The speech prison out (see his ideas Semitism. to above page also Hitler 1. by wrote a wide the put had range the bulk Hitler of issues; the of Versailles forward in Mein foreign policy in Kampf, Also called German book was aims 1923. book of Treaty clear a was indicating before 1923, policy. other that, This actually this of made by Versailles Henig to on those speech. in His anti- desire important unlike in points Treaty set nationalism, foreign but while Kampf. unity, on stressed, well in Mein Hitler the the ideas Mussolini, attaining power. A “Gross Deutschland” Also known had been For Hitler, Austrian as an Pan-Germanism, important this foreign Germans Versailles), but that were and Poland. 2. given Hitler However, overturn were on was 120), by contrast now aim policy with also the under of the aim rule of of creating mean (which unication of nationalists would Germany the idea German was the states, Gross the Deutschland 19th unication forbidden Germany other a in with by the German notably century. not only Treaty of of minorities Czechoslovakia Race and living space Linked to political would the ideas last point were include only “pure” race, which combined Such views on towards the the end of was dened the in Germans “robust existence the issue terms 19th of of who muscular of a race; race. power with of the fact, new were hierarchy century in A of all the with races belief of Hitler’s Greater rst had in Germany superior class Aryan intellect”. become Social popular Darwinism. 117 2 This held that human life, like animal life, was subject to the natural The Third Reich laws The Third Reich was a term this used by Adolf Hitler in the of theory need 1920s to describe the as 1,000-year empire he intended selection in more far as and Mein space the only the Kampf. ttest He further (Lebensraum) Ural mountains. Russians, Ukrainians, The “inferior” Poles would and This and survive. argued that this would other that the should involve “inferior” Hitler developed Aryan come race would from the East, dispossessing the Slavs, nations or untermenschen to create. The First Reich (or most people, according to Hitler, were the Jews. Here Empire) was the Holy Roman Hitler was reecting the anti-Semitic views which had been prevalent in Empire which had existed Europe for hundreds of years, but his rhetoric and actions towards the from the time of Charlemagne Jews were to reach new and hitherto unimagined extremes of violence. to 1806. The Second Reich His view was that if Jewish inuence was left unchecked, it would result was the German Empire of in “national race tuberculosis”. This meant that the German race must be 1871–1918 created by Otto protected against contact with inferior blood, such as that of the Jews, if von Bismarck . it was Once to become the living foundations the dominant space would for the have force in Germans been laid for Europe. had the been secured, “Third the Reich”. Source skills An extract Hitler in from Mein Kampf, written restoration by absurdity 1923. towards Germany has an annual increase in nearly 900,000. The difculty of feeding of new citizens must increase from year and ultimately end in and means catastrophe are found … Nature be her … favourite industry … she confers child, Only a the the strongest sufciently in right earth can ensure the courage large space independent of a nation species of obligation … As members humanity … [to] on … of this full the The land and soil [must be] the foreign policy … The we for The colossal dissolution. the Jewish domination in And Russia end of Russia as a state … Today will to achieve a position as a we world we must ght for the existence of our fatherland, for daily of bread the our unity of our children. If nation we and look the around on have allies from this England point and of view, only two states Italy. a[n] First question, par t a – 3 marks for to Hitler, why must Germany expand to of east? the Natural enemies and allies you can Germany. country fact, see led by In addition, in the up of First the not the Britain, of an was age-old of admiration similar a racially, in In dream; seen the for but as a Ruhr the a a the as a was because 1923 in of role 1923, natural also of dominated ally, (see partly he what in a enemy of communist and was, had happened the Hitler destruction potential because it communism France’s Europe British, also of speech in and in Jews. enemy wants Russia loathed were because it saw Russia Hitler natural and Versailles. was Hitler Jews Bolsheviks War, occupation great all reparations; however, France’s being France of source, many Bolsheviks. that Treaty the were World want fullment had from There convinced does 118 ripe acquisition demand As is existence objective 3. … political and the our East a eyes no According of the is our highest earth, … East struggling remain; of 1914 on for this in of turning unless knows master’s the the power; boundaries land are year are ways in end also to frontiers … this the army the the We population empire of of … by 120). because admired he said, “France Germany, especially page drawing after In saw their the France.” it fact, opposed Hitler them empire as and C H A P T E R 2 . 2 : T H E the way the world. in I M PA C T which Italy sympathetic a O F N A Z I S M small was nature also of O N nation seen as G E R M A N had an Mussolini’s been ally F O R E I G N able to because P O L I C Y: control of the so T H E O R I G I N S , much 19 18 – 19 3 3 of ideologically government. Source skills An extract written from by Mein Hitler in Kampf, pages And 564–66, of Anyone present arrive who undertakes alliance at the an possibilities conclusion Italy, further 1923. examination for that Germany the last we must of remains with England … superior on eyes the to part Germany the of no fact that England longer a in necessary the exists … not must England’s policy from directed an that, on more and unlimited more drive to for year an desire a position Europe. to Hitler, why would Britain and Italy alliance with Germany? of Second question – 4 marks the to year reference obstruction hegemony to its origin, purpose and content, must the value and limitations of using this of extract France’s not French interest assess be will the First question, par t a – 3 marks With contrary, in of close annihilation today; power and practicable want our cannot the According tie too, reinforcement of Mein Kampf to identify Hitler’s foreign … policy aims. Why did support for Nazism grow after the First World War? The Weimar Republic: Years of crisis The National many were years challenges as ● well In Socialist extreme as of political internally from 1919, a a the ● In of of Although the evidence the 1919 354 Many were and of the by was 1922 judiciary, still Its judges. of looked the were that ed of These faced occupation, in army the went putsch the the via strike in extremists assassinations. was Of unpunished– German the that Treaty assassinations. assassins of to claimed on by ex-soldiers. collapsed. went who members of down. crushed right-wing 326 right-wing replace up Kapp, political and Rosa President rebellion also detested politicians 376 by attempted the politicians to made disbanded, many the were Berlin and Rathenau, left-wing put Wolfgang after led rebellion. Freikorps assassins these to groups again were a Germany the then Walther the one Republic French Spartacists, left-wing including to of workers there Weimar from launched leader, Kapp right-wing conservatives, the Freikorps of strong against sympathy one the members units attack was Republic. crisis: parts when the right, paramilitary government, (NSDAP) Weimar and and called and other Germany conservative minister, in some were crisis, left Party new Liebknecht, government. their the and party However, the in economic army Freikorps continued these, who make Versailles. Between the 1920, would support ● in Workers’ both Karl uprisings overthrow he and Freikorps March unrest from communist called Left-wing groups severe Luxembourg Ebert German political got from foreign assassinated. civil service democratic and system. 119 2 ● In January heartland 1923, of reparations ordered various huge owed “passive to quantities existed 10% its of worth on xed wiped of and raw to by The able In Many do the this French government they ination 1920, the mark 1923 one pre-1914 affected alienated the German to industrial pay government denying exacerbated January This particular. further be the to German thus materials. and invaded Germany the strikes, which but troops force hyperination. marks. in which to response, and workers value, paper incomes out, In money, into 1914 2,500 the Belgian Ruhr, them. goods pay already to and the resistance” German continued French Germany, the had them middle their savings from the that was classes printed worth mark and and Weimar was those pensions Republic. Source skills Mary Fulbrook. Germany: The Fontana 1918–1990, page 34 History conrming of which (1991). was distress, The savings, and aspirations hopes, plans were … swept Even away when huge and in the a chaotic of over, the whirlwind material psychological was to have democracy, with fear of economic the shock longer of economic instability. First question, par t a – 3 marks impact of to Fulbrook, what was the impact of the the experience equated heightened of people According was a dislike assumptions numbers worst deep-seated thereafter and possibility of a lasting hyperination of 1923? effects, What was the impact of the Munich Putsch of 1923 on the The SA and the SS The SA (Sturmabteilung or “Brown success of Nazism? Shir ts”) was the paramilitary wing of With the Nazi Par ty. Initially, it was made catastrophe, up largely from the Freikorps and ex- By soldiers. They wore brown uniforms, was following the lead of Mussolini’s tactics Fascist Blackshir ts in Italy. The SA looking protected par ty meetings, marched by in Nazi rallies, and physically Ludendorff assaulted political opponents, thus of playing a key role in Hitler ’s rise to Bavarian leader, power in the 1920s and 1930s. takeover, but this 1923 an backdrop he Hitler had against for a Bavaria the of the Republic. and then, from to the last leader taking on a of Berlin. that in he he into impressed hero von the down. which coordinate General winning Ritter police to also War support backed economic government. Hitler was involved government, and Kampfbund, created 1922. would the pushed Gustav he over the power; that minute, Bavarian occupation take groups Rome plan on indicated at the to involvement to March marching had French bid right-wing This support then own political solution successful his unrest, his militant military gave support political become association Mussolini’s no of launched control Kahr, the attempted Despite having or army, Hitler SA men, tried The Schutzstael (or SS) was formed decided to go ahead anyway and, with about 600 to take in April 1925 as a section of the SA and over government buildings. The result was disastrous; armed police functioned as a personal bodyguard opened re and killed 16 Stormtroopers. Hitler was arrested and, along for the NSDAP leader, Hitler. The SS was with Ludendorff, tried for treason. considered to be an elite force and membership was restricted to those who were pure Aryan Germans. Under Himmler ’s leadership, the SS was used to carry out the killings on the “Night of the Long Knives”. It ultimately became one of the largest and most powerful organizations in the Third Reich. 120 However, publicity of and provided the the with was acting a as he received he served December Mein the less the trial free German lightest sentence: than It a year was of this during turned Hitler publicity. patriotic 1924. Kampf Nazis and, ve although years’ sentence this time in into Hitler a national claimed he was that found imprisonment. and was prison released that he gure he guilty, Moreover, in wrote C H A P T E R 2 . 2 : T H E I M PA C T O F N A Z I S M O N G E R M A N F O R E I G N P O L I C Y: T H E O R I G I N S , 19 18 – 19 3 3 What was the impact of Stresemann? Following his release from constitutional means to relaunched 1925 he did also not in secure reorganized; Schutzstaffel employed (or as with total SS) Hitler was and as in to decided over the leader use The or legal Nazi and Party Führer, party until 1926. were established propaganda Nazi ideas to a was although groups Modern spread to Germany. overall women’s created. aimed Hitler power control youth Hitler prison, take The party and techniques wider was the were audience. Economic recovery in the 1920s However, in experienced the Nazi party chancellor was following Under foreign currency and the Hitler’s recovery limited. then The mark, years economic was and halted. Renten the an Gustav minister was Dawes release which was prison, that 1924–29, with the Germany electoral Stresemann, during stabilized Plan from meant who the acted with rst for as hyperination introduction negotiated support the of the USA. This plan ▲ froze German reparation payments for two years, scaled down the Gustav Stresemann, who was level foreign minister between 1924 of German repayments demanded by the Treaty of Versailles and also set and 1929 up loans for regenerate Young A Germany the Plan, German by which much-reduced spread over from the USA. economy. the scheme next the 50 USA, of These This was agreed to repayments were important followed give for up further in helping 1929 loans reparations in was to with to the Germany. established to years. The changing international situation Stresemann brought other In ways. position in fact, Europe Germany back Stresemann’s and to revise into the foreign the international policy Treaty of aims to Versailles community restore were in Germany’s not dissimilar The Rapallo Treaty to Hitler’s. that However, cooperation these aims. with France between and of Britain joined Pact, Treaties Versailles. with Germany Kellogg–Briand Locarno Stresemann which 1925, and the Locarno was key Germany and France cooperation Given economic to had and as was of the nationalist best Nations in war, in 1928. agreed to uphold been bringing known pragmatic France outlawed that a League Germany Belgium European was established about a to the in it ushered in the Locarno Spring. of period Another key treaty that signed in western the believed achieve and Meanwhile, degree a way 1926 who Treaty the the borders hope was the Rapallo Treaty. This was signed on 16 April 1922 by representatives of the of rapprochement of Germany signed in the 1920s governments of Germany and the Soviet Union at a for world economic conference at Genoa in Italy. The treaty the recovery and the new international standing of their re-established diplomatic country, many Germans were not interested in extreme politics and the relations, renounced the Nazi Party was Nazi support unable to make any electoral breakthrough. Although nancial claims that each grew in rural and protestant areas in the 1920s, it seems country had on the other and that it did not pose a substantial threat to the Weimar government. pledged future cooperation. Secret clauses to the What was the impact of the Great Depression on the treaty allowed Germany to manufacture aeroplanes and Nazi Par ty? ammunition forbidden by The dependence of Weimar on US loans made its recovery dependent the Treaty of Versailles in the on US stability, and the Wall Street Crash of 1929 had a catastrophic Soviet Union; German ocers impact on Germany. This would be key to explaining German support also trained in Russia. for Hitler’s foreign and domestic policies. 121 2 The USA called in its loans stopped. Unemployment in grew 1929, later. included more losses. in industrial and particular the parties the economic restating the “November with of right was and that and Hitler’s that the also who Hitler’s party still promises, of the his the the West. did not 1929. both Treaty were and began It of year which cuts and small to fold and change domestic as a the and food and Weimar the back” jobs only of the Along policies those the Meanwhile, on Treaty beneted Nations, these in Republic, by by of far- Hitler government. believed because paying the Socialists. acceptance League politics. on Stresemann’s Versailles. However, German the in was to opposed be on Treaties the in Weimar criticized join should wage fell provide “stabbed Locarno Plan a policies, National attacks that the in was million million Communists the would been also not also polarization amounted the 6 prices Banks policies should aims crash a dominated with to resulted parties: up and 2.8 50%. that had Hitler Germany policy the to Europe already food including stepped parties, Young that led Germany enforcing the fact foreign German as believed for over to was deationary This affected. far-right, Germany and followed made He that cuts. extreme collaboration They the the 1931 pursued suffered; by situation Stresemann’s that Plan accepted badly more Party right-wing responsible Dawes the crisis. also support which February dropped criminals” Versailles. French Nazi myth friendship the of other by Brüning were on nancial expenditure economic to all Germany, Agriculture turned portrayed the million Heinrich production extreme Germans left 5 government job farmers This to Chancellor and in the which the agreements reparations. result acute foreign, of the Depression economic more crisis attractive to the people. Source skills Stephen Lee. 1918–1945, The page European 153 fanatical Dictatorships policy, (1987). most Taking advantage of the unpopularity Nationalism.” guaranteed of the political Versailles Settlement, Hitler was able upon the national the deep like “November Criminals” and of in the détente people back”. pursued must confusion educated of be He also by from international consciously slammed Stresemann: delivered and spectrum, was across anti- Finally, he undercurrent made of effective use anti-Semitism the making the Jews a scapegoat for in all the of “stab mainline seriously consciousness Germany terms taken to of implant Another be of Communism. the to the Germany’s evils. policy “our First question, par t a – 3 marks hopeless convictions According to support his Stephen Lee, how did Hitler gain and systematically in election campaign? to Class discussion In pairs, discuss the links between economic prosperity and political stability, and economic crisis and political radicalization. 1 What conclusions can you draw from your discussion? 2 What examples can you nd from Japan, Italy and Germany to support your conclusions? 122 C H A P T E R 2 . 2 : T H E I M PA C T O F N A Z I S M O N G E R M A N F O R E I G N P O L I C Y: T H E O R I G I N S , 19 18 – 19 3 3 L TA Self-management skills Japan Italy Germany Japan, Italy and Germany all signed up to international League of Nations (date of entry/ agreements that suppor ted depar ture) international cooperation in Washington Conference 1921–22 the 1920s. Compare their involvement by copying and Rapallo Treaty, 1922 completing the table to the Dawes Plan, 1924 left. Identify which country or countries signed each treaty and Locarno Conference, 1925 state their involvement in each Kellogg–Briand Pact, 1928 case. Young Plan, 1929 What factors allowed Hitler to become a dictator? When Brüning decided to call for unscheduled elections in TOK 1930, Consider the factors that this gave the Nazis a chance to break into mainstream policies. They million votes. fostered suppor t for the ideas increased their seats from 12 to 107, winning almost 6 In of the National Socialist Par ty the 1932 presidential elections, Hindenberg and Hitler stood for the Nazis against General in Germany. Investigate Paul Von gained 11 million votes (30% of the vote) in radical political par ties and the rst round and 13 million votes (36%) in the nal round. movements in your region Hitler’s electoral nationalist politicians summoned army by leader Kurt of have and Hitler to Von of Papen agreed put chancellor, was able to it, secure wanted form a in In to the the plan. only his in”, two of German believed side; they creating However, was as a a Nazi of it von idea be that Hitler misjudgment. members in was between the factors that led be useful they people to suppor t radical to would be President could In the to the be, as position cabinet, suppor t these ideas? Are there any similarities or dierences including government, that Hitler Papen, would believed stable the party dictator government, Franz today. Why do some people right-wing government. that also serious and strong nobleman They other position the and their hope to of 1933. on “framed with leaders Schleicher party him. army members Germany control Hindenburg von his impressed who leading Chancellor able following Hitler par ties in the past and the reasons people are attracted to these groups today? Feedback to the class. Discuss the extent to which studying History helps you to better understand the Germany. present. Steps to dictatorship Hitler called Reichstag. down. A decree of new 27 election, February communist Reichstag a a On and was Nazis passed association. imprisoned. the called Van Nazis to the der claimed suspending Leading The hoping 1933, it Lubbe was a 43.9% and of a Nazi was majority building found communist freedom communists won gain Reichstag of the inside plot. press, socialist the in was of the a Research fur ther the actions result, speech politicians Thinking skills burnt the As L TA 1 and were of von Papen, von Schleicher and President Hindenberg 1932–1933. To what extent can it be argued that Hitler ’s position vote. of power by 1933 was caused 2 Hitler then passed the Enabling Act, which gave him the power by “the scheming and intrigue to pass laws without the Reichstag’s consent. This change in the of unscrupulous careerists constitution, for which Hitler needed two-thirds of the vote, was and extreme right-wing achieved by preventing the communists from taking their seats, and sympathizers” (Henig, 1997)? by winning Centre Party support. 123 2 3 The rest of abolished, the Communist 4 By July In 1934, the This not for 5 was both When and any the the president, As early Dachau soon as to Germans those of Thus, Nazi Hitler the blood in rst though aims, (as he took the from of having become in in a on to of all he under rid the oath camp The of During as other of loyalty been of of clear by Paul of von to 1934 German and the Nazi Nazi with voteshare. hope: 40% Nazi vote share 30% 20% Unemployment 10% 0% 1920 1922 1924 1926 1928 First question, par t b – 2 marks What 124 is the message of Source A? 1930 1932 poster Hitler”. of full and Only politicalrights. was enforcing position out how 1932: at Aryan Jews. his to “Our was foreign achieve 126). election all enemies Source B unemployment and Hitler. Source skills Source A of SS Jehovah’s Hitler’s plan the chancellor pure with carry Night established and 1934 life. to the did support enemies. political 1935, citizens Hitler used August in to control. its and relationship position Hitler was wanted leaders. of had Laws of and Röhm, his needed General category Germany a Ernst Röhm ofces homosexuals any he abroad. killed get were Party themselves. under army as Germany, aspects had page the army German strong dissolved both Republic, personal Roma, control also were Nuremberg whether discussed a keep merged enemies. Jews, could was Weimar Hitler concentration in total and parliaments Socialist state. which, expansion SA the parties and and people state and embarrassment. regular Führer ideology policy clear the the forbidden and the 1934, include and less of and 200 political unassailable is in of SA, an together security forces with was doctrines the the some Other and Hitler Meanwhile, Aryan against threat Nazied: down, one-party to armed were a to died to was both leaders 1933, banned. army becoming deal was shut challenge President extended Witnesses. the Knives, Hindenberg, German moved potential internal Long purge were alarming want the to SA were Germany Hitler a system unions Party 1933, becoming join political trade last these C H A P T E R 2 . 2 : T H E I M PA C T O F N A Z I S M O N G E R M A N F O R E I G N P O L I C Y: in First question, par t b – 2 marks T H E a O R I G I N S , welter economic What is the message of Source of 19 18 – 19 3 3 egotistical interests, political and opinions, ideological conicts. B? … But the misery of our people is terrible! The Source C starving Summary of Hitler’s election promises industrial in the Sydney Morning Herald, and paupers. Herr Hitler is the last hope of a people everything has been taken. The If the that remains is the belief that he restore their honour, their this freedom, bread. collapse Herr Hitler denotes there salvation, a fearlessly German dead, the last will present who did not slow the 2,000,000 die in war for Germany, but destruction of the a better German future. Herr of Hitler is man, ghts for because them. he He understands represents of of German youth, striving for a whole also is involved shall be faced proportions. with For a in not only a that Reich, inheritance of the but highest us culture are With and symptoms an civilization. portending unparalleled effort this of brute force the Communist will method them the madness is trying as a last resort to poison stern and will the made the of and farmer collapse human around and people’s we vast will breakdown. for while been and of All the of 2000-year-old works fulls German have and also their millions, class alone case, can their only catastrophe thing in artisan from in whom become 1932. middle … have as unemployed appeared proletariat new undermine an inwardly shaken and form uprootednation. of life. Herr Hitler is the aming torch of those The wanting a new future for task before which Source D living has faced memory. condence, Adolf Hitler’s “Appeal to the German radio address made on 31 January its fourteen years have passed blinded day by when the promises and abroad, our past, forgot German made the by since the Reich, middle freedom, Since has those and days highest of its withdrawn Discord and thereby of his at values honour lost treason, blessing hatred have the deepest men and our see the Examiner’s markbands with your unity hint: on pages of For 10 the the and from nation values. our Farmers, nation workers, and and class must wherewith to unite build to the contribute new the Reich. and contrast promises to Sources the C German and D regarding people. in. Draft a response all to this question: Filled of the the walks sources and your own knowledge, best the reasons why Hitler’s foreign policy of were popular with the German people. disintegrating third and 11 assess to in in unbounded Four th question – 9 marks nation. aims life believe have of Almighty from millions women all and examine German we we everything. the moved distress, But Third question – 6 marks home Using with difcult statesmen people, those Hitler’s its most that Compare of for eternal bricks unhappy the 1933. the Over is German People”, in a us Germany. fourth a questions partner’s above, work. use Share the your feedback partner . 1 How could your 2 How could you partner have improve improved his or her responses? yours? The historical debate: Did Hitler have a clear plan for achieving his foreign policy goals when he took power in 1933? Hitler’s the overall Zweites foreign Buch policy (written in aims, 1928 as but laid out in Mein unpublished in Kampf his and in lifetime), 125 2 seem very clear, and he returned to them again and again in speeches TOK between Review the historians’ views in and sources you have read became 1928 briengs and and xed in at 1933. He letters an early also after continued he stage took and to power, never make references indicating really that to his them views altered. in your case studies thus far. However, did he actually have a clear plan as to how he was to achieve How can we assess historical these accounts? aims when he took power in 1933? Draft some ideas in pairs and share with your class. Historians What methods or criteria for Mommsen, have assessing historical accounts achieve objectives. do you agree on? economic seized are his divided pressures each over argued and of and Hildebrand, Klaus expansion and ending of Britain and third and such as argue the Treaty phase Hitler’s area past. Hitler’s War; aims in of aims Versailles. In be the aim were to such as had phases. and such the a be to as AJP the and of determined Nazi Party, Hans how and to by he him. Andreas denite rst the of Hillgruber programme phase of an defeat Russia. globalists, take Taylor blueprint usually The conquest known a formation would was as have within Hitler phase the German the Second over to rule However, of Fritz it is of the would of be alliance of the with France. The Intentionalists go further USA and Lee of the and thus clearly obvious that to refutes the II Europe, his whether break argued in Russia. Weimar is radical Wilhelm much regard a claimed fragmented with policy or historians Kaiser over a War, Fischer between Hitler Stephen however, foreign policy, those over continuity Hitler’s foreign World historian hegemony and those retrospect, German similar words, and regarding earlier Germany stressed policy debate of were other Greater have the from clear Hauner, ultimate Following However, would and actions school, Versailles second not presented that with Some, did domination. continuation the argue of The Hildebrand Another was intentionalist Italy. world his demands that conquest nal that achieve a the issue. Hitler Rather, opportunity Historians this that the in the the latter continuity latter. First that World of a historians Republic’s this was 1960s creation Other revision the late it from of foreign the Treaty of argument: between the diplomacy Source skills of First question, the point Weimar which domestic Republic showed and that counterpart the Nazi was that Third foreign Hitler Reich can be misleading. policy was as revolutionary saw revisionism merely The as a crucial as its step towards par t a – 3 marks projects According to Stephen which Although how did Hitler’s aims differ to the politicians ruthlessness, of They also beyond the politicians ambitions had a of strong the Republic’s element of statesmen. opportunism, they did respected not the share Hitler’s traditions of Social Darwinism European and diplomacy racialist and, under the Stresemann, Weimar well Republic’s those vision. of the foreign even policy were Lee, contributed much to international co-operation. One of Hitler’s Republic? aims was which to had smash been the multinational carefully built up agreements, during the like 1920s. the — Locarno Lee, Pact, 1987 Class discussion L TA As a class, discuss the dierent Communication and social skills perspectives on Hitler and Divide into two groups, A and B. Prepare for a debate on the following motion: whether he was a planner or an “Hitler had a well-dened and distinct foreign policy that had little in common with oppor tunist. Use the material that of his predecessors.” and sources in this chapter to 126 discuss which view you agree Group A will argue for the motion, whereas group B will argue against the motion. with most. You should synthesize the source material as evidence in your arguments. C H A P T E R 2 . 2 : T H E I M PA C T O F N A Z I S M O N G E R M A N F O R E I G N P O L I C Y: T H E O R I G I N S , 19 18 – 19 3 3 First question, par t b, 2 marks Source help and hints (See page 124) Second question – 4 marks (See page With reference consider source the as What 117) to its value evidence Examiner’s consider are of hint: listed origin, and purpose limitations Hitler’s Some and of foreign points is the message of Source B? content, using this policy that you it from aims. could below. Values ● A value himself of the origin explaining is his that aims is Hitler regarding foreign policy. ● A value that took ● of the Hitler had date (1923) these aims is that 10 it shows years before us he power. Regarding aims, content, such as Hitler getting rid refers of the to several Treaty of ▲ Versailles, more unifying land overview and of all soil, what so he Germans it is a and Nazi election poster of 1932: “Our last hope, Hitler ” getting comprehensive wanted to Examiner’s achieve. posters Limitations ● With will regard comments and ● A a he origin, Hitler in 1923 (before could have amended limitation speech win to of the through support for exaggerating his he purpose which certain took his power) aims that is trying and aspects so of it by 1933. was The point content: above the can also language is exaggerated, e.g. using hammer the anvil. and be seen very the run Your to you be to you part simple, of by but be get the with studied Nazi Josef very the As on visual the Goebbels; and knowledge point. Germany they sources, details machine, are that Posters usually were which quite effective. is important Here, is for message. propaganda clever main all carefully understand contextual to Depression key. the For for impact this helping of the poster , Great consider: ideas. ● ● key is could his a these is he ideas made need help hint: in strong imagery the way the in and and of the that the German background, the way they people including are are their portrayed expressions standing the ● the message, ● the choice ● the size of of “Our colour the font last to hope” reinforce for the message “Hitler”. 127 2 Third question – 6 marks Contrasts (See ● page 125) Source causes Compare and contrast Sources C and D D of is promises to the German more specic distress, as to talking the about regarding “treason” Hitler’s much Germany’s and mentioning communists as being people. responsible, whereas Source also Source C is more general. Comparisons ● ● Both talk about Germany being in a desperate the state. D particularly Source ● Both is problems say that Hitler is the only hope C much facing the more economic focuses on specic Germany the at as that problems, past to time, whereas problems of for losing the war. Germany. ● ● Both say that Hitler will create a new Source D discusses the terrible situation Germany. Germany is recovery, whereas future and in without the the Source hope that promise C focuses Hitler of on the brings. References Fulbrook, Fontana. Henig, M. 1991. London, The Fontana History of Germany: 1918–1990. UK R. 1985. The Origins A. 1925. Mein of the Second World War . Routledge. London, UK Hitler, Lee, S. 1987. Rogers, history. P . Aspects Prentice Steiner, Z. European of The Oxford New Eher Verlag. Dictatorships Western Hall. 2011. 1933–1999. 128 The Kampf. Civilization, York, Triumph University of Berlin, Germany 1918–1945. Volume II: Methuen. Problems and London, source in USA the Dark: Press. European New York, International USA History UK 2.3 Italian expansion, 1933–1940 Conceptual understanding Key concepts ➔ Change ➔ Continuity ➔ Perspective Key questions ➔ Examine the reasons for Italy pursuing a more expansionist foreign policy in the 1930s. ➔ To what extent was there continuity in Italian foreign policy in the 1930s? ➔ Discuss the consequences of foreign policy in the 1930s for Italy. After a 13 year campaign, the Italian 1932 colony of Libya is subdued 1933 January Mussolini proposes the Four Power Pact Hitler becomes Chancellor of Germany July 1934 June Mussolini meets Hitler in Venice Italy sends troops to its border with Austria to prevent Hitler ’s attempts July at Anschluss 1935 April Italy invades Abyssinia The Stresa Conference October 1936 May Italy conquers Abyssinia Mussolini initiates talks of an Axis October agreement with Hitler Italy intervenes in the Spanish Civil War Hitler ’s Germany also sends assistance July to Franco Italy joins Germany in the Axis 1936 October agreement An unocial agreement is made with 1937 Britain accepting the status quo in Mediterranean Mussolini is impressed by Hitler on a September visit to Germany Italy joins the Anti-Comintern Pact with November Germany and Japan, an anti-Soviet alliance 129 2 Italy withdraws from the League of December Nations Italian and British agreement: Britain 1938 April recognizes Italian Abyssinia Hitler visits Mussolini May Anti-semitic laws are passed in Italy September The Munich Conference Mussolini announces his long-term 1939 February programme April Italy and Germany sign the Pact of Italy invades Albania May Steel military alliance Italy declares itself a non-belligerent 1 September when Germany invades Poland Mussolini declares war on Britain 1940 June and France September– Italy invades Egypt and Greece October 1941 June Italy declares war on the Soviet Union December Italy declares war on the USA What factors had an impact on Italy’s foreign policy in the 1930s? 1. The impact of fascism The character of the Italian people must be moulded by — In the 1930s, Italian factors identied Italian foreign and that he on foreign page policy pursued was a policy 84. directed more continued However, by clearly to be historians Mussolini Fascist inuenced generally during foreign this policy ghting. Mussolini by the agree that period from the L TA Self-management and mid-1930s: glorication of war for its own sake, pursuit of imperial thinking skills expansion, and a move away from diplomacy and cooperation. Refer back to the diagram on During this period, he more Mussolini’s methods became more assertive and page 89 which identies the key was aggresive diplomatically. He continued to assert anti- characteristics of Fascism. As French territorial claims, but he moved away from his relatively good you read through this chapter, relationship with the British, instead a of fostering closer ties to Hitler’s identify where Fascist ideology Germany. This led to series Italo–German agreements including the appears to have shaped Rome–Berlin Axis and the Pact of Mussolini’s foreign policy. in 130 Abyssinia, Spain and Albania. Steel. Mussolini also engaged in wars C H A P T E R The road Mussolini to the of Germany. 2. Italian entry the on in Second the 1930s World would War in I T A L I A N E X P A N S I O N , ultimately 1940 as an 19 3 3 – 19 4 0 lead ally The impact of domestic economic isues As with by the the the other Great lira USA were was million. The bailouts for collapse when the of of was banks. a this Industry nancial major set up result, were declined and The in 1933 up of to brought and took developed the was banks under on and the grew of public the to 2 including brink industries. Istituto the by of Italiano government shares from affected Mobiliare The over badly affected overvaluing intervention, Italy largest also by unemployment Istituto increased. was Investment also more the support was industries Italy with Bank set Italy caused crisis. farmers responded materials Japan, problems worldwide Italian government gave and economic industrialists. the Industriale As prices. raw control by and government which allocation direct grain countries The exacerbated withdrawn, in 1931, European Depression. collapse in embarked into 2 . 3 : per The control la companies sector and Ricostruzione in TOK and Europe, Discuss in pairs the extent to excluding the Soviet Union. Indeed, by the end of the 1930s, the which economic forces are the government controlled 20% of the capital of key companies. Wages that main driving force for historical had already fallen before the depression were cut further. change. You should consider There were Great Depression, ban on by upheaval retained needed to The such the would result further of as that provided public Indeed, that power. distract fostering policy measures emigration. political he some the works Mussolini depression Nevertheless, the Italian public “revolutionary” now need this, however, undermined to by the be was from the impact programmes and the managed from prevent that he that from meant internal and and the social in that the rst case study on Japan of the and Europe problems espoused. in the 1920s and 1930s as well as considering this case and Mussolini economic fascism Foreign study on Italy. Make notes from your conversation and add to these as you read through this chapter. inspirational. 1936 emphasis of removal the elsewhere crisis Italy’s dynamic Mussolini’s to precipitated economic spirit more relief the on Italian autarky, economy and the was costs of Autarky Il Duce’s wars. Thus, domestic economic factors may have been a factor Economic independence, or in Mussolini’s decision to invade Abyssinia and intervene in the Spanish self-suciency. Civil War; economy. budget nonetheless, these wars came Even taxes were increased, decit political though of impact 28 and billion lire by undermined 1939. at a This support for high the price wars led ultimately the for to had regime Who controlled Italian foreign policy in the a from Italian an annual negative the elites. In 1936, Mussolini appointed his son-in-law, Count Galeazzo Ciano to work on foreign policy. Ciano had the 1930s? initially suppor ted closer links with Germany. However, When he came to power in 1922, Mussolini wanted to Ciano then became disillusioned with Hitler and argued control Italian foreign policy himself. In 1929, once his against the Pact of Steel, signed in May 1939. Ciano authority seemed secure, he appointed Dino Grandi as advised Mussolini to create a buer zone in the Balkans foreign minister. Grandi was a committed Fascist who against Germany and he suppor ted the invasion of favoured a “strong” foreign policy. He wanted to move Albania. Ciano lost favour with Mussolini for his antiaway from Anglophile policies and demonstrate Italian German stance when Hitler swept victoriously across strength, and ultimately ready the armed forces for the Europe. Ciano ultimately relented and suppor ted Italy “coming war ”. Grandi believed that Italy should not trust joining the war with Germany in June 1940. the League of Nations. Never theless, Mussolini still directed foreign policy and in July 1932 he moved Grandi to the position of ambassador in Britain. 131 2 Source skills J. Calvitt Italy Clarke against and Hitler: Rapprochement of C. The the Foust. Russia could and 1930s the of its mid-1930s, imports passed by through Italy sea, the received and of 86 these, Dardanelles, Suez, Gibraltar. Italy of its and Hence must either Nostro 70 the percent fascist dominate 17 Mare, the the the Danubian and to any other Mediterranean’s Balkan (including Austria areas. percent First question, par t a – 3 marks percent key points are regarding Italian economic made in inuence on this Source through conviction or – Hungary) concede in percent 13 What through willingly hegemony hinterland (1991). and In Italy power Bolshevik–Fascist be the their Italian foreign policy in the 1930s? prisoner Nor Examiner’s in the hint: In pairs, identify three of the following points. Highlight source. ● Italy ● The ● Italy had ● Italy could 3. and that Mediterranean. them needs was dependent majority to of on imports dominate not imports allow came the from the through sea. Gibraltar. Mediterranean. another power to dominate the area. Changing diplomatic alignments in Europe after 1933 Extract I have asked searched found, “new from myself “allies” order” not in Grandi’s why breathlessly for Pontiff Dino for for a Europe, only in the the Boss the last action revolutionary ideology. is so ten a new order founded but 1932 taken years revolutionary spiritual international diary, with or so, foreign of also in He the on they destined considers material the [Mussolini] wherever policy which exclusively Hitler. Party, might to the be create himself sense on has … a supreme An Regime, on a L TA Social skills Discuss the following question with a par tner. What does the quote from Grandi’s diary (above) suggest Mussolini wanted to gain from potential “allies”? To demonstrate held an Four in a meeting alternative Power Rome. It in to Pact, set France, Germany League’s or out relations, never central Rome the Power” parliament 132 Italy’s in 1933. League of that smaller and their Italy ratied the European Mussolini’s The Locarno for Pact, nations role signed it. in Nations Quadripartite unlike covenant, role at the intention European was signed should the diplomacy, of agreement, signatories Treaties the 15 to less say Nations. to develop July although agreed and was diplomacy. on have League Mussolini The 1933 in “Great Britain, the adhere to French the Kellogg–Briand Pact. C H A P T E R The resulting Four Power cooperation, though dismissed the success by for in other Pact reality allowed for this had powers. In pact Italy, 2 . 3 : further little I T A L I A N “Great it was 19 3 3 – 19 4 0 Power” meaning however, E X P A N S I O N , and was heralded as a Mussolini. Nevertheless, in 1934, Mussolini’s actions were seen as signicant, not Class discussion only domestically, promoted War and an so unication on the 25 to the independent July was to addition, of Europe, because Italy quo in Europe. met in the the the Stresa of to This agreed to resist they Front” Nevertheless, frighten the Italy Only he two had gained their later, with agreement, Britain this so without action in Hitler’s had the a it Germany condoned Stresa this France aimed to to to not breach prevent the of the any The Treaty of Treaty future 214–215.) even specically agreed. stance Hitler. reafrm Austria. violation pages were rm In fact, regarding None lead demands. Most in of the name Italy Germany; signatories Britain signed the page German The to be Stresa signicantly, Italian with Britain in broke Anglo–German 214). By signing Mussolini also got and Abyssinia. the Naval this rearmament allies. more Front Mussolini control apparently naval Front would them working expand (see Germany could that, to Stresa and rest status Germany. 1935, when its a Anschluss. June Britain the the expansionist Germany? 1935, work did as key to containing an intervene. alarming of by the Western democracies This Declaration also aims Anschluss. 1935. Why might Italy be seen troops “Final Hitler’s to his The resurgent talks Italy, government in Germany up to Austrian guaranteeing attempts territorial consent consulting ended of was towards Hitler ’s new When, the not independence offend that Stresa Stresa April and adopt to to 1935. (See their that and from the at to Italian during Agreement done knew protection agreed vague not key against invasion France, towards months principles actual and more impression France, Britain Mussolini Britain 14 agreed uphold concerned an accommodating gave than was did Discuss Mussolini’s attitude Austria’s mobilized achieve policies, the settlement. to be had World to aims). murdered Hitler Italy First given Hitler’s to and further protested agreement sanction on conrm “Stresa more signed the immediately April to European keener Hitler’s in of rearmament to and methods would perceived powers. name of Hitler Hitler’s No was by 1935 the been Mussolini Stresa end (the supporters by Germany. Britain Nazi Germany to the one deter However, had was to Conference”, the since attempt of European Anschluss which response Together, Versailles. changes any town also other Austria Dolfuss, now Treaties powers Versailles. In Italian Locarno three was the Austrian deter sufcient In of 1934, by opposed Germany, Engelbert border action also Mussolini with Chancellor but and had believed that agreement. Source skills Robert Mallet, a British historian academic, in an academic the of the Second Origins book World and Mussolini War , settlement and 1933–40, (1983). Germany, of Mussolini’s the long-term … Hitler’s to overturn Italy, anticipated and stressed Red to if for Sea allied the to creation Balkans, empire. Hungarian As prime avowed minister, determination fascist possibilities long Mediterranean Mussolini In offered clear the Gyualia Gömbös, that same spring, Versailles 133 2 he did an Italian after the not intend Ethiopia expansionist taking Ethiopia he British-controlled and the Africa the Sudan, uninterrupted Indian from the linking those empire the limit the also territories with Italy’s be On would thereby possessions continent. to drive. of express the of north east Mediterranean to their the recently Ocean. requested But in the immediate short term well had for to face domestic Ethiopia. attempt a deployed Africa could coup large remained not The anxiety move fear against that over numbers without Hitler Austria of widespread, which, by mid foreign ministry, to the British, that staffs had dictator that April at French Stresa, and in Italy … If Mussolini had wanted to sow anxiety had succeeded. within ofcial German circles, he East Mussolini quelling First question, par t a – 3 marks Italian were although orthodox Italy to this source, what were Mussolini’s mounting. key The give his once troops and 1935, of to wisdom fact, rumours general conversations, meeting the to might According anxieties Amid to actual elected try. Austrian statesmen northern plans last In from priority. continued reservations … defence absolute Mussolini Italian continued a future an military already and held its be enterprise one German to Italian own had diplomacy the the Mussolini’s Mussolini of stretch consider incursions Meanwhile Egypt would should German conquer Italian to policy of contrary, having motives for engaging in the Stresa Front given agreements? support to emphatic remain Mussolini’s in an its Africa demands independent policy, that remained Austria state. A should detailed Second question – 4 marks report With on the current European situation of 2nd of concluded that Austria amounted to reference Italy’s this source, zone”, and that Italian as this is a “to L TA that, hint:Remember origin, its purpose values and and content limitations studying Mussolini’s foreign policy for in defence the Examiner’s the assess own historians “demilitarised to April 1920s. Self-management, social and thinking skills what In pairs, discuss and make bullet point notes on the following question. extent” identify points question, points that assertion foreign you that agree disagree that policy should with and the “Mussolini’s foreign policy had only limited success up to 1935.” To what extent do you agree with this statement? Mussolini’s had only limited Italian foreign policy, 1935–39 success up to 1935. Mussolini’s key in Italy turning 1935–36, This action sanctions on its feeling were in and in which was relations positively was point at war Italian would take condemned imposed. with Italy. this the The in What were the domestic inuences on Italian continuously foreign by Italy’s the between was foreign League Although Western conquest turn policy its the policy of of aggression Abyssinia had the led Mussolini on Nations democracies, encouraged 1935 to and invasion to a new and a course. negative surge further The Abyssinia limited invasion a 1939. of was of acts impact received nationalist of aggression. agriculture had not fullled Mussolini’s goal of autarky and the economy would not be able to sustain a general foreign policy in 1935–39? war. The limited war in Abyssinia and the intervention in There was a lack of suppor t from the political elites, Spain would be a drain on Italian resources. These factors including the King, for a shift in Italian foreign policy that had to be borne in mind while Mussolini still aspired to had traditionally suppor ted Britain. These groups were control the Mediterranean and maintain the momentum of generally hostile to the Germans. The economic situation “Fascistization” that had followed the war in East Africa. also inuenced foreign policy. Italian industry and 134 C H A P T E R 2 . 3 : I T A L I A N E X P A N S I O N , 19 3 3 – 19 4 0 Why did Mussolini invade Abyssinia in October 1935? Source skills Source A A Source B speech public Mussolini the day made before to the the Italian Italian Patricia invasion The Abyssinia, October Knight. is not only objective, army, all commit Italy’s the her promises victory than in the fate Italy one table of the crumbs of march to its invasion with status that others try injustice, taking away When, the brought that marches Let sun. with million the alert. made? dead, that Italians and blackest were 670,000 army million united place united of 44 our and Fascism (2003). of Ab y s s i nia was und er ta ke n 1935. primarily It Mussolini of Allies, To ght her how the scene troops in aspects Italy to many of doing the 1896. of any intended to contribution sun” rival we they more went gave us to only gains the in African Mussolini fertile of a nd form of oil, for for Ita l i a n co al fa il u re gl or ie s of the “pl a ce in the Fur t h e r econo m i c a nd gold Ital ia n of It al ia n Mus s ol in i F ra nce . the thoug ht a of of Ital y’s the po we r fru s t r at i n g and a chi e ve p r o s pe ct recruits area mor e b ee n r e cr e a te gr e at Ad owa , de fe at the ha d and the also a ve ng e co l oni es Brita i n were of booty. to motives Ital y’s di s a s tr ous O ne ne w Empire and so, Versaill e s acquire now in Roman When peace and, demo ns tr a te common disabled wounded. colonial 1915, supreme 480,000 odious in the to to Ea st and a r m y. Afri ca s e ttl eme nt, as a g ive n the First question, par t a – 3 marks expected What, the according invasion of to Source A, were the reasons for Battle Abyssinia? the increase for only Births. in Ab y s s i ni a remaining territory and p o pula tion wa s fr om in uncol onized seeme d an ea s y the any c a se Afri ca n ta r ge t , gi ven Second question – 4 marks Italy’s With of reference Source A, historians In values and ● the its studying Examiner’s again. to assess Would and Italian Read to the limitations you purpose values the hint: response origin, have the found invasion question, in neighbouring of Abyssinia. of Source consider A the for the have values invasion related what same a nd i ts p re s en c e Er i tr e a a nd So mal il a n d. for below. the sup e r i o r i ty content limitations provenance second given and mi litary to Italians and at what the saw as the time. It Italian offers important in public an would insight October into 1935. Limitations and limitations? ● ● Which ● Do ones you had have you any not thought comments to of? Mussolini may not Italy at needed be to justify representing the his the policies wider publicly views held and in time. add? ● The date it the of the speech may be a limitation, as Values ● A value of the dictator of Italy policy. ● The origin is author had invasion of Abyssinia. A of the value how the Italian As it and is a speech Mussolini planned and is that it ordered offers was presented it a is made by directed the needs foreign for it the that to speech, at it insight the will time give into to ● the Mussolini used to justify the The of rally A value Italian of the content government is that believed it to reveals be the invasion Indeed, as to rally lacks and as would hindsight this Other public as is a motives support not it Mussolini be was speech, for for the his revealed. given on the eve invasion. the The content focuses on the justications, mainly invasion. what key support. dictatorship, speech the the propaganda. such historical, ● before probably invasion, ● reasons is day personal purpose invasion public. that himself, is the reasons for Italian one-sided perspective elaborate on the expansion. of specic Italy’s aims It presents position of Il and a highly does not Duce 135 2 L TA L TA Thinking skills Refer back to the terms of the Thinking skills In pairs, discuss the following questions. Treaty of London on page 87, 1 What key factors motivated the Italian invasion of Abyssinia according to and the gains Italy attained from Source B on page 135? the Paris Peace Settlement on 2 Attempt to nd evidence from the sources and this chapter that suppor t: page 90. In pairs or small groups, discuss the validity of Mussolini’s • economic motives for the invasion • ideological motives for the invasion • changing diplomatic alignments in Europe as a factor in the invasion. claim that Italy had been given “only the crumbs of colonial booty” (Source A page 135). M u s s o l i n i ’s had not L TA nationalist Communication skills foreign yet imperial been policy ambitions power objectives colonized, to in invading originated build an in empire like Britain and France. classical Roman Empire, the and He Abyssinia, l o n g e r- t e r m to also become a aspired to which Italian great an empire Draw a mind map that akin to the which had controlled large summarizes the reasons swathes of African t e r r i t o r y. for Mussolini’s invasion of The Abyssinia. political reason personality cult for sake its would own give It would in 1896. military also for be was also economic an revenge addition, forces the Duce) Mussolini also In (Il by invasion and an to Mussolini drawing reasons for on of victory Italy’s to the as would colonial conquering behind Fascist Abyssinia ignoble be defeat able troops. to the corporate the Great was bolster from state order and market Italian to war modernized. his own there the and to War this Abyssinians Mussolini emigration for and not the Depression. in regime. ideal, to attention targeted Mussolini’s the However, Abyssinia. divert ERITREA consolidate support element easy for was rally were needed to failings of the impact Abyssinia gain territory provide goods. an of was for export Mussolini Blue also hoped to nd oil. Nile When De FRENCH Bono Hitler announced rearmament, Mussolini German briey SOMALIA hesitated did not in his want invasion to leave plans himself as he too BRITISH SOMALIA exposed in Europe when he was at Addis war in Africa. However, the Stresa Ababa ABYSSINIA Graziani Conference nothing had convinced France an ITALIAN territories SOMALILAND to would expansion territory. Italian led had his plans to the him not of think that Italian Italy’s to Britain also and strongly control in wanted power Mussolini clear he meetings object Mussolini demonstrate Nevertheless, Italian him fear; to did Britain the to Germany. not and to make France advances as an he did area not possessions ▲ 136 Map of the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, 1935–36 want where to they, (see provoke too, map). had them in colonial C H A P T E R 2 . 3 : I T A L I A N E X P A N S I O N , 19 3 3 – 19 4 0 The events – What happened? L TA As you see acquired from the colonial map on territory the on previous the border page, of Italy had Abyssinia. skills already The Communication border itself Go to www.youtube.com/ lacked clarity, and this lack of clarity gave that would lead Mussolini the opportunity to watch?v=op-dD3oUMh0, or manufacture an incident to war. search for “ The Abyssnia Crisis, It was in Italy 1923 that and (as had backed you read Abyssinia’s on page entry 102) the into two the League countries of had Nations signed 1935–6”. a This clip from “ The Road to treaty of friendship in 1928. However, Italy drew up a plan to annex War: Italy” shows the Italians’ Abyssinia in 1929 and an invasion plan in 1932. Then, in December motives and actions in 1934, Italian oasis, which forces clashed with Abyssinians at the disputed Wal Wal Abyssinia. apology and Selassie, secret Il Duce made an not the a huge modern September death of investigation his the forces commitment totalling weapons, 1935, 30 Italians. compensation; entertain instructed personnel without In would order support in considerable requested Mussolini a resulted by to 500,000 were the League the Wal the idea to the of the soon Emperor League a “total war, East in of League attain to Mussolini of demanded Abyssinia, Nations. sending Africa. an The Haile However, investigation, conquest” an of army and in Abyssinia. with Abyssinians, retreat. resolved that neither side could had been be Class discussion held responsible disputed. then on On 6 and, of four put During point and forces the 18 tensions and maintain France the Laval respectively, this pressured by Italy of 9 at on May, Italian its Lake 5 to was on Assembly in 7 historic 1896. The to and, 1936, Abyssinia Africa Abyssinia impor tant to Mussolini? Consider the role of ideology as well as other October voted although was to the on 6 secret press, impose limited, factors such as economics and the impact of events outside Emperor Eritrea and the by Samuel to would the and the Italy. It to offer France were 2.6). army capital, ed In Hoare crisis. Chapter Abyssinian took Selassie annexed and the (see bases. with Germany. which Britain deal nally Haile Hitler’s ministers, pact crisis naval relations resolution 1936, forces large good contain swift April formerly with a a reached two foreign withdraw Italian and to up Britain had retain French about to and to Front drew leaked opinion war and bring Ashangi. May East there aggressor sanctions, had Why was the conquest of and was Addis L TA Ababa, On plan public continued defeated British Abyssinia However, invasion, This defeated Britain wanted Stresa and of Adowa. the Italy where the half as area full-scale Nations’ these between 1935, Pierre of the Italy. December Italy been Italy November, its captured had League Mediterranean, Britain to forces as effect. war, the its incident launched condemned later, the into However, Italy On as Wal Italy Italian Italy Nations the in to days sanctions. were October, October, importance League 3 for Self-management skills Britain. became part Summarize Mussolini’s actions in Abyssinia on a detailed Somaliland. timeline. Place Mussolini’s Mussolini had his great conquest. The war had the desired impact actions above the timeline. domestically, with a surge in nationalist sentiment that was further After reading Chapter 2.6, you encouraged by the League’s condemnation and economic sanctions. can add the actions of Britain Even the Italian Queen Mother had supported the war effort, and and France below the timeline. participated ring to the in the call to fund the war by donating her gold wedding government. 137 2 L TA Thinking skills with a Golden Rose. Source A Mussolini now enjoyed a new role as conqueror and R. Overy and A . Wheatcroft. The Road to War: imperialist; his reputation in Italy reached its highest point. The Origins of World War II, pages 220–21 (20 09). The threat of sanctions united public opinion behind Source B Mussolini. There developed a strong anti-British Ex tracts from Mussolini’s telegrams to a commander in sentiment. In cafes, zuppa inglese was re-christened Abyssinia, 1936–37 . zuppa imperiale. The war was popular at home. Women 5 June 1936 exchanged their gold wedding rings for iron substitutes to swell the national bullion reserves. The Queen was All rebels made prisoner are to be shot. the rst of 250,000 Roman women to oer her ring in 8 June 1936 [SECRET] a ceremony held at the War Memorial in Rome. A total To nish o rebels as at Ancober use gas. of ten million were collected nationwide. When the war began to go Italy’s way in February 1936, the new 8 July 1936 commander, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, became a national I repeat my authorization to initiate and hero. But the victory was won only with a massive war systematically conduct policy of terror and eor t, using all the modern weapons of war against extermination against rebels and populations in Ethiopian tribesmen armed with ries and spears. By complicity with them. Without the law of ten eyes May 1936 there were over 400,000 Italian and native for one we cannot heal this wound in good time. troops in Ethiopia, and a war that was supposed to cost 21 February 1937 1.5 to 2 billion lire in total ended by costing 1 billion lire every month. To speed up occupation the Italian air force Agreed that male population of Goggetti over used gas bombs on Ethiopian soldiers, both mustard gas 18 years of age to be shot and village destroyed. and phosgene, a total of 1521 canisters, which killed and Questions maimed an unknown number of soldiers and civilians. In In pairs or as a class, discuss what the telegrams in May the whole of Ethiopia was annexed and on the 9th Source B suggest about the nature of the Italian war in King Victor Emmanuel was declared Emperor. The King Abyssinia. In what ways do these telegrams suppor t the received the news, Mussolini recorded, with “tears in his points made by Richard Overy in Source A? eyes”. The Pope presented the new Empress of Ethiopia What were the results of the Abyssinian War? Speech by Italy has tokens of Mussolini, May her empire last; the will civilisation tradition and of at and of the humanity Rome, who, 1936 a Fascist power for after all empire of the victory, the because Roman populations associated it bears lictors of the … the An Abyssinia. peoples indestructible empire That with is their of the destiny. — Lowe, C and Marzari, F. 1975. The results of the Abyssinian War for Italy By in May 1936, creating relatively had quickly empire. Giovanni a an new had won East and a was Italy”. in war. cost be the Mussolini empire. only military to Fascist empire the African had Italian This Gentile, founded created 138 Italy Italian demonstrated Italian just an 1,000 might peak He has had war Italian and of philosopher, Ethiopia. The his he been casualties. had foreign claimed: made succeeded had won Mussolini expanded policy “ Mussolini something more. the success. … has He not has C H A P T E R Nevertheless, scare” and Mussolini navy the the against was and war between but Cavagnari In risen from lira trade The had not with take that on and a initiated Admiral the naval British ally war and the 19 3 3 – 19 4 0 warned Italian modernization Royal Britain billion of shift and for to to League at 16 to by great lire which due to Finally, forced in to lifted Navy. A was naval possible, would hit by for a the The war, occupying the ght sanctions price. during 250,000 perpetrated brutality. British Nations economic billion Germany were of high 40%, atrocities the a maintaining Italians fell the the middle sanctions Italian Italy, the war had once again and mean classes war gave did July, was October hard. by not the 1936, League. a really war had Italian the them guerrilla the decit there In imposed forces drawn-out in budget troops. in end in Abyssinia 1941. The results of the war for collective security The Cavagnari Yugoslavia, with E X P A N S I O N , “Mediterranean Indeed, building their a Domenico Britain. unnished France, come devalued to The had 2.5 reputation it to could cautioned cost ferocity until Staff tension due and although was had 1936. it Italy victory continued the raising Abyssinia of I T A L I A N defeat. addition, Italian on Chief incomplete programmes certain assault Naval 2 . 3 : exposed the Source skills weakness Source A of the League of Nations, which had been utterly An ineffective in its response to Italian aggression. Italian nally also caused with Indeed, 6 Italy Britain it is January that however, that Then, 22 the German meant Italy obligations. the impact it he a that, no must of no page of Mussolini’s had its from May 1936, “Italy Empire”. relations the war, on German objections He to stressed, independent. the agreed Rhineland; uphold for has Germany. Mussolini longer 162 the good to satellite. remain rearmament would during longer 1936, from closer told German February (See away and Mussolini becoming on move France, signicant 1936, ambassador Austria to and poster It its further actions on to this Locarno discussion of Germany.) 139 2 Source B A cartoon on 15 by David February Low published in the UK newspaper, the Evening Standard, 1935. First question, part b – 2 marks for each source Second question – 4 marks What With and is the message of the artists in Sources A B? reference assess the historians to values its origin, and studying purpose limitations the Italian of war and content, Source with B for Abyssinia. L TA Thinking skills 1 Discuss, in pairs or small groups, the key dierences in how Source A and B each get their ‘message’ across to the viewer. Which source is more eective in achieving this? 2 In what ways could the Abyssinian crisis be seen as a turning point in international relations? Source skills b Four th question – 9 marks Using the discuss Here you are some could Paper 1 examples expect set on for the of the the style Fourth Italian of in on Abyssinia in Using the sources and your own Abyssinia: c Using sources the what the reasons for the Italian invasion 140 in 1936. own Italian knowledge, invasion of 1936. extent policy of to Abyssinia your the and do you your own agree that knowledge, “Mussolini’s knowledge, foreign examine of a to a and results question question expansion sources the 1936”. was wholly successful up C H A P T E R 2 . 3 : I T A L I A N E X P A N S I O N , 19 3 3 – 19 4 0 L TA Communciation and social skills Write a brief plan for the “own knowledge” par t of each of the questions a, b and c on page 140. Share your plans with a par tner. Give feedback on each other ’s plans by answering the following questions. 1 Have you and your par tner structured your plans to meet the command terms TOK of each question? Spend 30 minutes reviewing 2 Are there key points that your par tner has missed? 3 What points has your par tner included that you have not? the primary sources in the case studies you have covered thus far. With a par tner discuss how far you agree with the following Why did Italy intervene in the Spanish Civil War statement: in 1936–39? “Sources from the time are Mussolini’s military quickly success greatness decided Fascist ideals hoped to in for Abyssinia and, to when naval his Mediterranean bases Roman Italian ideology; the militarist socialism. Spanish to in rebels in and look out in Spain military role had to broke of Balearic action war and Islands aspirations in Mussolini to had help made, right-wing Republic the intervention Mussolini connections Taking him was further in in society. from to for 1936, line always biased and give an he with Follow up on your discussion by Mussolini General re-establish incomplete picture of events.” considering how the limitations Franco the of sources pose a challenge for historians. Feedback to the class. Empire. motivated from war central assistance, Nevertheless, by the encouraged civil intervene. regarding gain return in ght as groups 1931. He the Spanish responded he in against had to in since stop Civil War requests liberal done Spain wanted to was for democracy Germany, the also assistance and Spanish of a Spain and to prevent communists from attaining a The Spanish was a war position presented the at the mouth of the for Mediterranean. intervention to the continuing struggle against Marxism. Italian Finally, he Republican Indeed, public as who also part democratically of intended left-wing to coalition weaken France, part of his wider foreign policy objectives, as supported he elected the Popular close and the links with the left Popular Front government that were attempting to overthrow. Thus, Mussolini France from gaining inuence in a left-wing Spain, and his own strategic position in the Steiner highlights another reason: right-wing saw in the Spanish War an included supporters the Mussolini opportunity to fashion the “new “the new Duce Italian”. claimed, “to “There have is ever only one greater way masses to create who a have warlike waged The masses who want to go to war”. — Steiner, and not have there unlike a clear clear during plan Italy any sent Franco than he anticipated. had when “nationalist” population. his he goals more other invasion sent that of his assistance, country forces and to appeal the war Mussolini Spain; to including church, the royal Nationalists, by General to Franco, seize had power 2011 Abyssinia, could the and ever in However, fascists, people”, war attempted greater groups. Italy” led the of military family. and who Mediterranean. These Zara forces conservative would and strengthen Spanish would supported prevent and Franco Nationalist generals Front France government had War between spreading the rationale Civil fought strategically forces, important War new Spanish in Civil 1936–39 close installation communism The the nor raged on far Italian troops, longer a coup civil were wider 70,000 did to than the war in July Nationalist failed to Madrid, 1936. developed, take and remained forces the half loyal A when capital, the to army the government. 141 2 What were the results of intervention in the Spanish Civil War? Although the forces had it not was were ● intervention aligned generally mainly economic half its to popular negative The 14 for cost foreign around was themselves with the by the Roman Italians. Church Catholic as Franco’s Church Indeed, the lira devalued in Spain, consequences Italy: had been currency billion supported with lire high; reserves. and it the The led to was total Italy cost of the increasing and war its it lost amounted trade with Germany. ● One third Italy had the ● ● L TA 1 Italy’s helped winning Italian Brigades ghting forces for 1937. Italian submarine and General Franco become an Italy drew stocks a Italy’s March Italy arms secure side, example, between ● of were the closer on France roundly at supply and satellite regime weakness Republic attacks to consumed right-wing military maintained Italian were in led been by Battle ships the war. Europe, had defeated the by of to Although and was exposed. the on For International Guadalajara increased in tension Britain. his independence and Spain did not state. Germany. Thinking skills What does the extract below from the historian Richard or Overy suggest about: now France. bore From sole depar tments ● 1937 onward responsibility in the Italian Mussolini, for the who three government , ser vice began the economic impact that Mussolini’s wars in to authorize substantial new programmes of Abyssinia and Spain had on Italy rearmament ● … The great weakness of the the impact of domestic economic weaknesses on Italian strategic position was the economy. Italy Italian foreign policy? was heavily War had become an addiction for Mussolini. His materials, conversation had always been spiced with a was vocabulary of conict, but after Ethiopia and Spain, the he came to see himself as a great war leader. In Mussolini March, 1938, jealous of the King’s position as formal sufficiency head of the armed forces, he appointed himself and the state his monarch as “First Marshals of the Empire” to like in create a spurious equality between them. Yet without utilization. expanding and modernizing Italy’s armed forces, country’s future warfare was in jeopardy … The limited eor t a very real war reliant on foreign par ticularly vulnerable means to play declared … To By the 1939 arms economy the and the a the over a Italy raw ore, She power. of strategy the owned was and lacked great policy self- worked, economy investment , state of iron … of for that trade, capacity. in par t need controls on oil blockade ensure extended Germany, coal, to sources and 80% labour of the transformed into peacetime. in Ethiopia and Spain forced Italy to spend almost as Overy, R and Wheatcroft, A . 2009. The Road to War: The much of her national income on armaments as richer, origins of World War II, pages 222–23. industrialized Germany, and twice as much as Britain Random House. London, UK 142 C H A P T E R 2 . 3 : I T A L I A N E X P A N S I O N , 19 3 3 – 19 4 0 Changing diplomatic alignments in Europe after 1936 The new relationship between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany One he of the now the key results committed Rome–Berlin agreement Minister of Axis between Galeazzo the himself Spanish to a Alliance Italy and Civil formal on 25 War alliance October Germany was for Mussolini with 1936. drawn was Germany This up that by signing coalition by Italian Foreign Ciano. Source skills A public Berlin 1 speech Axis by November This is axis the history Rome– the Mussolini, line between around which Rome all the and animated by the will for the are train in peace can collaborate. It surprise that today we have our Weltanschauung have common National everywhere the of master, the but same they have their in life will of history people, as nations … whom courage, resistance, we love the fatherland, is not a hoist the … and Germany contempt and Italy for follow easy the same matter ag in the sphere of economic autarky. of economic independence the political … We only the European independence in of young discipline, Without anti-Bolshevism force on believe in collaboration goal of based Both power Berlin living and common. driving Both of states in determining and 1936. vertical an announcing Benito many elements [world view]. Socialism same the many and enemies, Third in nation is doubtful. First question, par t a – 3 marks Fascism According the Mussolini’s of a of Not service International, conceptions of life in to this Italy source, and what Hitler’s key factors Germany do have common? and The end of Italian par ticipation in Collective Security Third International Italy joined and Japan. and stated The that signatories interests”. that as a key 1937 regard and to in the the a he in the measures to “safeguard the member the Axis Germany have already independence shift in key policy Soviet states Although foreign with Communist by successfully a the 1937, Pact Italy is policy. International, Union their now the by Indeed, the drawn some in This was also known as the Communist International or Comintern. It was an association common formed had seen Germany of national Communist Par ties group closer founded in 1919. to historians December Nations. with thus November against Powers. of you in attack Italian accepted been shift Axis Mussolini major an Pact, for Germany, had Mussolini’s had 1936 on League As of mid-1930s, Austrian he 1938 Austria the relationship represented of consult the Pact directed case point Austria. with in the become Indeed, and was joining left new directly in during However, it, By protected War. Pact turning Italy Italy’s Anti-Comintern would would Germany the told the Anchluss was since not the Hitler that when of the invaded on Italy no at First in to World 1934. deal longer protect Austria. Austria. with promoted Anschluss would Hitler for popular end off apparent had government Italy position gain starkly Mussolini Austrian Italian strategic most read, warned implying the was The Versailles, This creation and domestically. 143 2 Source skills Source A Denis Mack After the Smith. Nazis Mussolini reasons victory had for of with won arms power ideological closer Hitler immediate Mussolini ties is also comment: and as a money January well as victory” victory and he which 1933, pragmatic Germany. our Italian relied to upon of creating a “The was had German back his helped raised The to the Hitler sent him with admiration, new other with of replace positive in North France achieve Germans encouragement for the dominant and the Mediterranean. encouragement was a thought for agreement. put out to sincere, Tentative see The agree Poland and to conne Baltic, here was the Mediterranean to such an feelers whether their the axis the possible Italy to in dispose of Austrian the problem method would be for Berlin Hitler’s of a to treaty settle of their relations friendship would in practice bring Austria … into were wake, foreign so … policy that she than could one pursue parallel no with to free Balkans was and Germans ambitions leaving and be a of Germany. If Austria, as a formally quite in state, were thus in practice to One become obstacle now improvement the themselves form independent the would relations namely, simplest Vienna in that the his January If other would in power Germany’s therefore it fundamental dispute, which basis Mussolini Italy as … this reports were and Africa Italy Ministry homage … to to Foreign 1936. only ready be Rome-Berlin messages and could invasion. the German-Italian and support German Ambassador German conversation to axis. a Source B [Mussolini] possibility military prevent (1983). in with suppressed, a German satellite, he would raise no ideas objection. about racial inequality obstacle to the ambition Nazi an entente to … A with annex more serious Germany Austria, was Source C whereas A Mussolini had condently promised to cartoon line”, his country against “Prussian barbarism” Italy the 144 times and Nazi in given and 1933, a Dollfuss clear socialist was promise parties in brought that, if to both Austria David Low, “European published in the UK clothes- newspaper, … Evening Three by defend were Standard on 9 May 1933. the C H A P T E R 2 . 3 : I T A L I A N First question, par t a – 3 marks According to of between dispute Source A, what Italy and were E X P A N S I O N , 19 3 3 – 19 4 0 Second question – 4 marks the key areas With Germany? of reference Source this B, source to the assess for a origin, the purpose values historian and and content limitations studying of Mussolini’s First question, par t b – 2 marks position What is the message of Source on Austria in the 1930s. C? L TA Thinking and self-management skills 1 In pairs, discuss the reasons for the change in Mussolini’s position towards Austria by 1938. 2 How far was the alliance between Mussolini and Hitler an alliance of equals? What was Italy’s role during the Sudetenland See page 178 for a full account of the Sudetenland Crisis. crisis in September 1938? During the prole. He a general the wanted war. a of peace. Hitler; it in was invaded the In rest The Munich and Mussolini 1938, he Corsica, war itself be after at he was and had now the Tunis France, desperate to as a 1938, great Chamberlain’s meetings this He time simply 1939, in was put assumed a to broker of peace, helping failure to gain peace, Germany, hailed that in broke Europe was Hitler’s the a Mussolini Mussolini forward Hitler Mussolini as own Munich avert deal stepped the now high over in architect subservient plan for the Agreement and Czechoslovakia. instructed against seen by March of September Munich. Agreement Nice in two clear fact, Sudetenland. a to “peacemaker” However, crisis Following Sudetenland as to Munich highlighted determined Italian from and do prevent a the to weakness take parliament to demand France. Mussolini so German with war, at almost of Britain advantage the believed support. any of and this. In France, November annexation that he Britain of could had win shown price. Source skills The Source A bars Malta, Mussolini’s speech to the Fascist of February is surrounded by an inland sea which to the the oceans by the Suez Canal by the straits of Gibraltar, dominated a guns of Great therefore oceans; Italy does not therefore Mediterranean powerful suffer from she her Corsica of Italy; to all western Tunisia, prison is a pistol are pointed while our Malta positions and in Cyprus the Mediterranean. Greece, central Turkey, by are all have is free actually access a to the and the more prisoner and states ready becomes the complete encirclement of Italy the to link up political with and Great military … in From this situation, you can draw the populated following and this Britain. … the Suez. heart Britain Italy and threat Egypt the of … and and Corsica, is are connected are guards 1939. at Italy prison the Grand Gibraltar Council, the Cyprus; more she conclusions: will imprisonment. 145 2 1. The task and does of Italian not continental initially to policy, have Europe break which territorial except the bars for of presented cannot aims the in Albania, the is prison. map Once the bars has have only been one broken, direction: to West. at Libya ocean? to both French major state. Spain, The Ethiopia Ocean cases, Indian through we Ocean, through come opposition. It is the French up connecting Sudan, North against stupid or to not problem the a without covering Continent. Axis important thus The caters policy historical for the time enough policy approval he to “change knew risk of that war the Italy with down militarily weakened in Africa economy, a Africa. German rap for of same confessed settlement Musso”. was aware the powers threat that On that he the Britain as Italy if Germany. he would other and could not hand France get “give a Mussolini were not Anglo- try our this the Chamberlain the to they had been in the 1920s. His resolve of the old empires as decadent and backs the rst formulated in 1935, seemed Rome- truer Berlin Tied with pose spineless, on same of to Italian to analysis this the strong make ocean. Atlantic In yet to Italian march did Which But not and the weakness world”, independent a policy Western the genuinely was 2. by of after Munich. fundamentally question. First question, par t a – 3 marks Source B Richard British Overy and professors Andrew of history, What, according policy aims for to Source Mussolini’s A, are key foreign Italy? Wheatcroft, in an academic Second question – 4 marks book The Road to War: The Origins of World War With II reference to its origin, purpose and content, (2009). assess After Munich narrower desire to Mussolini’s still. The share options German with Hitler Class discussion became success the fed the values historians his the and studying limitations Mussolini’s of Source foreign B for policy in 1930s. opportunity Why did Italy invade Albania in April 1939? Hitler broke the terms of the Munich Agreement in March 1939 when Read Source A again. he invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia. Nazi Germany had now gone Discuss the following beyond revision of the Treaty of Versailles and had seized control of a questions: sovereign 1 state. What continuity was there in informed of the Mussolini’s foreign policy in the initiative On 7 Mussolini had not been conquest after the fact. and emulate Hitler’s consulted Mussolini by Hitler. now He wanted was to only regain success. the 1930s? 2 April What changes had occurred of by 1939 in Mussolini’s time foreign policy objectives? assert Albania a satellite Italian intimidate Adriatic. the 146 made state (see Grandi paths of of the Britain the a punitive meaningless in Yugoslavia, threaten domination Italy rather strength Dino ancient and 1939, was page claimed “with to that his loss its the east naval Mediterranean ”. Italy and invasion some wanted Albania the bases, for our of to expansion, dominating of to The been successful of conquest in Albania. had Mussolini Hitler’s ambition the of on country However, conquests the assault the imitate pursue Roman Eastern 101). order and as the would “ open Mussolini ” complete C H A P T E R ▲ 2 . 3 : I T A L I A N E X P A N S I O N , 19 3 3 – 19 4 0 Italian forces landing at Durazzo, Albania How did Italy take over Albania? King Zog from Italy of Yugoslavia. sent He warships ultimatum to occupation Zog had was leaked 5 Albania when April to of did Albanians to Italians. Nevertheless, would resist to signed keep the Zog the but the intimidated on 25 the King broadcast independence with when Greece and Mussolini Mussolini agreement birth anti-Italian Tirana mobilization ofcers March, ultimatum of demonstrators a some agreements to sent the an Italian refused. over Albanian Zog be Italian y assert demanding widespread to to trade When, distraction although Italian to Tirana, King planes submit he region. prevent 100 attempted refused capital, even Then, many also Albania, and not had 1934 the attempted sent issued, had the Mussolini the in and a a dropping baby, leaets demanded of However, royal demonstrations the government public secret. of ofcials address to on his to 6 the people on April. the ght reserves ed news heir, telling weapons Albanian the his was country. stating he occupation. 147 2 Source skills consideration Source A of G. Bruce Strang. On the Fiery March: Albania as for war had of been considering annexing some The Anschluss, also threatened while disquieting for Yugoslavia. He mused [Yugoslav Prime for friendship Minister] prime Stoyadinovic’s might mean minister that would be ahead Albania’s independence an Italo-Yugoslav agreed, saying that alliance. he was a tour of war, Determined “as long as we get immediate tricky, and in gain relationship Ciano early ordered April. a Durazzo, brought to from with their Berlin, The the operation invasion, to which naval bombardment widespread of the port of condemnation, prepared in order precipitated yet another crisis in Whitehall. to also poured scorn on Mussolini’s declaration Mussolini prepared peaceful Albania”. Italian intentions during his to meeting face if included of later Adriatic. of need It secure the form the and sacrice invasion Italian that go to outright Italy, Mussolini Yugoslavian an securing Albania. developing, Italian to of (2003). secure Ciano given means Mussolini domination prepares be a with Chamberlain in January. Ciano’s Third question – 6 marks had Albania, preceding represented mission; a information to their was his kind Mussolini project return, needed whether desirable or submitted Mussolini’s visit to Italy, reconnaissance Ciano determine Ciano encouraged of and Hitler’s better or a report and contrast Source and Source for not feasible. Compare A invading had excellent of wrote, coal, and expansionist agricultural though had no full list of On the strategic very one Albania’s yet potential Examiner’s hint: sources. different there Using the economic, would of In the wake cultural, reach into inuence. subsequent A and mineral the rm of former annexation of copy of the pens above to text, identify the following underline or comparisons Comparisons a wealth. Mussolini had for been some considering annexing time. German ● There ● The were strategic reasons for annexing Albania. tentacles Austrian warning a coloured several Anschluss, political Take contrasts. Albania advantages. 1939. deposits completed were April in motives potential, ● side, in Italian desire. extensive had expressed that and Ciano views regarding Upon highlight Albania Albania the B from sphere Italy Albania and Italian inuenced relationship Italy’s with decision to Germany invade. would Contrasts prevent any further German penetration there. ● Source A highlights the role of the Italian Foreign Source B Robert Second Mallet. World Mussolini War and the Origins of than a Ciano regime month Albania. in after Hitler took The Balkan Source B highlights the role Source B focuses the motive Rome idea ordered of an the outright invasion state had been Mussolini Rome. It since had the also time been of the gains discussion seen, the of the had of 148 as Cavagnari Italian greater of staff by focus the naval whole. had from As urged Hitler’s subject staff of the Italian Navy. his very in the Mediterranean we in have the rst the of of A dominating focuses to Source suggests be made in on the Albania. A the increasing invasion was to the prevent area, Italy Source B suggests attempting to that gain it from was its motivated developing with Germany. already give in charge staff aftermath 1935, in the to days inuence visit Adriatic naval immediate crisis Source of and Bagoglio position Subsequently, demanded, the a strategic navy. whereas of relationship chiefs invade, consideration by some on whereas economic whereas to to of annexation under Adriatic, Germany by decision Prague, ● the the the the the in (1983). ● Less Minister that ● Source A whereas only considers Source specically the B also impact the reasons considers on the relations for the invasion, results, with Britain. C H A P T E R On 7 April, led by General Alfredo Guzzoni, 2 . 3 : Italy I T A L I A N invaded E X P A N S I O N , 19 3 3 – 19 4 0 Albania Class discussion with a faced force them trained in the by of 100,000 had the only equipment. were in On April, 15,000 Italians. mountains, By but the Italian men and badly King Zog Italian The of King aircraft. equipped had agents afternoon hands. 600 hoped The troops to very and his rst which ght sabotaged the Albanian the day family a army had war of ed ghting, to In small groups, discuss the been impact of Fascism on Italian resistance Albanians’ of that foreign policy up to April 1939. limited all Does everyone in your group ports agree on the impact of fascism Greece. on foreign policy? 8 Italian government deposed forces buildings. King Zog in entered Then, on absentia Tirana 12 and and April, voted seized the to control Albanian unite with of all What conclusions can be drawn parliament Italy in from your discussions? “personal union”. Albania Italians withdrew then Albanian set foreign the Albanian the ofcial already invasion a was creation would of of League of was merged put the on under Italian use 28 of Nations government Ethiopia, later Greece the Fascist ofce army Emperor Mussolini from up with the Italian as a Italian and crowned Albania October 15 King King base April Shefqet from The The ministry Mussolini Victor of 1939. Verlaci. foreign command. Empire was on under and declared Emmanuel, Albania. which to launch an 1940. Italy and the Second World War Changing diplomatic alignments in Europe after 1939 The Pact Italy the of and rst was nations; the economic the and Steel, Pact a Japan the a for Pact and protocol, Alliance, Pact cooperation had had wanted the to the more of the Soviet the agreement discussion Steel’s focus apparent negotiated Union and agreement of the show the days to of Britain of the two include and and Japan in whereas France. Italy (See Steel.) Hitler Pact page before between sections: military anti-Soviet, unity, (see signed two between union Nazi–Soviet Germany two at Pact of a been be aimed was comprised fostered intention between about trust and The original Ribbentrop, told of 1939. The minister, only Friendship May secret wanted 181–182 Despite of 22 declaration policies. but Pact on second, Germany pages or Germany it in 183). was and his August foreign 1939 Mussolini was signed. Source skills Richard Road to Overy War: and The Andrew Origins of Wheatcroft. World War II The (2009). dangerous strongly showed Now in that Mussolini Albania by “dynamism”, had matching he began restored German to his approach to with economic crisis an alliance which he was to with call Mussolini knew the the “Pact There inside was Italy, strong even resistance from the to ranks his own such of The generals were hostile to and of had of opposition link to to Germany war, … that he was increasingly resented anti-German the humiliating sentiment. something to do with No his doubt decision an In May he sent Ciano to Berlin with senior authority Fascists. the of … idea and offer honour Blood”. wave was reports a evidence of growing opinion police Italian contemplate Germany a public Secret prestige on unilateral commitments; anti-German. to sign an immediate agreement further 149 2 with in Hitler the On pledging event 22nd of May full German the military agreement might assistance involvement was in over war. neutralize the threat from the West Poland. signed; First question, par t a – 3 marks Mussolini teutonic “Pact surprised though changed and of its name Steel”. enough the German suspicious pleased to at more leaders Mussolini’s that Italian According were there move, Steel promises to Overy resistance with in and Italy Wheatcroft, to the idea why of a was Pact of Germany? Why did Italy remain a non-belligerent in 1939? TOK When Hitler invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, he unleashed a In pairs consider how the general European War. During negotiations over the Pact of Steel, Pact of Steel may have been Mussolini had suggested that Italy would not be ready for a general perceived internationally war until 1943. Thus, when Hitler ignited war over Poland, Mussolini when it was signed. Why might declared Italy a It seem non-belligerent. historians view the agreement dierently to contemporaries? would in September society the L TA Thinking skills Italian government that from was on Renzo expenditure for had in an his of 1936 path De of war asserts as (De Paolo for that fascism.) to the of creating Hitler. the was not alliance Felice has for the of It Italy, case and by be argued in also against argued from then Italian on he historian Mussolini France against left-wing to Europe militarized have that and sympathetic could war was the and Britain criticized too of “warlike” historians However, been it a nation. fate with being However, a outbreak Some Germany. this an Alatri, aims sealed Nazi consider 1940. with had by his strengthened Steel Mussolini to response against that directed until apologist was Pact Felice such Mussolini’s view the continued Italy, historians Mussolini that and Mussolini Lire (millions) was 1931 a Germany defence, 1931–40 Year and terms that 1939 being realistic in not joining the war. Italy had been waging war for 4,890 several 1932 4,880 1933 4,300 1934 5,590 1935 12,624 and years, could not in Africa afford and to in join a Europe, general and the country European was war weary conict. Why did Italy join the war in June 1940? Despite 1936 1937 having Mussolini to ● join Italy Italy out war was non-belligerent, of the war for it was several difcult for reasons: 16,573 Not 13,272 1938 15,028 1939 27,732 to Fascist his ● 58,899 the leader; portrayal Mussolini staying 1940 declared keep April it of did he something contrary condent not neutral; 1940, was want he did said: and Italy not “To to an to a be people doctrine leadership become to embarrassment Fascist decisive want make of his a lesser [the Il rank “another great as and for at the odds power by Switzerland”. country] with Duce must In be sent into battle”. Overy, R and Wheatcroft, A . 2009. ● The war regime could and to give Mussolini remove the the opportunity inuence of to radicalize conservatives and the the Church. In pairs discuss what the table above suggest about Italy’s ● defence spending. If Italy be remained dominated because ● The war it by had could a and Germany remained bring Mediterranean. 150 neutral Germany that won would be the war, hostile Europe towards would Italy neutral. territorial gains and perhaps control over the C H A P T E R However, in June buyer of million. This sea. In in the 1940 Italy’s Italy food coal March June the and – motives textiles, German two 1940, 1940, Italian predominantly received German In end, were thirds Britain Mussolini joining economic. and coal of for by in the declared all war 1939 and it I T A L I A N Second had supply – had coal Britain and E X P A N S I O N , World been owed became German on the Germany August return Italian blockaded 2 . 3 : a Italy be War principal US dependent to 19 3 3 – 19 4 0 $40 on it. delivered by ports. France. Source skills Source A Source B Mussolini’s France, declaration June of war on Britain and 1940. A 1941 text After having solved the problem of frontiers, establishing break are 45 the million access This gigantic the in is the and our not two it of arms We military own truly is of Japanese, attacking. The For new order, the social civilization”. to chains A “Victory! Italian, soldiers in want sea. free only our young ones is up reads showing Italian that nation unless it of has ocean. struggle sterile taking frontiers. development decline; and to struggle against of us souls free is are sea territorial strangling logical we our and our for land poster German the who one and fertile stand struggle phase revolution on of … the it peoples the between verge centuries ideas. Delzell, C. 1971. First question, par t a – 3 marks What are Source the key points made by Mussolini in A? First question, par t b – 2 marks What is the message conveyed by Source B? 151 2 suppor t. Mussolini continued to follow this plan until his Perspectives decision to enter the Second World War in June 1940. Italian historiography The British historian AJP T aylor In general, “left-wing” historians in Italy asser t that Taylor suggests that Mussolini had expansionist goals, Mussolini had an over tly aggressive foreign policy and but that there was a lot of conict between the foreign expansionist aims. The “right-wing” historians, such as policies of Hitler and Mussolini. He argues, however, that Renzo De Felice (Mussolini’s Italian biographer), argue Mussolini thought Hitler would agree to leave Austria that Italy did not have large-scale expansionist plans. De independent and that Italy could then play France and Felice views Mussolini’s foreign policy in the context of Germany o against each other while gaining concessions the policies pursued before 1914 by the liberal Italian from both. The problem was that Hitler intended to achieve government. He argues that, from the 1920s up to at least Anschluss 1935, Mussolini wanted to get France’s agreement to establish Italy as a great power with an expanded empire The German historian Gerhard Schreiber in Nor th Africa. To this end, he was advised to pursue Schreiber sees Mussolini’s foreign policy as dependent the “policy of the pendulum” or, in other words, to be the on socio-economic domestic policy. In his view, foreign decisive weight in European relations. In addition, the policy was used for propaganda purposes, and its real right-wing historians generally claim that the alliance aim was to gain domestic consensus and limited imperial with Hitler ’s Germany was not sealed in order to pursue expansion. He claims that Mussolini had no clear strategy imperialist objectives. Britain’s pressure on France to aligned to Nazi Germany, and was more a victim of his follow sanctions over Abyssinia may have fostered a own public promises to his people that he would create a new course. Felice suggests that Mussolini remained Fascist empire. By the summer of 1940 he therefore had equivocal about Hitler, and hoped to attain his objectives no choice but to join Germany in a general European war. by making one side and then the other pay for his Mussolini’s actions in the war up to 1941 TOK Following Mussolini’s declaration of war, there were some limited air In small groups review the raids and skirmishes between Italy and France before an armistice came sources by historians in this into effect on 25th June 1940. chapter and investigate other historians who have written Mussolini on Italian foreign policy in the into expanded 1930s. Where possible, nd of historians writing in dierent However, both languages and at dierent times. response. Mussolini’s North Libya, both the Africa. whilst the another of Balkans war Italian these and in forces Italian Italian failures North Europe in invaded force invaded offensives meant Africa. the Mediterranean Egypt from the Greece failed due from to and Italian the Hitler’s forces were German forces took colony Albania. British drawn into Yugoslavia What dierent viewpoints can and Greece in April 1941, and forced an evacuation of British forces. you nd? Hitler’s forces, under General Rommel, had pushed the British back Consider the origin and purpose and advanced as far as El Alamein in Egypt by June 1942. of the publications you gather. Discuss the extent to which the L TA historian’s views seem to be Self-management skills inuenced by preoccupations Consider Mussolini’s foreign policy aims: at the time of writing. ● increase national pride ● dominate the Mediterranean ● consolidate domestic suppor t for ● build an empire, gain spazio Do you agree with the idea that historical accounts are developed his regime by individual historians rather vitale(living space), and expand territories in Africa than through collaboration ● revise the settlement of 1919–20 ● dominate the Balkans between historians? How ● foster the spread of Fascism. does this compare with the 152 methodology in other subjects For each of these aims, identify the extent to which it had been achieved by 1941 such as the natural sciences? and give evidence for your conclusions. C H A P T E R 2 . 3 : I T A L I A N E X P A N S I O N , 19 3 3 – 19 4 0 Full document question: Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia will Source A be no need declaration La domenica del Corriere, of the Italian della Sera, depicting in action emphasise of January the ofcially any purely operations. against raise any case for we a must No defensive one difculties in Europe provided the Abyssinian prosecution forces, in Italian would Blackshirts and newspaper character Corriere whatsoever war weekend always supplement of of operations resulted rapidly 1936. in an accomplished declare to interests England would be fact. and It would France sufce that to their recognised. Source C Ruth War Henig. The 1933–41 Since his Fascist ascension leader ambition power Origins to by had raise strong the to Japan, term to military but for least in of glorious he at World it a as of a and the European around its onset in expansion a of and more the cheap, Abyssinia, or France and short, him short agreement, Britain of for the on expense glorious, the empire. lacked harder aimed the the his well-equipped, even he inclined of 1922, Mussolini and the of in secret expanding needed was prospect war Thus no inuence forces, consent, Mussolini the base Africa that tacit by made them. seek possibly Second status its however, Depression secure the power Italy’s and economic effective to made increasing Mediterranean Unlike of (1985). more at … towards triumphant conquest. Source D Martin Blinkhorn. Mussolini and Fascist Italy , (1984). Source B The Memorandum of General from Staff to Marshal Badoglio, Mussolini, Chief December 1934. been a The problem of Italian-Abyssinian conquest Mussolini’s an Italian century. very plane alone less to … then recently one The the Abyssinian Abyssinia. which object can … complete army In shifted no and from be is solved nothing total Empire … The Neither nor likely will by more of can we our action the danger the Japanese of problems for of had half African the interests dictate it. Existing attract the groups were of certain sufcient colonies were failing to to or conquest way In what millions of potential emigrants the speedier be of dream force beloved of fascist propaganda, proving unrewarding and were of to the few thousand build actually settled there; moreover, their the policing and economic diplomatic infrastructures complications. the the pressure administration, less nationalist industrial who the represented diplomatic destruction the other a Ethiopia relations depression has of accomplishment fashion constituted a considerable there drain on the Italian treasury. The explanation 153 2 for the attack fascism and on its Ethiopia Duce. The thus lies fascist in First question, par t b – 2 marks need for What excitement, perfectly and conict and personied sanctied by in the dramatic success Mussolini himself puerile machismo of cult. Other dictators such as and Salazar in Portugal Franco cults and of lack personality rendered on the appeal excitement. nor such the a the artist in Source A? reference the to values its origin, and purpose limitations of and content, Source B for constructed of studying the Italian invasion of Abyssinia. stability Neither psychology thing of in historians personal message Second question – 4 marks assess Spain the the With Duce is was Third question – 6 marks Mussolini’s of fascism conceivable. Compare and contrast Source and Source B motives for invading the C views expressed regarding in Mussolini’s Abyssinia. First question, par t a – 3 marks According invasion to of Source B Abyssinia how be should an Four th question – 9 marks Italian executed? Using the the sources reasons for and the your Italian own knowledge, invasion of analyse Abyssinia. References Class discussion Blinkhorn, M. 1984. Mussolini J Foust, and Fascist Italy . Methuen. London, UK Source B was written in 1934. Which events does it refer to Calvitt when it says: “in the Japanese Bolshevik-Fascist Clarke, fashion there will be no need for USA and C. 1991. Rapprochement of the Russia 1930s . and Italy against Greenwood Hitler: Press. The New York, a declaration of war...” What links De Felice, R. 1981. Mussolini il duce: Lo Stato totalitario (1936–40). Einaudi. are suggested here between Turin, Italy events in Asia and Japanese expansionism and Italian expansionist plans? Delzell, C. 1971. Macmillan. Henig, R. London, Knight, Lowe, Mack 1985. C 2003. and R. Mussolini Marzari, D. 1983. 1983. Overy, R and War Random Z. of the and Second Fascism. 1975. Italian G. Westport, The 2003. Selected Documents . World War 1933–41 . Routledge. Routledge. Foreign London, Policy, UK 1870–1940 . Routledge. A. the Fiery 210. Origins 2009. Triumph the page of Paladin the Books. Second London, World War, UK 1933–40 . UK London, University On USA and London, House. Oxford CT, Mussolini, Wheatcroft, 2011. 1933–1999. Strang, F . Mussolini Macmillan. Steiner, 154 Origins Palgrave II. 1919–45: UK Smith, Mallet, The Fascism, UK UK P . London, Mediterranean London, of The Road to War: The Origins of World UK the Dark: Press. March: European New York, Mussolini International History USA Prepares for War. Praeger. 2.4 German expansion, 1933–1938 Conceptual understanding Key concepts ➔ Causation ➔ Consequence ➔ Continuity Key questions ➔ Examine the ways in which Hitler challenged the post-war settlement. ➔ Discuss the consequences of Hitler ’s actions for the international situation. ▲ Hitler becomes German Chancellor Adolf Hitler, taken in 1933 1933 January Hitler introduces a programme of February Hitler leaves the Disarmament Conference rearmament and announces the intention to withdraw October Germany from the League of Nations Germany signs a non-aggression pact with 1934 January Poland Saar Plebiscite 1935 January March Stresa Agreement Anglo–German Naval Treaty June Italian invasion of Abyssinia 1936 March Germany remilitarizes the Rhineland Hitler sends military suppor t to Franco’s July nationalists in Spain August Hitler ’s Four Year Plan is drafted Anti-Comintern Pact is made with Japan Rome–Berlin Axis November 1937 Hossbach Memorandum 155 2 As we was have to out seen, destroy alongside and, in the outbreak Hitler’s the rearmament. process, of main Versailles the general This stage war in foreign Peace was was policy aim Settlement, achieved set Europe for in after which achieving had between further to be 1933 territorial power carried and 1938 claims and the 1939. Changing diplomatic alignments in Europe after 1933 The be response key for Germany’s the of Britain Hitler and position constraints international of and his in the France goal of Europe Treaty situation after was of to his actions overturning still after 1933 Treaty vulnerable Versailles. 1933 the and Fortunately worked to his of it would Versailles; remained for Hitler, under the advantage. Britain Britain by was events expansion. priority also the Its being redress Far safety the of were of Treaty were also sympathy with Hitler, from afraid of with it was already the the but British to be unfair Many saw as Many and a its buffer main politicians supported right-wing dictator, also Japanese with communist also crisis Empire. Versailles they about overstretched, British the economic worried grievances”. of who the only where “legitimate Britain communism not East, resources the considered some in pre-occupied in politicians Stalin, to the and had spread of East. The Little Entente France This was a series of France was very concerned by the possible German threat but was too treaties between Romania, weak to act on its own, especially after politically divided, the failure of its 1923 intervention Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, in the Ruhr. It was also following a series of weak which were concluded from governments, and had major economic problems. Lacking support from 1920 to 1921, and aimed to the USA or Britain in the task of preserving the Versailles settlement, it prevent Austria and Hungary built a defensive line of fortresses along the Maginot Line between 1929 from regaining territory lost and 1938. It also developed alliances with countries on Germany’s eastern after the First World War. borders: Poland Romania and and “The Little Entente” countries – Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia. The USA The economic concerns Other ● 156 meant was unlikely factors also worked The international insularity ● depression and The rather memories of this war to prevent in the Hitler’s First the its was focused on domestic stance. favour: was encouraging national security. World War determined war. USA isolationist situation collective many another that change economic than of made to were to take still acute, any measures and the horror necessary C H A P T E R ● The need to weakness ● Britain and dealing ● The avoid of France with League with of revision France reparation as were unable to of the and the allowing with a speed for and predecessors reinforced this by the E X P A N S I O N , 19 3 3 – 19 3 8 military time. agree on a common policy for — to the of the failure Manchuria League Versailles Rhineland were deal a effectively blow to both the itself. had in effectively to was already 1929–30 cancelled begun; and at Britain German the Lausanne 1932. historian even in Treaty payments of perceived expansion evacuated Conference However, at System and was France Nation’s Japanese The war and G E R M A N Hitler. Washington ● another Britain 2 . 4 : the Zara Steiner breakdown ultimate Steiner, of purpose 2011: writes, the international that clearly regime, distinguished Hitler him moved from his 95 Germany’s challenges to the post-war settlements, 1933–38 Although the had careful a to be cautious and his he worked worked to Italy. his and, of the dictatorship and of to that he potential France by Hitlerwas the within aims, He desired opposition. to prestige peace, However, security: commitments alliances he that existing with effectively and still followed only undermining able he thus collective multilateral henegotiated increase Germany Hitler’s backlash. undermined from time, actions, and any years isolated same these Versailles he claimed defuse ve Germany action, at favoured international Hitler to next withdraw situation an Publicly, the Alongside Treaty avoid carefully over limit alliances, to policy. actions might international power Britain and challenge of his the own Europe. Challenging the Treaty of Versailles: Withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference Article that with 8 of the national Covenant armaments national safety”. of be However, international disarmament international conference When 1933, the achieved. threat Disarmament there of was France, Nazism Manchuria were Furthermore, way that arguing it in on was to make was be prior that nally on in it demanded point consistent implementing took until to convened how events to Britain to would difculties treated, concessions had lowest 1932 to thinking and disarm unfolding at about France with in an for Geneva disarmament unwilling The conducive that Nations the an organized. borders. clear of to meant consensus should Germany the Conference not governments that be particular, its League policy to little also Germany prepared German still the “reduced did Britain could with the in be the new same time in disarmament. not agree indicating about that it the was Germany. Hitler had participate requested only if parity other of armaments, countries reduced 157 2 their to armaments theirs. When in 1933, of Nations, Hitler pulled to November 1933, the of keep Germans “victors”. Germany’s claiming conspiracy with to France out that he of this both these the weak plebiscite gave that to allowed the and launch an 95% had the last and assault of on rearm League of a French self-defence. for stood the the to Conference the part approval at talks and were incapable Hitler from Germany Disarmament Conference Germany withdrawal needed or at organizations Germany rejoicing Hitler’s freedom a level, refused his up to League rest of In actions, the gave the him Treaty Versailles. Source skills in Source A the month, disarm A speech by Hitler, 14 October cannot degradation tolerate the of the nation discrimination the withholding by which the end, are the rights which are granted as course at to present nothing other in nations the leaders common … The every of with 1918. Like decent every traitors to our service. Fatherland but we man We feel must are not and we do in the for time what of his and for what we have had innite desire other love for our wholeheartedly nations … but, our for lives the every not for us to conditions be done. We that of are devoid Since it of a sense of been made of only was to so of certain to Great own not of prepared Germany to at consider it is impossible, her position, her company for in view Germany upon other other that powers equality and reluctant that, to since reduce the their level, could all seek controls actual must equality be in way. To this kind by of the intransigence British the government, yield, insisting on a waiting period which and Germany give could some prove indication its of good what intentions were. he and, This gave Hitler the its excuse with it needed brushing aside an Italian compromise, he announced is to nd a 14 October 1933 that Germany was ending to its participation in the conference and … us from real we of to it to membership that the League of Nations, an of that he had Germany’s always second regarded class as status a and of whose members, including the German decided indignity continue the they equality have of the ones, that years he institutions Powers present, the insisted enough were refused for rights not supported symbol were that He Germany’s that institution declarations ve that have bearable honour clear sure French, its has affair Geneva at both those at we honour, members which Sudeten war on under the demands accept. powers attempt impossible by he honest understanding men those country’s people an as purpose our faith such in made status in distress his Englishman all placed responsible responsible effected foreshadowed of its its be Germany the decent Frenchman, that reasonably lifted duty to men forces and Hitler employ he other November seen a of have be in would who must to perpetuation consists was of part tactics later: matter France’s intention deliberate would a an cause”. using of of 1933. In Germany lack broadcast the on on “the to he privately felt contempt. of force nations. First question, par t a – 3 marks What, according attitude towards to Source A, international is Germany’s cooperation? Source B Third question – 6 marks Gordon book It A. Craig, Germany was writing 1866–1945 necessary to in an academic (1978). avoid appearing Compare and contrast Source and Source A of [Hitler’s] 158 the piece. foreign When minister the told rupture came, Nadolny later views expressed regarding the Disarmament villain the B Conference. Hitler in and the C H A P T E R Examiner’s contrasts two full sources in hint: the sources paragraphs and Highlight giving as shown showing brief the below. clear quotes comparisons to Then linkage support 2 . 4 : G E R M A N and in write the honour” points. In Source to A, Hitler ● Source of a Germany member of A looking the about degradation discrimination” seeing about Source for talks League talks Germany. B itself of as Source “second Source B of class” says of rights” that ● for Germany the that Nations. “equality also a and ● and Source A the language “indignity”, shows Hitler’s was blames Germany “deliberate “devoid feelings be “the Source A claims great powers” for looking for great for of a sense of Germany’s powers” Conference, doing villain that actions, “intransigence” “certain “certain was to countries’ “equality”. blames A Disarmament appear was ● where Contrasts “perpetuation refers A, 19 3 3 – 19 3 8 treatment. Similarities ● Source degradation”, between your E X P A N S I O N , this of only the so is of Germany “excuse” that the Source an for Source it the B failure says would not piece”. Germany whereas but and to B victim talks claims leave the of of that other the Hitler League of not Nations. allowing Germany Source specically B “refused to to be on names an equal France footing as a and country ● that In yield”. Source with he ● Source B talks of the for League of Nations “contempt” that Hitler other did not and this tone is Hitler says nations”, want an he wants whereas “an Source understanding understanding B but implies was that putting had forward the A, demands “that the other powers would not present accept”. Undermining collective security: The Non-Aggression Pact with Poland Germany’s of withdrawal collective particularly Germany the unwilling had government Treaty particularly Treaty. For to take any he was system 1921 the the in had borders. Germany that French the France now of rapprochement further undermining the to It had by failure concept was stop surprise. to also out of Stresemann as the part of Hitler. and, by an with the security He The pact and system. was unable the with he Locarno pact, security Poland Germany’s diplomatic it. the been 1925 France’s on of were though signing alliance pressure on had even weakened signed keep clauses Poland Germany suited stage The recreate Czechoslovakia collective the Pact of pact impose between for border, to France this would broken West’s Locarno, this at setback Non-Aggression land borders frontier. attempted chance world at a eastern 1934. with Poland this the German however, that had had the border Europe. at 10-year January, eastern eastern hoped a Germany; the against Eastern and in moment, his into took was Germany’s alarmed given western action securing in League on had guarantee accepted the Pact that resented to and, entered Non-Aggression Versailles from Poland, vulnerable rearming, German The security. in eastern encirclement also ended Poland, Moreover, any thus as this was Class discussion an unpopular international convince move in Germany, community Britain like and others had no the an that act Non-Aggression of Pact statesmanship; Germany was a it looked could peaceful be to the used to What do Hitler ’s actions in the years 1933–34 over nation. disarmament and Poland reveal Of course, Hitler intention of keeping to this agreement. Hitler about his tactics for achieving preferred bilateral agreements to collective security agreements, as his foreign policy objectives in these could more easily be with Poland broken. He declared privately that “All our these years? agreements have a temporary signicance”. 159 2 Changing diplomatic alignments: Mussolini and Austria In June was not would the 1934, a success; not agree unication important part to persuade of Germany. keep was also as Party organized July, a of the Austria, by campaign in the which Hitler and as a been a an tried “satellite” he wanted and been had and Hitler become had meeting Anschluss, Germany Settlement, would attempted Hitler of This force coup was Nazis. of the Italy. gained to He by substantial back right-wing terrorism, Nazis which to rst be the step of a coup Germany. troops concern. and Germany, down Austrian Austrian Chancellor with with the The Austrian international border to and intended union 100,000 forced The was caused Italy’s supporting Frauenfeld. intimidation the mobilized pass, was Eduard assassination Dollfuss. that Austrian Tyrol, the always however, between Hitler Alfred d’état 1934. South had aims, should this, by Austria. policy Austria state on Austria, rejected Versailles Englebert Brenner in that and However, unimpressed foreign that buffer the in immediately Hitler and Mussolini meet in Venice in 1934 Germany Hitler’s a was position of as led culminated The Hitler’s met. minority. Meanwhile, Nazi Mussolini to Mussolini of Mussolini of aware part German and Mussolini Austria Italy ▲ Hitler and politician moved in to a Mussolini them show disown Kurt von of to the strength the actions Schuschnigg Coup d’état took over and stabilized the Austrian regime. This is a sudden and violent take over of government, usually by a small group of people. A putsch is another word for a coup (for example, At this point, regarding whose therefore, unication support reassured he Hitler with would Mussolini that was forced Austria. need to play a He did not against the Western Austria would not waiting want be to game alienate Mussolini, democracies, and he annexed. Hitler ’s attempted Munich putsch in 1923) The growing strength of Germany: The Saar plebiscite, January 1935 In accordance territory, under to held French return to the control This triumph so a done population of opportunity strength Gordon This of fairly, the of the for and been 1919 result vote) Hitler. the territory Nazi with and Versailles, result the and of The was This that was the now Saar voting to of Saar, It opportunity popularity of the was an the to by given growing Nazi Germany. the that nevertheless the been overwhelming return supervised was coal-rich given surprising reinforce small had should was not a Germany plebiscite the was the area German. propaganda which beginning extreme differences The the of 1935. a League the great power regime. entire and Historian writes: success, period of Germany Craig marked had the for in since Germany. (90.9% was Treaty plebiscite agreement and 160 with a of the able European in of the a other new vulnerability other the Powers, course security of system. Powers phase in made his unscathed, his two — own policy. and, tactical years Craig, to no free 1978 attempt to He survived thanks skill, had to and himself the a interfere, good from the distractions the deal of and luck, restraints of C H A P T E R 2 . 4 : G E R M A N E X P A N S I O N , 19 3 3 – 19 3 8 Source skills A poster the Saar foot from 1934, plebiscite. read “To in the The lead words up at to the Germany”. L TA Communication skills Go to http://www.britishpathe.com/video/hitler-acclaimed-in-saar- news-in-a-nutshell Watch the Pathé News clip showing Hitler ’s arrival in the Saar. How does Hitler use this event to show his growing power? L TA Thinking and self-management skills Look back at Craig’s assessment of Hitler ’s situation by the end of 1935. He identies several reasons for Hitler ’s success: ● Hitler ’s tactical skill ● luck ● the distractions and dierences of the other powers. Find examples from the period 1933–35 to suppor t each of these factors. Which of these factors do you consider to be the most signicant in explaining Hitler ’s success? (You may want to review your answer to the question on page 159, identifying the dierent tactics that Hitler used.) First question, par t b – 2 marks What is the message of this poster? Challenging the Treaty of Versailles: Rearmament Joachim von Ribbentrop As early as February 1933, Hitler told his generals that rearmament was Ribbentrop star ted o as the most pressing priority: “the next ve years must be devoted to the defence Hitler ’s adviser on foreign capacity of the Germany people”. In fact, Germany had always ignored the policy. In 1935 he negotiated rearmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. With the cooperation of the Anglo–German Naval the Soviet Union under the Rapallo Treaty (see page 121), Germany had Agreement, and in August 1936 continued to build aircraft Hitler continuing and to train and expand its army. In this sense, he was appointed ambassador was what had already been started by previous German to Britain. He hoped to arrange governments. However, he now increased the pace of rearmament an alliance with Britain but dramatically. ultimately failed in this goal; he By 1935, was the introduced over half a ministers, had army needed 2,500 be increased same men. revealed that to the million around grounds in had the In the March Hitler Britain and able protect to year; existence planes. from France 7 army 1935, of the itself 21 divisions. increased Hermann Luftwaffe, justied had to this failed against to the level to Conscription 36 Göring, which of disarm divisions one by of this growing that Soviet Hitler’s on was not helped by his arrogant behaviour. After this, he became negative towards Britain, seeing it as weak . In 1938 he became time rearmament and and the Germany foreign minister, a post he kept until 1945. Army. 161 2 Challenging the Treaty of Versailles: The remilitarization of the Rhineland Early in 1936, Rhineland. East under the Hitler This turned area terms of had the his been Treaty attention to the demilitarized of Versailles. In Prussia order to provide installations left Poland bank bank of or or security garrisons within the River 50 for France, were no military permitted kilometres of the on the right Rhine. Germany Belgium For Hitler, the Rhineland remilitarization would be of the an important step strengthening Germany; he in his Rhineland plans France Saar for be able an attack to build fortications there would to prevent ia from France. Rhineland Austria Austria The timing of Hitler’s actions in 1936 was Hungar y Sudetenland led Danzig – Free City both by domestic international Italy considerations. food ▲ and shortages In Germany, were causing rising prices unrest and among Disputed territories around Germany, 1935–38 the attention from provided an British ties and with economic ideal Hitler, Hitler Britain France the Hoare–Laval Hitler’s excuse Franco–Soviet ratied on Locarno 4 over and Rhineland. and so also Pact for he to crisis that page moving not he troops He threatened Hitler to by he oppose was break crisis distract seeking and of the closer of the the crisis with takeover advantage this to Abyssinian now Hitler’s take both the Mussolini’s that could needed the fact fallout that from 204). back Assistance 1936. action. meant distracted and Internationally, take agreed (see Mutual and this knew were March Pact problems. opportunity French population into Treaty argued that Germany the (see this with Rhineland page 214), violated was the which the was spirit of the encirclement. Source skills A speech To a this by Hitler, [the March Locarno] contribution 7 Pact which But 1936. Germany represented a should because frontier while with steel France and and Bolshevik International, it as to imposed of complete upon us on heavily, , not but had not Western concluded this Russia is power the of no exponent Treaty political and political creed signicance of a philosophical new the or means that a non-aggression be taken orders This with two … … be different issued states from … not in Paris but in one Moscow. gigantic mobilisation Europe is of opposed the not East only against to the a but to the spirit of the Locarno Pact. Soviet revolutionary system in would was Frontier. letter European of a Central France this and defencelessness our … section which aggression headquarters, condition then a fortied concrete garrisoned … be made … armaments, would great would her happen state decision sacrice this Bolshevik Cited in Norman H. Baynes. 1969. Its First question, par t a – 3 marks It cannot will 162 not be be is … world foreseen victorious revolution. whether … in this France philosophy as well. According the spirit to of Hitler, the how Locarno has France Pact? gone against C H A P T E R Both Hitler’s generals about marching likely to decided the provoke to take a Abyssinian effective the 48 hours my life. If to withdraw troops intelligence action was warnings weak The successful was again peace and challenge the on returning that despite military invasion the divert the in to the was make League and the hesitant dangerous action However, disarray France 19 3 3 – 19 3 8 from Hitler caused taking by any that or the on the about British were the most Rhineland, we nerve-wracking would have had legs. and 7 March French, to happen. the French Germans accompanied Hitler look of Britain as new of as by and well. The 1936. who In had stop invaded fact, received However, to security peace and offer France He a though Britain settlement. frontier negotiating the our was attention post-war the into Rhineland fact were E X P A N S I O N , no the with a force. providing of the a France. Rhineland British this as diplomatic Britain the between the the Ofce it and G E R M A N said, marched the either to to tails into to sides interested by that later into Foreign viewing Britain prevent he had to intended Rhineland, their our moved taken from march French surprise remilitarization, relatively would the German hoping However, with not the Rhineland, response after this and the gamble, the German a a crisis action. of was into 2 . 4 : also pacts he offer, which was man France away included created his of from his demilitarizing similar suggested with a that zones he was neighbours and Nations. Source skills Examiner’s many the following The is marks overall that of the and by the faces This of the are also the ags the were German be the citizens giving troops. that every German can both are seen on the soldiers who owers The Nazi ying building here occupants expressions and to the the about action. give answer? Rhineland happy How you message both troops hint: would from would also First question, par t b – 2 marks indicate What is the message of this photograph? support for the remilitarization. 163 2 L TA Thinking and communication skills Read the views of historians Kershaw and Craig on the Source B impact of the remilitarization of the Rhineland. Identify and Gordon A. Craig. Germany 1866–1945 (1978), make notes on: page ● 691. why this success was impor tant to Hitler ’s position in With the [invasion of the Rhineland] … Hitler Germany had eectively destroyed the post-First World ● why it changed the international situation. War security system. The German remilitarisation of the Rhineland was a victory not merely in Source A the sense that it enhanced German prestige. Its Ian Kershaw, Hitler (1991), page 124. psychological eect was to reveal the exclusively The remilitarisation of the Rhineland was impor tant in defensive nature of French strategical thinking, the context of rearmament; it matched the revisionist and this had devastating consequences among expectations of the traditional conservative-nationalist France’s allies. Before the year was out , the elites; and it was hugely popular among the masses King of the Belgians was seeking release from of the population – even in circles otherwise distinctly the obligations incurred by the treaties of 1920 cool about the Nazi regime. As the re-establishment of and 1925, and his government had abandoned German sovereignty over territory which no one disputed the intention of extending the Maginot Line into was Germany, it would have been on the agenda of any Belgium and had set a course back towards strict nationalist German government. And given the well- neutrality. There were tremors in the Little Entente known divisions between Britain and France in their as well, where politicians with an eye to the main stance towards Germany, it was an issue which more chance began to weigh the advantages of getting than most stood a likely chance of success. But precisely on to Hitler ’s bandwagon. All in all, the Führer had the manner in which Hitler achieved his notable triumph good reason to exult , as he viewed the disarray of was guaranteed to give a massive boost to his leadership French for tunes, “ The world belongs to the man position. He had been proved right again, in the teeth of with guts! God helps him”. Foreign Oce hesitancy and military anxiety. And his popularity among the masses … had never been higher. Increasing the inuence of Nazism: The Spanish Civil War L TA Communication Spain became the battleeld for a European-wide struggle between the forces skills of Go to http://www.britishpathe. communism other. — and Henig, socialism on the one hand and the forces of Fascism on the 1985 com/video/scraps-of-paper Mussolini and Hitler were pushed closer together when they both Watch the Pathé News clip intervened in the Spanish Civil War on the side of Franco. showing Hitler ’s invasion As you will have read in the previous chapter, the Spanish Civil War of the Rhineland. What began in 1936 with a nationalist revolt led by the army against the impression does the footage republican Spanish government. and the commentary give about Germany at this time? Both sides conict. appealed General Germany and to the Franco Italy, international led while the the community Nationalists Republican and he for help asked government in for hoped this help to from get TOK support from Britain, France and the Soviet Union. Review the historian’s accounts Germany did not send ground troops but played a key role in transporting in Source A and Source B above. Franco’s troops from German bombers Morocco to Spain at the start of the conict, by attacking and Discuss the use of reason in of the Condor Legion caused havoc civilian the accounts given by each centres, most notoriously Guernica in April 1937. German submarines historian. To what extent are also attacked government ships in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, in their views inuenced by contrast to Mussolini (see German involvement. expectation and hindsight? 164 page 141), Hitler placed limits on the extent of C H A P T E R Hitler ● had He wanted a reasons friendly Spanish mineral German submarines. He would attacks be on for intervening government resources able to civilian test and out in also his air in G E R M A N civil war: this Spain that provide force would military and see E X P A N S I O N , supply bases the 19 3 3 – 19 3 8 for effects of air L TA ● several 2 . 4 : Self-management populations. Refer back to Chapter 2.3. ● He was able to pose as the defender of European civilization against Compare and contrast the the Communist threat. impor tance of involvement in ● A pro-Fascist French government in Spain would further undermine the Spanish Civil War for the security. foreign policies of Mussolini and Hitler. What were the results of this conict for Hitler ’s position in Europe? ● The ● It war reinforced and the Fascist ● It dragged for suspicions Soviet Union three years, between on the polarizing Britain other, and thereby opinion France in on preventing Europe. the a one hand strong anti- alliance. distracted (see on page the 217) opposition to West, led and Hitler expansion Britain’s to in believe Eastern failure that he to take would any strong not face action further Europe. Changing diplomatic alignments: The Rome–Berlin Axis and the Anti-Comintern Pact The most important alignments Hitler of was the recognized Abyssinia” update the and in approval, Hitler principle that German The new in Austria in in out the their of Comintern Pact stated in On the of cooperation was of the In with as British a Mussolini. “Emperor initiative opposition 1936, pursue be diplomatic and the with Chancellor to to a side, on Hitler Italy July It consisted year directed between Rome–Berlin interests same of prevent promised herself War a German Mussolini’s Schuschnigg policy German to to state ” “ based in of on the return for non-intervention. 1936. mutual the III Italian agreement to signing to removed. acknowledges October November Italy Civil between Emmanuel now an Spanish relations Schuschnigg atmosphere Mussolini setting was commitment culminated the with Treaties. signed whereby of Victor worked Austria Austria, a King Locarno inuence result improved by (see an against of a page Germany Axis series 143). agreement the and between of secret This with Communist was Italy Hitler and protocols followed Japan; the up Anti- International and Class discussion that, the case of an attack by the Soviet Union, the signatories To what extent had Hitler would consult on measures to “safeguard their common interests”. The succeeded in removing the militant nature of this agreement indicated the beginning of the openly most impor tant restrictions of aggressive phase of Hitler’s Hitler delighted, foreign policy. the Treaty of Versailles by the was as these agreements demonstrated that Germany end of 1936? was no longer isolated but an important player on the world stage. 165 2 The impact of the economy on Hitler ’s foreign policy: Source skills The Four Year Plan Ruth of Henig. the page Second 30 In Origins World War, process Four By 1936, the (1985). the the The rearmament consumer butter and and foreign was to every effort more self-supporting of to synthetic by trade in Hitler solved the by for to introduced prepare and with and Believing it would no that of minister, in foreign raw of materials order to Dr. Hjalmar enable Schacht, more exports to trade. Germany’s more the this an Kershaw that land economic and living problems space. He could decided only to be go economy more closely under party control, all in and Romania particular German This was September to be 1936 done under via the a Four Year leadership Plan, of which Göring. Hitler end of of the the was year renewed and the of contours own make the crisis, now in 1930s power [1936], pace of rearmament Schacht a strong with anti-Comintern democracies, latter target would economic resigned. position. too fast However, As the and that there historian is Ian writes: the providing for manufactures armaments. war. in that doubt Germany exchange for cause creation because of Indeed, shortages by were food materials a economics armaments encouraging bringing Hitler By for The on believed order and was less acquisition autarky, Europe in thus However, whereby to imports Hitler. range bilateral eastern supplied vital for were by south-eastern raw of there essential agreements states enough materials, materials, concluding shortages fast struggle: become wide stockpiling raw as exchange. spending produced, out of well to make be a as progressing starting Plan], favoured developing meat, not was [of Year Germany was economy evidence the growing were all position of German the pact the And had out emerged Japan, passivity economy international set. German-Italian with of and the uncertainty committed tension the and various buttressed axis full an tilt to Civil of the the all western arms crises reinforced. … War preparation escalating interwoven and secured Spanish — of for race 1936, war , in the Hitler’s Kershaw, 1991 advances she could The impact of Nazism on Germany’s foreign policy: supply vitally needed The Hossbach Memorandum supplies of oil. The conference marks the point at which the expansion of the Third Reich First question, par t a – ceased to be latent and became explicit. — Wiliamson, 1995 3 marks According what to ways Henig, did On 5 top generals November, Hitler make Germany his called war a special ministers: meeting Hermann that was Göring attended (air), by Werner his von (army), Erich Raeder (navy), Werner von Blomberg (defence) and prepared Foreign for and plan Fritsch to Hitler in Minister Konstantin von Neurath. Hitler told the meeting that war? what We he was know and Hossbach, L TA Communication, thinking and social skills At the say about written without to this down from having and to be meeting ve days regarded because later by that he made been seen by Hitler. Hitler proposed gave an several as “his the at the that will of and points military time. overview actions last main Hitler’s notes conference, situation was The were compiled assistant, Colonel document Germany’s now testament”. needed was led international to be taken. The Read the full text of the following extracts are taken from Hossbach’s memorandum: Hossbach Memorandum at: avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/ hossbach.asp The aim racial of German community question for foreign and Germany to policy enlarge was: was it. It to make was where could had reckon secure therefore she achieve a and to preserve question the of greatest the space. gain at The the Make bullet point notes on the lowest cost? German policy to with two hate inspired antagonists, key points made. In pairs or small groups, discuss the signicance of this meeting. 166 Britain and a thorn in the esh force. If the resort of France, to … to whom a German Germany’s force with colossus problem its could attendant in the only risks is centre be of solved accepted Europe by … the was use there then C H A P T E R remains still to be answered the questions 2 . 4 : “When”? G E R M A N and E X P A N S I O N , “How”? In 19 3 3 – 19 3 8 this Source skills matter Case 1: there were Period three contingencies to be dealt with. Second question – 1943–5 4 marks After that expected which date … Our would Führer was problem of only a change relative then still space by the strength have living for been it would carried was 1943–5 worse his at for decrease out by the unalterable the our latest point in of view relation rest of the to could the world. determination to be rearmament … solve If With reference purpose the Germany’s assess and the values limitations … of internal strife in France should develop into such a domestic crisis as Hitler’s absorb the against Case French army Germany, Hossbach then completely the time and for render acting it incapable against the of Czechs use for would foreign evidence after policy 1937. war have come. 3 France should “proceed” position to our threat be against rst overthrow the If as to plans If origin, 2 of If its and the Memorandum Case to content, embroiled objective, our plan made use in For in Czechoslovakia to Germany so Germany. the any of this with of our Austria possible war to another improvement event and in war the of being state our embroiled simultaneously operation settle the that against Czech in the and she could not political-military in war, order to must be remove West. Austrian question, it Class discussion was to be assumed that Britain – herself at war with Italy – would decide not Refer back to Hitler ’s foreign to act against Germany. policy ideas in Mein Kampf While none of the military leaders objected to the planned destruction (see pages 117–118). What of Czechoslovakia, Blomberg and Fritsch were unhappy about a policy continuities are there in his that could lead to war with Britain and France before Germany was aims as set out in 1923 in Mein sufciently prepared. However, all those who were hesitant about Kampf and those as they appear Hitler’s aims – (Blömberg, Fritsch and Neurath) were ruthlessly removed in the Hossbach Memorandum? from power in February 1938 when Hitler appointed himself Supreme What change in attitude do you Commander of the German army. These changes were accompanied by see concerning Britain? the retirement of 16 high-ranking generals and the transfer of 44 others, In pairs, review Italy’s position thus removing anyone who might be less than committed to Hitler’s on a potential naval war with goals. As [Night of Kershaw writes, “ Following the Reichstag Fire and the Rohm crisis Britain. What would be the the Long Knives], the Blömberg-Fritsch affair was the third great Italian view of the “cases” milestone on the way to Führer absolutist power ” (quoted in Darby, 2007). discussed in this meeting? How signicant is the Hossbach Memorandum as evidence of Hitler ’s foreign policy objectives? A copy of Hossbach’s minutes of this meeting were used at the Nuremberg The Nuremberg Trials Trials as evidence of Hitler’s planning for war. However, AJP Taylor points A series of military tribunals, out that the memorandum is only a copy and indeed only a fragment of held by the Allied forces after a copy of the original, which has disappeared. Taylor also argues that the World War II. Key members purpose of the meeting was not actually to discuss foreign policy aims but to of the political, military, and convince conservative military and nancial experts of the need to continue economic leadership of Nazi with the rearmament programme, and to isolate Schacht, who opposed it. Germany were put on trial Taylor states that “Hitler’s exposition was in large part day-dreaming and unrelated charged with crimes against to what followed in real life” (Taylor, 1969). peace and crimes against However, as a road-map Hitler’s enlarge and other central it”. It Hitler’s historians for war, goal: also “to made sense of the would still Hossbach make clear secure this that, while Memorandum and Hitler’s urgency; argue to preserve war-like was all and taken the it did cannot clearly racial set used by humanity. out community expansionist seriously be and intentions those present. 167 2 TOK Think about what a historical fact actually is. Write a brief denition of what a fact in history is. Share your denition with a par tner. How is this similar to or dierent from a fact in the natural sciences. Discuss as a class what could be considered the “historical facts” in this chapter. Does your discussion suggest anything about the methods of, and challenges faced by, historians? Full document question: Hitler ’s remilitarization of the Rhineland Source A A Source B British armed against We report services Germany would question were as would at be regards be in … Force, already drawn As Services to in the such reinforcements country we dispatching proper these take and At forces in the even the to o ur the an the cartoon 18 March published in Punch magazine on 1936. ther e an that in the a ir. the i r of the in our the modernisation we no unti l to of any br ing tw o of a the large h om e … wou ld mo n t hs defence to th os e this e q uip ment coast requires ha ve t wo pr ovi di n g To ca s e the p ro vi s ions i ncap able or a rmy vis -à - a nd the se r e turned F o r ce Fiel d f or c e s wh i c h Med ite rr a ne an quite the on l y e xte nt Ar my e x tent to As na va l d e fensi ve a moment A war Ge r m a ny, coul d of with a Me di te rr a ne a n p o si ti on be longer we re s o ur ce s ha v e case an y a ga i ns t should defence tha t w hil e the w e a k ening pure l y made upon … d ange r ous . rega r d s the three ght commi tte d req ui r e me nts jeopardise Italy in ope r a ti o n Mediterrane a n would Air he a v il y thoroughl y by the to Ge r many hosti l i ti e s out of ability e mphas i se w i th present of heads 1936. once minimum the the their in war naval carried vis at of possibility our by on Air … Fo rc e . artillery extent, Source C have number the of our number searchlights the air anti-submarine most of our is quite threat from defences important anti-aircraft inadequate for ports, guns to a and and deal with Ruth an Henig, academic World War a academic The Origins historian, of the in Second (1985). Germany. On 7 March marched was 1936, into announced the that posed which had Senate … challenge just The to token German Rhineland the remilitarizing Germany 168 British book, it by and German because the been government of the threat Franco-Russian ratied by remilitarization the forces Hitler Versailles the was to alliance French a further settlement and to the C h a p t e r British government’s and orderly revision. had already gone Hitler that German of a ministers general include League of once an again, preferred in to In order, the British government of its were willing the of to agree to as and Now return to had policies objectives by a well new of action rather than by rights multilateral diplomatic that believe of many that this the have no March have been 1936 plunging he and point challenged, could Europe not into be in German to conclude of a … After struggle territorial … Above for deemed system three of years, German concluded … all, we claims are to make aware that in all the In resulting either from erroneous commentators at which and that stopped provisions or from the disproportion Hitler between should the ready Europe be for states participating discussions. politicians was longing between creation for the doubt measures, unilateral territorial claimed itself can these respected, the rights beyond of unalterable Europe for today misinterpretation establish its of declares I any character equally security tensions retrospect, and avoid to express agreements Europe. in to pacication equality he and peaceful We military as to defensive government the shown that intentions real 19 3 3 – 19 3 8 however, purely equal of return Hitler as part which revision the the to Rhineland measures rearmament his indicate German frontiers achieve to peaceful colonies. his way of air-pact, eastern German peaceful its some e x p a n s i o n , secure package Nations, Germany’s former of remilitarization more might For G e r m a n to wish out 2 . 4 : the size of its population Lebensraum can never and after be solved by wars. from First question, par t a – 3 marks war. According to Source for to resist A, why would it be difcult Source D A speech by following the Rhineland, The Hitler Saturday German its 7 March the to arising of the their and other What 1936. has continuously negotiations observe from the side to as replied offers the maintain essential regarded has contracting and of the full Rhine and to can Germany’s Pact pact. fullled assurances Rhine parties the condition being of through aggression in 1936? First question, par t b – 2 marks the all Pact no by were so This repeated peace a by military message of Source B? Compare and contrast Source and Source the views expressed in the C D regarding Hitler’s motives long ready longer the Second question – 4 marks his actions in 1936. on Third question – 6 marks obvious France. is last for as German Reichstag government during readiness obligations the remilitarization emphasised years to Britain be With France reference assess friendly for infringing a the to value historian its and origin, studying remilitarization of purpose limitations the the of and content, Source reasons for C the Rhineland. alliance Four th question – 9 marks with the against the Soviet Union Germany. Locarno meaning In Rhine and directed this Pact ceased to exclusively manner, has lost exist Using however, its these examine inner the … sources the and reasons Rhineland in for your own Hitler’s knowledge, remilitarization of 1936. References Baynes, H. N. Fertig. Craig, G. 1969. New 1978. York, G. 2007. Henig, R. 1985. Steiner, I. Z. The 1991. Wiliamson, DG. Hitler: of the Triumph The of and Second Longman. University 1995. Oxford Appeasement Origins The Adolf 1866–1945. Hitler. Oxford of April 1922–August 1939 . USA Hitler, 2011. 1933–1999. Speeches Germany Darby, Kershaw, The the the Road World London, Dark: Press. Third University War . War . New Hodder, Routledge. York, USA UK London, UK UK. European New Reich. to Press. York, International History USA Longman. London, UK 169 2.5 German expansion, 1938–1940 Conceptual understanding Key concepts ➔ Causation ➔ Change ➔ Perspective Key questions ➔ Examine the ways in which Hitler went fur ther than challenging the post-war settlement after 1937. ▲ German troops march into Poland ➔ To what extent was Hitler successful in carrying out his foreign policy aims? ➔ Discuss the consequences of Hitler ’s actions for the international situation. following the star t of hostilities on 1 September 1939 Anschluss declared with Austria after 1938 March German troops march into Austria The Sudeten crisis September Germany occupies the rest of Czechoslovakia 1939 March Lithuania gives up the por t of Memel to Germany Anglo–French guarantee of Poland 31 March Conscription introduced in Britain 27 April The Pact of Steel May 12 August Anglo-French mission to Moscow Nazi-Soviet Pact 24 August Anglo-Polish Treaty 25 August Germany invades Poland 1 September 3 September Britain and France declare war on Germany Following Hossbach in his next foreign was revision pursue 170 the shake-up Conference, the of his policy. The takeover the of post-war goal of of his Hitler military was rst of in a these was Sudetenland. settlement Lebensraum in command position These and the the also East. to in 1937 start takeover actions put after taking of the more Austria; completed Hitler in a risks the the position to C H A P T E R 2 . 5 : G E R M A N E X P A N S I O N , 19 3 8 – 19 4 0 Challenging the post-war settlement after 1937 Anschluss, 1938 Between 1938 and 1939, Hitler was able to achieve the aims that he Class discussion had set out at the Hossbach Conference in 1937: the annexation of Discuss the events that were Austria and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. However, had indeed, this was happening in Asia at this time. not achieved in the way that Hitler anticipated; historian What expansionist moves had Alan Bullock sees Anschluss as “a striking example” of Hitler’s ability Japan made by early 1938? Do to combine “consistency in aim, calculation and patience in preparation with you think events in Asia had any opportunism, impulse and improvisation in execution ” (Bullock, 1967: 204). inuence on the international Despite his failure to take Austria in 1934, Hitler had already made response to German expansion? much progress 1936, an in establishing Austro–German Nazi inuence agreement had in been the country. signed, In which July agreed the following: ● Germany ● Both ● Austria reafrmed powers would “German In addition, to the was an actions attack in the a interfere foreign gave the Austria’s in each policy independence. other’s consistent internal with it affairs. being a with prominent to take Chancellor activities Hitler. of the However, Berchtesgaden Austrian Nazis, such as Arthur government. opportunity Austrian the “The whole treason. That paradox must now, all raise be to of on 12 over Kurt Nazis and Schuschnigg February directly Schuschnigg. Austrian when Austria 1938, due Schuschnigg he requested arrived Hitler arose at launched the into an onAustria: Hitler: of clauses role of by interview in a 1938 alarmed meeting not conduct secret in recognition state”. Seyss-Inquart, However, agreed its was history so now in Schuschnigg, this. The his voice crushed… German if I it the reach Herr Austria past, its I Reich its and am just is no is the one one of the today. And I The can determined Great problems most interrupted better end. absolutely border chosen is long-overdue that settles have of … difcult Powers, Who road is to of you here make and an me and end nobody with any high historical tell not that act will will German ever took…” Schuschnigg: “Herr everything remove Hitler: I am I have to “That going blown only to is to obstacles what solve to bits Reichkanzler, give … you the the say, to I am quite better Herr so-called order a Schuschnigg. Austrian and willing your to believe understanding, But problem ridiculous I one as am way defence far it … as telling or We will possible the you ▲ Schuschnigg, Chancellor of Austria that other mechanism do …” … will be ” Chancellor Schuschnigg’s recollection of the conversations at Berchtesgaden, 12 February 1938, written shor tly afterwards from memory 171 2 Source skills Second question – 4 marks With reference limitations historians of origin, purpose and Schuschnigg’s to its account of studying Examiner’s hint: Here points are some the that Austrian you could crisis consider content, his assess meeting of 1938. in your the with value Hitler and for answer: Values ● A value and ● so of the would Schuschnigg so ● it would The is that the been of which is saw as as was knowledge conversation fresh value he Schuschnigg rst-hand wrote have purpose meeting origin have in his present at the of what was said. down soon after the meeting meeting mind. Schuschnigg made a record of the important. Limitations ● Schuschnigg’s he is unlikely precisely ● His support After being agree to a agitators, Inquart of war were of be of would Schuschnigg for L TA Communication skills 13 not they united that to the afterwards to remember ban is from the memory, so conversation so by Hitler very hours These his treatment, Hitler’s here is reasonable of abuse, included the attack very tone so on it is Austria. aggressive which Party were economic demands was told Schuschnigg releasing Nazi Pro-Nazis the for exaggerate could exaggerating. against and sympathy to used that minister. and also to systems would that if all appointing be of made the two effectively he did was forced imprisoned not to pro-Nazi Seyss- the ministers countries end Austrian agree, Hitler Austria. attempted 1938, Austria”. gain he Schuschnigg wanted able want two demands into March to language assimilated. march written Schuschnigg’s nance, independence; be might idea interior was been here. submitted lifting and to to the list as he the contrast is have would that Certainly, in it purpose possible ● as account to a in a desperate which “free and Austrians last Austrians German, could action: were he to independent only answer announced vote and “yes” on social, or a plebiscite whether or Christian “no”; given and the In pairs review Chapter 2.3 wording, along with the fact that Schuschnigg’s own political party and then discuss the reasons was in charge of the plebiscite, there was a good chance that a Yes vote for the change in Mussolini’s could be secured. This would then give him a chance to break free of his position on Anschluss by 1938. agreement Hitler, gave on 172 decided assurances his Italy, 12 Hitler. therefore, his mobilized from with army. Britain March that When or 1938. to he act before would not this Schuschnigg France, he could object to found resigned. happen. Anschluss that Hitler no Mussolini and help marched Hitler was into coming Austria C H A P T E R On 13 March, moment to his the home in following a of Linz, incorporation of Austria was subsequently population Historian in Klaus a spur an town This the apparently decision into sums E X P A N S I O N , 19 3 8 – 19 4 0 visit announced the conrmed Fischer G E R M A N the emotional Hitler plebiscite of 2 . 5 : Reich. by 99% of on 10 April. up the impact that brought of Anschluss: The it Anschluss about had had gambled convinced politics the weary his been Anschluss policy Hitler’s international again. of had He and opponents. belief in the and power that his Hitler became ruthless against blackmail also consequences. strategy vacillating reinforcing methods vindicated effective and the successfully that had only and far-reaching it was war- Aside from effectiveness intimidation, far-reaching of the consequences Austrian crowds greeting Hitler after Anschluss ▲ in the eld of diplomacy. friendship of Mussolini, and of the With the Anschluss Vienna at two this Fascist that Europe. Hungary Yugoslavia. tyrants Germany’s From Hitler Hitler and European strategic had Vienna — the – polarised disposal south-eastern and promoted further was his It it position acquired was Fischer, powers. only direct a Another was greatly access footstep consequence to to the enhanced. whole of Czechoslovakia, 1995 L TA Thinking and communication skills Use Fischer ’s analysis of Anschluss to add detail to your own copy of this mind map. Germany's Hitler ’s position strategic in Germany position The of impact Anschluss Changing international Hitler ’s tactics alignments L TA Communication skills Go to www.britishpathe.com/video/hitler-annexes-austria Watch this Pathé News clip of Hitler entering Austria. According to the commentary, what made it hard for anyone (inside or outside of Austria) to oppose this move? 173 2 The Sudeten crisis Hitler’s action diminished than After he the against only by deserved. success Czechoslovakia. the — of Czechoslovakia fact that Craig, were a virtuoso antagonists performance, made things Austria, several Hitler reasons turned for his ● Germany for him attention to this: Hitler N Annexed easier 1978 annexing There his was considered by Slavs (1938) POLAND SUDETENLAND to be untermenschen (racially Terezin Annexed Prague by Poland and socially (1938) inferior). Lidice BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA CZECHOSLOVAKIA (Germany ● Many protectorate, 1939) 1933 Czechs had BOUNDARY resisted rule in Austrian the old SLOVAKIA (1939) Austro–Hungarian Uzhgorod Banská Annexed by Germany Empire Munkacs Bratislava and had Bystrica (1938) fought Annexed by Hungar y (1938–39) GREATER GERMANY 0 HUNGARY for Russia during the World War, First rather than 100 for MILES Austria. ▲ Par tition of Czechoslovakia, 1938–39 ● Czechoslovakia by the and was Versailles had the only Settlement; therefore proved successful it that independent consisted of ethnically many diverse state created different people peoples could live together. ● One of These and the ethnic Germans now bordered lived groups had in the Germany ● Czechoslovakia ● Czechoslovakia area (see was in the formally an was new lived known its as location enthusiastic allied to Czechoslovakia in the the on Sudetenland, the map supporter France and was German. Austro–Hungarian of Empire which above). the League of Nations. Russia. L TA Thinking and social skills In pairs, consider how each of the bullet points above would contribute to Hitler ’s hostile attitude towards Czechoslovakia. The Sudeten Germans The Sudetenland had been strong given frontier further a mountainous Czechoslovakia and to strengthened Czechoslovakia 174 – to had ensure this a its rich order prosperity. frontier strong area, in arms by in to The building industry mineral give the Czechs defences. and a resources new had In state – a then addition, well-organized army. C H A P T E R However, had not the Sudeten accepted Austrian Imperial regarded themselves impact of the grievance The ruling Great leader of the for for 1935, from to up Initially, in the however, “in clear plan and 3.5 As their E X P A N S I O N , million part loss of of discrimination. high the 19 3 8 – 19 4 0 people, the former status With unemployment, told too how warned presented of various was him was and the their that the that sense of the Czech German Party, encouraged government and subversion. government Programme; with these and On his demands rights. to use he but did was force would achieved. Germany the Hitler Czech Czech Karlsbad future”, be the became to Sudeten agitation reluctant to the on of Heinlein, demands Germany. special Heinlein distant this the for led Nazi demands form and Konrad and He by programme Hitler He not on Germans, continual autonomy issue resented Czech discontent funded Heinlein Czechoslovakia. generals was relentless Demands included Depression of some Czechoslovakia. they self-government. make a 24April1938, Eight victims Sudeten which, keep as themselves, in nation, Sudeten government to position G E R M A N grew. mouthpiece Heinlein Germans their 2 . 5 : not In not against solve the commit addition, ready for Sudeten himself many a war of at to any Hitler’s this stage. ▲ Konrad Heinlein, leader of the Sudeten German Par ty The May Crisis, 1938 Hitler changed his Czechoslovakia rumours mind as started a near government ordered In fact, to the involved had as decision to the smash the a for the the taking action May Germans border. of apparent this British action and Green, summer the of by As a against Crisis. were result, and Sudeten On 20 making the Britain May, military Czech and France his military to feeling of all as in On tell the 5 was “ It showing is near in Hitler, the sent of the by only the in my what he was unalterable future ”. the Sudetenland increased the Hitler to Germans reject conquest German and their Czech Sudeten pictures powers were though in September, told Meanwhile, as May, increased from interested by to looked 28 generals: demands Sudeten it On action tensions Heinlein was Germans. anti-Czech told had Czechoslovakia threats. government. Hitler Hitler attack instructions agreed ill-treatment and humiliating, 1938, However, that to French Hitler on Czech Beneš proving the unfounded preparations Germans, Edvard frenzy to so-called mobilization, Czechoslovakia against thus justice up to self-government. offer, Czech were Operation President that partial such found Sudeten violence for no He Throughout as the rumours responded known to regard the Germany. that underway. of circulating preparations warnings with result and press lm this not in whipped footage of Germans. 175 2 L TA Thinking and communication skills Speech made 1938 the at by Hitler annual on 12 This may be a matter of indierence to the democracies September Nuremberg … but I can only say to the representatives of the Rally. democracies that it is not a matter of indierence to us, I am speaking of Czechoslovakia. This is a democratic and I say that if these tor tured creatures cannot obtain State founded on democratic lines by forcing other rights and assistance by themselves they can obtain nationalities without asking them into a structure both from us … manufactured by Versailles. As good democrats they We can quite understand that the French and British began to oppress and mishandle the majority of the defend their interests in the world. I can assure the inhabitants … statesmen in Paris and London that there are also If this were a mat ter foreign to us … we would German interests which we are determined to defend regard the case as so many others, merely as an in all circumstances … You will understand that a interesting illustration of the democratic conception Great Power cannot suddenly submit … to such a of self-determination, and simply take note of it . base attack … What the Germans demand is the right But it is something most natural which compels of self-determination which other nations possess … us Germans to take an interest in this problem. if the Democracies, however, should be convinced that Among the nationalities being suppressed in this they must in this case protect with all their means the S tate there are 3,500,000 Germans. That is about oppressors of the Germans, then this will have grave as many persons of our race as Denmark has consequences. inhabitants … unbearable is That conditions generally known. right self-determination. Economically deliberately and over to a slow cer tain ruined process of Mr In pairs, read Hitler ’s speech and consider what evidence people their handed a 3,500,000 are in to of nation robbed were name this were people the in Wilson this document provides of: of these ● Hitler ’s political views ● Hitler ’s tactics with regard to taking over the after wards extermination. The Sudetenland misery of the Sudeten Germans is without end. They ● are being manner oppressed and treated in in an an inhuman and undignified intolerable way Hitler’s the nature of Nazi propaganda. … speech Sudetenland, government, at but the Nuremberg this which was Rally brought declared caused under martial more control by unrest the in the Czech law. L TA Communication skills Go to www.youtube.com/watch?v=hprV2nQRvbc, or search for “ The German people persecuted at Sudetenland”. Watch this German propaganda lm. According to the lm, how are the Sudeten Germans being persecuted? 176 C H A P T E R 2 . 5 : G E R M A N E X P A N S I O N , 19 3 8 – 19 4 0 Chamberlain’s inter vention It of was at this this However, ew point that involvement Britain are Chamberlain three times to decided discussed in desperately meet Hitler Berchtesgaden, to 15 to more act. wanted try to The detail to make in full avoid a deal September reasons the a next war, over and the this was so now Sudetenland. meeting, agreed Sudeten of it the German be areas transferred Germany. persuaded and to that Czechoslovakia should the this nally days his Cabinet French deal. to The agreed of to Chamberlain agree Czechs after two persuasion. Chamberlain arriving at Berchtesgarden ▲ Godesberg, Chamberlain to tell but He Hitler Hitler with an demands the He and should that be now As on seemed terms Soviet They a that Hungarians to 28 as be ▲ troops occupy Chamberlain leaving Godesberg the September. the war French previously, that they in also though and not the territory hoped Union, of German mentioned army. for should allowed Sudetenland Hitler’s news, insisted the for Czechoslovakia met, 1938 Godesberg excuse of Poles September furious. handover Sudetenland. and to good Czechoslovakia, peaceful the 22–23 ew the was wanted war It nature 1938 At a and chapter. the with could was said inevitable. they Czechs the resist a help The would had of good their German Czechs support defences allies, rejected Czechoslovakia. and France a strong and the attack. 177 2 Munich, 29 September 1938 With now Britain prepared own to war, further ght, not Hitler yet agreed in as a out his that ready to a Mussolini mediator war, and Conference Munich. were with pointing was prevent Power they and conference. stepped to France that generals Germany for and showing Here, a a Four was plan held in presented Chamberlain, Daladier, Hitler and ▲ Mussolini at the Munich Conference by Mussolini by Hitler!) (though was written agreed on. The plan included the following points. • The German occupation international The • international Czechs would (neither the • Poland • Hungary • was be be to along the get to nor given determine would leave the also and would a supervise Germans transfer of take place provisional by new plebiscites allowed populations to in join actually 1 October frontier by areas the and 10 of an October. dispute. Sudeten territories happened). Teschen. South with Sudetenland would commission allowed plebiscites to was Germany, of commission the Slovakia. other powers, guaranteed the independence of the rest of Czechoslovakia. Neither invited this the to Czech the Munich agreement though France therefore had Following which he war they had no the “liquidation of receive guaranteed option to Hitler, against Beneš Conference. would but conference, agreed consultation. his President, settle to the the all Czech of 21 Czech told Britain borders at got Hitler a that or few to not he to if they The days a Czechs later. in through deprived gave resisted even statement interest be were France, sign international October, Stalin Locarno. resigned determined On the of leader, were from Beneš matters was Soviet Czechs help Chamberlain however, remainder The no agree. Czechoslovakia. the nor orders of for the state ”. Source skills Gordon A. Craig. Germany the 1866–1945 as (1990). Munich he seemed could do no to convince wrong, and Hitler his country’s it could betrayed an impatience it earlier. In that it possible, seemed had repair search for 178 to economic restrain factors him, for no it was was of disinclined as good domestic in any case, to that take; and conquests longer was clear deciencies. of Hitler’s Moreover, campaign the against the new had at the that end of 1938 contributed to the the mounting power war not Jews triumphs, he for measures policy that his without discipline acceleration characterised readiness that might now be pace of his external policy. One C H A P T E R of the complaints government Jews in of that he made Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia against was 2 . 5 : G E R M A N the that and “the were still poisoning Germany and would E X P A N S I O N , the 19 3 8 – 19 4 0 destruction connected in his of Jewry were inextricably thoughts. First question, par t a – 3 marks the nation” have to be objectives, against dealt it is with. clear As that he the turned to conquest According new of Munich space to Craig, what Conference Czechoslovakia L TA Beyond the Treaty of Versailles: The liquidation of on was the impact of the Hitler? Thinking and social skills 1 According to Craig in the source above, what factor L TA linked Hitler ’s domestic and Communication skills foreign policies? 2 With a par tner, discuss what conclusions Hitler might now draw as to the attitude of the West regarding any future action he might take. German troops enter Prague in March 1939 ▲ What does this photo suggest about the attitude of the citizens of Prague towards the takeover of the rest of Czechoslovakia? As a its heavy result of the Munich industry, a Conference, third of population man-made mountainous defences and the Sudetenland. Slovakia and Ruthenia internal Clearly, affairs, Hitler liquidation 1939, Hitler complete Tiso, As who with when of though saw the Slovakia still Munich state ” Agreement (Stackelberg, encouraged the Slovaks He was was head new to Hitler Czech crush independence of for this the were to controlled as “a People’s in excuse to Hachá, moved agitation. Prompted for stone From this to the early and by for Prague. to ask Father for Jozef Party. the asked of the from disruption Emil and of stepping 173). helped by 70% natural self-government President, Slovakia given lost the fortications cause Slovak both given 1999: willingly fascist was and ultimately independence. Austria, the the Czech were Czechoslovakia its directly Hitler, German get troops Tiso involved into proclaimed full protection. 179 2 In the This, and hope of of Moravia 15 March On 16 March, Germany; 18 action March, placed on Czechoslovakia, a mistake; 1939, German Bohemia and led and was to Ruthenia to a of the troops Hachá was now forced an was in told assurances occupied Moravia be change Chamberlain any Hachá asked to to sign see over Hitler. Bohemia Hitler. Slovakia Germany This was to On of saving course, were independent occupied British the the given by by state Nazi Czechoslovakia. protectorate under towards Cabinet the of a Hungarian policy British rest declared of protection troops. Germany. that leaders ” the “ no On reliance (see page could be 223). German expansion: Poland It MEMEL LITHUANIA Baltic Sea was now target clear would be tha t Hitle r ’s P o l a nd. been dismantled 18th century as and a ne xt P ol and co untry p a r ti tio ne d ha d in th e be twe e n DANZIG Prussia, EAST Russia However, PRUSSIA and following self-determination ALLENSTEIN been the recreated as Wi ls on’s at a Austri a n Ver s ai ll e s, na ti on. Empi re . ai ms It of it ha d wa s th is N part of the Treaty of Ve r sa i ll es tha t wa s MARIENWERDER probably as West to allow most res e nte d Prussia had by been the Ge r ma n s, gi ve n to P ol a nd POZNANIA GERMANY POLAND WEST splitting UPPER Transferred Poland EAST 0 50 100 mi to the Prus s i a This as the Corri d o r, Polish s ea , off Germany. p i e ce the re by f ro m of the l a nd, a ls o re s t k nown incl uded th e to of Danzig, whi ch b eca me a “free by Treaty of Versailles city” Voted to allowing Polish (1921) become UPPER use Voted access of city SILESIA it East to run it as by the both a sea L e a g ue Pol a nd of a nd Na ti ons, Ger ma ny to por t. remain SILESIA 0 50 100 km German (1921) Less of ▲ than a Prague, week the after the Germans occupation proposed to The Polish Corridor after the Poland that Danzig should have should be returned to Germany, and that Germany First World War road the and German Germany minister Polish direct rail link. claim before access This to the Colonel the East Prussia actually a World refused, War. seeing via more Sudetenland, First Beck to was a German-controlled legitimate which had However, this as not demand been Poland’s the start of than part of foreign an attack on territory. Britain’s guarantee to Poland In March Memel. from East in 180 Russia Prussia no four 1939, Hi tl e r Lithuania in position days 19 1 9 ; that to later. a s ke d wa s ha d a Meme l a s ta nd the Ba ltic Li thu a n ia n s tate wa s a s ubs ta ntia l up to t ha t c it y a nd Ger m an Hi tl e r a nd g ov e r nm e nt h ad the be en s t r ip m a de of l a nd pop ul a t io n. l a nd wa s to h an d over in de pe n de n t bor de r in g Lit h u a n ia h an de d ov e r wa s C H A P T E R Britain now Poland to decided to act and, on event of 30 March, a 2 . 5 : G E R M A N guarantee E X P A N S I O N , was offered 19 3 8 – 19 4 0 to TOK give help in the a German attack: You have already reected In the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and on the role of the individual which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with in history when considering their national forces, His Majesty’s Government would feel themselves bound Italy’s foreign policies under at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have Mussolini. In pairs consider given the Polish I add Government an assurance to this effect. the role of Hitler in shaping and may they that stand in the the French same Government position in this have authorised matter as do His me to make Majesty’s it plain that Government. directing events. Intentionalist historians view the role of individuals and personalities as The Anglo–Polish Treaty failed to make Hitler more cautious in his key forces of historical change. actions. Indeed, he was furious about this opposition to his plans, To what extent do you agree commenting, “I’ll cook them a stew that they’ll choke on ”. Two days after the with this idea. Refer to your British guarantee to Poland, Hitler responded by declaring the Anglo– study of German expansion in German Naval Agreement invalid and ending the 1934 Non-Aggression the 1930s. Other historians, and Pact with Poland. He then ordered his Chief of Staff, Keitel, to prepare par ticularly Marxist historians for the attack on Poland. This was known as Operation White, and argue that economic forces the plan was for a limited war on Poland rather than for a wider war are the key factor. Investigate involving Britain and France. historians’ views on German expansion in the 1930s. How Changing international alignments: The Pact of far can you identify political or cultural perspectives of the Steel, May 1939 historians from their accounts? Pact of Steel International of Albania Mussolini’s increase tens i o ns (see attemp t his thislooked own like Thus,Britain Greece The and that Britain Germany, if it for writes, the needed he another Nevertheless, the supported the “War ‘mission’” ri s e wi t h this M u s s oli n i’s a ct io n ind ep e nd en c e imp or t a n c e , a ctio n to bet we en i mme di ate ly i s su e d for it or of [Hitler] towards (Kershaw, agreed power sign agreed was of H it le r Br it a in the in vas i on c au s ed by a nd a nd to F ra n c e di ct a t or sh i ps . gu a r an t e e s to of getting to Hitler four to bo t h on Pact no of at an to to its involved that Italy immediate Steel, the rst he of his told suitable conventional fullment 1991: Pact come and hostile of the Steel aid wishes in a Mussolini reaction of the and not other desires”. full-scale would of with be conict, ready for years. Poland was Albania, the the “contrary clear intent the to in given wary the attack action support hostilities was was signing step thus in three to Mussolini’s each made Hitler decision: decisive his Hitler’s He Mussolini war after F r a nce involved privately with show co o r d i na te d whereby and day a France. became However, to to Al thoug h i nte r natio na l and he and conti nue d 1 4 7) . Roma ni a . Germans found pa g e war his Poland. generals: opportunity ”. military ‘idea’, with the conict. It “ we As The are left Kershaw represented accomplishment of his 134). 181 2 Source skills Source A The Italo–German Alliance, 22 May Contracting Party Party political Pact of full order to remove German Majesty the Emperor come the close Reich King of has which Chancellor of Italy Ethiopia, to confirm relation exists Germany of Firmly through that a friendship Fascist time solemn pact and National If the affinity it bound unity of hopes also in this one of and them Socialist through future to Italian support threat. Powers, stand of side the their by it against with other step with the Contracting involved another to its its side in as military or Party an that military power Contracting all wishes Parties, ally might other will and on will land, the and people the becomes immediately ideologies solidarity the happen, of complications I t a l y. together their comprehensive German threatened III. should and at inner the diplomatic His Albania, consider between and and and support … afford and Steel). ARTICLE The will 1939 in (the its sea, and in the air. the interests, are side the determined and Berlin 22 Fascist Era May 1939 in the X VII yea r of th e to Source B strive of with their united Lebensraum maintenance for in them a by world carry out come to the an vital Parties that the Parties the Italy making culture photograph following the taken in signing Berlin, of the May Pact of 1939, Steel. wish, to safe … A the have terms: remain each in other, of all in order common situation common be as a enter Should one of threatened of into necessary of interests jeopardized happenings interests. interests be of will with European immediately Parties and the prescribed whole. II. international these and way, disintegration, understanding the event regarding space] this following contact Contracting will and securing I. or ARTICLE In the the Germany European Contracting interests In assignment of upon permanent to unrest for [living peace. history, the ARTICLE The of of foundations agreed effort any kind, the they consultation measures to security the Contracting outside, First question, par t a – 3 marks According to unite and Italy Source A, what common factors Germany? preserve the from of through or other the First question, par t b – 2 marks What is the message of Source B? other L TA Thinking skills Look at the ar ticles of the agreement. Who do you consider would benet the most from this alliance? 182 C H A P T E R 2 . 5 : G E R M A N The Nazi–Soviet Pact In the summer democracies Union for an communist East, was an highly thus In alliance. secure the had growing collective joined still signed to a a proposal the The with distrusting also made it and as in the stage Poland, to the and, hoped prevent an Soviet alarmed that Hitler’s democracies French alone Soviet in had had Union 1935, were and in but this Agreement. the and Nazis, alliance each of favoured Nations the with negotiations ultimately “Little RidingHood”. West the (see seemed renewed the with other what he a following democracies Chapter 2.7). Hitler’s dragged occupation on, Meanwhile, both Stalin of Communication and L TA However, called and with government Agreement military 1939, Soviets 1934, had rearmament to this the war In Western Munich Munich a work Hitler. capitulation of of Hitler, the a at France, initially League pact in France. communist German after the Stalin Prague. a appease to collapsed to of and Herblock, conict. had of loathing Lebensraum prevent by 19 3 8 – 19 4 0 Soviet Union Britain would defensive response Despite the power for Soviet would and However, suspicious worked It Union security aggression. the the cartoon Goldilocks Western Hitler’s neutrality Britain by the plans two-front Soviet with Union the a his with Soviet preventing fact, with alliance both approached Despite and desirable. an alliance 1939, Hitler Russia alliance forming would of and A E X P A N S I O N , sides had social skills clear to the Germans that he would welcome an agreement In pairs or small groups, a result, on 24 August 1939, Germany pulled off one of the most discuss the meaning of the controversial and cynical alliances in modern history: the Nazi–Soviet Pact. car toon above. Under this Non-Aggression Pact, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany Why was an agreement each pledged to remain neutral in the event of either nation being between the Soviet Union and attacked by a third dividing Northern party. In addition, the pact included a secret protocol Nazi Germany so surprising and and Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of shocking to Poland, and also to inuence: the Baltic states and Bessarabia in Romania were to be in the the rest of the world? Russian sphere, and Poland was to be divided between the two powers. Source skills Source A The Nazi–Soviet Pact, 23 August Article I. The Government of the German The Government of the Union obligate themselves Reich of Republics each peace any U.S.S.R., and desirous of between Germany proceeding provisions of from the concluded reached Germany in the and following either individually or jointly II. Should one Parties of the become High the object of action by a third Power, the other Neutrality April, the of attack the Contracting Party shall in no manner 1926 lend between act any and High Agreement any and strengthening belligerent fundamental from action, Powers. Contracting the desist aggressive other, other Article of to Parties Soviet with cause Contracting and on the High 1939 violence, Socialist Both U.S.S.R., its support to this third Power. have Agreement: 183 2 Article III. The Contracting continual purpose contact of Article on IV . grouping the two future another order to affecting The High for of powers Should between the over problems of shall the shall an the make should determined two aimed at disputes High one settle or in that the kind through opinion or, if establishment or friendly Article for a that, this The period in Parties the VI. so of far does present as shall this ve years. Article VII. The within ratications Agreement is with the or it shall one and can course of of how only be further both of such a denitely political event Governments means of a will friendly resolve agreement. III. Europe, attention With regard its interest declares these both its in is to called Southeastern by Bessarabia. complete the The political Soviet side German disinterest side in areas. IV . parties This as protocol strictly shall be treated by secret. the Moscow, concluded August 23, 1939. Source B proviso prior validity be shall in force to of extended possible into by conicts year exchanged enter both Contracting the treaty shortest be is the High period, present the shall State bounded the Article to commissions. automatically another ratied of advance of Polish interests maintenance exchange Treaty years, one not the the party. Parties another, through arbitration ten expiration Treaty necessary, of be in question both of whether is conicts disputes any this any other Contracting these In High Article exclusively of desirable independent state exchange their participate whatsoever indirectly V . question parties maintain developments. Neither arise parties in of the one problems parties of or Article with in interests. contracting directly shall consultation information common Governments Parties be time. The Berlin. as for soon The as it signed. The section above was Secret was additional Article and below not Estonia, I. In the to the Latvia, event of a the time the territorial Baltic of Lithuania boundary of the and interest of In Lithuania areas (Finland, northern represent inuence this in the the shall spheres U.S.S.R. of in States Lithuania), boundary Germany at protocol politicalrearrangement belonging the published announced. the of connection the Vilna area is ▲ recognized by each Article II. In event of a political rearrangement of the The signing of the Nazi–Soviet Pact party. First question, par t a – 3 marks the territorial and According areas be to the Polish state, the spheres of to Source A, what measures inuence followed to maintain peace between of countries? Germany and the approximately by U.S.S.R. the line shall of be the bounded rivers Narev, First question, par t b – 2 marks Vistula and San. What 184 were to belonging is the message of Source B? the two C H A P T E R For Hitler, this that he could raw materials expedient For ● to there It would it faced was that he could war on two Soviet also Union. the purges the the war plans He for considerable Soviet in always in a long-term the threat other strongest the were keep a meant ghting his Stalin’s There each from due Stalin, after ● alliance avoid Union East (see hope and out from that that have fronts. clearly of a G E R M A N free hand could regarded war. and in also it as Lebensraum advantages, as This E X P A N S I O N , Poland get a 19 3 8 – 19 4 0 and valuable short-term in the East. follows. was the army the West important was as weakened box). Germany the a He attaining Japan, glossary 2 . 5 : Soviet and Union would would weaken emerge as the Stalin’s purges nation. During the 1930s, Stalin killed ● He got considerable territorial gains from the pact: half the Baltic of Poland and or “purged” anyone considered the opportunity to take over Finland and States. to be a threat . This included ● The Soviet Union could keep trading with Germany: Germany was peasants, workers, political to send mechanical goods to the Soviet Union in return for raw opponents and even senior materials and foodstuffs (see Source B below for the importance of military ocers. In fact , approx this to Germany). 35,000 ocers were either shot or imprisoned. Two contrasting views of the Nazi–Soviet Pact L TA Thinking and communication skills Source A Source B Molotov ’s comments to the Supreme Soviet on the Comment by Dr Julius Schnurre, Head of the Economic ratication of the Non-Aggression Pact, 31 August 1939. Policy Division of the German foreign ministry, 24 October 1939. The chief impor tance of the Soviet-German non- aggression pact lies in the fact that the two largest The Agreement means a wide open door to the East for States of Europe have agreed to put an end to enmity us. The raw material purchases from the Soviet Union between them, to eliminate the menace of war and to and from the countries bordering the Soviet Union can live at peace one with the other … still be considerably increased. But it is essential to meet the German commitments to the extent required. Only the instigators of a general European war … can In view of the great volume this will require a special be dissatised with this position of aairs … eor t. If we succeed in expanding expor ts to the East It is really dicult for these gentlemen to understand in the required volume, the eects of the English the purpose of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, blockade will be decisively weakened by the incoming on the strength of which the USSR is not obliged to raw materials. involve itself in war either on the side of Great Britain against Germany, or on the side of Germany against Great Britain. Questions 1 ways in which the Soviet Union and Germany viewed Is it really dicult to comprehend that the USSR this pact? is pursuing and will continue to pursue its own independent policy based on the interests of the What do Sources A and B indicate about the dierent 2 peoples of the USSR and only these interests? Does this pact suppor t the idea that Hitler did not, in fact, have a clearly planned foreign policy, but was taking advantage of situations as they arose? 3 Which country do you consider gained most from this pact? 185 2 Source skills A cartoon on 20 by David September Low, “Rendezvous”, published in the Evening Standard newspaper 1939. The tex t reads: (Hitler to Stalin) “The scum of the Earth, I believe?”; (Stalin to Hitler) ▲ “The bloody assassin of the workers, I presume?”. First question, par t b – 2 marks What is the message Examiner’s that the two key the cartoonist points greetings Stalin hint: are that giving this making What Hitler one source? The outbreak of war Note is here. of do and Despite that Britain’s they Roderick of is their the about the true relationship? signicance of has the on come ground, about meeting between 186 the the or as a any assurances action at all, to let Poland, alone Hitler declare did war. not As believe historian writes: could not conceive that Britain and France, having failed to ght nature for a militarily the assurance strong and democratic Czechoslovakia a year before despite What the of Soviet aid, would now ght to save a militarily weak and dead which result of “rendez-vous” two France’s Stackelberg undemocratic body and take another Hitler indicate would dictators? Poland without the prospect of Soviet aid”. — Stackelberg, 1999 C H A P T E R Hitler had was therefore signed a full Mussolini informed his on attack cause a division to trying reach an Germany a was not up 31 taken August, resolve the for peace any of its In reality, wireless make who 1 On 3 in and Poles the also that a left he border the and a Corridor. further be held to prepared to attacked been staged bodies killed by the invaded of lethal Poland that the by and war. wait Poles. To criminals injection for this one attack. convicted excuse Britain However, had had and that negotiation. should not to last-minute condition was delayed Hoping Empire claimed the as gave Poland thus Germany uniforms used troops on Hitler British Polish war behind was also 19 3 8 – 19 4 0 time, September. the E X P A N S I O N , and same war. 1 refused evening, uniforms, attack for Britain the conference wanted Polish At until Poland, Polish German ready disarmament same they that guaranteeing Hitler Polish Polish not and The in heard August. August Danzig the he 25 G E R M A N and At German 4.45am planes Warsaw. received the authentic, September, on near 1939, 26 on That dressed dressed was for proposed However, so-called Germany war in Britain. stations September bombed hand soldiers on he Britain agreement by when involved initiatives. been This This Mussolini appear had shot. on it SS that planned free crisis. back alliance between Britain. give On him Poland proposal to taken military 2 . 5 : to by call this Poland the off time, destructive What is reluctance War with lusted after 1939. No himself war into the — France localized time. not Watt, the it, As events Hitler’s wanted presented 11.00am. everybody though else it. in a all that which war, one is of by and remain extraordinary World government attack Britain would most Second British the When war. affair; fact, which else war though ultimatum response declared in historian will an no for led to was approached with France Mussolini he Donald up war Hitler the able it. and that the unleashed Watt concludes: outbreak of the overcome Hitler came been hoped had to to had willed, Britain, at perilously the desired, least close not to in talking 2001 Hitler ’s actions after the declaration of war Following Poland. so-called to of the British Subjected defeated, Pact the and to declaration a “blitzkrieg” Germany and the Ribbentrop–Molotov 1939. The of Germans war, style USSR line were as Hitler of had now war, divided to an the were up been able launched Poles Poland agreed transfer attack quickly along in the most on the Nazi-Soviet of their forces west. The phoney war In October in Britain there was months. 1939, now no This Hitler trusted direct was offered Hitler, action the from period peace and proposals these Hitler known were against as “the but not the very taken West phoney few up. for people However, the next few war”. Hitler takes over Europe The calm events, ● of Hitler’s in the phoney war was broken in April 1940. These are the at Norwegian key 1939–40: troops April occupied Denmark and landed the ports 1940. 187 2 ● 10 May, Germany simultaneously. surrendered troops had German ● After the swept British had at from Dunkirk in through left, 14th The Germans occupied To however secure the “Operation English and the Although bombing of the was which from point Soviet ensuring would Hitler that ensure would a this of the would invading Paris June. Atlantic coast; under end in nale, the would go invasion Marshal of called the during air over the Force fought Hitler switched break in the the summer Luftwaffe back the to off invasion for that Soviet of the much in the case. his Thus, Union Britain. of of the start the one East. Soviet speedy not to the morale still anticipated nish on marked was turn the a This this Hitler victorious be 22nd Britain RAF , to against to war the Air lebensraum return the the southwards; control cities. 1941, to that for would undefeated. eventually as Dutch British Britain. decided Barbarossa able The May. government Royal British middle Union of 1940 planned of defeating Hitler and needed Battle coast that June moved own the British achieving still be in other France independence the the of the aims: would the hoped Britain the as to end surrendered France its Germans led and by real Britain verge Operation he no above Hitler this with against the policy launched 1941 1940 skies however at foreign of Germans France allowed the This London Blitz. British, It on of had of the and the and victories. France. northern was lion”, Channel. in June defeat Sea autumn planes it swift Belgium captured France Belgium achieved days; was Petain; ● four Holland, Hitler evacuate troops unoccupied ● after to attacked Again, June the attack defeat, after However, Soviet longer main Hitler far Union and that defeated. L TA Self-management and thinking skills T ask one T ask three Return to the question on page 161. How far had Hitler fullled his foreign policy aims? What new examples to explain Hitler ’s success in In Chapter 2.2, we identied Hitler ’s aims were to: achieving his aims can you add to these headings? ● ● ● ● destroy the Treaty of Versailles ● unite all Germans ● gain more Lebensraum (living space) for the Germans ● gain Britain and Italy as allies. Hitler ’s tactical skill Luck The role the distractions and dierences of the other powers played For each of these aims, identify the extent to which it was What other factors played a role? achieved and give evidence for your conclusions. T ask two T ask four Review Hitler ’s actions between 1933 and 1939. You have read about the pacts and treaties signed by Decide how far you agree with Bullock’s claim that Japan, Italy and Germany between 1933 and 1939. Copy Hitler was able to combine “consistency in aim” with and complete the following table to consolidate your “oppor tunism and improvisation” in how he conducted understanding of these agreements. his foreign policy. 188 C H A P T E R Agreement 2 . 5 : G E R M A N Countries involved E X P A N S I O N , 19 3 8 – 19 4 0 Eect/impact of this Reasons for the outcome treaty Non-Aggression Pact, 1934 Stresa Front, 1935 Anglo-German Naval Treaty, 1935 Rome–Berlin Axis, 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact, 1936 Pact of Steel, 1939 Nazi–Soviet Pact, 1939 Anglo–Polish Treaty, 1939 T ask ve Comparing and contrasting case studies. a In pairs, compare and contrast the aims and methods of Mussolini’s and Hitler ’s foreign policies in the 1930s. c In small groups compare and contrast the aims, methods and results of the foreign policies of the expansionist states in Europe and Asia. b In pairs, compare and contrast the successes and failures of Mussolini’s and Hitler ’s foreign policies in the 1930s. Full document question: The outbreak of war, September 1939 to Source A both sides would foundbetween Germany’s received The reply at to Britain’s 11.20am, German 3 and For Germany nor had the she refuse to demands receive, in the accept, let ultimatum by our many war. Since rst and to the all National has since again to frontier already tore every refused The eastern months Treaty all time when Germany has to a the Poland. revision the Treaty of The Reich those which intention of demanded articles already remove by tried peaceful the was again worst … breaches of of The British also lies and those of the justice Government who, took the by their chief part practical at the revision. of the of German people The reasonable solution in the and also economic The blame peaceful Cabinet for interests for revision policy … not, like and Britain, their intend Government to dominate the been but they are determined to defend intransigent in own liberty, their independence, and frustrating all their life … we shall therefore the any aggressive action on the part Government of a being this have Without British … this Dictate therefore nation and Europe. as and great British answer intervention a the above every for that understanding nations prevented with by of negotiations their attitude, all political Eastern world, among of unbearable, entire having do treaty. run formulation described impossible settlement Government the been long Versailles Governments. 1933 of statesmen pieces, German year had for condition peaceful Socialist the there reigned 2. the … the demands Government. On of have the the time 1. not alone made Versailles British did raised German only full, been Poland. 1939. annihilating people have and ultimatum, September Government certainly Germany doing England with the same weapons and in justice the same form. 189 2 The Source B relationship unbearable A cartoon by David Low published in newspaper, the Evening Standard, October Poland proposals has to become Poland by England’s intervention. were Poland on has 21 with My the frustrated UK … changed her tone toward us. A permanent 1939. state to of initiative others the West risk with reasons France us: will our of supply a in in my position it will and We the to to must … not The have 2. West against because sources Attack Line: I and which effective we Europe. Maginot … the [S]pecial ghting be that take England full for pass great obligations because Eastern from still view. possibilities autarky West this me Blockade: of the in is determination undertaken two allowed intervene. ruthless is be probability not fortify only 1. The have neither has … cannot in consider impossible. Source D Hitler’s speech Obersalzberg, to 22 Our strength our brutality; women with the a and light great party lies heart. founder utters word one only I in to of shoot I East in I place and in millions knowingly sees in him have And have with so put the of and only given everyone criticism. the sent death States. shall formations quickness Khan History of at 1939. our children and head in Genghis command present leaders August the who for my the death- command Source C relentlessly Hitler’s speech to his August death have of the called you political together situation, to in give order you a that picture you gain some insight into the individual which I have based my decision origin the and living be sure a It order is to easy nothing … strengthen for to [O]ur to act … We us to lose, your make we economic hold have opponents experienced condence out no will only a decisions. have We everything situation more other be little. inconceivably who are masters, is such have than a choice, risking a few we to gain that more must great deal great. below no Britain’s Our average. men of stake in enemies No action a that Only we situation thus we can Daladier and need … has arisen. poor worms Munich. They will be too to blockade. Against and attack. Russian raw Theywon’t that go wehave beyond our a autarchy materials. we will be depopulated and settled with years act. and war have those in cowardly Germans. My conceived of pact with the Poles was time. As merely Our as a gaining of for the can gentlemen, the fate of Russia will be is exactly the same with in the case of as I he a very sick man am now going through leaders personalities. Poland. After Stalin’s death – No is – we will break the Soviet … Union. Then German 190 send of … rest, gain to children and Poland cannot and language. space new Chamberlain in women factors I on many may To have compassion 1939. Polish I without commanders-in-chief, into 22 and rule there of will the begin earth. the dawn of the C H A P T E R 2 . 5 : G E R M A N First question, par t a – 3 marks According the to outbreak Source of A, how hostilities in had E X P A N S I O N , 19 3 8 – 19 4 0 Third question – 6 marks Britain September caused Compare 1939? Hitler’s and contrast motivations Sources for the First question, par t b – 2 marks Four th question – 9 marks What Using is the message of Source B? the examine sources the and reasons your for A and attack own Hitler’s on C regarding Poland. knowledge‚ attack on Poland Second question – 4 marks in With reference assess A as the to values evidence of its origin, and purpose limitations Hitler’s aims in of and using September 1939. content‚ Source 1939. References Bullock, A. University Craig, G. 1967. Press. 1978. Oxford, UK Fischer, K. Watt, D. R. 2001. and Oxford, Germany 1995. Stackelberg, Hitler Nazi 1999. How the Origins the Second World War . Oxford UK 1866–1945. Germany: Hitler’s War of A Oxford New Germany. Came. University History . Constable. Routledge, Pimlico. Press. London, UK UK London,UK 191 2.6 The international response to Italian aggression (1935–1940) Conceptual understanding Key concepts ➔ Consequence ➔ Change ➔ Signicance Key questions ▲ ➔ Discuss the reasons for the British and French policy of appeasement. ➔ Examine the response of the international community to Italian aggression. Stanley Baldwin, Prime Minister of Britain 1935–37 The League of Nations formally comes 1920 January into being Japanese invasion of Manchuria: 1931 September condemned by the League of Nations; weak sanctions are imposed World Disarmament Conference 1932–34 Franklin D Roosevelt is elected 1932 November president in the USA Hitler becomes Chancellor of Germany 1933 January Italy sends troops to its border with 1934 July Austria to prevent Hitler ’s attempts at Anschluss The Stresa Conference 1935 April The Neutrality Act passed (expires in August Italy invades Abyssinia six months) Roosevelt invokes the Neutrality Act, October preventing the supply of arms to either The Council of the League declares country 7 October Italy to be the aggressor in Abyssinia The League’s Assembly votes to impose 11 October sanctions November The Hoare–Laval Pact 192 December Limited sanctions are applied C H A P T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O I T A L I A N A G G R E S S I O N 1936 January The USA passes new Neutrality Acts ( 19 3 5 – 19 4 0 ) The French Popular Front wins the election. February May Italy conquers Abyssinia The League ends sanctions on Italy Italy and Germany intervene in the July Spanish Civil War Britain and France set up Non-Intervention August Committee The USA passes a joint resolution 1937 January outlawing the arms trade in Spain Neville Chamberlain becomes Prime May Minister of Britain Italy withdraws from the League of Nations December In an Italian and British agreement, Britain 1938 April recognizes Italian Abyssinia Mussolini now accepts Anschluss May The Munich Conference: Mussolini, Hitler, September Chamberlain and Daladier meet Hitler invades areas of Czechoslovakia, 1939 March breaking the Munich Agreement April Italy invades Albania Italy declares itself a non-belligerent when 1 September Germany invades Poland Mussolini attempts to set up a conference 3 September to avoid war Mussolini declares war on Britain and 1940 June France September–October USA passes the Lend–Lease Act Italy invades Egypt and Greece 1941 March 193 2 What was the policy of appeasement and why was it pursued by Britain in the 1930s? Appeasement, policy of policy is 1930s, to most in prevent political closely particular the the of with demands, resulting long-standing In in years, Britain, It the war there were 1930s: 1 Public opinion of context, order came to of in seen be to seen settle reasons to a a diplomatic conict. policy as and Hitler 1939. as was avoid in Appeasement Mussolini war was to foreign 1938. encouraged trying many of both which in Britain’s crisis and outbreak tradition the with allowed appeasement historical nations Munich outbreak territorial and to associated policy. inter-war to ask disputes a late failed weak to and get away continuously However, positive follow a Hitler The the for idea, most and as of part for the of a peacefully. policy of appeasement in Neville Chamberlain, prime minister of Britain, 1937–40 The Franchise from 8 were given to take Act million Thishuge the of this should be by in “This prevent tell no The on in of in the British the rst 1928, number time, this was meant which be which a British public to of women lowered that was voters over to against war in the the politicians protect always faith had and age in Britain age were fully him the than in supported … from in of of 30 21. more favour being League likely of appeared and to League its voted need effect the on House street to week may that of maintain Nations of realise people believed of seen the the Whatever rst Nations a the widely the supporters which League in bombed. in showed told that destruction devastating man was of even a The 1937 was society highlighted Baldwin the It in and feeling feeling debating Country”. have for 400,000 the air London was 1935, anti-war Spain the through ”. There more in widespread Union Stanley well a and clearly As as get in ballot” King from casualties security. “peace is This Oxford Guernica would it created wars”. for mainland. can put of had the attack think will all ght that 150,000 public out “I earth bomber end aircraft war War when not London British on to 1933, would collective Britain, war. peace Union in 1935. The Union to show that the principles. The demands of the dictators seen as justied Many and British that politicians Hitler had Increasingly, there caused the there the the electorate World war 1932, carried 2 “the the would through increased for opinion, First bomber power him, there the another Commons that had from the public House German civilians and in February vulnerability to 1918 million; security. horror that of 21 vote, of The clearly to increase notice collective by was all to grievances In was a for business these that the Treaty grievances belief the particular, do of felt genuine powers, support treaty. possible 194 this concessions dishonourable more, ▲ in making not that just idea of the by with First Versailles the and rationally and was First War her and to harsh War. been allies, punitive without too World had mistakenly, Hitler, and the more believed, Mussolini to World Germany revising Chamberlain countries of relating and thus clauses that sort recourse it out to of was the war. C H A P T E R 2 . 6 : In addition, as more 3 many I N T E R N A T I O N A L conservative dangerous than the R E S P O N S E politicians threat of saw T O I T A L I A N the threat A G G R E S S I O N of ( 19 3 5 – 19 4 0 ) communism fascism. The lack of an alternative policy Support was no for supported 4 appeasement clear alternative. was found anti-appeasement The Labour collective Party, security in party which but did all to political provide was not the a parties political support and coherent there political party in opposition, rearmament. Economic pressures There were Already was its also Britain’s facing made be it able to balance to of It it was It was For not following First if it that with that further high welfare many defence still. the By were These of no appeasement. Great the too 3 order quickly imports of million difculties would to nance would cause machinery rearmament spending Britain overtaking government in Depression 1930s, economic benets rearming too policy unemployment: 1930s. although a War, that armaments; cut reasons, World countries early on feared 1937 for faced the crisis, these until other also in support also the situation money payments materials. 1932, spend maintain rearmament. raw from unemployed hard by economic production. were reasons severely competition industrial people economic weakened worsened a T H E started increased and again in dramatically. The Anti-Appeasers Some individuals did speak out against appeasement: Foreign Secretary Anthony Winston Churchill called Eden resigned in for rearmament to be February 1938 because stepped up and he disagreed with vehemently opposed Chamberlain’s policy concessions to Germany of appeasement of Italy. (though he did not oppose the appeasement of Mussolini over Abyssinia). He suppor ted the idea of a Grand Alliance of the Anti-Fascist powers. Du Cooper was You will have seen Secretary of State for plenty of David Low’s War (1935–1937) and car toons in this book . then First Lord of the These appeared Admiralty in Chamberlain’s in the Evening Standard government until he newspaper and were resigned in protest at consistently critical of the Munich Agreement appeasement throughout in September 1938. the 1930s. Low was attacked in the right-wing press as a “war-monger ” and his car toons were banned in Germany. 195 2 Britain was Japan, Italy in a weak military position and, by 1937, with threats from TOK and There have been many critics of dangerous. the policy of appeasement as rearmament pursued by Britain and France policy in the 1930s. As you have read January here, those involved at the time forces seem to have had a dierent against to As a reduce be this result, British was 1938 will Germany, the in strong of enough to and it “We of Staff be our main This foresee territory, increasingly concluded the enemies. cannot safeguard Japan becoming should Britain’s statement: Italy was Chiefs advanced, number this Germany, the further position the was time trade that, aim of reiterated when and until foreign vital our in defence interests simultaneously”. view and this perspective was 5 Global commitments suppor ted by public opinion. In pairs discuss the extent to Britain which history looked dierent obligations had to in the past. Create a poster: most “History itself looked dierent European. Preservation in the past” outlining your essential Britain ideas. Include references to the priority. material you have covered in they to consider politicians if worldwide countries considered was However, were its European British and to Britain’s becoming a of League the great imperial increasingly the interests defence remain commitments and to be difcult to Indeed, global was power, commitments its Nations. more Empire world alongside of held which were administer now and than to be was so its vast that defend. this book . In addition, Empire, 1937 L TA Thinking skills as Imperial another 6 the such Dominions Canada, Conference European (the self-governing Australia that and they New were parts of Zealand) not the British made prepared to it clear help at the Britain in war. Defence priorities Worried about pressure on the the cost of Foreign its expenditure, Ofce. In 1937, the the Treasury Treasury was put also putting forward a report What does the foreign on defence expenditure in which the priorities for defence were to be, in oce repor t on defence order of importance: expenditure show about Britain’s expectations for a ● military ● the preparation sufcient to repulse air attacks future war? How might France preservation of trade routes for the supply of food and react to this repor t? rawmaterials ● the defence of the ● the defence of Britain’s 7 The impact of Neville Chamberlain Clearly, the comments he from became follow with also a nancial policy Germany had an very but in much Hitler. looked Italy. He the of Staff in 1937, for However, and to consulting his Cabinet. Right up France to hope the continued to Europe maintain and Britain the that he peace. his that could He he take and war achieve little own lead broke a ran Sir faith in out, “general the when but personal to diplomacy distrusted the and to confrontation determined adviser, had choice than Chamberlain chief USA; should moment little rather was Empire Chamberlain, have negotiation aid that and Europe. of of Chamberlain’s the allies, that would war use of meant conciliation detested settlement commitments with believed to Chiefs tension alone, without he and peaceful Britain’s and 196 a that allies. pressures, Minister impact. international about the Prime Empire to the bring foreign Horace in the views resolve policy Wilson, League Soviet negotiating Union, with Chamberlain settlement” or of C H A P T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O I T A L I A N A G G R E S S I O N L TA Communication ( 19 3 5 – 19 4 0 ) Class discussion skills How might the policy of Go to www.youtube.com/watch?v=gR8lSozEbcs, or search for “Why Appeasement?” appeasement encourage expansionist states? Watch a summary of the reasons for Britain’s policy of appeasement. Make notes on the rst 10 minutes of this video clip. Add notes to the points above on the reasons behind Britain’s policy of appeasement. Why did France align its foreign policy to Britain’s policy of appeasement in the 1930s? France certainly Germany 1920s and that it the First from the impact huge that the loss weakened invaded wanted When join some harshly The of by subsequently in In an allies with defeat 1924, attempt as to a (1920), had and a However, the frequent in in the Germany. impact of In had 1932, a Edouard failure coalition redress by its of the Edouard in and defence France of it the and economic Daladier. a this terms and seen the then to Britain been also treated apparent settlement. of the period be also the treaty by occupation of appeasement in the Dawes evacuation 1925), agreement of he Daladier did and, what won any coupled forced not and conicts action with stagnated. the The increased. general election. but to to bring (1924), became ideological the other 1920s alliance. take Minister, was nd Romania unemployment radicals issues to economy and Prime in this and unable ended to the Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia, French fell tried through supported was elected at and government exports socialists by can France (1927). that been French When post-war the agreements (1920 meant permanently the had However, 1925 to 1930. reparations initially of position, changes meant this laid society, Versailles the uphold debts costs. appalled 1923. been had and the resources. and France 1914 huge in economically had French Germany followed bilateral Depression, was to in to of of faced 10% abandoned. that Briand; mutual overvalued, Herriot to replaced been of felt were Agreements German Great was Entente”. 1930s against franc and Poland signed view Ruhr all Treaty guarantee Yugoslavia “Little the the Rhineland series the It regarding indication suffered punished and at views no agricultural attack. 1870 French French the strengthen the France ratify the Aristide Locarno the German attempted France from (1926) Yugoslavia known for Minister signed Belgium Romania to occupied the troops and rst Nations, about and trauma Germany Anglo–American they Foreign French of the under of resurgent failed land; had Germany between Versailles, ended Plan a its was appeasement. resultant future Germany Britain’s there Britain, industrial wanted with at when the any on on of and of unlike ghting and many policy sympathy the French force a and, impact life, with Versailles, population League collapse the prevent USA of War an prevent the the of twice to showed too to of had French agree follow World which The not Treaty would after waste, did the due resign his and stability, was however, ▲ Edouard Daladier, the French Prime Minister in 1938 197 2 and there were six different problems fostered emulated Mussolini’s unity wing and led parties. victory L TA Leon in the In the Blum. to the Cabinets growth of Fascists. general of 1936, Blum’s the the elections However, less Right-wing formation January in right-wing than activity Popular Popular under the two leagues, an won leadership government was Economic of whom galvanized Front, Front years. some a of left-wing alliance of left- resounding Prime criticized by Minister the right Thinking and social skills for expensive domestic In pairs compare and contrast have been the British and French reasons rm stance for pursuing a policy of Minister appeasement towards the as aggressor states in the 1930s. continual changes Are there more similarities or in how deal In addition, its military he rearming. against in May moved to to reforms Blum was internal 1938 the and right in with when also Fascist to for a meant France his Daladier establish supported government believed criticized threats. managed and they huge that attempts returned some in to as political arms there should take stability spending. was little a Prime These continuity Hitler. more dierences? L TA Self-management skills Eastern some there was planning. Europe, offensive a conict Despite which a would capability, its between series have of France’s required military foreign guarantees to France planning in to the policy the states and of demonstrate 1930s was entirely Review Chapter 2.3 on defensive. This was in contrast to its offensive action in the 1920s, Mussolini’s expansion in the and most clearly seen in the building of the Maginot Line, a chain of 1930s. Consider the extent to fortresses along the Franco–German force ineffectual border. Furthermore, France’s air which a policy of appeasement was and its army limited. As a result, the French became would have encouraged increasingly dependent on Britain. When Britain decided on a policy of Mussolini’s aggression. appeasement in the 1930s France had to follow its strongest ally’s line. How was the international response to aggression in the 1930s aected by the weaknesses of the League of Nations? The international response to acts of expansion and aggression in the 1930s Refer back to Chapter 1.3, should have been dealt with through the mechanism to facilitate collective page 62, to review the aims security: the League of Nations. However, the League had many limitations: of the League. ● It lacked the ● Its key organ France, three Italy of The Soviet ● The League’s ● It was the and decisions. rst, of power and Union economic Mussolini’s the with power Council, Germany “revisionist” was time in it France to of which joining powers a member who until and organization face of to and Britain little Hitler’s act the its founding was in led by 1926. wanted effectively the was in the Germany. was it power League’s inclined faith September aggressive diplomatic uphold had or the failed economic France Italy not structure However, while was Japan, were impotent each Without Britain and nation, Britain, The to latter revise the Versailles. ● and credibility countries Treaty 198 the USA. inefcient. military lost of more the look League’s fascist after it and its ability states, authority. USA, resolutions to 1934. was own to up enforce to its interests contain C H A P T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O I T A L I A N A G G R E S S I O N ( 19 3 5 – 19 4 0 ) What was the impact of US foreign policy on the international response to the expansionist powers? As has been Nations in period. The globally in its discussed 1919 and own and USA wished by which War remained advocated Asia. In USA out a was the to to be avoid impact of in the policy to being of drawn Great minds passed the not in into trade the Memories of the Neutrality in the and US of of inter-war were and by the League investment that and affairs Act the 1930s of Americans. in join conicts during Depression anti-war. the did isolationism engage non-involvement USA USA continued the staunchly of a 1.3, free policy fresh policy 1935, pursued This the opinion, also it Chapter wanted interests. strengthened in not was public First World isolationists both designed Europe to keep and the Franklin D Roosevelt, US president ▲ of a possible European war by banning the sale of armaments from 1933 to belligerents. Source skills A.J.P . War Taylor. The Origins of the Second supply. World moral (1961). which American isolationism completed the Europe. Academic commentators that the problem of the two be “solved”, Soviet Russia if the hands would the two World Powers, United States, were what drawn into European affairs. This a desire, would from have across not a policy. grasped the Western eagerly Atlantic. at This United States were was unarmed not backing on Pacic; impossible and for neutrality them to except legislation act even provide the feared. It very only thing dealing with work against the Hitler would and tie Mussolini; ready had they to already lacked make. concessions too was Great which much Britain moral material and capital; strength. as forthcoming from the United None States. First question, par t a – 3 marks offer. a according to AJP Taylor, was the impact of in the the was statesmen material What, The could observation was was statesmen in were France and this dictators they would Western and observed, it rightly, Roosevelt isolation their of President exhortation; made base USA ’s policy of isolationism? it of What was the impact of Soviet foreign policy on the international response to the expansionist powers? Western to Italian off in hostility all and towards German diplomatic and 1917 and had regime. This failed, talks and League remained and the of hostile concerned “red scare” Russia the until its the 1927, in an was end potential not the restore to 1920s of from in the Lenin, some diplomatic links the Paris had remained communism had cut government robbers”. when Britain response overthrow included band its democracies Vladimir “a affected Bolshevik attempt made. threat the not leader, of were also Western with foundation, the did Union The ties USSR Bolshevik on agreements with in aggression. but Russian economic Soviet economic invaded Nations, the new Peace called the Relations diplomatic links particularly and, until following a 1930. 199 2 Source skills A Soviet poster by D. Melnikova, produced Moscow, Soviet June The in in the Union, 1930. text reads “Proletarians of all countries, Unite!”. First question, par t b – 2 marks What is the message artist in of the this poster? L TA Thinking and social skills Look at the details of this Soviet poster. In pairs or groups, discuss how the Western democracies of the 1930s might have reacted to this Soviet propaganda. The Soviet Union under Stalin (from 1929) wanted to build “socialism in one L TA Communication country”, which meant that it would not commit to exporting the revolution and social skills until the process Work in pairs. Create a diagram the Communist to show the factors inuencing Stalin’s the policy of appeasement that when the France and Britain took towards Japan in Mussolini and Hitler in the 1930s. of foreign Europe Stalin Latvia, the mutual the by to Hitler’s expense Poland towards Soviet assistance in in of and the Union pacts the aim joined a the France activities the democracies. from of by alarmed hostility the acquiring was League and Front” of 1931 shift in Czechoslovakia in the of East 1932, Soviet fascism. 1934 in West Lithuania, against Nations in and Finland, tangible “Popular the of policies Lebensraum Between a towards expansionist Afghanistan, There of the Asia Union. with France. pursuit with away Soviet pacts Nevertheless, and threatened stated the USSR. Europe shift became non-aggression policy end, began Union and Estonia, foreign this at signed complete policy Soviet Asia, was International and To signed 1935. Class discussion However, the aim of forming a Popular Front against fascism failed Should the Western because Britain and France were following a policy of appeasement. democracies have worked with It was clear to the Soviet Union during the Spanish Civil War that the USSR to form a “Popular Britain in particular feared communism more than fascism. The nal Front against Fascism”? What catalyst for the Soviet Union to abandon its attempts to work with the advantages would this have British and French in order to contain the fascist aggressors came at the had? Why were the Western Munich Conference in September 1938. Despite its assistance pact with democracies reluctant to ally Czechoslovakia and the territorially strategic importance of that country with the USSR? to 200 the Soviet Union, Stalin was not invited to the Munich Conference. C H A P T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O I T A L I A N A G G R E S S I O N ( 19 3 5 – 19 4 0 ) What was the international response to the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935–36? Both side the as a French key German ambitions described, in March that they Foreign and 1935. At would only the to three unite this had an meant were Italian had in Although As French gave expansion French in as at to the could French not have Front impression French go ahead interests condoned point on contain Stresa the Africa. Italy this to chapters form Mussolini the had believed Mussolini specically East that Abyssinia, the keep previous together suggested Mussolini his Britain silent on during would have concerned about The demonstrated British when 1935, with the the as plans plan and compensate sea British via accommodate further them, reinforced When Mussolini widespread League favour of of a November November by the 1935, that 1935. League public League. a there military they would had However, proved there at the as an and the ineffective will in was foreign dealing with British of was from election more to in the and in Britain important; secure sequence the Abyssinia. invasion the the to the government from the was the all to wanted perception there general time see 1935, June Abyssinia invasion against a expansionist access condemnation National you from action, in of Britain This Italian was was Italian with that plan. October opinion opinion helped saw this Italians navy. Rome region hoped The military Italian to Ogaden the French. appease went Mussolini Mussolini to the “acquired” outrage As the Abyssinia resist in to now had not public attack the rejected Italy as Eden Selassie’s Italians they when response to wanted Italy Abyssinia public stance British they would British attitude Anthony give Abyssinia Conference. threaten The report Britain invaded same Haile so international action the would and by that Nations. pro-League that of Stresa potential Emperor stating the Secretary that matter the could Somaliland. ofce, below, British Foreign a the plans particularly in come the to settlement, Austria. had inuence country, been mentioned a with Laval attempted resist. Britain in had post-war meeting, Pierre political the the countries economic. of British of tolerate Minister takeover not the acquire were and guarantor of power events crisis. Source skills convey Source A in Laura Fermi, political in 1938 Jewish-Italian activist, to who escape writer emigrated from to Mussolini’s The the nearly a quarter-million “To as cast he an recalls army ower of men, embodying of the Italian manhood, upon a barren in two thousand in view of the coming goodwill “peace ballot”, and public opinion, embraced an all-out of favor of the miles League of nations. At Churchill economic Nations the end spoke in of sanctions September London and whole from home, world and against without sea, what and may then well in be this a position series of policy and on against a people and in regions the which of the upon campaigns imposition the the embark government of elections, command in Mussolini”, (1966). England, the to Storm: USA Italy, the In warning and shore Mussolini a Gathering no conqueror in four thousand years aggressor ever thought it worthwhile give hostages to to subdue, is to Winston “tried fortune unparalleled in all to history.” 201 2 It is tempting these if he words read to them, did. The chance this late date, Ethiopian of his of money own for as the s p e nt ( To Post, was pre-war believe ha v e that nothing?”) in he he s a id dollars tha t wa s fa tal is ti c – ha v e that on the in d ri v e the the und e r t ak in g , tha t 2 Great he and the bil li on a nd a sk ed s pe nt this – to of why arms “C an so su m war, at … of on so to arms to of to the sea. sanctions the It France through is only said that condence could not procure needed then, embargo France with Djibouti, But policies, Ethiopia pathetic he buy. unofcial down the justice, difcult the assuring connived from placing to against League’s water and equipment desperately the port British was and the try the Selassie, it for unofcially Abyssinia traditional 1 00 position imposed, control Haile fr om c os t would if a and was embargo access wa r n in g l ir e she an up war Britain Italy, the am ou n t this taking Ethiopian at to inte rvi e we r already we be l ie ve d a ll owe d an While ef fect Mus s ol in i, ne g li g ibl e b o th had him. Morning you by on C hurchi ll s e e ms would preparation million as wha t had determi na ti on he dissuade the ha v e commi tte d war Mussolini to s p e cul a te may was in understand the and modern was during lifted, trying the in part least. Source B A cartoon by David Low, published in the UK newspaper, Evening Standard, July ▲ The tex t reads “On the throne of justice. See no Abyssinia; Hear no Abyssinia; Speak no Abyssinia”. What is the message of the cartoonist Second question – 4 marks in With Source on 1935. First question, par t b – 2 marks reference to its origin, purpose and content B? assess the historians the 202 the 24 values and studying Abyssinian limitations the crisis in of Source international 1935–36. A for response to C H A P T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O I T A L I A N A G G R E S S I O N ( 19 3 5 – 19 4 0 ) L TA Thinking and social skills In pairs or groups, discuss the key points made in Source A regarding British policy in the lead up to the Abyssinian crisis. The response of the League, Britain and France ● On 6 December Abyssinian arbitrate; side ● however 7 for Italian January On tacitly 17 11 On on 20 Talks Despite via June for the of an Eden July arms to “unfriendliness” supplies end of held do as large he page Nations found to pleased 137), to neither Italian the Italy and in French Tunisia forces in League, as East a continued and again. observers from the mobilization League return of Abyssinia. Italian to In parts living in of directly made. Italy Italians build-up appealed The of session 3 and to Abyssinia discuss the be to sent broke crisis the down and region. at as pressure to for shipping. he the previous war sides of It also of on arms enabled Selassie it and was 25 to July, The its to the British in would free response be warships have attempts from perhaps Abyssinia Mussolini British clear conquest. removed again to asked mobilize declaration duly sanctions; and They the British of Britain to for his war, decided to chapter, and impede they in of not and actually Italy neutral poorly Italian seen from the movement observers, equipped forces had the key Stresa but and invaded League. close Suez to Germany increased rallied war and to Italian all to a the Italy. and, such domestic as members of harsh also good under signicant to Italian sanctions The as the the maintain was Africa, ignored effort and implement Canal, East exports Italian to by government the supplies began slow materials, out Front the to war wanted British and was carried the Nazi fact not not aggressor process embargo for the the this were revive authority troops USA not However, Hungary little did sanctions wanted the found however, government Mussolini. The did Italy. began a League limited. oil, Austria, therefore, a both sales which also Mussolini’s completely. on that Without uphold Nevertheless, wanted Mussolini resolution, Africa. Britain with appease October. The relations to peaceful towards act imposing were a Italy September, League. sanctions the a status was gave special of on steel route to agreement France League East October, sanctions the (see of committee a to army. Abyssinia coal, an September outdated 7 incident League requested efforts assertion Mediterranean, process appealed embargo as On support. nd that Mussolini’s 28 ofcial Selassie ofcials to the the League Anglo–French declared on its Selassie between Anthony At the Hague. beginning of Wal arbitration Hitler, following Haile Selassie May, 19 The Wal asked Franco–Italian contain Mussolini 1935, state, May a to allowed Emperor member ● the Selassie League’s improved March Africa, on the 1935, support Somaliland, ● following Haile responsible. On and 1935, Emperor sanctions, discussed support in behind Mussolini. 203 2 Even when failed to the take Italians further used chemical weapons in Abyssinia, the League action. The Hoare–Laval Pact In their attempt Germany, end the French Hoare by in foreign drew up him However, both and Laval (1935) and bordering tension of was France for forced was to up outraged denounce this the to pacify press. Samuel access to the opinion duplicity British and to Mussolini Public apparent The pact plan 1935, counterpart, receive French by resurgent December sought policy. a appeasing and sanctions French continued. resigned. The e t D In would the League’s an British which Selassie in against with caused. and Pact, leaked the had Laval Abyssinia. support were Pierre Front came it Hoare–Laval plan and Hoare – Laval proposal ANGLO- S E a r o t A e t e t EGYPTIAN a r I I S T R e d ( o t ) H P n YEMEN I the Stresa c T A L the the British countries o r I and secretary, Hoare R E Abyssinia and the Britain and maintain most demanded governments to French conict giving sea. the c SUDAN I e t T A L B o r I A P YEMEN A n N N e E E d R I R I E R E Adowa T R T A A Adowa Aden Aden Asab FRENCH Djibouti (French) Djibouti SOMALILAND BRITISH BRITISH Addis Addis Ababa Ababa SOMALILAND SOMALILAND ABYSSINIA Ogaden ABYSSINIA Deser t INDIAN INDIAN OCEAN OCEAN I Mogadishu T Mogadishu UGANDA KENYA KENYA Lake Victoria 0 TANGANYIKA BRITISH 300 TANGANYIKA FRENCH ITALIAN Assigned Italian to economic Italy sphere inuence 204 of km C H A P T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O I T A L I A N A G G R E S S I O N ( 19 3 5 – 19 4 0 ) L TA Thinking and communication skills Read this source. Discuss the key impact of the Hoare–Laval Pact on domestic politics in Britain and France. Using this source, identify political opposition to appeasing Mussolini that existed in Britain and France. A .J.P. Taylor. 19 61. The Origins of the Second World War (19 61) pages 126–127 . Early in December Hoare took the plan to Paris. Laval welcomed it. Mussolini, warned by his equally erring exper ts that the war was going badly, was ready to accept it. The next step was to present it at Geneva; then, with the League’s concurrence, to impose it on the Emperor of Abyssinia – a beautiful example, repeated at Munich, of using the machinery of peace against the victim of aggression. But something went wrong. Hardly had Hoare left Paris on his way to Geneva than the so-called Hoare-Laval plan appeared in the French press. No one knows how this happened. Perhaps Laval doubted whether the National government were solidly behind Hoare and therefore leaked the plan in order to commit Baldwin and the rest beyond redemption. Perhaps Herriot, or some other enemy of Laval’s, revealed the plan in order to ruin it, believing that, if the League were eective against Mussolini, it could then be turned against Hitler. Maybe there was no design at all, merely the incorrigible zest of French journalists … At any rate the revelation produced an explosion in British public opinion. The high-minded suppor ters of the league who had helped to return the National government felt cheated and indignant … Baldwin rst admitted that the plan had been endorsed by the government; then repudiated both the plan and Sir Samuel Hoare. Eden took Hoare’s place as Foreign Secretary. The Hoare-Laval plan disappeared. Other wise nothing was changed. The British government were still resolved not to risk war. The results of the international response to the Abyssinian crisis The It Hoare–Laval had been drawn the away from Rhineland complete French pact exposed his in sealed as East not the sham. Africa March conquest would a and 1936. in of any the closer for League attention France return support fate The to was his further of of home when prepared support action Nations Britain to and Hitler let against regarding in 1935. France was remilitarized Mussolini Hitler, and the sanctions. Source skills Telegram of from Nations, 6 Haile May Selassie to the League its efforts and 1936. that to it territorial We have decided unequal, our age, most and to bring unjust, have to most chosen an end the barbarous that our people will the road not be to and in order to consecrate and in peace to the war exile assumed sovereignty, independence ... we recourse to the League of Nations the covenant, recognize exercise resulting from of an the armed force and to illegal numerous in of violations of international agreements. wholly First question, par t a – 3 marks our now according should to Haile Selassie, should the demand League that or the to of What, empire’s extensions, for not exterminated ourselves preservation respect decide most other order secure should of Nation’s do in response to Italian continue aggression in Abyssinia? 205 2 Selassie ed on 2 May, and the Abyssinian capital, Addis Ababa, fell to L TA Thinking and Italian forces. However, there was no ofcial surrender by Abyssinia and social skills a guerrilla support Go to www.youtube.com/ war from journalists, watch?v=oyX2kXeFUlo, or search for “Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia addresses the he for recognition of its the Despite Selassie’s at the League of Nations, League voted June 1936. new “Italian return Britain USA and to and on powerful Italian He us its France June, moved its own recognized to jeering international a resolution concluded will be his you lifted Japan control the with on of of Italian Italian deny the ominous and tomorrow”. resolution were to of for the by Italian pleas the occupation recognise made despite which recognized of Selassie criticizing for He It speech, sanctions, was refused 30 Italians. speech today. impassioned end the conquest. is recognition USSR against inaction. Empire” for and a statement,“It Watch Haile Selassie’s speech in League made community prophetic League of Nations”. continued failed; on 18 the on 4 15 July. July, November Manchuria. Abyssinia, the The 1936 In 1938, although the Empire. Source skills raised Source A Article from Guardian, 3 the UK October Mussolini’s Abyssinia newspaper, a from the of as at dawn young they and invasion his African adventure afternoon of Rome. his to in the the “A ofce in solemn the hour Palazzo is about of yesterday, Italian crossed began balcony in break history of our fatherland,” he with The wheel of fate had begun to turn and infantrymen the border heavy slog not be stopped. from In Eritrea on Wednesday Venezia, could cheering on The said. thousands curtain speech 1935. long-expected began the with up London, the British cabinet held a two- the hour meeting on the crisis in the morning, valleys. and Italian bombing planes roared in the service striking rst at the border town of of Italy’s humiliating defeat at is of the Abyssinians in chiefs being 1896. Two bombers were reported to be piloted sons, Vittorio, aged 19, and 18, Count while a Galeazzo third had Ciano, as his be the Italian force, de Bono and Eritrean advancing on 12 miles by General from held of under numbering by soldiers, 40-mile Adowa. is is 100,000 and rain-soaked but to army, mounting Somaliland, is tracks Abyssinian Ministry of the League denouncing the Italian of the League a to be by Sir the rst drive north to be … I do not Nations on moment Affairs in as there for a government 206 hospital bearing the Red But do the anything recently reached to Hoare, the British League at Geneva, that to the will fulll in the ever speech of they that was … a On United be of behalf to the the difcult of Kingdom, second within history more none the I can in measure their of their has the obligations which the Covenant Geneva, a upon them. The League stands, and breach country stands with it, for the collective Abyssinians Adowa Cross. of the Covenant, struck acts a not 1935. suppose Assembly say Foreign The bombs they Samuel Secretary, maintenance that France. will be within commanded reported aggression Covenant. accord September my claim with they men, lays of saying the capacity, telegraphed Street. Britain Italy. intention The by General reported front Another Graziani, Italian up a Downing action Source B pilot. 11 including to any son-in-law, Foreign Emilio coordinated are upset Speech Tonight called that Bruno, with aged were stressed by to Mussolini’s and of French the ministers the must hands key Adowa, It scene afternoon overhead, Mussolini of unprovoked aggression. especially to all C H A P T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O I T A L I A N Article Source C Extract from League A G G R E S S I O N of speech Nations, by Haile June Selassie to Haile Selassie, to … It existence of the claim and Emperor that the of Abyssinia, am ago justice assistance which is due promised to to it when had fty international was given who had nations asserted breach to prevent noted three of the conict that conict with power full to on in of as and their Hitler’s it is the Nations. It is the to small very of promises had is was Germany. of no for It states that respected their and … it is In a word, the principle it is of the equality international of morality is at stake. key criticisms Crisis of are the League’s made in response Source to the C? Second question – 4 marks … With value to and route the crisis Mussolini the the with Britain crisis aggressor believed could had shifted now take the move origin, purpose limitations the of and content, Source international B for reaction to crisis. had a Thinking and social skills the states. after to its and studying undermined they to values Abyssinian Abyssinian fatally would the historians of had reference assess dealing France Thus … Abyssinian that meaning only be undertaken response the advantage. What guilty undertakings body Both made independence First question, par t a – 3 marks nations surprise the and of assistance diplomacy. credible appeasement security: of that aggressor? absolutely Front. collective my violation fty-two the practice, a real without as in Government international Stresa with the Rome European Germany’s alliance by considered the Nations ended but Covenant effect What Covenant grief, League L TA League the triumph then, doubt, profound also the What, Without the the with … Ethiopia powers under … of committed treaties declared of I to been of eight that aggression collective and here states months is Covenant 1936. ensured people the security? integrity today of the value I, 16 ( 19 3 5 – 19 4 0 ) It this avoid balance towards a of a In pairs or small groups, read Source A and discuss the key points it makes. Discuss the reasons it gives for British hesitation. To what extent do you agree that France’s position Hitler. held Britain back? Source skills A cartoon man by David who Low, took the published lid off”. on 4 October 1935, L TA “The Research and communication skills In pairs, research headlines and press repor ts on the invasion of Abyssinia from around the world in October 1935. Make sure you reference your sources appropriately and include a correctly formatted works cited list. Present your headlines and press repor ts to the class and assess whether there was international consensus against the Italian action. First question, par t b – 2 marks What is the message of the cartoon? 207 2 How did the USA respond to the invasion of TOK Abyssinia? In small groups explore a range of historians’ accounts on the Abyssinian President Roosevelt Crisis. Discuss what distinguishes a 1935. stated better account from a more limited one. the Is it the range and quality of the sources a He failure to calamity arrive and sent that the at would a Mussolini US peaceful lead a personal government to and settlement adverse message people in effects East for all on 18 August believed Africa that would be nations. used in the account and the depth of However, the United States would not take any direct action, as suppor ting evidence? Is it the time was made clear in a radio address by Secretary of State Hull on 6 and context it was written in? Is it the November 1935. In this broadcast, he said it was the USA ’s duty language and expression used by the to remain aloof from disputes and conicts with which it had no historian? Does your group agree on direct concern. which accounts are better? Source skills The Secretary States of State Delegation Washington, October 8 daily p.m. to the Geneva, October 15, possible, at 17 It United peace, whereas by object is 1935, is telegram, important newspaper the 6.00pm. that, rumors and if Europe about the attitude or Government policy toward some reports are that just controversy, phase foreign about to and of this of it can or will key or another, or agencies shall knows our extent be that chief … agencies minimized prior Every to purpose the was with in to leading aid in are US made in this source with response to the Italian invasion reference one the of to its origin, purpose and content, foreign the values and limitations of this source for way studying the international response to greatest ofcial outbreak to the Second question – 4 marks the possible into … points to historians or chief Government cooperate peace our drawn Abyssinia? assess Governments began being the With whether avoid especially governments inquire hostilities to of of Italo-Ethiopian be First question b – 3 marks regards this after will reports What from war and Italian invasion of Abyssinia. abroad the war preserving The end of the appeasement of Mussolini’s Italy How did Britain and France respond to the Italian invasion of Albania, 7 April 1939? Britain, as Italy along had was a and now turning support. Royal Navy, at France, point went as but the as had condemned guaranteed for far Churchill surprised 208 with previously the Chamberlain. to guarantee urged Chamberlain appeasers’ a more did the Italian invasion sovereignty He no of longer borders direct response not agree. to with by Mussolini Greece. of Albania Balkans, trusted Greek commitment the the dictators British sending was, and, this military in the however, C H A P T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O I T A L I A N A G G R E S S I O N ( 19 3 5 – 19 4 0 ) L TA Thinking skills G. Bruce Strang. On the Fiery March: Mussolini Prepares Axis aggression was eroding. Chamberlain wrote to For War, page 247 (20 03). his sister, “Mussolini has behaved like a snake and a cad.” Chamberlain thought the invasion showed Italian leaders were ignorant of the real British Mussolini’s “complete cynicism”. The Prime Minister reaction. Despite the comparatively muted protests, had reached the conclusion that “any chance of the aggressive nature of Italian policy did provoke a future rapprochement with Italy has been blocked response. The foreign policy committee decided on by Mussolini just as Hitler has blocked any German 10 and 11 April to issue a guarantee to Greece, and, rapprochement”. Mussolini’s decision to invade under intense French pressure, agreed to extend Albania may have brought potential gains in Italy’s one to Romania, while making a concer ted eor t to strategic situation but at the cost of fur ther alienating bring Turkey into an eastern Mediterranean security the Chamberlain cabinet and fur thering the division arrangement. Greece accepted its guarantee, although of Europe into two competing blocks. By the middle of it refused in the rst instance to join in guaranteeing April, British strategic intelligence listed Italy amongst other countries independence. In Turkey, the Inonii Britain’s likely enemies. British planners also shifted government cited constitutional diculties, and, the emphasis in war planning to concentrate the British more seriously, concerns about its own security in eet in the eastern Mediterranean at the expense of the absence of a British guarantee. Never theless, on the commitment to the Far East, a clear signal that 13 April both Chamberlain and Daladier issued public resistance to Axis aggression had assumed a higher statements in their respective parliamentary chambers priority after Mussolini’s attack . guaranteeing Greece and Romania against aggression. Although the issuing of guarantees would in the end Question be signicantly less than an ironclad, interlocking In pairs, and with reference to the source above, discuss security system against Axis aggression, it did signal the extent to which the invasion of Albania in 1939 that the patience of the Western democracies with marked a turning point in British policy towards Italy. What was the reaction of Britain to Italian expansion in 1940? As you 1940 The have read Mussolini’s British Operation then Fomm in been feared by Italian British eet then Chapter 2.3, invaded when Egypt counter-attacked Compass Beda the in forces and Libya the in in pushed Italian navy harbour occupied at Italian them February Italy and (as you Taranto forces out 1941. of The in Egypt, the the war Greece North British have on joined invaded in June from Africa defeating Navy, them which read earlier), 11th November, Albania. in had at had sunk 1940. half The Crete. L TA Communication and thinking skills From Andrew Rober ts. The Storm of War : A new History of against a force four times his size, concentrating on the Second World War, (20 09) page 120–121. each for tied area in turn. Operation Compass had close suppor t from the Navy and RAF, and, aided In mid-September Mussolini, fancying himself a second by a collapse in Italian morale, by mid-December Caesar, sent [his] Tenth Army to invade Egypt with O’Connor had cleared Egypt of Italians and 38,000 ve divisions along the coast, taking Sidi Barraini. He prisoners were taken. stopped 75 miles shor t of the British in Mersa Matruh, while both sides were reinforced. It was a nerve-wracking Question time for the British in Egypt… On 8th December 1940, In pairs discuss what this source suggests about how Lieutenant-General Richard O’Connor, commander of the the Italians were pushed back in Nor th Africa in 1940. Western Deser t Force [numbering only 31,000 men, 120 guns and 275 tanks], counter-attacked ercely 209 2 Therefore, for the the initial Italians. German forces and been had June military However, arrived. pushed response the The back British British by by the were in evacuated German British turn forces Greece to led to pushed El in reversals back May Alamein when 1941 in Egypt by 1942. Full document question: The international response to Italian aggression, 1935–36 Source A Extract Source C from Nations, the Covenant of the League of 1919. Sir Samuel delivered London, Article 16 – Should resort to under Articles to have other war 12, members severance of between and an of all 15, it of to or shall war It deemed all hereby to the between the their all any business other involving our a member of the League or mind shall such be cases the to governments duty of the Council recommend concerned to the one the the naval League forces to or shall be used air what force the contribute to protect to in 1935. Italy against a clear. nation, full attack Power … of us … of we act make no fear threats. should was different, in our that launched almost the an Italian What kind the or me had any very this would Let We of success. something regard sanction her. attacked with would an upon inevitably lead in It was in that totality several an the atmosphere of opposed conversations of threatened themember to military began, States and … appeared to the be action. effective members the the [It] seemed to me that Anglo-French of co-operation was be at essential if there was to armed covenants no breach Geneva. For two days M. of and I discussed the basis of a possible League. photograph … of US protesters, to League. not. Source B 1936. These … I or a is a Italy made the all unsatisfactory these League that member contemplated and in I is facts will that the States the will place. co-operation the kind that suggestions up. up, result taking full and are break peace now compromise put less demand summer. between of Laval the unsatisfactory of M. immensely unless the conict choice the are than last that either most from It to believe faced… … proposals favourable Mussolini 210 speech, Commons military quite as negotiation A a dissolution Laval the of state, … military, war was that as Italians retaliate war It … position the … whether clear embargo isolated covenant-breaking of was oil If covenant- of resignation House December whatever, relations, personal of nationals it prevention or be 19 the League against nancial of the which exchange the of covenants subject nationals and its League, nationals the of act the commercial the member or trade the state, nancial, of all and breaking state 13 immediately prohibition nationals any disregard committed undertake the in Hoare’s in was which C H A P T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O I T A L I A N A G G R E S S I O N amongst Source D Italian Ruth Henig, a British academic historian, academic book The Origins of the War bargain they immediately tentatively leaked struck of the uproar in Britain. of Nations setback had member suffered state. its in ve years, and this second time in the French failed “Hoare-Laval pact” The press, and caused an again, government was Hoare Anthony Hoare’s himself Eden, negotiations resigned, who supporter. was The to in be aggression much nearer to the great work powers together to had shown resolve their to peace or to protect the serious interests of Paris, replaced perceived British prevent forced threats repudiate to Europe. inability League League the was Once reports and a proclaim (1985). to to of and Second had The weapons, conquest League serious World other in The an ( 19 3 5 – 19 4 0 ) as a weaker League not on members. These lessons were by lost Hitler. strong government First question, par t a – 3 marks now led the way at Geneva in calling for In economic sanctions against Mussolini, Source League dragged a reluctant French oil to it. But sanctions, agree to the French whilst the the closure would the not measures major The which problems French had for would the not were reluctant Suez Canal, the Stresa have caused Italian war abandoned front, effort. hopes and the is want to run a serious risk of to the naval war in the British British condent victory. For imperial not its be own crush naval the – such commanders outcome a war to exploit expansionist action troops was were resistance by able situation the with to use in message of the photograph in Source B? reference the to values its origin, and purpose limitations of and content, Source studying the international C for response vital would to to crisis. Third question – 6 marks Compare and contrast Source and D C the regarding views the expressed Hoare–Laval in Pact. further result So that Abyssinia, poison Abyssinian were British China. the overrun of a Japan ambitions muted, be threaten and war? even there would would the the state unleashing Mediterranean communications, slow League Italian that about member did the though made a Second question – 4 marks historians a to of assess not are First question, par t b – 2 marks With restoring points response support What both key its government British of what regarding resorting behind A, and gas Four th question – 9 marks Using the examine to the sources the and impact Abyssinian of your the own knowledge, Anglo–French response crisis. 211 2 References Fermi, Henig L. R. Roberts, Allen 1966. 1985. A. Taylor, AJP . Warner, G. 1961. Storm On the the of Second War: A Chicago World New Press. War. History Chicago, Routledge. of the USA London, Second World UK War . Fiery March: Mussolini Prepares for War. Praeger. of The Origins 1968. of the Second World War . Penguin. UK State. Government Spottiswoode. 212 of of USA Department 1931–1941. The 2003. CT, Harmondsworth, US Origins University UK. GB. Westport The 2009. Lane, Strang, Mussolini. Pierre London, 1943. Peace Printing Laval UK and Ofce. and the War: United States Washington Eclipse of DC, France . Foreign USA Eyre and Policy, 2.7 The international response to German aggression, 1933–1940 Conceptual understanding Key concepts ➔ Continuity ➔ Consequence ➔ Signicance Key question ➔ Examine the international community’s response to German aggression. The international Germany, much reaction 1935–39, criticism and has to the been debate actions the of subject amongst of historians. A car toon by David Low, “What’s Czechoslovakia to me, anyway?” ▲ As you read this next section, consider the 18 July 1938 options stage available of Britain German and to Britain and expansion, France took France and the at each extent encouraged to German which the decisions that aggression. What was the international reaction to German rearmament? As we desire have to Germany’s League of Germany allowed in the Nations back Treaty However, the French an new the realization already bring conditions the other 2.7 billion still was a militarily. marks relatively force if it a of the in Britain Treaty of Disarmament page 157), It 200,000 that and could in Britain (rather be towards Germany’s Versailles. Following Conference proposed France should 1935 had for of an worked that than also allowed an and 100,000 reduce air the hard Germany the should 8 not of its force to get should be stipulated army half to the size of them see of in would peaceful while for was now from was (GNP), that further to to blatantly this clear able British and obviously product was be the increased 1935; demands was Germany national It by Nations actions This that France. Germany by League expenditure gross and introducing attempts Germany’s marks German indeed, get the could the was ended Versailles. military Britain strengthen that, who of billion proportion to into Treaty powers, to Germany force rearmament. the 1933 that air back German worry would modications by in low nonetheless rearmament (see Germany a to the Germany terms up of conference. army the concern from 1933 contravened catching sympathy aspects force. and to was Versailles), that air conscription establish of and in into have French and there certain withdrawal to 200,000, the seen, reverse it such treaty achieve these means. 213 2 In response to threatening Stresa in German moves Italy, and ministers of protest Hitler’s at to Austrian This the However, united ● three France Russia, was by the Italy. the following a prime The their was ministers ministers Versailles reafrmed Hitler’s conference held and drew provisions commitment as it you have could read have in acted Chapter as took a developments now concluded Franco–Soviet of Nations; conclude any and opposed believing The the enter was a might Washington British navy the to 2.3, at foreign up a formal regarding to Locarno was deterrent place race want and to that to and known Hitler’s undermined its Henig in size. (see fact On eet navy summarises gave as plans. this the thus effect been of made eet The it for 35% the was treaty in set that treaties tempting to to strength concern of of to the German agreed also Versailles completely this offended unwilling naval agreement Britain’s. was alliances, naval percentage The 159), Germany it was a the opportunity this with its also German Agreement. to when This Britain and Britain of page unwilling encircled. Britain was Treaty the (see was contain feeling terms 22). the June, equal had the page to Germany time there the limit 18 Naval submarine German capacity; a Italy government. by into Germany country initiated renegotiate to with governments. at Assistance entry However, Germany Germany offers which to Mutual Russia’s surrounding was London Anglo–German the of lead to pact side. communist Italian with a on with communist idea stretched triple German a a would Hitler’s eet, to with using and in Russia development naval respond coincided Poland keep France’s this the This with pact French already Japan to about that second both 1935. important worried Ruth they and in also on and of and 1934, front. League ● Britain action, Front, with to in attended disregard and First, it Austria independence. collective Stresa was France, disarmament, rearmament, over in allowed aside. Source A below. Source skills eld Source A of arms process, Ruth Henig. The Origins of the Second While such an agreement may have had, in of the the of Versailles desirable from a British considerably by agreeing view, the treaty, it was politically inept. It drove the and between the time French when it Britain and was on the Italians vitally one on powers to a to work could the other, important together. claim that it for to stop do business with Nazi they had German stipulated not of attempted the other to major and Italy. of the What other was now provisions at The British possible in repudiating treaty, fortied by the knowledge that the was Germany agreement France Hitler British strenuous to that a government supporting government of hand the three and prior signatories, wedge excess point secure of in been by militarily 214 they violation (1985). navy a But German World Treaty War limitation. condoned the him, most was, if unlikely opposition? not to a restrictions tacitly offer C H A P T E R 2 . 7: T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O G E R M A N A G G R E S S I O N , 19 3 3 – 19 4 0 Source B A cartoon minister Ramsay went to by David Pierre Low, Laval, MacDonald sea in a in Barrel. 24 June Italian If a boat the 1935 prime labelled Barrel The (with added minister had “ Collective been Anglo-German annotations), Benito Mussolini isolation”. stronger, my story The depicting and British text would reads have French prime “3 been prime minister wise men of Stresa longer .” Naval Agreement – Mussolini furious Germany Rough watching: seas also a indicating reference tricky to the international terms of situation the Anglo- naval Treaty? ”Collective The isolation” totally opposite the collective of limitations ● The to of third ”boat” inadequate rough for seas security First question, par t a – 3 marks According Stresa Source the A what were Anglo–German development which First question, par t b – 2 marks the key Naval What is the message of the cartoon undermined the Stresa Front invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935. In fact, this Stresa Front in ruins. After this, Hitler was able to pursue with greater hint: on the Use the cartoon to his help aims B? left annotations the Source was Examiner’s Mussolini’s in agreement? you write your answer. condence. Here What was the international reaction to the remilitarization The is a starting overall cartoon is sentence: message that the of this Stresa of the Rhineland? Front When Hitler Treaty of from marched Versailles either Britain into and or the the Rhineland Locarno France. in 1936, Treaties, he violating faced no both the opposition to last by the is details up weak long. fact of your and This that the unlikely is … shown (use cartoon to the back points) 215 2 The French and thus society not made wanted In government was to a addition, the of 265,000 when such to a The French Stanley long, unwilling was were (see of the not page any only offered that it the As It to for the such a failure the to by But a is that that it to Staff there had To to little but clear its too, army in the would in France. Minister were for 1936 this the armed against and this reason and at invasion that Prime One that war an the them support they, Rhineland. it with mobilize commitments, elections. putting ministers was French right exaggerated deal that successful in nor forthcoming response, clear made a the would political negotiating to … turn to a lead have and forces Germany with has this or got Hitler a it Great on is Germans had page also 163), smokescreen”; Hitler Star made now for opinion – view the were would the a this move made directly. is of a there France of British rmly — that Harold be a as a that in of … zone, troops turning will can or The to be only 1940 minority. favour enter the Macmillan, government in to 1936 his “ There war to in Eden, seen settlement will only have German rights newspaper, – a our given often of and value. war. either face Britain especially without the the we in bargaining country hard particularly “ The course, (see conditions confronted, in this been for point, stop was as it, confront where abandon if this to put of invading than attitude back wrote Hitler diplomatic surrender still at as action Lothian wrote: an from public “a zone settlement time, garden ”. preferable the Hitler’s Lord rather Eden be Hitler see time calls adopt for not back settlement chance vigorous did same Craig politician, unless at the would stop last Conservative However, at surrender instructions now. a it the politician own Anthony It had made a negotiations The war over ght [demilitarized] reoccupation. point: for made military also their undesirable for while which left Rhineland, French government divisions neither army the have told “caretaker” The with 30,000. would Britain to into William aim seems into British Minister ght into only for General and French Staff, war British going historian Foreign of war the negotiations easier the a war. 168). threatening. are of government position only Germany French to was consider impossible were overstretched Signicantly, … the looked Imperial in time to marching Chief contemplate Britain’s Chief the drawn-out thus to staff there size, Baldwin’s the against forces fact Gamelin, lead war general in at position response a German supposed General a clear propose number of in be 1941 ”. reality act peace a no given and of Germany. Source skills A.J.P . War Taylor. The Origins of the Second World (1964). French had of It was said at the time, and has often been the that 7 March 1936 was “the last when Germany could have been all the sacrice and 216 Technically, on paper, suffering this was and truth … The French it the was army Germans the reverse could it could extract march promises behaviour from the Germans, and of then stopped of a would true: go away. The situation would remain great the war. army, chance” it without great Germany; good … a Psychologically said into since, had none. the same as before, or, if anything, worse – C H A P T E R the 2 . 7: T H E Germans ever. There Germany I N T E R N A T I O N A L more was until in resentful fact there no was and sense R E S P O N S E restless in T O G E R M A N than opposing something solid A G G R E S S I O N , point. It It opened also opened 19 3 3 – 19 4 0 the the door door for for Germany’s her ultimate success. failure. to First question, par t a – 3 marks oppose, until undone and which aims defeat. 7 the settlement Germany at victory March was of Versailles rearmed. can thus be a Only a According country threatened double was in with the to Taylor, Rhineland why not a was good opposing Germany idea. turning The international reaction to the Spanish Civil War: The Non-Intervention Committee In France, a republican Popular prime minister, it not was that in could Blum Leon French join feared unlikely idea of Blum, Italy support to Baldwin’s keeping to he such a of the government in Britain a wider conict largely Conservative the Spanish British the fact British faced did it received business nancial government war aid interests risks in if Spain. as He of so so did the to 1936. a the The Spanish France. European regime However, knew came new government; right-wing and therefore to prevent to from the Spain, lost also not upset that up Britain with countries the the those to that In the would resulting supported It Union). in a the plan. nationalists an also enemy the viewed reinforced There believed socialist Franco’s Civil French. addition, impression investors the make Mussolini. Soviet Spanish French of believed want Franco. (an and with from General communist They encircle government and Franco the border agreed different want in to wanted leader, not government that were nationalist government Republican the its views June intervened all and Baldwin’s win in conict. motives probably on move. whereby similar support Germany British of have out becoming with elected to directly However, would was wanted and if non-intervention, commit Spain interests with to government in opposition was War Party government were that or tough the by many they communist anti-union position. A total three of of 16 the Germany, countries key Italy completely and and, signed members as the we of the the Soviet have Non-Intervention Non-Intervention Union seen, – sent ignored the substantial Pact. However, Committee NIC aid (NIC) – commitment into TOK Spain. In small groups investigate a In addition, Britain’s policy of non-intervention favoured the nationalists: current civil war or conict and nd out how the international ● It focused on preventing aid to the Republic the Republicans, and allowed the use Gibraltar community has responded. Nationalists, rather than to as a How does your understanding communications base. of the international response ● In December 1936, Nationalists that Franco, the Britain allowed signed British a trading companies agreement to trade with with the the rebels. to the Spanish Civil war in the 1930s help you to make sense of the complexity of responding ● not Spanish republicans, was able to get credit from to civil conicts today? British banks. 217 2 The to policy win of the Republicans, to the The war while in Spain. Hitler thus played a key Non-intervention and Mussolini role in worked continued to allowing against give Franco the effective aid Nationalists. failure policies which of of a non-intervention Britain was helped thus non-intervention civil also and the policy right-wing appeared France. weak of further Hitler the League government to Hitler, discredited had to and ignored of Nations, power. this the The appeasement non-intervention, and had Western encouraged him successfully democracies further in his actions. What was the international response to Anschluss? With Anchluss Versailles He in which invaded an ● was was up Italy The which was now to which that with us had not to was could a he had have of in and internal time violated union was British a of stronger French Why political dependent was of Austria. position crisis and Ministers army and to to attack Berlin, this? but on did not even threatened needed feeling German Schuschnigg’s discredited referred to that the after to Britain’s Germany’s made a taken but arrested to this use action force to also by help. Abyssinian affair in with the stated, Austria House actions Germany prevent and discussion. union statement and for for Germany’s place, friendship appeals the League condemned prepared Treaty protests was Anschluss. France’s the Germany forthcoming. Chamberlain which been and Chancellor even again the response. an the Nations not Anschluss nothing from by at had strengthen was there in state increasingly inevitable. Commons in of was Britain, was to respond League Anschluss In paralysed reservists refused ● apart government a Hitler forbade international have support, ● Yet, limited France call ● 1938, independent Czechoslovakia. there May specically and “ the hard unless of the we way fact and is others it ”. Source skills speak Source A up now Archbishop David Faber. Munich, 1938 14 March The Times newspaper told room with that for “our doubt which correspondent about [Hitler] the and public his leaves The Labour of Dollfuss a few years 218 socialists, had little for judgement”. “calmness The “sooner told fellow were and the balance or union later of was Germany and inevitable” his recalling earlier peers, and “nally, may he bring greeted stability too, against inclination to Europe”. At the Foreign the of Austrian Lords jubilation army Party, of Austria Ofce brutality the to no some everywhere”. Even appealed its of readers Schuschnigg. Canterbury (2008). House On for of to relief. the general feeling was one … C H A P T E R 2 . 7: T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O G E R M A N A G G R E S S I O N , 19 3 3 – 19 4 0 Source B A cartoon the by Evening David Low, Standard, on “Not 12 only April the Austrians First question, par t a – 3 marks According Britain’s to Source attitude A, what towards voted”, published in the UK newspaper, 1938. First question, par t b – 2 marks factors inuenced What Anschluss? is the message of Source B concerning Anschluss? What was the international reaction to German aggression Examiner’s forget in Czechoslovakia? to cartoon use to hint: the Don’t details support of your the two France’s reaction points. Following Anschluss, it was Czechoslovakia would France treaties which a had committed threat that to they argued follow with their were that Minister to two be France no the with common in clear to Britain’s to in and Hitler’s next foreign policy 1924 Czechoslovakia in the However, not a that in to way the these be Minister nding France signed keep could Foreign lead of assisting position and focus Britain Czechoslovakia, interests. Czechoslovakia Daladier to French treaty defended, Bonnet out of were a event also French only military too 1925, of saw obligations. and moves. and Start the same the cartoon sure you the you a by way on look hint as annotating as we page it in annotated 215. Make at the title to to the meaning give of cartoon. They Prime happy showdown Germany. 219 2 Britain’s reaction Many British survived in central that a as politicians had democracy for and eastern Czechoslovakia “highly He a had could articial” some to Germany. In any case, a We could going to giving (see to meet Czechoslovakia as leaders rst the in speech of Germany. this one 20th to one. This David century would agreed, agreement the for spite the despite of the a the from fact Beneš, have on 22 21 that of was over said a to a believe of as unsustainable. believed the that he Sudetenland military help to that, be a pretext abandoned French in the for idea connection 1938 seize of with her rst has all of by he an world also to Rally y of meet had marked the leaders. of Czechoslovakia should international have rst. to Chamberlain it population would French the and abroad that areas the in y out, world Nuremberg initiative not time solution. the move pointed that 50% Czechoslovakia, at the did between the over diplomatic radical the that and and was to at discussed the week, the that a ruthlessness man who I to get in join commission. the Chamberlain thought could Chamberlain British this The would told face Germany be and and privately I relied saw in upon his face, when he I got had the given if these on to get French ignoring their government, proposals their ew own. back Godesberg about were agreed now proposals no able the agreement government, alliance led were by with President rejected, Czechoslovakia the Czechs accepted the 1938. Poland Sudetenland that, was and mean Chamberlain Bad previous Cabinet Czechoslovakian was September, Hungary the here September discussion been Czechs following deal Edvard On and simply conict supervised but hardness that Czechoslovakia. plan not had states word. this would it that, impression Over offer diary the ministers demanded be a was summits comprised his to did as new Czechoslovakia Germans would nd Reynolds Hitler Chamberlain to decided This meeting, In other ultimately therefore or saw handover his she He was September prime Germans of 12 time the This – have avoid hard which remarked 220 to Chamberlain at I the country. worked historian Germany. … in Czechoslovakia, determination France Hitler as At that 176), own; of to Hitler’s diplomacy, other position Germany and page a wrote help to that Sudeten with guarantees Following in Chamberlain Czechoslovakia, than Chamberlain for. negotiated not their Britain the and not one war obligations Given was ghting and with peaceful with period However, worth creation Britain Czechoslovakia. longer Europe. was sympathy organize sympathy a to later did not Czech than 1 the to upon. go Germany, proposals far territory October. that However, expecting had Hitler now enough. He wanted the met he wanted to and to have previously said claims occupy C H A P T E R Back in Britain, Godesberg to 2 . 7: T H E many proposals. Czechoslovakia; unacceptable. were On dug 27 in All and between people third Armed that visit conict any force, I of should who thing, and issues between had feel it and and are if I 38 be liberty be very at stake. is its a it would rejected honour new gas war. masks it that is of a I to do not be such worth we not any to me; a in were trenches distributed. broadcast: digging far-away hesitate to country pay even good. but the if I world were by domination, living, embark 19 3 3 – 19 4 0 the Britain, be a A G G R E S S I O N , commitments were should dominate Under before we In radio quarrel would would its proposals for following nightmare mind G E R M A N the nothing. resisted. clear, the because thought up would million made know nations must that T O colleagues it preparing incredible we made in must that said gas-masks whom believe we on said started parks Germany nation people great to now Chamberlain trying R E S P O N S E Chamberlain’s Czechs fantastic trenches a the London’s horrible, of France countries September, How I N T E R N A T I O N A L on but it, war that it convinced fear life is is of its for a terrible really the L TA Thinking and Communication skills Task one In what way does the car toonist Low in the car toon at the star t of this chapter disagree with Chamberlain? Task t wo Go to www.britishpathe.com/video/the-crisis-latest/query/Sudeten Watch Chamberlain’s broadcast on this Pathé News clip. What is the British attitude towards Chamberlain as shown in the clip? Go to www.youtube.com/watch?v=cPoOTNPYKnQ, or search for “Peace in our time? (1938 Munich Crisis) Par t 2 of 11”. Watch par t of the video Peace in our Time? What point is the narrator making about Czechoslovakia and the British attitude towards Czechoslovakia? How useful is this documentary for a historian investigating the Munich Crisis? Task three Go to www.youtube.com/watch?v=BFlsYrTF0, or search for “Hitler and Chamberlain: The Munich Crisis 1938”. Watch this documentary by historian David Reynolds on the Munich Conference. How does this compare to the documentary Peace in our Time? in terms of presentation and content? (You will need to watch the rest of Peace in our Time? to answer this question.) 221 2 Hitler agreed to a third conference, which was to be chaired by Mussolini. TOK As you can see Investigate primary sources was responding to the Munich president, Agreement from around the the world in September 1938. page Share the key points made in however, each source in small groups. a Highlight the language used in problems the sources and identify where Chamberlain, there may be bias. Discuss that greeted in with joint for highlight he through later this said nor the agreed details declaration News of of that clip enthusiasm Beneš, which full the Pathé much Edvard conference, 178 the to the the below, in Britain. Soviet give the Munich was Germany negotiation and would he regretted Stalin, Agreement). and in our hope Sudetenland conference, “peace last Neither leader, Britain meant this time” to securing to (see Chamberlain, from to (though invited Germany only attempt peace Czech was For would not the for Hitler deal use this with force. was a For phrase using). whether the meaning of the in 1938 has changed over L TA words and expressions used Communication skills time. Consider the following Go to www.youtube.com/watch?v=SetNFqcayeA, or search “Neville Chamberlain question: If language changes returns from Germany with the Munich Agreement”. in meaning, what eect might this have on our understanding Watch the Pathé News clip showing Chamberlain returning to Britain. of the past? Can we really What exactly has Hitler agreed to according to the signed declaration? understand the past through What information concerning the agreement is not given in this clip? primary sources? There press was support there “a the both Labour and have are in a We have handed of the resigned that war of his the been and However, Winston disaster ”, from the party. agreement. had policy and Clement even at Churchill Duff government. agreement. averted. The Chamberlain Cooper, The the Attlee, time, called First Labour British Lord and leader British had of of Liberal the said: been the victory Britain Chamberlain’s unmitigated opposed Party, We in majority criticism total Admiralty, Parties relief supported from was policy the much mostly unable midst for today over of a reason a go in tragedy. and seen to to a for We carefree have humanity. gallant, ruthless It rejoicing. felt has civilised We humiliation. been and a have felt This has victory democratic for that not brute people we been force betrayed … and despotism. Class discussion In pairs, discuss the extent to which you agree with the historian Richard Overy’s appraisal of the Munich Agreement that it “represented a realistic assessment of the balance between Western interests and Western capabilities” (Overy, 2008). The invasion of Czechoslovakia: The end of appeasement Hitler’s takeover great shock were not of of put limited; He under made There he rest was new a to of in had could pressure his the outrage Czechoslovakia Germans. 222 and broken not shift take stance Czechoslovakia Britain. be of a a It signed justied opinion rmer clear was in a in speech March clear any against on and claim Britain, 17 1939, that agreement by stand in now and to caused Hitler’s his be aims invasion uniting Chamberlain Hitler. March 1939: was C H A P T E R this this, by the in last effect, force? ... it step I upon in no am war greater to that it will challenge if it be a not were a the small prepared senseless take ever of operating mistake part R E S P O N S E state direction not commitments yet believes bre I N T E R N A T I O N A L attack a While unspecied foreseen, T H E to and it to engage be be this of this its to nation in new and now that has so 19 3 3 – 19 4 0 Is Communication skills world cannot suppose power others? the in which A G G R E S S I O N , by dominate country than thing, utmost G E R M A N followed to conditions made cruel the is attempt under could to or an T O L TA Is 2 . 7: What does Chamberlain’s speech reveal about his change be because lost resisting in policy towards Hitler? its such a made. What was the international reaction to Hitler ’s demands regarding Poland? Given Hitler’s on March 31 that, its if it aid. These actions 1939, was the France expansion, Munich would and and it even did against that of were to difcult deter strengthened position Meanwhile, The Pact of both and countries. In doubling In fact, stronger Britain this it military to and introduction was estimated with to would to Poland it was to on 7 did a right-wing Japanese In said come to fact, Italian part aid to as a of to Britain to Hitler, action still negotiate. and France Britain further Mediterranean in the Poland warning direct Chamberlain May, assistance military and Czechoslovakia. more Hitler In as military act taking April, Eastern mutual was support get Romania. the for and France that British army, clear position them was the was allowed the Britain sending aggression. strengthened territorial 1939, programme attack, Czechoslovakia acting that and conrmed March, the by Danzig, which accepted from diplomacy in Turkey over Poland Poland also actually Albania Greece demands to by case also negotiating of war in the area. Steel Germany feel use invaded with had than further to its it guarantee could Mussolini Mediterranean unprovoked territory to German guarantee controversial. Britain he a assurances. Moreover, Britain’s agreement an taken more and offered similar gaveguarantees an Memel, anti-Semitic; had allow Hitler believed When a Agreement. be Nevertheless, and victim gave guarantees dictatorship over Britain take also that than of radar set to Britain in they stand was reach France been in in In militarily, be on was by from the two was introduced. in and it a much this Britain, The 1939–40, that were 1938, Hitler. preparations. detached between conscription completion. peak be announced and against near a would, had military now collaboration April Britain up not government and rmer could military that a stepped Italy fact, air too, defence rearmament which roughly time equal it terms Germany. Negotiations with the Soviet Union If Britain a German French and France attack, were were then more to help be able from enthusiastic to the about assist Soviet this Poland Union than the in the would British event be as key. they of The had 223 2 a long tradition politicians quickly; on of the however, government to Franco–Soviet/Russian left there follow Union’s approaches had even not Even in Soviets, other, The ● An ● If ● An In of and which the Britain, with of In addition, to intervene internally and local who fascist saw countries. negotiations as in the was East an There explained and Stalin alliance Stalin There such an the also alliance: purges. countries against push it was with were front actually also Chamberlain However, agreement Soviets that Germany. towards war. distrusted, a would all and to prevent join in the bowed different the on the one Soviet for other. guarantees assistance to to expectations British mutual come nally the were and to instead that an the Soviet This was if treaty another’s Union reasons were to by aid being left in to for with, the Overy have by or the even failure in the right threatened outright interfere Richard should they rejected to other historian Union states excuse were by British alone. forces. as an European French neighbouring this the Soviet crises, Russia”. diplomatic could the Russia This a where such proposed the after Eastern this and demanded militarily by other in about of Stalin’s form of the British established Hitler. wanted and attack. Stalin French, over, just Soviets Germany in Sudeten weak negotiations. hand, part be Conference. distrust misgivings, start one France an to the to ignored about Poland, these to and Many had concerned other with included France but event deal despite be be hemmed-in push on had unenthusiastic militarily alliance It Munich profound to over alliance reluctance Austrian was cooperation. an action. the most such a of the to alienate might the still reasons win agreed on and Poland, to felt an should Soviets Britain the into 1939, what “the was could hoped alliance April the army Germany pressure to that line during practical, alliance Spain was this Chamberlain Soviet Britain felt invited confessing more ● been 1939, also of Source British take the A, below. Source skills Soviet Source A negotiators, gures, Richard Overy. Origins of the Second World found all that top the military British had and political sent a War junior representative, who had no powers to (2008). negotiate Talks continued throughout the both sides complained endlessly obduracy and deviousness of the other. the Soviet side insisted discussions before any more offended on full real progress could the west showed what condemned as a “dilatory” even Soviet attitude. 224 sea delegation instead of was by sent air. leaders. western It was soon delegations for the military alliance, had and secured forces agreement across for Poland to the had passage ght on a long When it arrived army. The discussions, which the had The on 12 August 1939, broke trip three by Soviet the Molotov begun British that plans German later slight be of Again This military not made. agreement. In no August an about discovered the sign summer, deeply though and the days and were not revived. up after C H A P T E R 2 . 7: T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O G E R M A N A G G R E S S I O N , 19 3 3 – 19 4 0 Source B A cartoon by David Low, published in the UK newspaper First question, par t a – 3 marks What, for the according failure of to Source the A, were Anglo-Soviet the Daily Mail, 5 April 1939. First question, par t b – 2 marks the reasons What is the message of Source B? talks? L TA Self-management and communication skills Review the relationships between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies and Germany between 1933 and 1939. Refer back to the discussion of the reasons for the Nazi–Soviet Pact (see page 224; also pages 183–184). Make notes under the following headings: ● the view of the British and French concerning an agreement with the Soviet Union ● the view of the Soviets on an agreement with the Western democracies ● the view of Germany on an agreement with the Soviet Union ● the view of the Soviets on an agreement with Germany. TOK Imagine that you are advising Stalin on whether to make an agreement with either You have used your imagination Britain and France or with Germany. in the task here as an “adviser ” Prepare a presentation to Stalin on the advantages and disadvantages of each to Stalin. How do historians use course of action. Make sure you give evidence to suppor t your points. their imagination when writing What is your nal advice on the course of action that Stalin should take? their accounts? 225 2 The international reaction to the invasion of Poland: The outbreak of war Chamberlain have read Hitler in continued Chapter invaded Chamberlain and so war Poland issued was to 2.6, on an hope for 1 negotiated attempts September ultimatum declared a last-minute at to 11.00am 1939. On Germany. that settlement at same but, diplomacy 3 September, Germany as you failed. did at 9.00am, not reply day. L TA Communication skills Go to www.youtube.com/watch?v=r tJ_zbz1NyY , or search “Neville Chamberlain - Britain’s declaration of war 1939”. Watch Chamberlain’s broadcast to the British that war has been declared. What emotions is Chamberlain attempting to rouse in his speech? Source skills Richard Overy. Origins of the Second World War reason 1939 (2008). before was a particularly [Hitler failed] to see that the western reached their limit in 1939. Hitler to much judge that intrinsic calculations, Poland interest but he in failed was not British to see in itself and assessed the Polish crisis that not but in great-power means to terms status. assert of their global To ght for British and well. the Mediterranean Given favourable and Allied when land major its the severe were military balance, economic continued crisis at if such was power Far the Polish unrepeatable the preparations was opportunity expansionism. Allies crisis threat level If fervently war had hoped viewed to to that the was Allied and made to economic bite across warfare, the winter Hitler would offensive. The be unable only to mount incalculable was in an the possibility effort to of achieve German the bomb “knock-out” and blow dreamed were made of by air theorists. Great efforts a in over the summer to complete the the civil defence evacuation preparations, to arrange into as Hitler – gas of women and children, and to attack. First question, par t a – 3 marks the to this source, why was September an challenge come for of According future, of of This East war high nature it. intelligence and a summer own prepare on the late declare both on interests the be a the as blockade months necessary Balkans, given to French Poland French the of attacks merits, of could element powers so – time was which right did powers strategy had it good 1939 an make a opportune time for Britain and France to German and would stand against Germany? the see L TA Research skills Research the response of the international press to Hitler ’s invasion of Poland. Can you nd headlines and ar ticles about this act of aggression that are: L TA ● negative ● positive ● neutral. Communication skills If possible, try to nd newspapers from dierent regions and countries, and from 226 Present your ndings to dierent political backgrounds. You should spend no more than two hours on this the class in a 5–10-minute task . Make sure your sources are appropriately referenced and that you make a presentation. list of works cited. C H A P T E R 2 . 7: T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O G E R M A N A G G R E S S I O N , 19 3 3 – 19 4 0 What were the reactions of Britain and France to Hitler ’s actions, 1939–1940? Despite the no to help During also by British Poland the “phoney debated the Union. capitulated. territorial waters However the Denmark the and campaign The failure decision it The the defeat from Dunkirk, Chamberlain been or prepared determined to Battle London and amend and carry” basis. at the getting involved By end the campaign. invasion As Zara 1940, of the of which the 1941 German a to global the outcome of in the were Allied sent forces contributed Churchill to attack. been about Nazis the against to It invaded move, Norwegian to Germany. occupied to help driven Norway, but out. Chamberlain’s took over “peace the evacuation the British proposals. His as head few so nd stance. that even of a British is At that would Churchill to this possible prove Luftwaffe have was key in the attacked months. However, Roosevelt when most was the allies. Britain the army. government leadership next to It However, the of German offensive”. over could Britain Americans the persuaded buy arms stood USA Congress on alone in “a against were not from Germany’s to cash favour Nazi of war. as was also suffering explained Union powers bring victory, ensured mines offer was to at the ensure end of chapter Germany’s U-boat 2.5, Hitler’s ultimate defeat. writes, Axis were lay was the where Britain Soviet force air had mining, Blitz 1940, the which could September. inevitable getting the However, in to and Acts of Allied in ore and of these ghting. Nevertheless, Steiner Each in of 1940 isolationist end the they began iron that alone attempted Neutrality for troops and was members cities its Allied another Britain Britain with the Germany of in consider other 1940, continued other began Poland, Finland decided campaign stood forward to an to which Britain. France continue ensuing During of Britain to Swedish planned in aid as then block result aid prepared just Allies of onslaught send Norway. The With put to Norway government Hitler Allies poorly the Britain the invaded resign. promises Nazi should order coalition point, the However, after was of to in day French war”, whether Soviet Finland and against the conict. only the destruction the were world encouraged Soviet Union While entry of war Nazi and the of Soviet Germany shape embark the survival the the to and of for the into the most post-war policies what prevented and the aggressive States Britain Union and, of on United a United part, became total States dictated the settlement. — Steiner, p. 1064 The Second World War: The historical debate How impor tant was appeasement as a cause of the Second World War? In the much the years following debate war. Sir the end of the historians as Winston Churchill called unnecessary war” that would not to Second among the role the have World of Second taken War, there appeasement World place had War was in causing “the Hitler been 227 2 stopped earlier, for example over Czechoslovakia. men who realize By had that been they consistently aggression and that had Hitler Poland, did aims, have and the Fascist chance of gambled a that of others the dictators the that not wickedness of Union. he to of the and who and they or weak, had had when argued carry actions gone to was dictators war out of the unless therefore as themselves failed he Hitler foreign European they his meant invaded that his to dictator. also had much — 1938 encouraged AJP Taylor in frightened ruthless Appeasement would war as continuing the have cause Hitler demands war. how Rhineland seen calculating policy for reacted the a Soviet for would ... up with Hitler’s on fact in stand trigger he the to to plan over to the clear winning as in 1936 were dealing giving was in “appeasers” afraid were alienated which not The seen the policy leaders: a blunders Taylor, 1961 Class discussion Those who argue that appeasement was a weak policy suggest that other actions could have been taken by Britain and France. In pairs, consider the advantages and disadvantages of these alternative routes of action: ● using the League of Nations more eectively to stop the actions of the dictators ● being prepared to use force against Hitler when he marched into the Rhineland ● standing up to Hitler over the Sudetenland ● spending more on armaments in the early 1930s ● following Churchill’s idea of establishing a Grand Alliance of the anti-Fascist countries against Hitler. L TA When British 30–40 years Cabinet minutes and government papers became available Communication and after the end of the Second World War, it became clear social skills that Chamberlain Divide the class into two teams. the The motion that you will be realities difculties debating is: public opinion of Treaty the of had and the been constraints British on economy, concerning of dealing Versailles the on with a complex Chamberlain British horror of Germany – imperial which it Given included commitments, another – situation. war becomes and the as well the injustices to the easier see as “Appeasement was both the forces that shaped appeasement as a policy. Richard Overy argues that wrong policy for the 1930s and Chamberlain’s policy and paid the war earlier was, in fact, the right one for Britain at the time a awed policy.” off in sense that Hitler was forced into a when a general European You will need three speakers on than he had planned, and at date Britain was in a each side. The rest of the team stronger military position than it had been in 1938. should help research and write Indeed, most historians would now agree that it was the ambitions of the speeches, and also prepare Hitler that were the key cause of the Second World War. Ruth Henig questions for the opposing team. sums up We the debate: cannot be encouraged view he who would his already reinforced 228 certain in – not But historians and was held put and are the that up this prepared of extent expansion now to Britain any may in ght to course and serious have no a which by the France resistance speeded doubt war, Hitler lack or up that to his of might have opposition were Hitler series of his been he received. powers in serious eastern expansion The decline, was plans. was wars, intent to on achieve expansion his objectives. C H A P T E R other plans Nazi or T H E powers try to – it ultimately resist demands Corridor I N T E R N A T I O N A L for was them. the had And return likely to two R E S P O N S E choices: whenever of the provoke they — G E R M A N could resistance Sudetenland, war. T O acquiesce came or Henig, A G G R E S S I O N , – Danzig in whether and the 19 3 3 – 19 4 0 L TA The 2 . 7: his Communication skills over Draw up your own timeline from Polish 1933–40. 1999 Above the timeline write the L TA Self-management actions of Hitler and the actions skills of Mussolini (use a dierent colour for each dictator). Go to www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eu78iaVsBEE, or search “ World War II – Below the timeline, write Germany – Road To War ”. the actions of the Western Watch the documentary Germany: Road To War to review the key actions taken democracies. by Hitler and the responses of the Western powers. (Hitler ’s foreign policy star ts Make your timeline detailed 15 minutes into the clip.) and useful as a revision tool. Full document question: The Munich Conference, 1938 Source A Extract from The Times, a UK leaders, cause that threat the October conqueror returning from a victory battleeld nobler it can every and the people shown their on the sense resolute that have war, of was no the Mr. to three the of that visits imposing his he civilisation will but injustices are faced and removed recur in of between ignorance and it to remains our chiey taught great wehave prepared the been to so face a to all of For – being left to fester until “Still magazine, Hope”, 21 published September in Punch, a 1938. of a much enthusiasm greeted these Führer’s sentiments, see the to instead our know of to that of nation Mr. the through can, of remedy. … such smoke-screen led instead for as So times learning worst late policy. gratitude by nely the cartoon, UK wishes Indeed, on at dangers the was his propaganda. show the times, too range, horror peoples them its people’s go them Chamberlain, by … upon other in is Kingdom certain popular own may allowing sentiments is A their Germany. increased effect hope in immense of us The Chamberlain have denite United it against less with wisdom the out of achievement hands, understanding Let this of and manner concerned. his seem a of King incalculable broken from which each visits by Government less people clear with crisis; Source B yesterday; catastrophe is a with from be would adorned Chamberlain have in home Mr. the been come than reception Had has laurels Munich alike to in on it the ruin prevail 1938. quiet No of to newspaper, unless 1 peace lessons which only a through people their 229 2 Source C Speech Source D by Winston Commons, 5 Churchill October in the House of 1938. Zara Steiner. European The Triumph International of the History Dark: 1933–1999 (2011). I will begin would must we like to saying ignore nevertheless have defeat, than by and that have or be sustained we what a everybody forget stated, total France but and has which namely, Chamberlain that unmitigated suffered more only to … one has been a more resolute did war, and no No he he struggler for Minister. Everyone there been such peace knows intense and than to maintain and that. done That is quite true. quite clear why was to Great Britain or France I so much all at this along juncture to being if, sacrice in and with I that him the … believe, Prime could in a war fact, they through the brought have at any time been ordinary during is over. Silent, broken, Czechoslovakia She suffered has association with the always with League been an in the of Nations obedient could I which still of think 1933 and of lay when all the into by which servant of thrown away, the combinations neglected I parallel do not were or fair before Herr hopes Europe Hitler Nazi and I to resources in the our do of I loyal, their a the to darkness. her to she has long peace beginning the have the of been immense have been believe history brave no a no threat carry it Signicantly, leaders of out to after its was convinced war, unless state it prepared was to under a crisis conditions, worst-case The bombing campaign, expectation the of a future number of German aircraft bombs, and were all the resulting assumed years behind Czech army planning grossly casualty that the Britain with was at corresponding Little … exaggerated was there the expected was no French … least it two German from air the substantive … people, matter that … opinion when he of on spoke country know the of evening “a of believed There Britain and replace him. political that the was no no and 27th in people While reflected men of quarrel nothing”. peace. British between hardening still undoubtedly most a of the women, S e p t e m b e r, f a r- a w a y whom we acknowledging and public country credible possible he wanted “war leader the mood, who party” could who what First question, par t a – 3 marks the cost … I do spontaneous they learned not grudge outburst that the of them joy hard and the natural, relief ordeal According to greeted enthusiastically Source A, why was Chamberlain when would so on his return no Munich? longer but be they suppose required should that of them know this is the the at the truth end. moment; … This is and do only not First question, par t b – 2 marks the What beginning 230 of the reckoning. a 1919 democratic and assumed scenario. programme. and arresting cannot duty minster certainly make ready so”. was power, which whole Prague … obtained which think squandered, grudge of against even … of at rst power when exists ready the opportunities growth a of restore prime state, Chamberlain When treaty, back democracies of peace no agreed, summer respect Western that The abandoned, recedes every could Czechoslovakia diplomatic the mournful, virtual little protect The “no gures All that were and channels was in with Czechoslovakia. Minster easily Whitehall war, Britain’s terms There was danger do ready civilian Britain am both Germany his Not go secure ought of ght. with that might undaunted Nevertheless, there to Hitler Never that not agreed advisers in to position. peace. that his strategy. the terrible determination also that high-risk believe position attack has a and be Prime was military consensus uncompromising understood intervention is the message of Source B? from in C H A P T E R 2 . 7: T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E S P O N S E T O G E R M A N Second question – 4 marks With reference assess the to values historians its origin, and studying 19 3 3 – 19 4 0 Four th question – 9 marks purpose limitations the A G G R E S S I O N , Munich of and content, Source C for With reference knowledge, Conference. decision to to the examine agree to sources the and reasons Hitler’s your for demands own Chamberlain’s at Munich. Third question – 6 marks Compare and contrast Sources A and C Munich Conference. the views regarding the expressed outcome of in the References Eden, A. Mifin. Faber, 1962. Facing Boston, the Dictators: D. 2008. Munich, 1938. Henig, R. 1999. Modern History Overy, R. 2008. Origins of Steiner, Z. 2011. 1933–1939. Taylor, The Oxford AJP . The Memoirs of Anthony Eden. Houghton USA 1964. Harmondsworth, the Triumph Origins & Review, Second University The Simon of the the pages World Dark: Press. of Schuster. London, 29–31 War . Routledge. European New Second UK York, World London, International UK History USA War . Penguin. UK 231 Writing the internal assessment for IB History copy of the IA. In total, completing the IA should Key concepts take ➔ Causation ➔ Change ➔ Consequence ➔ Perspective ➔ Continuity ➔ Signicance approximately designed to give guidance for both 20 hours . students approaching This and these chapter teachers is some tasks. Class discussion Key questions ➔ How does the pace and the time you ive in aect the What is the purpose of the interna assessment in topics you might be interested in, or curious about? history? How might where and when you ive aect the evidence and sources you have access to? Which topics coud ➔ How is the interna assessment structured and you investigate that students in other paces coud not? assessed? What does this te us about the nature of history? ➔ What are some suggested strategies for choosing a topic and getting star ted? What does the IA ook ike? ➔ What are some common mistakes students make? ➔ What are good criteria for seecting sources? The IA Each ➔ What are the chaenges facing the historian? is of divided these into sections approached in Below overview is an more three will detail of be main sections . explained later each in this and chapter. section: “Doing history”: Thinking like a 1. Identication and evaluation of sources historian (6 marks) The internal assessment (IA) is an engaging, • inquiry-based 2200 word Ceary state the topic in the form of an appropriate investigation inquiry question. that provides opportunity select, teachers to students personalize research individual and and interest write or their on a with the learning. historical You topic will • Expain the nature and reevance of two of the sources seected for more detaied anaysis of of vaues and imitations with reference to origins, curiosity. purpose and content. The IA is course. an essential Students higher level as of in (20%) component both will of standard the level complete the IB History (25%) same and task 2. part their course mark. Your teacher • evaluate your nal draft, but only a Investigation (15 marks) will small, Using appropriate format and cear organization, random provide critica anaysis that is focused on the sample of your class’ IAs will be submitted to the question under investigation. IB for moderation. • The purpose of the historical investigation is Incude a range of evidence to suppor t an argument to and anaysis, and a concusion drawn from the engage students in the process of thinking like by creating their anaysis. historians own and “doing questions, analyzing history” gathering perspectives, and and examining evidence, demonstrating rich 3. historical knowledge in the conclusions • draw. Given its importance, your Reection (4 marks) they teacher Reect on the process of investigating your should question and discuss the methods used by provide considerable time, guidance, practice of historians, and the imitations or chaenges of skills and feedback throughout planning, drafting, revising the process of investigating their topic. 232 and submitting a nal W R I T I N G Your history teachers purposes best design the or and develop started task is have and at most been can you own exposed practice in writing skills. The is be to IA the of historical whatever IA course, to F O R I B H I S T O R Y Beginning with the end in mind: what does success look like? select can however students purposeful teaching analysis Self-management skills be after methods, A S S E S S M E N T syllabus students. The introduced some for encouraged question. during effectively the context, learning should point use school individual your any the I N T E R N A L L TA Nevertheless, suit T H E the and Throughout the process of panning, researching, drafting and revising your investigation, you shoud be continuay checking the criteria. Ask your teacher and other students to provide specic feedback using the criteria. Continuay ask yoursef if your work meets the criteria. IA History designed to assess each of the following objectives: Before at the getting started, assessment you criteria should to look appreciate carefully what each Assessment objective 1: K nowledge and section of the IA demands. Teachers will use understanding the • Demonstrate understanding of historica sources. same important success criteria to will have look for a both clear like SL and HL . understanding before you invest It of the is what time Assessment objective 2: A pplication and and hard will use work that this task will require. Teachers analysis • the criterion found in the IB History Guide Anayse and interpret a variety of sources. to provide nal feedback draft. The to teachers assessment is and based to on assess the “positive Assessment objective 3: Synthesis and achievement”, meaning that teachers will try to evaluation nd • the best t according to the descriptors in Evauate sources as historica evidence, recognizing each criterion. Students do not have to write a their vaue and imitations. perfect • paper teachers to achieve Synthesize information from a seection of reevant and sources. based on whether of 25 marks the should in the not highest think scores are in descriptors, terms above or of pass/fail below 50% total. Assessment objective 4: Use and application To simplify the criterion and to provide some xed of appropriate skills targets • for what success looks like, consider using Reect on the methods used by, and chaenges the assessment tool provided on the next page. facing, the historian. • Formuate an appropriate, focused question to guide a historica inquiry. • Demonstrate evidence of research skis, organization, referencing and seection of appropriate sources. 233 IA Teacher, Peer and Self-Assessment Tool Criterion A: Identication and evaluation of sources (6 marks) Suggested word count: 500 Improvements Criteria for success Strengths needed • Does the investigation have an appropriate question clearly stated? • Has the student selected, identied, and referenced (using a consistent format) appropriate and relevant sources? • Is there a clear explanation of the relevance of the sources to the investigation? • Is there detailed analysis and evaluation of two sources with explicit discussion of the value and limitations, with reference to their origins, purpose and content? Criterion B: Investigation (15 marks) Suggested word count: 1,300 Improvements Criteria for success Strengths needed • Is the investigation clear, coherent and eectively organized? • Does the investigation contain well-developed critical analysis clearly focused on the stated question? • Is there evidence from a range of sources used eectively to support an argument? • Is there evaluation of dierent perspectives (arguments, claims, experiences etc.) on the topic and/or question? • Does the investigation provide a reasoned conclusion that is consistent with the evidence and arguments provided? Criterion C: Reection (4 marks) Suggested word count: 400 Improvements Criteria for success Strengths needed • Does the student focus clearly on what the investigation revealed about the methods used by historians? • Does the reection demonstrate clear awareness of the challenges facing historians and/or the limitations of the methods used by historians? • Is there an explicit connection between the reection and the rest of the investigation (question, sources used, evaluation and analysis)? 234 W R I T I N G T H E I N T E R N A L A S S E S S M E N T F O R I B H I S T O R Y Bibliography & formatting (no marks applicable) Suggested word count: Not incuded in tota Improvements Criteria for success Strengths needed • Is the word count clearly stated on the cover? (2200 maximum) • Is a single bibliographic style or format consistently used? • Is the bibliography clearly organized and include all the sources you have referenced or used as evidence in the investigation? ● Co-develop Getting started: Approaches to good investigation of questions a historical and carry event as out a an entire class. learning history ● Read L TA Thinking skills an identify excerpt which from parts a historian’s are analysis, work and evidence and narrative. To star t generating ideas for a topic and to hep you focus your question, use a research-based thinking routine If such as Think-Puzzle-Explore (see Ritchhar t, Church and than Morrison, 2011. Make Thinking Visible, Jossey-Bass). dates and more likely students better simply understand memorizing chronological to be and that history reporting narratives, curious, engaged is on then and more facts, they are motivated Think: What topics do you think might interest you? learners of history. Accordingly, they will more Puzzle: What puzzles you about these topics? likely develop Explore: How can you explore more about each of investigation these topics? how Ideally, you will have opportunities to appropriate and organize have and a questions better write for their understanding effective of analysis. throughout Seecting a topic and appropriate questions the IB History course nature of develop other about history. the skills assessment the This prepare necessary these provide links in kinds to and methods will papers Additionally, clear explore of for the the IB develop and the you to IA learning Self-management skills better and History L TA understandings to the Before beginning, ask your teacher to nd some course. exampes of student IAs with examiner ’s feedback . activities These can be found on the IB Online Curriculum Centre TOK. or in the Teachers’ Suppor t Materials for History. Examine the formatting and ayout of each component to ● Debate ● Compare controversial historical events and claims. visuaize in advance what your IA might ook ike, and the and corroborate conicting sources of steps that wi be required to compete them. evidence. Once ● Take on, role play or defend IA perspectives or experiences you Discuss the arguments value and and of an limitations Develop of historian’s evidence. criteria often for it do Identify selecting and well is time not a by Gather of understanding familiar with the of the assessment historical select how topic conducting a to of some topic begin focus. Students selecting interest and background a get topic. to know reading a general history textbook or an online sources. and sources maps, to know encyclopaedia. ● general are comparing from historical and event. it ● some components criteria, ● have different analyze (photos, etc.) focused a variety artwork, on the of different journal same kinds entries, event or issue. that will These help kinds of perspectives, You you may nd narrow sources some the often interpretations topic information focus outline and the quickly. differing controversies 235 IA that make written for an engaging textbooks references, and investigation. articles annotated will also bibliographies for Well- and sources. essential include additional, more detailed sources that will help research After selecting a topic, formulating question can essential that take what questions of the most common planning and that you select, it is question. errors writing you kinds for of also be an very appropriate challenging. the time to topics help produce investigations. carefully Before you It is think a poor question about a good question is helps ensure researchable criteria good begin that you should submit a proposal to their essential the IA is students the IA when formulating topic. for a investigation. make is formulating Formulating success Consider a and manageable good the and following question: any There is an adequate variety and • writing, topic good stage. research about the a in when the Whatever formulate footnotes One of to your availability of sources related to teacher to ensure that the investigation will be 1 The your topic. successful. question is The sources are readable, • Some teachers recommend that students write about researchable. available and in a language that a topic related to their course syllabus, but there is accessible. are a countless are better motivate off choosing you however, so number to possible topics learn. students of The may that topic not topics and interest must be you you and Questions that are vague or too • historical investigate broad make it dicult to write a any focused investigation limited to 2 The topic that happened within the last ten years. 2200 words. question is All investigations 1 An will take one of three forms: Questions that are too broad • focused. investigation issue, of 2 person or of a historical event based make it dicult to manage the theme, on a number of sources needed to variety adequately address the topic. sources. An investigation historical based building, on place eldwork or of Interesting, controversial or • a challenging historical problems site. make better questions. 3 The 3 An investigation of a local history. historical topic, students question is When selecting a Questions with obvious answers • often (i.e. Did economic factors play a engaging fail to select a topic that is manageable. For role in Hitler ’s rise to power?) do example, examining all of the causes of the Second not make good investigations. World word War is too broad investigation. topics that cannot for Many be the purposes students researched also in of a 2200 select depth because Using the concepts to formuate good there are and/or not secondary Investigating of literature students write perspective entire very a community engage to the in work engaging; particular itself. in of the history, site, often lot of to piece focus portrayal rather who are an historians, challenges the or to local opportunity more authentic but when The IB History concepts: than choose investigate have that professional a work, or many they claim, or lm but when Students experiences produce primary questions papers historical to also be contained a available sources. better on or can readily historically-themed work investigate 236 a can investigation the enough these looking course change, consequence, Each of about these the as a able the to for topic successful they they are thinking can be key perspectives . ask helpful good thinking and to IA concepts, good investigations. six causation, historians’ formulating several that on and shape questions historical generate historical of Therefore, framework Using focused signicance concepts kinds investigate. is continuity, you questions eventually students questions. may about focused be any into W R I T I N G T H E I N T E R N A L Concepts A S S E S S M E N T F O R I B H I S T O R Y Possible investigation prompts • What changes resuted from this topic? • To what extent did this event, person or issue cause change? • To what extent did the topic remain the same? • Did this event, person or issue cause progress or decine? • What were the ong term, shor t term and immediate causes? • What were the factors that caused the event reated to the topic? • How has this topic had immediate and ong-asting eects? • How signicant were the eects of this topic? • To what extent is this topic signicant? Is the signicance of this change continuity causation Student’s topic consequence signicance topic justied? What events, peope or issues are impor tant to know about this • topic? What dierent perspectives or interpretations are there about this • perspectives topic? How did peope experience this topic? • To illustrate, Revolution the a student might following use interested the possible in concepts Russian question brainstorm singular the to questions, investigations: Paper Change: change In what Russian ways did the Russian 3 You society? To what extent did the Tsarist Stalin’s in causing How the should signicant were long term factors Revolution? think likely To what extent did Stalin’s of one will or accounts Paper the 2 or questions concept. require there historians. will Here because of be are showing how the Most good students there issue some some they How important was Lenin’s role key historical concepts: will under controversy question capture more than How signicant was in To what extent did Doctor Allied area bombing in reducing experience of upper class industrial capacity during the Second World Zhivago War? Russians (signicance; consequence) during ● To what extent did Gandhi’s leadership achieve Revolution? Indian After many than perspectives multiple German the specic, Revolution? Perspectives: the a purges ● capture of historical preparedness? Signicance: October past of questions. that more about be investigation, one the signicance examples consult investigations exemplars military should notice include between affect the system? February Consequence: you on good regime to Causation: For examination historical resemble focused Revolution above Continuity: is cause. generating some possible questions, independence? (signicance; perspectives; students causation) can bring greater focus to their topic. For example, All a student interested in how women successful thoughtful Stalinism may narrow the focus to a or causes event. of an A student event may investigating have more and begin focused with a well-developed, question that is based on particular one place IAs experienced or more of the historical concepts. long-term success if the 237 IA Internal Assessment skills 2 Researching Gather information sources and • evidence. Categorize the following questions (Good – Needs Carefuy read and evauate • Improvement – Poor) according to their suitability as a information. historical investigation according to the criteria provided above. Suggest ways the questions might be improved. 3 Organizing 1 Which Second Word War m is the most accurate? 2 To what extent did nationaism pay a roe in causing • Create notes. • Record references using a and processing standard citation format. the First Word War? 3 • Create a bibiography. • Organize ideas into an outine. • Formuate an argument. • Write each section of the IA . • Revise and edit. • Check assessment criteria. 5 Sharing • Submit a draft for feedback . 6 Revising • Revise based on feedback from How did women win the right to vote in the United States? 4 Did Hiter use m for propaganda? 5 In what ways did Stain star t the Cod War? 6 To what extent was the inuenza epidemic a factor in 4 Drafting the coapse of the Centra Powers in 1918? Common probems when seecting a topic and question: Poory focused question – too broad and • your teacher. unmanageabe. 7 Publishing • Obvious question. • Question is not researchabe. • Submit na copy to your teacher. • Evauate using criteria. Getting organized: researching L TA Getting organized: making a pan Communication skills of investigation When suppor ting historica caims, it is impor tant to make L TA Self-management skills your evidence visibe to your reader. Make sure you use a standard bibiographic format to show the reader where Create your own pan for competion with target dates your evidence was found. In the discipine of history, the and goas. Submit this with your proposed topic and University of Chicago stye or MLA stye is most commony question. Incude some initia sources of information you used because it provides signicant information about wi use. the origins of the source, and the endnotes or footnotes format aows the historian to inser t additiona information Completing the IA successfully requires that about the source where necessary. students includes create a plan for several important completion steps of the that inquiry Take process. Some of the steps may overlap, but it good Post-it important that you organize your tasks and track dates. and for Your give completion teacher some by should feedback to setting goals read least at ensure that and one the notes next A plan of investigation should following to the Using different research record stage. thoughts passages as you read and and think information in IA is coloured relation to the highlighters to question. identify not perspectives on the question as you read books, take include also be helpful. If using borrowed steps: • photo Seect a topic and formuate a use a question. write of note • Submit a proposa to your teacher. • Identify information sources. time of important taking notes thinking on writing the event as later you is pages on application the visible chronology 238 key about a 1 Planning the to due can the during helpful draft different plagiarised. are stay ideas on notes is page. they in are clear tablet will process. researching in your device highlight Students read the a to who have make a Create to mind. and and their easier a timeline ensure the W R I T I N G It is strongly recommended bibliographic where you information nd that and important you page T H E record I N T E R N A L most the and common university numbers evidence A S S E S S M E N T F O R I B formats history H I S T O R Y used for bibliographies in departments. analysis. Common probems when panning and organizing an IA : Many students writing but process this is is afterthought most and to much information several wait Chicago the is web of of the sites that MLA if instead nished. Style chicagomanualofstyle.org ), of bibliography, throughout, versions Manual end accomplished draft accessible very their easily recorded up-to-date the compile more when easily until • Lack of genera background knowedge of the topic. • No feedback on proposed topic and question. • No pan for competion. • Inaccuratey recording page numbers and references. • Poory organized notes; or no notes at a. the of as There are provide the an (www.mla.org), (www. which are the two Internal Assessment skills Create a proposal for the IA using the template shown. Topic: Student: Research question: Proposed sources: Sources (2) proposed for evauation in Section A : Section A : Identication and Common probems with Section A : evaluation of sources Section A is worth recommended much does more not marks, a strong this 1 than count most 6 that of the 500 for a A. 25 total marks. count does words. While this substantial students Section the word will not There are portion be It not key Question is not ceary stated. • Reevance or signicance of seected sources not expained. exceed section of • Student summarizes the content of seected sources. • Limited anaysis. • Discussion of origins, purpose and content is in the successful three is • without aspects of isoation to vaue and imitations. section. Clearly (This state must the be topic stated of as a the • Poory chosen sources. • Specuates vaguey about the vaues and imitations investigation. question). of sources. 2 Include a sources the detailed 3 brief explanation student analysis, has and a their relevance to the With reference to their of the selected brief two • for explanation of Reference to origins, purpose and content is not expicit. investigation. origins, purpose and Thinking about evidence: origins, content, analyse the value and limitations purpose, vaue and imitations of the two sources. Because history it is is by built on nature a foundation interpretive of and evidence, controversial. 239 IA This to is not them and dead things something history is people. historians many simply While agree a people long there are upon, understand list of a great there – dates are have poor is a questions that are controversy. Since enshrouded relatively few It important witness is in the the past events they depends the to of evidence interpreted. agree upon Ambrose future, Even can only once a used, that change Bierce but are facts study, largely on historian how historians over said, and time. “ God can beyond the fact that you understand how to value the and limitations origins, purpose of sources and with content how source. Discussing the origin, purpose of and one outside the context of the value and which they will result in a poor assessment. are generally Origins • Where did the source come from? • Who wrote or created it? • Whose perspectives are represented? Philosopher alone alter this people limitations sources of debate content understands support many the personally source. countless reference and in it evaluate historical reasons primary that the knows past .” the Though Whose are not? the past cannot memory as each new and actually be changed, understanding generation evidence brings and of changing as revisionism. new historical is historical always forward new perspectives. questions, This interpretations Purpose changing is who challenge arguments orthodox, and historians or referred are generally Why was this created? • What purpose might this document have process served? to Content Revisionist • • What does the source mean? • What does it revea or contain? • How usefu is the information? Is it those accepted interpretations. reasonabe to beieve it is accurate? Can Besides revisionism, another reason why history it be corroborated? is controversial the same events and kinds events from for might of time typically accounts differ a limitless Sources and place referred interpretations documentaries, to and or evidence drastically. origins purposes. from sources. are in can different same that different come the The is and number that as all we possible originate primary and record evidence of are narratives articles People perspectives, Historical that from from investigating sources. that books we the it origin has to are called secondary primary and often sources therefore limitations always give the events range of Students valuable 240 are have than case. greater sometimes at make the error more more insight into of value, there thinking the and is factors from multiple perspectives often and speculate signicant that to a to that to in students (place the can conrm) source likely cause value to of by greater may to other value include question a time) value ways source has someone or and more nd a Limitations validity mind, the value they isn’t necessarily indeed, and the use have own can look a wide eyewitness. source investigation, is but useful identify This primary their that is, the source. by reliable, Historians available then investigation. truthfulness, error not opposite not true. If the to fewer sources. the evidence and and does events, historians. proximity source that using the term bias is not sources. authentic secondary Being in primary sources, always Students closer a (support, Keep historians the of corroborate any nd created Generally, of bias, of a history but biased bias. offer clearly you us. how content in does is Remember You the is time and often that used. make most are that value to does the you of able limit the people This dismiss the be because unique place. ensure to necessarily unreliable blindly affects source not that should bias important Students should the it source perspectives experiences, that a – bias source. assuming detect mean they in will their not evidence explain the W R I T I N G T H E I N T E R N A L A S S E S S M E N T F O R I B H I S T O R Y Internal Assessment skills Use this template for taking notes from each of the sources used in the investigation. Research Question: Source (bibiographic information): Primary or How is the source reevant/signicant to the secondary investigation? Origins/Purpose? source? Vaue/Limitations? Page#: What evidence does the source provide? What is your interpretation? How does the content of (quote, paraphrase, describe) the source reate to your question? What perspective does it add? ● Seecting sources for the IA Select clear One of the challenges to students writing Section A is making sure that two appropriate sources to able to should be why able the to clearly chosen and sources to the relevant students content heavily online the mistake non-scholarly encyclopaedia textbooks. As of nding a are of your the largely The stated, topic, articles these but sources and are they investigation choices to such general good of sources. Before explain why is important students to the choose sources or vaguely related to are not upon. use for good are selecting include general an rule, appropriate you should include both primary but may not this and work secondary with some sources, types of points sources While secondary sources on a to are likely to be easily obtained, they often especially analysis sources a history starting They detailed should As as in less consider to discuss in Section A. this Interviews, section. source irrelevant investigation provide poor explicitly relying topic build and Some investigations. for have should investigation. make on that You question. range too sources and ● Often of question. effectively are the important the evaluate. that explain to clearly, investigation. You excerpts they the choose or a be successful sources signicance personal correspondence, the newspaper articles, journals, speeches, letters, following: and ● You will about as be the possible. you can why If much Be it when was of as discuss purpose to choose much was of where information you will have as of is much the to created. and limitations with difculty explicit sources which to origins and more Section come than they A. more might generally, present often meaningful Ideas about readily when but balanced provide with using not material origins primary secondary always, arguments and evaluating reference Choose secondary sources that reference the to evidence the much in purpose sources perspectives. ● value with sources strive readily primary evaluate and as created was not students where following who it detail source sources the created; created; this identiable, it to and sure identify possible: it; expected origins other the historians used to support their less difcult to purpose. arguments. You will nd it 241 IA assess uses, the or validity how arguments, evidence the if of the evidence evidence the is historian the historian interpreted has in the documented the clearly. the investigation, should Depending discussed they ● Consider using focus periodical articles. can write excellent, topics for be articles and articles often bibliographies peer-reviewed additional sources Be about have that for rich you the careful web-based not sources. referenced difcult to or use to nd ● investigation. purpose hand, great too Many heavily online can is be found online, of as rich well It is respected so On ● is the the primary are it other as Be Consider have interviews. exceptional experiences, or other with and an audio that purpose, any limitations careful or them because value arguments make origins that the argument about reliability and and about specic the references purpose. the of value basis why the of of a source bias the is without bias limits not a the strong validity content. sources articles You should avoid summarizing the content written much. by Some IAs strong students based interviewing on Summarize and describe extensive knowledge the When using interviews, le for reference and extent analysis necessary about the to content construct source’s value a and limitations. people’s historians to or You should be thorough in examining all and record of the source’s origins including date of them origin, as be Discussing advantageous origins, content, aspects experience. can explicit. on or ● people A historians. using written they comparatively, separately. more dismissed only ● the more important the too by Section general ● can often make value sources about authorship. number on properly information and discussed chosen, and of sources. footnoting can footnoted validate origins, a relying sources two journals. to ● the portion the on limitations These largest Many concise you historical on the analysing simultaneously separately historians on cultural context, author’s background, accuracy. publisher or other important information about the is likely a poorly details. origins chosen is source If little identiable, for it analysis. Anaysing the seected sources After the stating two the selected research sources question and their and explaining relevance to Internal Assessment skills Use the Section A assessment criteria to discuss and Source 1: Prisoner of State: the secret journal of evaluate this excerpt of a student’s work . Identify Zhao Ziyang 1 where the student has explicitly discussed origins and The origin of the source is of great value because the purpose, and value and limitations. author is Zhao Ziyang, the General Secretary of the This investigation will seek to answer the question “ What Communist Par ty during the Tiananmen Square Protest did the Tiananmen Square protest reveal about the (the Protest). Zhao attempted to use a non-violent democratic sentiments in China between 1980 and 1989?” approach to resolve the protest and spoke against the Democratic sentiments are dened as people’s attitudes par ty’s hardliners. After a power struggle, Zhao was toward democratic ideals. This investigation will analyze dismissed and put under house arrest until his death factors that inuenced democratic sentiments from multiple in 2005. The content of the journal is translated from perspectives, but will not assess the ethics and justication thir ty audiotapes recorded secretly by Zhao while he was of the Chinese government’s response to the protest. under house arrest between 1999 and 2000. The book is published in 2009 by Simon & Schuster, one of the In order to take into account the opposing views on this largest and most reputable nglish-language publishers. event and keep the scope of the investigation manageable, The reputation of the author and publisher increases the I have made use of a variety of carefully selected sources. reliability of this source. Two primary sources will be evaluated… 242 W R I T I N G T H E I N T E R N A L A S S E S S M E N T F O R I B H I S T O R Y Zhao’s purpose for recording these tapes is to publicize within the Communist Par ty through the lens of the his political opinions and express his regret for failing to progressive bloc. prevent the massacre. This is valuable because Zhao was However, its exclusivity may limit its value because there not allowed to publicize his opinions while under house are no counterparts to compare with and to verify its claims. arrest, so this source is the only surviving public record As a translated material, the source may not accurately of Zhao’s opinions and perspectives on the Protest. This present Zhao’s intentions and may have lost some cultural source is also valuable because its author, Zhao, was expressions. In addition, this source may be biased in that directly involved in the government’s decision-making Zhao speaks in favour of political reform and democracy, process during the protest. It reveals the power struggle which does not represent the Party’s position… 1 Zhao, Ziyang, Pu Bao, Renee Chiang, Adi Ignatius, and Roderick MacFarquhar. Prisoner of the state: the secret journal of Zhao Ziyang. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009. commentary Section B: Investigation to Common probems with Section B: • Too much narrative. • Poor referencing of sources. ensure section, ● The and type should that of that is your question investigation your be there will writing. carefully logic and argument you pose determine For planned ow example, is for how a to the very clear. the you organize question that Limited awareness of dierent positions or • invites comparisons (for example: whether a perspectives. lm portrays you to an event accurately) will require Listing of evidence instead of integrating anaysis • discuss both similarities and differences. and evidence. “To to Overuse of quotations. • what discuss “ways • Pagiarism. • Poor organization and arguments that are dicut ● As extent” both questions will perspectives of require “ways you no” and yes”. you gather thinking in evidence your notes, and document keep in mind your you may to foow. need to adjust or change your question. You Few connections to the question and purpose of the • should give some consideration to planning investigation. and writing Section ● Where appropriate, perspectives It is essential the purpose argument in the the of that of using sources, cost you all of be but or that question posed the of without in Section are this with leads writing Section A. very simply listing explaining how A. clear that to facts they are critical an eventual addresses Students they ● treatment Evidence reader their question. The following often relevant interpretations, multiple experiences when writing this investigation The synthesis of should may offer or an there may be Most of event. the be should summarize used evidence collected relates to the papers read in something and sparingly. and explain investigation. as must evidence make or should long be lists of explained, support of specically an explicitly Too many quotes or the how it student from sources. integrated argument, and your paraphrase as and convincingly add to your argument. relate should Any references to sources, or ideas that are not be own, should be referenced appropriately section. be evidence of writing using The different Historians Quotes your considered discuss topic. different Quotes researched, points the listed for referencing conclusion Section have of an ● ● before on construct awarded section. the focused you incomplete inaccurate in B and sources marks an integrated evidence-based error the No marks commentary keep investigation bibliography. your must you the bibliography, will to B Concusions are not evidence-based. • carefully and critical organized. endnotes completed others’ or footnotes. carefully, ideas as your you risk If this is not plagiarizing own. 243 IA ● You of should avoid narrative. sequence of events investigation. demonstrate chronology you are writing Retelling On a is the clear and a signicant historical not the other purpose hand, you understanding historical context of of a amounts narrative of require the numbers be the of archives could sources. should the limited community or yield Wherever varied and sources. that fewer, kind of but very rich possible specic, Interviews this your rather IA or might primary sources than few should and general. events analyzing. Submitting your bibliography ● Your conclusion must offer question read is essential. possible identied simply as a answers in The or Section summary of conclusion solutions A. It to should points, but The bibliography – list of sources should a well-reasoned, convincing, end of your to the There is no suggested required number number of of for your sources entirely investigation the It it process, last minute bibliography the very is mentioned should be here created with as not simply thrown part of together on you your you are history, for before is not submitting the worth any paper. marks of paper but it is investigation. should essential topic and doing. the Local example, component the that is often use or poorly completed. Any sources kind as evidence in Section B must be or included community ordered at appropriate referenced of paper. because overlooked depends inserted investigation. an The B writing This sources be rather at ● alphabetically evidence-based the closure – not Section as an the might in your bibliography. offer Internal Assessment skills Use the Section B assessment criteria to evaluate power gave people an optimistic belief in democracy, and an excerpt of this student’s investigation. Has the encouraged other progressives to act more openly. student eectively integrated evidence and critical However, contrary to the revolutionary attitudes later commentary? in the protest, the democratic sentiment under Zhao’s …Sentimentality played a key role in the events leading leadership was relatively constructive. Based on the up to the protest in 1989. Western democracy and Seven Demands parliamentary system were believed to be the panacea that, in the beginning of the Protest, protesters did not for China’s social problems. As Zhao Ziyang stated in his intend to be anti-governmental or anti-communist; they memoir: “in fact, it is the Western parliamentary democratic merely demanded that the Par ty take actions to end system that has demonstrated the most vitality. It seems corruption and grant citizens more political freedom. 3 drafted by the protesters, it was clear 4 1 that this system is currently the best one available.” As the leading gure behind the Par ty’s progressive The death of Hu Yaobang, the former General Secretary bloc, Zhao was generally in line with the protestors. of the Party who advocated strongly for democratic Internally, he attempted to persuade hardliner par ty reform, created a unied sense of democratic sentiments ocials, par ticularly Deng, into making concession with 2 that united both ideological and practical groups. 5 Hu’s the protestors. He also allowed the media, such as the successor, Zhao Ziyang, an even more progressive leader, People’s Daily and the China Central Television to bypass spoke publicly in favour of political reform. Zhao’s rise in censorship and broadcast the protest… 1 Zhao, Ziyang, Pu Bao, Renee Chiang, Adi Ignatius, and Roderick MacFarquhar. “Preface.” In Prisoner of the state: the secret journal of Zhao Ziyang. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009. xv. 2 Meaning the inteectuas and the working cass. 3 Liang, Zhang. “ The Tiananmen Papers.” The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/books/rst//iang-tiananmen.htm (accessed May 26, 2014). 4 Ziyang, op. cit. 5 Zhao, Dingxin. The power of Tiananmen state-society relations and the 1989 Beijing student movement. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001. 156. 244 W R I T I N G T H E I N T E R N A L ● Section C: Reection A S S E S S M E N T What is history? interpretive In Section C opportunity revealed to historians (approx. 400 to on reect you and investigating about the words) what the like the they your have used face ● worth the fewest marks own. (4), but difference between a good and an did You should understanding with a some this that number of which chapter. no of the to already study challenges have been Section opportunity doubt A reect is of history and this is the must What methods limited ● Is be focused topic and/or give you understanding, specically the kind of on the ● What it by history rather in than a nature investigation reection did your objective? investigation to nding historians time on ideology are to the far back reliable and use? place? How How were are they or world views? capture the entirety of an event? in the challenges time for causes? should of causation? the historian How search an Can immediate causes ever be but from long term causes? of How might national identity, cultural norms, you or beliefs affect one’s ability to reason nature and of of challenges by possible values undertook, and in ● your nature specic separated it and beset earlier to creative scientic an limitations, designed on to outstanding have discussed more make limited paper. it opposed section could they the Is H I S T O R Y evidence? when This it How present by ● is as I B the investigation methods challenges topics you F O R arrive at an understanding of history? general. ● How might mass culture, the entertainment Common probems with Section C: industry Limited understanding of the nature of history and • or historical other powerful forces inuence understanding? the chaenges facing historians. ● Limited understanding of the methods historians • Who decides important what to topics record and and issues are study? use to examine and study history. ● How does bias and editorial selection impact what Poory focused on the chaenges specic to the • is recorded and reported on, and what is not? student’s topic. ● Throughout History your teachers IB History should course, provide your TOK opportunities and to think about and discuss the challenges what ways determine historical truth and can often be How does or it, his or her determined purpose, largely by she How are the decides is scant to use. and Consider evidence, the methods sounding educated guesses historical record reasonable absolute to – also historians that often they ll judgments believe. certainty speculations where with But verify often their accounts are or of the inherent problems in prove – in is also example, or to the in history how revolution period historians cannot beyond ● the In what are decline with events? think are terms treated like now under investigation? make moral judgements? ways affect does our the idea of treatment progress of some and historical doubt What is the role of the historian? Can the correct. to its of history challenging because of how ever be objective? stem evidence-based Are it all perspectives of history equally valid? If nature. not, History of uses? essentially gaps they we challenges related historian very ● from event understanding the judgements For terrorism historian Many an where make ● that of history? he Should authoritative affect methods value compared there in who atrocity, or outcome recorded technology determined? writes the is understanding. ● History it of history, determining does how for ● you In is how do we determine which have greater used value? for so many different purposes including political ● slogans, identity, other dead in national entertainment, ways. past. the narratives, The History present. questions past to is advertising the historian living, Therefore, consider in personal and your is no group countless studies changing there and and is not might used to How might knowledge solve it complex be of your investigation problems in the be present? abused? visible shortage reection a How In would all of be far too ambitious for you to consider of these questions in Section C. It is essential section. however that you give considerable thought 245 IA to what you learned investigation. awareness and in the of You the words, there history of should facing specic topics like be a from demonstrate challenges limitations investigating about should clear own. of topic Before assessment, make other the ● Select nature of history as a way and your own sure to you your have planning teacher and for completed nal the and thoroughly research a question of investigation. interest. of ● thinking, research, connection personal between selection, submitting following: used In process writing. historians, methods your your clear For Complete all sections fully, according to the a criteria. greater understanding of the nature very useful. of history, ● the following books are Compare OCC E.E. Carr, 1961. What is History? Penguin Books. London, UK ● your IA to or in the Include all relevant examples Teacher posted Support sources in on the Materials. your bibliography. M. MacMian, 2008. The Uses and Abuses of History. ● Reference Viking. Toronto. all standardized sources citation using a consistent, format. J. l. Gaddis, 2004. The Landscape of History. New York , ● Edit ● Submit and proofread your work carefully. Oxford University Press. a draft for effective feedback from your teacher. Final touches: Wrapping up the IA ● The Internal Assessment is arguably the Include a candidate opportunity IB History students have to title page with your question, name, best number and total word count clearly maximize listed. their overall course mark. The nal assessed mark ● is entirely in your hands because you control Include a table of contents. the Internal Assessment skills th Discuss and evaluate the student example below using on June 4 the criteria for Section C: historians, can be biased and unreliable. Therefore, historians . These sources, although highly valuable to should exercise caution when evaluating these sources. Ever since Deng declared martial law on May 20th, 1989, the Tiananmen Square Protest had been a taboo topic in In order to counterbalance the aforementioned dilemma, Mainland China. There are no public records of the Protest, I purposely limited the number of sources originated and any discussion regarding the Protest is immediately from the protestors. I also took advantage of my Chinese censored. In the educational system, particularly, the prociency by looking through Chinese newspaper Protest was considered “non-existent”. The Party’s archives and talking with former protestors and former illegitimate historical revisionism illustrates the extent Par ty ocials during the protest. These methods of to which history can be manipulated to inuence public acquiring evidence should have helped me gain a more opinions. Therefore, historians have the morally imperative balanced understanding of the democratic sentiments role to present a balanced account of the Protest. during the protest. However, historians hoping to investigate the Protest face Apart from balancing dierent perspectives, historians who a dilemma: most primary sources are not made public by investigate this issue are under social and ethical pressures. the Chinese government, and most available sources are If they suggest that there were democratic sentiments from the protestors’ perspectives. Historians either have no within the Party and the Army executing the martial law, primary sources to work with, or have a disproportionate many former protesters (especially families of victims who number of pro-protest sources. This dilemma is a common were killed during the June 4 problem caused by illegitimate historical revisionism, historians of downplaying the Party’s crime. In addition, the which made it dicult for historians to remain objective. Western world almost unanimously agrees that the June Government records are not available. Media coverage during 4 the Protest is censored. Government and military ocers who antagonist. Historians who propose otherwise are under gave orders during the Protest are not permitted to publicize signicant ideological pressure. Therefore, historians should their narratives. On the other hand, a large number of sources prevent these pressures from inuencing the investigation. originate from political dissidents, protesters who sought Any conclusions should be re-examined by other historians asylum overseas, and families of protestors who were killed to ensure a higher degree of objectivity. th incident) would accuse the th 246 incident was a massacre and that the Party was the I N D E X Chiang Index Kai-shek China Abyssinia 102, events how of did 129, 130, invasion the USA Abyssinia? international of 192, 60, 193 Abyssinia respond to 137–8, the invasion to Italian invasion political 201–9, results results of the Abyssinian results of the international invasion did did of 101, Albania, 7 France April take why did Italy invade Anglo-German Anglo-Polish Treaty anti-Semitism appeasement in Agreement 97, in the invasion April 1935 1939? 133, 146–7 155, defence Britain’s global of economic of how dictators as justied of was World Neville an War? opinion Clement 129, policy 170, Austro-Hungarian 227 113–14 (China) 31, 37–8, 200 67, 69 Dawes 165 88–9, Duff 90 92 199–200 46–8, 129, 130, 143, 155, of of 145, of 156, 171 Balkans 100–1 Beer Hall bias 240 Putsch 193–5 Czechoslovakia 179–80 Kapp 175–6 Bismarck, 239, Otto Crisis 145–6, Gabriele 83, D’Annunzio 170, 174–5 of 91 36, 82, 83, appeasement Britain’s 129, the guarantee conscription declaration Germany 170, of did Britain Albania, outbreak reaction 7 of of the Fiume affair on to Poland 180–1 110, and 197–8 Conference 195, 155, 157–9, 192 the 170, 195, 201, 203 to 1939? 186–91, and the Italian invasion of on Rome, Italy 226 to Hitler’s actions did Fiume 227 aggression in 139, 145, response what Czechoslovakia to was 83, impact 1933–40 129, 130, 133, 137, invasion reaction in 60, Four of 1940? of Abyssinia Britain to 203–4 Church 82, 209–10 causation 85, 93, reaction Neville appeasement in Berchtesgarden, Godesberg, Munich 180, the 15 22–23 1930s 237 226, September 29 reaction 1938 1938 September the rise of Fascism of to in 1922 Fascist the 1930s 94–5, Italy 130–1 120 178–9, why did and Nazi Fascism grow in Italy after the 90–1 in Shantong 15, 161 119 Hitler to Nazism become a dictator? grow after the First 155–6 diplomatic Year alignments with Mussolini and alignments with Mussolini and 165 Plan 155, 166 challenges to the post-war settlements 157–69 Memorandum reaction to 155, 166–7 German aggression in 219–23 reaction Non-Aggression rearmament 168–9, and 129, 130, the Fiume affair on to German rearmament on Germany 170, Assistance 187 Treaty Germany 162, 214 Civil Ruhr Italian invasion of 1923 120, 156 changing to Hitler’s actions 227 German Italy Italian from the Chamberlain’s Steel, France 1933–40 invasion align its in 130, of Czechoslovakia in 145, 151, Abyssinia foreign appeasement 181 162–4, Anti-Comintern Pact 1935 155, 160–1 164–5 the Disarmament Conference 170 171–3 post-war settlement intervention German international May the policy to 1930’s? 152 1939 expansion international aggression 159, 155, in after 1937 Sudetenland crisis 177–9 186–91 and the January 1938 171–9 the and War 1938–40 Anschluss 204–5 209 Poland 213–15 Rhineland 157–9 challenging to with 161, the 155 156 1939? Axis plebiscite 155, of 215–17 withdrawal 181 Pact 155, 165 Spanish 132–3 145, respond Britain of possessions 160 155, timeline April war 113–15 111 diplomatic international Saar Mutual the success 111 international 101 France policy Party the 119–20 for 1933–38 Rome–Berlin Pact 7 to Nazi on 119–23 remilitarization war with response the 1923 226 121, allowed 1933–38 liquidation May relations on of Versailles 110, Czechoslovakia 219 177 177 1938 for 110, of of foreign 213–15 1933 1939–1940 227 196 September Conference, 229–31 194, on policy October 1933–38 of outbreak Hitler’s 111 War? Japan Four 111–13 France invasion 97 91 237 Chamberlain, change 87, 85, on 91–2 Hoare–Laval did foreign D’Annunzio 83, on 120 Crash Plan 155, Pact Germany 74 83, affair 21 Albania, Party Fiume 96–7 86–9 declaration how Catholic factors War? 110, Franco-Soviet Italian C Catholic the power? 14 90–1, of Power France Italian the Road Italy 151 expansion Burma War Fascism with and his 143 support 20, War 120 118, support Germany’s between World 82–3, Japan 220–3 relations did Germany 209 France consolidate economic March First Germany 156 Republic Hossbach World on 110–11 changing 91–2 Italy’s First defeat 111 1922 SS factors Young 200 D’Annunzio on why respond German 89–90, Germany 156 129, 123–5 Germany impact 187 111, 119 uprising Street what 222 of Pact 120, Reich Weimar Alfred 110, unemployment Wall relationship Germany and Putsch 170, German Treaty timeline Mussolini of Germany Depression Treaty Poland Putsch Third 92–3 181 194–7 204–5 Britain 1939–1940 reaction on April war 133, 223 war Pact 130, 1930s to 1933–38 Hoare–Laval how in impact 112 of 120–1 the of Spartacist and 152 of he 21 Rapallo 91–2 Fascism 244 von Great Kellogg–Briand 110 did when 121 World Munich seizes 20, 90–1 impact bibliographies Britain how 110 First the Nazism Japan intervention 1938 82–3, War the Austria Fascism plan 121 116–19 of invasion F 192 policy 1920s 120 World the changing Stanley 121 125–6 Chancellor Stresemann impact B Baldwin, foreign the of impact Edouard 130, after 121–2 Anthony Egypt in of World Eden, 165 situation 1933? impact why 60, clear 110, First policy E 105 a in recovery impact 236–8 131 authoritarianism have of impact Cooper, Europe 111–13 240 Disarmament 171–3,218–19 in 192 160 Plan alignments 110 appointed impact 69, 110 international hyperination (Comintern) 143 156–7 101 of Putsch power 155, SA impact Dalmatia 86, 222, Ruhr 195 83, 195, 237 Crisis Daladier, Empire 75, 132, 129 diplomatic Hitler Hitler 60, Gian 83, Plan took 237 d’Annunzio, 222 Dawes 20 D 196 Hall economic Chamberlain’s 194 160, Nationalist 100–1 83, 37, 1933 did 15, Union) Fascism 143, the and the 83 133, Anschluss of 227–31 Chamberlain alternative cause for 91, May a crisis Georges liquidation as Manchuria (Italy) 222–3 appeasement Manchuria (Soviet d’état Ciano, changing for Party continuity Galeazzo Beer 31 crisis Party 195–6 67 68–9 23–4, Communist 194–5 60, Manchuria Demands” Czechoslovakia 196 seen 67, China Communist Croatia 196 37–8, in Party coup priorities 31, Communist 83, Front 67 corroboration 194–7 United Germany Winston 1–2, 155 incident 31 Sudetenland nationalism autarky 165 130 pressures Second Austria 155, Second International 197–8 impact public 143, the Communist Corfu commitments the important of 129, Bridge 37–8 Lai Churchill, concepts 22 Polo 129, 86 changing the consequence 40–1, 1930s appeasement France 21, 195 Britain’s demands 19, En Marco 37 of Clemenceau, 147–9 181 29, 118, the 15, 170, Pact anti-appeasers Axis to 209 Albania? Albania Alliance Anti-Comintern Attlee, 1939? over Naval respond of Party Twenty-One 214 Anglo-Japanese Arab October Chou and Italy lack in Francesco G the warlords did end Abyssinia results Italian 181 Britain of Party invade how 181, the 135–6 83, how to the instability China 139 response 205–7 Mussolini 1935? Albania War Franco, 19 Nationalist 208 response 210–11 why following Manchuria of Jieshi 83–5 establishment 153–4 Jiang Futurism actions A see 14 Crisis 1938 Pact 203–4 outbreak war Britain’s reaction 197–8 of and the Pact of 180–1 Anschluss 218–19 179–80 175–6 183–6 186–91, Britain 1939–1940 Poland to Czechoslovakia Nazi–Soviet of into reaction of alignments 181–2 and 226 France to Hitler’s actions 227 247 IA Sudetenland crisis Sudetenland Germans timeline 174 170 Giolitti, Giovanni 82, Göring, Hermann 161, Grandi, Dino Great 132, Britain Great see of 85, 87, 91 the 146 German rearmament 130, 152, impact of China: Soviet on the Nazi Party of Nationalist 60, 83–4 US response Italian 31, to of reaction of Selassie hegemony of Abyssinia Konrad Himmler, Heinrich of historical Hitler, 201, 203, 204, 206 175 Japan 82, Anglo-Polish Anschluss 15, Inukai 23, 34, 53 Treaty 1938 Italy 110–11, 129, 130, 155–6, 170 218–19 intervention in Sudetenland crisis 193–5 1933 diplomatic with Mussolini 155, over actions the signicant evidence of is the 155, Hossbach Hitler’s foreign war policy as objectives? 167 impact of the policy impact First World War on Hitler’s foreign 116–19 of the Great Depression on the Nazi Party 121–2 impact of of the Munich Nazism Crisis outbreak race demands regarding 179–80 of the crisis from Rhineland 155, 162–4, the Conference 117, 137, Hossbach Memorandum is 125–6 170, the 117–18 118–19 and the power? issues 96–7 policy affair on factors War in identity weaknesses March Rome, of on the on with the with western of Soviet Socialist Party (PSI) 83, World 1933–40 82, rise of Fascism 192, 204–5 166–7 Hossbach foreign Memorandum policy for 84 as objectives? 120 Liberal Italy 1922 94–5, Union diplomatic 83, 85, 101–2 policy? grow in Italy after in Europe after alignments in Europe after issues 1935–39 in the and internal nal invasion assessment touches getting 232–3 started 235 Italian in foreign 137–8, respond 1939? and 243–4 investigation reection research sources 239–43 153–4 respond to to the invasion a topic your peer invasion Civil 238 international Anschluss 201–9, and appropriate bibliography questions concepts to 235–6 243 self-assessment tool formulate 234–5 World in the European of intervention results of the in Abyssinian good War War war the War response 218–19 of the Abyssinian results of the international what of to aggression 1935–40 192 the expansion who 1936–39 in 22–4 Pearl Harbor of Sphere 29, on 47 Japan’s 46 Association 29, 46 46, 47, 49–50, 34–6, 38, 41 52, 60 31, to events in Manchuria and of 1940 42, Bill the the 31–2, the 60, 29 Union outbreak the 63–5 1938 Soviet Japanese and 46 38 with of historians growing 29, war 46–7 49–54 53 inuence of the 39–42 in China 31 43–4 USA response of China response of the after to the of the to attack on Pearl Harbor War 29–30, 60 39, 41 40, embargoes Axis of 60, Pact on actions of after War 1937 and 83–5 Europe to 29, for Japan 44–6 42–3 74–5 46–8, Japan with 1932 Nations 67 Sino-Japanese Tosei-ha pressure events League 1932 timeline USA ’s response to USA ’s response to why in did after September Jiang up to 1941 60 74–5 regard to Japan 1930–41 Spanish for War Civil collective for Italy response 142 security Kapp 1940? Italian to events 1937–38 Japanese change 70–1, 71–2 actions its policy 1931–37 towards Putsch 16, 37–8, 44, 45, 47, 67, 110, 61, 71, 102, 15, 20, 111, 132 China: by 31, Japan 60, Nationalist Army 14, 23, 27 67–8 31, Party 34–6, 38, 41 Italian policy L in 68, 119 Pact 19 Kuomintang the 1930s? League of 70–1 Japan 72–4 34, Kai-shek) annexation the 209–10 foreign 31, Kellogg-Briand see Britain 1938? Jieshi Kwantung of USA K War 139 to the 152 152 205–7 reaction controlled to militarism 29, 34–5, instability USA ’s 129–30 was 1920s? 34–9 Nanking 149–52 crisis historians results timeline 236–8 the 39 up response 29, Pact crises of and control Rape Korea crisis crisis take Harbor (Chiang results Abyssinian 21 61–6 political US 210–11 Sudetenland actions of Japan 77–8 Spanish Second 14, Mobilization Tripartite 139–41 and thinking questions Mussolini’s 19–20, 40 National trade 147–9 the 31, Sino–Japanese 145–6 perspectives 245–6 submitting teacher, of 238–9 selecting using evaluation in Valley” Europe Party events 209 Albania? in incident security 134–41 France over the during for face leading Mukden 208–9 in War Assistance Army military policy collective 130–4 Abyssinia the role 1938 investigation of and Italy’s identication plan Italy 246 of 18–19, 46 22 34–6 Nation’s perspectives 141–5 15 21 75–6 1930s April USA 21–2 30–4 Minseito 131–2 Abyssinia policy the of Neutrality after policy did USA Co-Prosperity war 29, militarists the Europe foreign Abyssinia? 1920s? 15–17, 15, Indo-China Manchuria foreign in of the 1931–36 alignments foreign how of League 86–7 Mussolini’s participation take War? 32–4 Asia policy Kwantung powers results Italy World 192 nationalism Kodo-ha 85 on crisis East 120 134 did First 14–15 Dark concerns of reaction inuences how the Japan 56, “the of 149–50 7 the 39–42, expansion into invasion 143 Albania, to World did 30, 85–6 102–3 alignments diplomatic intervention imperialism of in Law 1853–1926 political domestic of the militarism First Rule 90–1 diplomatic Britain 23 16 1931–41 Pearl economic did the Imperial 129 invasion 150 19 34–6, problems impact Fascism War? domestic how of foreign 132–4 of 31–2, economic 86–7 protest Italian Japan and impact European inuenced support 1939? October 18–19 from immigration economic 143–5 171 155, Hitler’s 110, did in in 19–20 Preservation causes foreign was nationalism what 85 October relations Entente 1920s War benet China 86 expansion relations factors Abyssinia 146–7 150–2 23 Manchuria, timeline the 88–9 Association long-term on the 1900 Shogunate Fiume 1939? 1940? 49–54 causes of after results foreign in Japan peaceful Peace his April 40 crisis policy did Japanese 105 economic World national of events I 248 198 105 83, in June non-belligerent invade Sino–Japanese descent long-term end 167 hyperination Nations in 20 Japan lack 1939 125–6 162, Conference of 215–17 98–100 1935–39 allies Buch Hossbach signicant 120, (Lebensraum) 22, Greater 1936 Disarmament 149 foreign 91–2 First changing 117 and Zweites evidence of Mussolini’s economic of changing 123–5 space enemies Pact of 14, how consolidate domestic changing 174–5 Kampf living Hoare-Laval actions 100–4 working-class 164–5 Deutschland Adolf 83, was Nationalist Italy 82, democracy First 100–1 Veneto D’Annunzio of 1933 War Mein of First 226 remain Mussolini economic 41 Balkans Italian what Italy did Japan 210–11 92–3 why 157–9 and how Hitler’s 161 dictatorship natural Hitler, 186–7, 155, Civil Adolf Gross success 215–17 withdrawal Hitler, the League 40, Mussolini Fascism 175–6 war Sudetenland 155, on did why war J 199 97–8 1938 of 168–9, to to Czechoslovakia remilitarization steps did Triple reaction of rearmament Spanish 1923 international Hitler’s Rhineland Albania the 1935? 223–5 to why 23–5, the successful 223 liquidation May of 120–1 international Poland Putsch the how impact Memorandum France join Japan 29, how 187 Union invade Italy 199–200 powers 201–9, Italy did international 217–18 Caporetto impact of 166–7 the did why how the Vittorio and on the powers 243–4 1920s? 187–9 declaration of in policies Europe after of of 166 Memorandum and of impact Plan takes Hossbach how alignments on 227 Battle after 160 Year Hitler’s Europe policy Soviet Battle impact diplomatic Austria Hitler in 156–7 changing Four alignments policy 227–31 why 82–3 ambitions 181 171–3, 223 Abyssinia War Tsuyoshi 37, War 192–3 investigation 239–41 97, Chamberlain’s changing Civil weaknesses 120 evidence Adolf Spanish timeline Heinlein, Hirohito 137, 131 132 226 Britain remilitarization Haile 209–10 219–23 World expansionist of with Italy Poland expansionist the 1939–1940 H Second foreign invasion Mussolini’s 213–15 foreign the to of Czechoslovakia regarding Poland negotiations Party in on demands impact Depression 181 (GMD) debate Hitler’s response 111 Great appeasement aggression invasion Guomindang see the historical 166 121–2 Greece of German Britain Depression impact end 174–5 Nations 36, 37, 60, 61, 192–3 69, 73 I N D E X Germany 110, international Italy 130, 155 137, organization of response 139, and to aggression aims of the to events in to Italian invasion response to Japan’s response to the Libya Italy 102, Lithuania Little Lytton Nazism Night of the of of Nations 61–6, after 1932 SA 203–4 67 to why did support Nuremberg 180 War? 83, 101–2, 132, 133, 165 60 19, crisis viewpoints Steel 1 1939 31, 32–3 League of Nation’s Nations response failure to take action Pearl to events in Manchuria 37, for Japan’s for Manchuria results for the Japanese 31, 37, Bridge, actions incident 60, Filippo Monroe 15, Mukden why did 224, of 1933 180 60 of not Nations take 63–4 stronger action against 130, 145–6, 178–9, 84, 85, 143, 129, 160, 130, 165, 132, 181 in alignments with a totalitarian of after Hitler and what was state? his Mussolini’s 96–7 Italy power? foreign 96 policy in the on the foreign policies during to Italian Sudetenland Russia invasion crisis in September Rome, October actions Party in (PSI) the 82, inuenced Italy join why did Italy remain why did Mussolini 1922 war 94–5, up to 120 1941 152 (Nanking), nationalism 15, Nazi–Soviet Pact Italy Mussolini’s foreign policy? the war in June 1940? non-belligerent invade Abyssinia in in 150–2 1939? 150 China 43–4 1939 views of 170, the 183–5 of Poland 159, 226 181 of Portsmouth Treaty of Tientsin Treaty of Versailles 161 Italy Nazi–Soviet Pact aggression 212, 231 UK Depression on the Nazi Party 121–2 Munich Putsch of 1923 on the see 168–9, 149, 143, 192, reaction success 155, 15, did 165 199, 165, 208 15, of 29, 37, 38 Shidehara Kijuro source help Germany to expansionist Acts the 72, to 192, USA on actions to Japan with response to response to 21, the see USA 1938? Panay 187–9 Victor as a cause of the 60, of powers the USA 193, the 199 21 199 attack on Pearl Harbor 74–5 regard to Japan 1930–41 54–5, events 1937–38 Japanese change its 71–2 actions policy 1931–37 towards 70–1 Japan 72–4 72 Soviet Union Emmanuel Vietnam to Wall of Italy the attack on Pearl Harbor Street Crash 86, 95, 97, 134, 149, 165 Conference Washington Treaty Weimar Republic II of 15 14 1921 System 15, 21–2, 21 23, 36, 214 119–20 Germany Woodrow Wilson’s internationalism 111 Washington 22 110, 111, 112 113 points 113 23 Y Young 14, III 29 W 226 Wilson, 16–17, 18–19, 24 Plan Yugoslavia 111 83, 101, 152, 156 43–4 War of 105, 105 and invasion international 171–2 237 Unity the on 227–31 Shidehara’s Darwinism to policy immigration of did Wilhelm Social foreign USA ’s USSR 75–6 Social 156–7 respond 208–9 USA ’s why 54 Shanghai Nanking USA US pressure USA ’s 19 appeasement 186–91, USA of 86–7 V War? the War 157–69 75–6 149–52 of Rape 83, 1933–38 Neutrality 160–1 Europe was Expedition 156, 21 the 161 187 to 113–15, 130 Japanese 69 Japan war 110, 215–17 155, 1904–05 160, war 214 77–8 War, World 90, 15 14 90–1 Abyssinia? US D. 16 86, Britain 36, 156 Sino–Japanese Great 83, Entente 81 130, over for phoney 193–5 174–5 U to von 14, 83, Treaty reaction War Sino-Japanese 110–11 the invasion Germany London 152 important Siberian 185–6 of the of response Kurt outcome 214–15 174 96–7 Treaty Germany 162–4, 1935 of 170, 143 Kanagawa impact 1933–40 70–1 192, 120 of Union takes signicance 149, 118, Treaty 181 outbreak October 105 contrasting impact to with 121, 59, Franklin Second 86–7 135–6 the regarding 154 Axis opposition of demands USS how N impact Pact Joachim World 60, 155, 121 intervention Reich 14 Second 217–18 Doctrine 133–4, 111, Germans International 240 plebiscite 165 141–5 224 145–6, Third after Saar 141 119 129, Third of 201–9, 200, Chamberlain’s 245–6 Soviet Hitler did Nazism Hitler’s S response 156, Crisis how 120, 199–200 183–5 223–5 Europe Committee Non-Recognition totalitarianism to response Erwin in 1936–39 110, Sudetenland 28 110, see issues uprising Conference Triple 1931–41 156, 214 130 129, position 162, international powers 170, Union 102–3, the 164–5 Gustav USA Russo-Japanese 97–8 two 155 1922 155, 149, Treaty on expansionist 1936–39 Stresemann, December 53 reaction 1933–40 Roosevelt, Ruhr 82 why Nanjing 7 109 Rommel, 209–10 145–6 1935? on 128 Schuschnigg, factors Harbor policy T 191 Romania 210–11 Socialist Harbor 152 1938–40 Rhineland 98–100 Mussolini’s Pearl secondary 24 Germany revisionism Europe Mussolini’s consolidate domestic on on Assistance Soviet Hitler’s Josef with 165 1939 Italy War Germany Stimson Stresa attack Pearl 169 reection 100–4 d’Italia international March 3–4 223 Rome–Berlin create successful role 16, the with intervention Japan Ribbentrop, Mussolini 1938 1? associated foreign Pact with on Spartacist 69 the 1933–38 italy 172 alignments appeasement how Italy’s Paper 60, to reaction international 200, 160 did Italy 133, diplomatic of 29, Germany Japan 82–3, to Sudetenland 14, 150, Treaty italy 1938 Soviet Germany Japan how impact 4–12 references League 129, 1920s? questions R 42, of 46–7, Mutual Non-Intervention on attack Non-Aggression 132–4 Popolo Nazi Stalin, 1931–1941 130, Rapallo diplomatic the the 237 international 120–1 Mussolini of in 49–52 1933–40 Poland 64–5 Austria time 11 USA Japan Poland 34–5, Benito changing the my source Hawaii international League Putsch changing Il 53 Bridge 38 the the Anschluss end 44, Polo 229–31 Mussolini, did 42–3, Marco 103 170, 29, Civil Italy’s 12–13 expect Matthew Japan 96, Conference Munich did Italy 45 29, 13 distribute 10, of Germany Japan? Munich 38–9 102 response I you perspectives 105 incident Union Spanish 175–6 Doctrine Morocco Perry, 86 Lithuania militarism 36–7 37 67–9 Giacomo 1938 relations China government Beijing Matteotti, Crisis and following Marinetti, Memel, can 1941? international 181–2 75–6 45 results 170, 242–3 241–2 5–8 Nazi–Soviet 149–50, 78–80 limitations Franco-Soviet 130, approach Harbor, why 29, results May to what 61–6 Polo Soviet 240 analysis markbands 34–5 “Manchukuo” and sources impact should reaction China’s First 2–3 how 66 Marco the relations of Paper 156 Zedong after 167 examination? Manchuria Mao grow P Pact Manchuria of values Nazism sources sources negotiations how League selecting 123–5 for 57–8, 239–41 analysing 124 114 83 of 124 1931–41 response orthodox 113, M impact 120, 120, 25–8 Japan 119–23 Trials document Line Nazi O 156 David Commission Maginot and impact 195 Macedonia Italy 105–9 Japan sources dictatorship World 85 124 143 (Schutzstaffel) steps 120, Fascist (Sturmabteilung) SS 63–5 Italy Knives between Germany 192 Abyssinia incident 62–3 120–1 Long 152 Treaties David 198 85 101, George, Locarno Low, 170, Entente Lloyd policies 1870–1923 129, League Manchuria Mukden democracy 1930s relationship response Liberal the 143 response liberal in hints 1937 117–18 29, 42–6 Z Zhang Zhou Zog Zuolin Enlai of 31, 34, 67 67 Albania 101, 147–9 127–8 249 Laura Fermi: copyright reserved, Klaus © Mussolini 1961 reprinted Fischer: Fischer Group by 1995, and (University The by Nazi permission Germany: reprinted by Continuum Publishing of University A Chicago of of New all University History, permission Publishing Press, Chicago, of US, © Brown imprint of B. 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Prange: Prange At 1981, Literary Dawn We Slept reprinted Agency. by (Penguin Books), permission of the copyright David materials work. contained in any third party website referenced in THE MO V E G LO B A L TO WA R Equipping learners to critically explore historical concepts, the student-centred Authors approach of this text enables big picture understanding and strengthens results. Keely Rogers Providing comprehensive coverage of the syllabus for first examination 2017, a Jo Thomas dedicated chapter on the new IA is included. Adam Woelders O xford course books are the only DP resources developed with the IB. Internal Assessment chapter This means that they are: ➜ The most comprehensive and accurate match to IB specifications ➜ Written by exper t and experienced examiners and teachers ➜ Packed with accurate assessment suppor t, directly from the IB ➜ Truly aligned with the IB philosophy, challenging learners with fresh and topical TOK Who’s on the cover? 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